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This thesis compares the motives, experiences and practices of Germans in the Papal, 
Bourbon and Garibaldian armed groups.  
It shows how solidarity was, on all political sides, increasingly conceptualized as an act by 
and between nations and argues that political mobilization did not necessarily directly inform 
the single enlistment. Recruitment activities not only combined mercenary traditions with new 
forms of communication and association, but they also overlapped, leading many to change 
between armed groups.  
The study provides the first in-depth statistical analysis of these Germans based on soldiers’ 
registers, contextualizing it with transnational soldiering across Europe; not only did Germans 
stay in the regular armies for quite long periods, but previous and later enlistments in other 
armies were common – this also holds true for the “German” Garibaldians.  
Examining hitherto neglected economic incentives, the study demonstrates the plurality of 
political, cultural, economic and professional motives of single soldiers, thus blurring the 
lines of the opposition between the militarily inexperienced political war volunteer and the 
mercenary that is so central to the polemics of the time and “new Risorgimento 
historiography”.  
Based on legal sources and soldiers’ reports, the study analyses the every-day life of Germans 
in the Italian armed groups in terms of a culturally revived “new military history”, and is 
particularly attentive to issues of masculinity. The different institutional contexts the Germans 
were placed in – e.g. foreigners’ corps, ministries – informed differing experiences. In 
contrast to the multi-national make-up of many corps, imagery of national grouping 
progressively superseded formal military structures, resulting in continuous comparisons of 
corps and nationalities and increases in “nationalizing” experiences. This goes counter to the 
image of foreign commitment in Italy as a cosmopolitan experience and an a priori positive 
understanding of the “transnational”. Hence, the role of foreign soldiers was crucial for the 
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1.1 German soldiers in Italy – between conceptual extremes  
Is this a history of volunteers or mercenaries? Of international military careers or specific 
commitment to Italy? Of Bavarians, Württembergers and Liechtensteiners or of Germans? Of 
a cosmopolitan community or national groupings? Of revolutionary groups or armies? Of 
German-Italian attraction or repulsion? Of national or international personality cults? Of an 
add-on to “national” history or of something distinct and historically relevant? Of European 
similarities or Italian specificity? A military history from above or one from below?  
Are these stories of a tourist or of a military life? Of clashes or friendship? Of foreign or 
German soldiers? Of pay or sacrifice? Of brotherhood or (blood-)brotherhood of arms? Of 
officers or soldiers? Of military figures or democrats or democrats as soldiers? Of solidarity 
between humans or the solidarity of nations? 
Is this about war experiences or military experiences? A comparison of the political sides or 
of the connections between the sides? Is this a brotherhood of Catholic peoples or do we have 
before us a Catholic universality? Is this mobilization or recruitment? International 
experience or national experience? Spontaneous movement or organized endeavour? Is this 
about the bans on foreign recruitment or freedom to enter foreign military service? Previous 
military experiences or first-time-soldiers? “Germans” imagined as barbarians or 
disciplined soldiers? Short-term volunteers or long-term professionals? Is this a question of 
national military histories or transnational military history? Linguistic practices or physical 
presence? National discourse(s) or a national movement? The Italian example or German 
images of superiority? European Civil War or national performative wars? Clashes or 
transfers? Is this a history between armies or a history in armies? 
 
As the cascade of oppositions (many of these, of course, only seem like oppositions) at the 
beginning of this page tries to synthesize, the history of foreign soldiers – and among them 
Germans in the Italian armed groups of the Risorgimento between 1830 and 1870 – seems to 
be caught between a series of extremes. If nothing more, controversy is motivating
1
 and 
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 See the emphasis on dialogue and dialectics in Antonio Gramsci, Letters from prison, edited by Frank 
Rosengarten, 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 369. 
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extremes can be an indication that we are dealing with as yet much uncharted terrain. The list 
above symbolizes some of the main questions that will be addressed in this study. This thesis 
explores if and to what degree they were really oppositions, whether and to what extent they 
complemented each other. 
In the formative period of the Italian Risorgimento
2
, between the 1830s and 1870, 
many non-Italians, among which citizens of German states, joined the various Italian armed 
groups across the political spectrum. Subjects of different European countries (and sometimes 
beyond) were amongst those that participated in Mazzini’s attempt at an “invasion of Savoy” 
in 1834, became soldiers of the Sicilian State or the Roman Republic in 1848-49, or joined the 
various Garibaldian undertakings between 1849 and 1867. Throughout this period, foreigners 
and again Germans, also enlisted on the opposite political side, joining for instance the 
Armies of the Papal States or the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, or the pro-Bourbon 
attempts to launch a counter-revolution in the 1860s.  
But the question remains: which story should be told about the foreign or German 
soldiers that joined the armed groups of the Risorgimento? Is it a story of romanticism, of 
adventure and the desire to see the world? Or was theirs’ really a story about the 
Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento as international movements? Perhaps it would be better 
to write about the European ideological families, the internationals of nationalisms, Catholics 
and legitimists. Better yet, rather than focusing on the foreign-Italian cases, the attention 
could be directed toward the life-course of soldiers that served in multiple armies in Europe 
and beyond, even changing political sides to do so, and in so doing accumulating both 
enlistment premiums as well as threats of punishment for desertion. Yet another option would 
be to narrate the biographies of foreign officers in terms of their international military careers, 
and their participation – particularly when in the higher ranks – in a world of European 
military notables. 
It would be possible to tell a history of international bonds and connections that go 
beyond those of the nation, a history of crossing borders – hence, from today’s perspective at 
least, a more or less “positive” story. Conversely, this could be a story of transnational clashes 
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and experiences that further delimited and reinforced (national) borders – hence a negative 
story to our contemporary political sensibilities. Putting aside for a moment the decisive 
question as to which of the two more adequately reflects historical reality, are not both 
versions in the end very close in their ultimate “aims”? And is it even possible to tell the one 
story without the other?  
If one looks closely, the last question especially is equally valid for many of the 
possible directions and histories outlined at the beginning. At this point it would be good to 
bring a bit of order to these extremes and different stories.  
With the history of the Risorgimento, my studies on German and Italian nationalism, 
and in particular on the national myths surrounding the two as my point of departure, an 
analysis of the presence of foreigners and especially “Germans” in the Italian armed groups of 
the Risorgimento seemed on the surface to approach the dimensions of a paradox, given the 
mobilizing force of national discourse in general, and the Italian nationalists’ image of the 
Austrians as “tedeschi” in particular. 
With regard to the Italian soldiers, at least those on the pre-Unitarian side and more 
specifically those that fought with Garibaldi, the recent Risorgimento historiography seems to 
provide a more or less clear explanation that adheres to the general history of nationalisms: 
The “nationalization of religious references”
3
, such as self-sacrifice
4
, the metaphor of the 
family
5
 or the logic of honour
6
, promulgated an individual’s preparedness to die for their 




As will be shown more in depth in chapter 2, the existence of Italian volunteers 
seemed to be a direct result of Italian national discourse(s), and their impressive numbers 
seemed to be one of the clearest proofs of the high penetration and assimilation of national 
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discourse – i.e., the “mass movement” against nationalism as a project of the elites only – 
and/or of the (typically democratic? typically Italian?
8
) idea of war volunteering in pre-
Unitarian Italy. Unfortunately, however, these Italian volunteers, though they are considered a 
type of proof, are not directly addressed in studies on Italian nationalism; they continue to be 
excluded from the research sets, even as they are in fact more or less central to the respective 
argumentation.  
Traditionally, the nineteenth century has often been presented as a period of the 
decisive nationalization of European armies: in contrast with former times, the armies of the 
nineteenth century now seemed to be built principally or even only by national subjects, and 
furthermore by subjects that – independently from obligatory conscription, where it existed – 
seemed increasingly willing to serve the nation in this way. That foreigners continued to be 
present and serve as soldiers in many armies during this century has, until very recently, been 
overlooked by much of the historiography.
9
 Based on the nationalization-paradigm for the 
armies of this period, it was, to all effects, assumed that the numbers of foreigners were not 
significant nor were their stories relevant. 
It is only in recent years that the “multinational” composition of “national” armies or 
the interplay between different national corps in various war campaigns of the nineteenth 
century – from the Russian campaign of Napoleon
10
 to the Crimean War
11
 and the American 
Wars
12
 – have caught the attention of historians once more. Many of these works adopt a 
narrative tone, which is one of the explanations for their published “success”. However, it 
seems that from an analytical perspective much remains to be done on the issue of foreign 
soldiering in the nineteenth century. 
At first it might seem that it would be quite difficult for national discourse to function 
as an explanation as to why foreign soldiers would enlist in an army that was not their 
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national army. The same seems to be true for the Italian and foreign soldiers that joined the 
politically opposed, legitimist armies and armed groups, among which the Papal and Bourbon 
Armies as well as the pro-Bourbon “political brigandage” of the 1860s.  
This leads us back to the drawing board where we must face once again the black box 
of "motives", insofar as many of those elaborated in nationalism studies do not seem to 
pertain or apply to this scenario. In so doing, a variety of possible motives for joining an army 
resurface. The extremes are perhaps made most visible by the articles of two authors working 
in the research group directed by Gilles Pécout on international war volunteering in the 
nineteenth century
13
: Pécout himself wrote one, and Matteo Sanfilippo the other. According to 
Pécout, the role of political and romantic driving forces and “collective sentiment in the 
international public sphere”, therefore ideas of transnational solidarity and friendship, is of 
paramount importance in the history of foreign soldiers both in and from Italy; having taken 
this perspective, Pécout considers these soldiers to be “volunteers”.
14
 Sanfilippo, instead, 
asserts that this image in itself is informed by romanticism. Therefore, according to him for 
more than one foreign soldier – whether it be a Garibaldian or pro-papal fighter – it would be 
more appropriate to “ask how much he has in common with the pre-modern mercenary or as 
well with subsequent developments, from the Foreign Legion (founded in 1831) to today’s 
private corps that add to the governmental armies.”
15
  
It clearly makes a patent difference whether we are speaking of volunteers, 
mercenaries or professional soldiers. This is so because this decision to assign one of these 
concepts to the subject studied, whether or not one is aware of it, leads to taking a stance on: 
the hierarchy of values that inform the history of the nineteenth century; the hierarchy of 
factors between social, political and cultural history; the reach of national discourse in the 
case of the Italian soldiers; the reach of internationalism with regard to the foreigners; and the 
power of European democrats and liberals and that of the legitimists in mobilizing society in 
Italy and Europe. 
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The issue of motives is, hence, without doubt one of the central questions that must be 
addressed in a history of both Italians and foreigners that enlisted on the various Italian sides 
of the Risorgimento.
16
 The underlying reasons for its importance – in the current 
historiographical context – will be discussed in further detail in the coming chapters.  
Some of the possible explanations for the mobilization of foreigners that have actually 
been advanced concern elements that could function at least as well, if not primarily, at the 
international level: these range from the international personality cults of Garibaldi
17
 or the 
Pope
18
 to the idea that there was perhaps a European Civil War
19
 or European Culture Wars
20
 
between revolutionary democrats/liberals and the European counter-revolution of legitimists 
and (at least a segment of) Catholics; similarly, the economic incentives to enlist in foreign 
service as well as promises of building military careers across European borders can, as will 
be discussed in the thesis, still function in the nineteenth century at the international level.  
But the history of soldiers, of war volunteers, professional soldiers or mercenaries 
does not exhaust itself in the question as to “why” they joined the armies, or in the question as 
to “how” they were mobilized. Whether they enlisted for economic reasons or as a means to 
continue or begin a military career, whether they had been reached by political and cultural 
mobilization or less so, the initial motives can inform, but do not determine, the experiences 
that the soldiers would have in the armed groups; furthermore, the history of armed groups 
does not exhaust itself in the question as to how their members were recruited. Nor can the 
same be said with the regard to their application of violence, even if this remains an important 
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aspect of the functions of the army. From a historical point of view, armed groups are much 
more than a mere instrument for the continuation of politics with other means (to cite for the 
umpteenth time Carl von Clausewitz), and the time an individual passes in the army can 
transform and change him more than the act of teaching him or her to fight and kill. And once 
the question of motives has been examined and somewhat resolved, our attentions may turn 
toward the sphere of soldierly experiences.  
1.2 A comparative history of the Germans on the different Italian sides 
The object of this study are the German soldiers
21
 that between 1834 and 1870 were part of 
different armed groups in Italy: From the “invasion of Savoy” in 1834 to the armies of the 
Roman Republic in 1849 and the various Garibaldian armed groups between 1849 and 1867, 
and also the Bourbon Army up to 1860, the pro-Bourbon “political brigandage” of the 1860s 
and the Papal Army up to 1870. For the purposes of this study, Germans are those individuals 




The main time frame
23
 of the study (1834-1870) connects the episode in which the 
"brotherhood of peoples" concept was put into practice at the military level when the 
Mazzinian Young Europe was called to action in 1834 with the last (merely symbolic) 
military defence of the Papal States in September 1870. The latter – together with the 
dismantlement of the army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1860 – marked the end of 
foreigners’ regiments in nineteenth-century Italy that had noticeable German presences. The 
year 1870 also constitutes a decisive break – from the German point of view – in the history 




The case in which Germans served as soldiers in Italian armies seems to be 
particularly intriguing in various regards. Immediately, the negative mutual stereotypes of the 
“tedeschi” in Italy and the “Romanen” in Germany come to mind. Concurrently, certain 
communalities and parallels specifically between Germany and Italy were already being noted 
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at the time; at times the one or the other were considered the example that could and should 
be followed respectively by the one or the other.
25
  
This German-Italian study necessarily sheds light on other levels of analysis as well, 
among which the military history of the pre-Unitarian Italian armed groups and the history of 
foreigners enlisted in these groups
26
, the reason being is that the specificity of the German-
Italian case can only be evaluated by integrating these levels through additional comparisons. 
The participation of Germans and other foreigners
27
 on the various Italian sides during the 
Risorgimento wars is, in turn, but one example of the wider phenomenon of participation in 
foreign wars during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By concentrating on one national-
Italian case, it was possible to delimit the parameters of the study to a specific group of 
soldiers, and in so doing allowed me to gather and study quantitative data in far more depth 
than would have otherwise been possible. 
Despite brief mentions in the literature of single German figures fighting on the 
different sides in Italy
28
, the history of these German soldiers has never before been written; 
therefore, their exact numbers have yet to be determined, and their placements in the military 
corps and their experiences have still to be analysed.  
This study brings together different strands of historiographical inquiry. The history of 
the German soldiers in the Italian armies will be examined within the context of the history of 
foreign soldiering of previous and subsequent centuries. A social history of the German 
soldiers on the different Italian sides in terms of economic rewards, officer-soldier 
relationships, professionalization, and differences as well as developments in training will be 
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connected to the substantial historiographical fields of the new history of the Risorgimento
29
, 
the historiography on nineteenth-century nationalisms
30
, and the history of international and 
transnational connections in the same period.
31
 The comparative integration into this study of 
the Germans enlisted in the Papal and Bourbon Armies also mirrors a rising interest in the 
history of the “victims”, i.e. the supposed “opponents” of the Risorgimento, that has been 
fuelled by the anti-Risorgimento polemics in the Italian public today as well as the tendency 
to overlook these portions of nineteenth-century society in much of the traditional 
Risorgimento historiography.
32
 Finally, by concentrating on the motives and experiences of 
German members of Italian armed groups
33
, this study, more than other studies, places itself 
within the context of a culturally revived “new military history” that since the 1980s has 
begun to flourish
34
 by analysing the ways in which the soldier experiences his life in the 
military, his day-to-day life, and how his experiences were informed by general social and 
cultural structures and by the specificities of the military life-world, and therein pays careful 
attention to the issue of gender and conceptions of “masculinities”.
35
 Differently from other 
publications on comparable cases this study also aims not only to provide – as difficult as it 
was at times to gather this data – quantitative information on the foreign (and among them 
German) soldiers, but to make a comparison of these numbers with those available for other 
countries and armies between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as make an in-
depth analysis of issues such as pay, housing or the question of military careers and 
advancement with regard to the whole Italian political spectrum. The comparison of the 
soldier groups on the various sides (pre-Unitarian armies, “Party of Action”) should help to 
                                                 
29
 See from the substantial literature only Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall, eds., The Risorgimento Revisited. 
Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012); see the discussion on p. 82. 
30
 The literature is so comprehensive that it cannot be presented here; see as more recent overviews for instance 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Nationalismus. Geschichte - Formen - Folgen (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001); Rolf-Ulrich 
Kunze, Nation und Nationalismus (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005); Siegfried Weichlein, 
Nationalbewegungen und Nationalismus in Europa (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006). 
31
 For a transnational history of the Risorgimento, see the recent special number of the journal Modern Italy, 
edited and introduced by Oliver Janz and Lucy Riall, "Special issue.The Italian Risorgimento. Transnational 
Perspectives. Introduction," Modern Italy 19, no. 1 (2014): pp. 1-4. 
32
 For an overview, see John A. Davis, "L'Antirisorgimento," in Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, eds., Fare 
l'Italia. Unità e disunità nel Risorgimento, Gli italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai 
nostri giorni, vol. 1 (Turin: UTET, 2008), pp. 753-69. 
33
 For reasons that will be discussed later, I have consciously chosen to write a military and not a war history of 
the German soldiers in Italy; see the discussion of both p. 80. 
34
 See p. 80. 
35
 See for instance Robert W. Connell, Masculinities, 2 ed., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Christopher E. 
Forth, Masculinity in the modern West. Gender, civilization and the body (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Wolfgang Schmale, Geschichte der Männlichkeit in Europa, 1450-2000 (Vienna; 
Cologne; Weimar: Böhlau, 2003); Jürgen Martschukat and Olaf Stieglitz, Geschichte der Männlichkeiten 
(Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 2008). 
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reveal whether similar elements were in operation or whether the divergent ideological 
components of the sides were linked to differing motives for enlistment and/or, significantly, 
other German-Italian or military experiences.
36
 
1.3 Parts and chapters, sources and methods 
The study is divided into three parts and nine chapters. The first part is comprised of the 
second chapter, which develops the guiding questions of this study and the research contexts 
within which it is placed. Chapter 2 discusses the choices that had to be made over the course 
of the research and the principal definitions from which the study set out to investigate the 
history of German soldiers. It then places the Italian case(s) in a more comparative European 
context. Lastly, the chapter will present in a more substantiated manner the main corpuses of 
historical sources used in the various chapters of this study and the ways in which they have 
been analysed. 
The second part of the study comprises chapters 3 to 6, which examine the “why” and 
the “how” of the enlistment of German soldiers; it does so by discussing the different aspects 
of the German soldiers’ mobilization, recruitment and motives for joining an Italian armed 
group.  
Specifically, chapter 3 enquires into the actual efficacy and reach of political and 
cultural mobilization between traditional and modern forms of legitimization and political 
communication across the political spectrum. It discusses the ideas surrounding the creation 
of “German Legions” for Italy as well as the contemporary concepts of transnational 
solidarity as they were used by democrats and Catholics alike. The chapter makes use of 
published and unpublished sources dealing with German democrats, Catholics and legitimists. 
Namely, the protocols of the assemblies of the German Catholic associations between the 
middle of the century and 1870 are analysed in order to understand the ways in which the 
issue of papal defence and the Papal Army was treated at the time by these groups; other 
Catholic publications, such as translations of novels, pamphlets and public speeches are 
equally taken into account here. These sources also contained information on how the 
mobilization and recruitment of Germans for the papal cause were more concretely organized 
in terms of specifically dedicated associations and subscription campaigns intended to 
augment the enlistments into the Papal Army. In some instances, the material preserved in the 
                                                 
36
 “[…A] comparative approach helps render the invisible visible; it aids us in questioning our own 
generalizations”, writes Green in Nancy Green, "Forms of Comparison," in Deborah Cohen and Maura 




regional archives in Germany was such that it was possible to study more in depth several of 
these associations and their work to recruit for the Papal Army.
37
 With regard to the opposite 
political side, recruitment activities are researched by using unpublished material contained in 





 By looking at these sources, it is possible to see the specific ways in 
which, in the papal case, cultural and political mobilization, official recruitment structures, 
private associations and economic reasons to enlist were in fact intertwined, but hindered as 
well by the legal obstacles put in place against the recruitment efforts for foreign military 
service. Similarly, the activities of the German democratic sphere will be discussed by having 
a look at the letters exchanged between Becker and Rüstow with Giuseppe Mazzini, Giuseppe 
Garibaldi and others. 
Chapter 3 not only follows the “brotherhood of peoples” up to the peace-movement of 
the later nineteenth century, it also shows how this concept began to spread beyond the 
democratic sphere in which it had for the most part been created and used; publications of 
German Catholicism were very useful to this end. The chapter then examines how in the 
military context the concept of the “brotherhood of peoples” was connected to ideas of a 
“brotherhood of arms”, “blood-brotherhood”, small-group cohesion and “comradeship”; the 
use of these concepts in the reports and writings of German soldiers across the Italian political 
spectrum will be analysed; and an examination of legal sources and texts written by Giuseppe 
Garibaldi will be made to evaluate the influences from “above” on these concepts and 
practices. 
Chapter 4 analyses the actual methods and procedures put in place for recruitment to 
the Italian armed groups. It shows the significant developments that occurred in terms of the 
bans German states placed on the foreign enlistment of their subjects by making a comparison 
of legal sources from the various German states. The chapter then goes on to identify the role 
of the recruitment of foreigners within the context of the general modes of recruitment used 
by the armies of the Italian states. The tension between the international traditions of the 
nobility and the process of professionalization within the history of the (foreign) officer is 
explored, as is the connection between professionalization and the international mobility of 
officers. To do so, a comparative analysis was carried out of career requirements, systems of 
                                                 
37
 Archiv des Landschaftsverbands Rheinland, Düsseldorf; Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe, Archivamt, 
Münster; Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive, Münster.  
38
 Some of the original papers in the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn; I made use 
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Socio-Political History in Moscow. 
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advancements and education levels, and especially the specific ways in which the Italian 
armed groups enabled the continuation of military careers begun elsewhere. To be able to 
evaluate the possible attractiveness of economic rewards and their effect on the decision to 
join the Italian armed groups, a comparative analysis is conducted of the economic 
foundations of the foreign soldierly commitment, in order to assess the conditions on the 
different political sides. The economic conditions are also compared between foreigners and 
Italians, revealing that the traditionally differing economic treatment of the foreign soldier 
compared to the so-called “indigenous” soldier and officer informed polemics not only 
between Italian and foreign soldiers on the same political side but also between the political 
sides. Finally, pamphlets, decrees and soldiers’ reports are used in the last subchapter to 
analyse the reciprocal head-hunting between the political sides and changes of sides; this 
analysis revealed not only that side-changing happened more frequently than is normally 
acknowledged, but that both economic and political elements were used to incite the soldier to 
change sides in the conflict or even just military corps within the same armed group. 
Chapter 5 presents the outcomes of the statistical analysis of the data on the German 
soldiers and officers extracted from the soldiers’ registers. Aside from providing numerical 
counts of foreign and German soldiers and officers on the different Italian sides, the chapter 
proceeds to analyse the data using as a guideline several leading questions: for example, the 
social origin of the soldiers in terms of age, previous professions, and regional origin; the 
frequency and nature of previous tours of duty in other armies and the actual amount of time 
served in Italy; the reasons noted for leaving the respective Italian armies. This information is 
then used to make a comparison of the different corps within each army. The chapter closes 
with a more in-depth characterization of the German officers on the various sides that is based 
on their biographies. 
Chapter 6 goes on to examine the complex issue of motivation of the soldiers from 
another point of view, namely it concentrates on the opposition between war volunteers and 
mercenaries, which informs contemporary polemics and places the two on the opposite 
extremes of the spectrum in the historiographical analysis of the foreign soldiers in Italy in the 
Risorgimento.  
The chapter brings together a discussion of problems of proof of motives both in 
historiography and (motivational) psychology with the results of the statistical analysis and 
biographical cases. By doing so the chapter argues that the two concepts fundamentally stand 




The third part of the thesis (i.e. chapters 7 and 8) drifts away from issues of motivation 
and reasons to enlist, and focuses instead on the experiences of the German soldiers during 
the time they served in the various Italian armed groups. Specifically, chapter 7 describes the 
daily life of the soldier and the types of “work” he was required to carry out, and it compares 
the Papal, Bourbon and Garibaldian armed groups in terms of training, military punishment 
and disciplinization as well as officer-soldier relationships. Based on the presentation of legal 
sources and the ensuing discussion on their importance for the general practices observed in 
the different armed groups, as reported in the soldiers’ accounts, the chapter argues in favour 
of adopting a more nuanced picture than that of a fundamental opposition of military cultures 
between the political sides. Lastly, the chapter assesses the differences between officers and 
common soldiers, and it delves into the history of concepts such as comrade, companion and 
brother as they were used within the specific context of the Italian armies of the nineteenth 
century by examining the soldiers’ own reports of their time spent in Italy as well as the 
written and applied military regulations. 
Chapter 8 analyses how the experiences of the foreign, and specifically the German 
soldiers, were informed by partially conflicting, partially overlapping loyalties to their chosen 
Italian sovereign (or, mutatis mutandis, Garibaldi) and corresponding political party, to their 
own military corps and finally to their regional and/or national groups. By integrating the 
soldiers’ reports with questions regarding visibility, international as well as national military 
infrastructures – such as military chaplains and national military casinos – the chapter 
enquires to what extent the experiences of the German soldiers in Italy broke up or  
(re-)confirmed their national grouping. By examining actual German-Italian transfers and 
providing a more in depth analysis of the example of military Gymnastics, the chapter 
concludes by asking what the historical relevance of the German soldiers’ presence was in the 
Italian armed groups and the ways in which they formed an important element in the context 
of a specifically “military Risorgimento”. 
 
With this brief outline of the thesis, I conclude my introduction. But before actually presenting 
the results of the research it is necessary that I contextualize it, present the underlying 
reasoning, the rationale. Otherwise, it would not be clear from whence my story comes, and 
how, where and why it diverges from the many other engaging narratives that have been told 













2 A military history of Germans in Italian armed groups 
2.1 The nationalization of European armies and the continued presence of foreign soldiers 
Whatever the definition in each specific context, the presence of “foreigners” – however 
defined in the specific context – in European armies since the early modern period is not a 




2.1.1 The French Revolution a watershed? 
In some of the older literature, the idea that the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars 
was the decisive watershed in the history of the foreign soldier still persists: In the previous 
period, the foreign “mercenary” was considered a “normal” figure in European armies. 
Fuelled as well by the historiographical “fashion” of the time, economic interpretations 
continued to take centre stage in the study of foreign soldiers during the 1950s and 1960s.
41
 
Whether or not it was intended, these studies were basically concurrent with the “stereotype” 
of the pre-revolutionary “mercenary” – the defining characteristics being they were foreign 
and enlisted for pay – that had already been consolidated by the end of the eighteenth 
century.
42
 The French Revolution, instead, was seen to have led to the “nationalization” of 
armies, both in terms of the origin of soldiers and the motivation of these last; the presence of 
foreign soldiers in the “nationalized” militaries even after this period was mostly 
“overlooked” mostly ignored, because it did not conform to this military history narrative. 
 At least until 1815, the percentages of foreigners in the European armies were 
sizeable. In the Prussian military, for instance, the percentage of non-Prussian subjects varied 
between 66% in 1743, 50% in 1786
43
 and 36.6% in 1802.
44
 These Prussian numbers, 
                                                 
40
 At least two recent volumes regard foreign soldiering in the nineteenth century; one is entirely dedicated to 
“transnational soldiers”, and the other contains several articles on foreign soldiers. The first volume is Arielli and 
Collins, Transnational Soldiers; the second, Krüger and Levsen, War volunteering. These two publications also 
provide a bibliography containing recent publications on the respective cases under examination. 
41
 See, e.g., Victor G. Kiernan, "Foreign mercenaries and absolute monarchy," Past & Present 11, no. 1 (1957): 
pp. 66-86, or Fritz Redlich, The German military enterpriser and his work force. A study in European economic 
and social history (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1965). 
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 Michael Sikora, "Söldner. Historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 29, 
no. 2 (2003): pp. 210-39; Michael Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion. Strukturprobleme militärischer Organisation 
im 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), pp. 302-303. See the discussion on the concepts of 
“volunteer” and “mercenary” within the context of the nineteenth century on p. 271. 
43
 These numbers are provided by Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, pirates, and sovereigns. State-building and 
extraterritorial violence in early modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 29. The 
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however, are noticeably greater than those of other armies in the same period: In Spain, the 
numbers of enlisted foreigners were 25% in 1751 and 14% in 1799
45
; in the Austrian army of 
the mid-eighteenth century approximately 20% of the soldiers were of foreign origin;
46
 the 
number of non-Britons in the British army varied between 38% in the 1760s, 32% in 1778 
and 20% in 1813 and 1816, while in France, 25% of all soldiers were foreign between 1756-
1763. This number fell slightly to 22% in 1789
47
, but rose to nearly 50% in the Grande Armée 
of 1812.
48
 A decisive problem with these percentages regards, of course, the definition of the 
term “foreigner”. In the definition used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, all those 
who were not subjects of the respective state were considered foreigners,
49
 and as such they 
figure in the aforementioned statistics. Hence, soldiers from neighbouring areas as well as 
those from further away were considered “foreigners”. Peter H. Wilson, for instance, has 
shown that in the German armies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their “foreign” 
soldiers frequently came from the empire, “from neighbouring counties and imperial cities”.
50 
 
While statistics on foreigners in European armies after 1815 are rather scarce, they are 
available for this previous period, even if the definition of the term “foreigner” is somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                        
number indicating that 56% of the military were foreigners in 1786 is provided by Christopher Clark, Iron 
kingdom. The rise and downfall of Prussia 1600 - 1947 (London et al.: Allen Lane, 2006), p. 306. 
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 Huck, Soldaten gegen Nordamerika. Lebenswelten Braunschweiger Subsidientruppen im amerikanischen 
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 Thomson, Mercenaries, p. 29. 
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 Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, p. 297; Michael Sikora, "Das 18. Jahrhundert. Zeit der Deserteure," in idem 
and Ulrich Bröckling, eds., Armeen und ihre Deserteure. Vernachlässigte Kapitel einer Militärgeschichte der 
Neuzeit (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), p. 92. 
47
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48
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Wars," in Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins, eds., Transnational soldiers. Foreign military enlistment in the modern 
Era (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 54 and 56. For the complex history 
of foreign soldiers and foreigners’ corps in the Napoleonic army see Jean-François Brun, "Les unites étrangères 
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thematic issues dedicated to the bilateral military history between France and single European countries. 
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 See already Ernst Opgenoorth, 'Ausländer' in Brandenburg-Preussen als leitende Beamte und Offiziere 1604 - 
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problematic. This is not astonishing, considering the “nationalization” of the armies in terms 
of recruitment and origin of the soldiers was often taken for granted. More precise numbers 
are sometimes available only with regard to the colonial branches of the armies. In the Dutch 




For the home armies often we do not have these numbers. However, based on some in-
depth studies of officer corps in nineteenth century armies, it is possible to detect a tendency, 
at least.
52
 According to Gundula Gahlen, who analysed a sample of approximately 10% of all 
Bavarian officers between 1823 and 1866, 9.1% of the officers in this period were not born in 
Bavaria. Many of the “foreign” officers, however, came from the German Confederation 
excluding Austria, and only 3.3% were from Austria or non-German states (most of which 
were from France). Gahlen notes a clear decline in the numbers of non-Bavarian officers from 
1836 onwards, for which only 4% of the officers were of non-Bavarian origin by 1866 for 
instance.
53
 Karl-Heinz Lutz has identified a similar trend in the percentages of foreign officers 
with regard to Baden. He has specified the percentages for different ranks of officers, which 
nevertheless exhibit a similar trend; the number of foreign officers dropped from double-digit 
percentages in the 1830s and 1840s to around 5% by the 1850s and 1860s.
54
 Only with regard 
to the cavalry (14.3% in 1854 down to 12.7% in 1868) and staff officers (60% in 1834 down 
to 7.14% in 1869) does Lutz note decisively higher percentages of non-Baden officers. The 
numbers regarding Baden staff officers reflects the Bavarian findings, and also those for 
Baden, Württemberg and Hessen-Darmstadt, that there was a comparatively high percentage 
of foreigners among the generals. In Bavaria between 1815 and 1870, 51.7% of generals were 
non-Bavarians, 17% of which were not German.
55
  
When all of this information is considered together, it is possible to observe that while 
percentages of foreigners in European armies were still quite elevated in the eighteenth 
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century, a downward trend occurs for which it is possible to conclude that a process of 
"nationalization" of the armies took place, but this happened particularly from the 1830s and 
1840s onwards, hence some decades later than the French Revolution. While Prussia was 
“precocious” with regard to this development – insofar as this came about directly following 
the decision to end foreign recruitment within the context of universal military service, a 
measure that was introduced in 1813
56 – 
the decisive reduction of foreign soldiers in most of 
the other European armies happened some decades later. From a quantitative perspective, this 
clearly calls into question the “traditional military history narrative” which identifies the 
“French Revolution as an important turning point in the ‘nationalization’ of military 
service.”
57
 Not only did the actual “nationalization” of many armies take place decades later 
than was often assumed, but many armies continued to have a certain percentage of foreign 
soldiers well into the twentieth century. Thus, the regular European armies remained 
“multinational”, even if to a reduced degree compared to former centuries. The history of 
these foreign soldiers, however, has mostly been neglected. An exception is perhaps the 
historiography on the French Foreign Legion, which continues to be caught between opposing 
“positive” and “negative” views.
58
 Other cases of “foreign” regiments and foreign soldiers in 
“regular” state armies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are already studied far less.
59
 
One example of this is the case of the British foreign legions in the Crimean War. After a 
highly controversial parliamentary and public debate, Britain, in desperate need for fresh 
soldiers in the Crimean War, issued a “Foreign Enlistment Bill”
60
 in 1854, the aim of which 
was to form its own “foreign legion”. Negative diplomatic responses from Switzerland and 
Germany on the basis of existing Swiss and German prohibitions of recruitment of their 
nationals on the part of foreign nations, resulted in acts of "unofficial recruitment" on the part 
of British authorities in these states. In the end, three legions were formed: the “British 
German Legion”, the “British Swiss Legion” and the “British Italian Legion”.
61
 Some 7,000 
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soldiers of the German and Swiss Legions were eventually sent to Üsküdar near Istanbul, but 
“they were too late to join the fighting in the Crimea.”
62
 
2.1.2 Studied cases of foreign soldiering: Philhellenism, International Brigades etc. 
Historiography has focused mainly on cases in which foreign soldiering seemed at least to be 
more or less independent from the "regular" armies of the state and has almost entirely 
overlooked foreign soldiering in the regular armies of the states themselves. Some studies are 
basically confined to naming single, hitherto rather neglected cases of foreign soldiers. At 
times they provide a valuable foundation for more in-depth future research, one example 




The bulk of studies, however, has concentrated on a series of more well known cases: 
especially Philhellenism and the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War. 
Many of the studies that have been carried out see “Philhellenism” in terms of a 
“cultural” movement
64
, while fewer studies have specifically focused on foreign soldiering in 
Greece as such. The more than 200 German soldiers that moved to Greece in 1821 and 1822 
have been studied by Regine Quack-Eustathiades in research that also used the “memoirs” 
written by the subjects immediately following their Greek deployment. Her work brings to 
light the plurality of motives underlying the soldiers’ actual enlistment as well as the negative 
picture of Greece that they carried away with them.
65
 Gilles Pécout, drawing on similar 
sources, has instead focused on Italian Philhellenism, describing a continuity that linked the 
Italian philhellenic combatants of the 1820s with the Italian philhellene volunteers of 1897 
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(the Red-shirts of Ricciotti Garibaldi) through cases of Greek “Philitalism” in the ranks of 
Garibaldi’s army. Compared to Quack-Eustathiades, Pécout places more emphasis on the 
importance of more circumscribed “political passions” as the primary motivation of the 
volunteers. These passions “came”, according to Pécout, “in three different degrees of 
intensity: a humanitarian solidarity that was imbued with the spirit of 1848, a radical 
internationalism and a proletarian socialism that focused on the question of a popular army.”
66
 
He also addresses a research controversy regarding the different models of Greece between 
Europe and the Orient, acknowledging the “orientalizing” gaze many of the foreigners turned 
on Greece. This, however, was not necessarily in opposition to the idea of “a common 
renaissance of the Mediterranean peoples of Europe”, insofar as politics were, according to 




The history of foreign soldiers in European armies did not end with the nineteenth 
century. A period that has been subject to much study is the Spanish Civil War between 1936 
and 1939. It is fair to say that the “International Brigades” still hold a high level of fascination 
for scholars, and arouse a “popular and scholarly attention far beyond that which their 
numbers might appear to warrant.”
68
 To prevent an excessively reductive “political” picture of 
these Brigades, however, some recent studies have underlined “the often complex motivations 
of those who volunteered”.
69
 Josie McLelland, for instance, makes a distinction between the 
decision to volunteer and “combat motivation” and shows how the latter was not only 
complex in itself, but also tended to change during deployment.
70
 Nir Arielli argues that the 
“push”-factors, such as the wish to leave states where communism was under heavy attack, 
and not just the (ideological) “pull” factors ought to be considered.
71
 Arielli also studies other 
aspects than individual motivation as well; in his work, he underlines the crucial importance 
of organizational structures, by stating that “the assistance of other individuals and 
organizations was almost always necessary. Such an approach inevitably deconstructs the 
romantic view of self-determined young men (and women, in smaller numbers), who moved 
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around Europe at will that sometimes emerges from the literature on the Spanish Civil 
War.”
72
 Studies that have focused on one foreign component of the Brigades have 
highlighted, too, the “nationalizing” effect of the foreigners’ units, despite the fact that the 
“homogeneity” of the various “national” units constantly changed throughout the war. For 
instance, the experience of the Spanish Civil War was seen by American Italians as a 
demonstration of a “good Italy”, in contrast to “the ‘official’ image of Italians as militaristic, 
aggressive, and imperialist. Instead, they created an alternative definition of italianità centred 
on a filial relationship with a ‘mother’ Italy as the personification of an egalitarian tradition 
and of the battle for universal freedom.”
73
 The German brigadists also seem to have used this 
type of logic: 
“One volunteer noted that in the early days of the war, ‘there were very few who 
declared themselves to be ‘German’, they were Bavarians, Rheinlanders, Upper Silesians or 
Saxons.’ But membership of a German company or battalion, and the approval of both the 
Spanish population and international observers, gave the men the confidence openly to 
declare their nationality. […] The volunteers were able to feel that they were rebuilding a 
‘good’ national identity in the eyes of the world, keeping alive the traditions of the ‘true’ 
Germany, which had been obscured by Nazism.”
74
 
The bulk of studies on the Spanish Civil War is dedicated to the “International 
Brigades”, i.e. the foreign “volunteers” organized by the Comintern. Already lesser studied 
are the foreign volunteers that adhered to the Trotskyist and anarchist Spanish organizations. 
Furthermore, only recently have studies faced the task of studying the opposite, fascist side, 
i.e. the foreign soldiers that fought for instance in the German “Legion Condor”. Stefanie 
Schüler-Springorum takes a cultural historical perspective. Her research attempts to identify 
changes in the “image of Spain” on the part of the legionnaires before and after deployment.
75
  
2.1.3 Recent trends in both early modern and modern studies on foreign soldiers 
Recent studies on foreign soldiering have some common traits. They show how important it is 
to ask not only what the motives of the individual soldiers were, but those of the “hiring” or 
“sending” side as well. Formal and symbolic inter- and transnational alliances may be an 
important reason for the integration of foreign soldiers and foreign units across the 
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 Studies show that foreign soldiering before and after the French Revolution was 
more multifaceted than is only implied with the differentiation between early modern 
“mercenaries” who enlisted only for pay and modern “volunteers” who enlisted for strictly 
political reasons. But a certain tension between these two ideal-types of foreign soldiering 
seems to subsist. How then can the British “mercenaries of the Crimea”
77
 between 1854 and 
1856 be reconciled with the “Soldiers of Conscience”
78
 in the past case of philhellenism and 
the later instance of the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War? Is it possible to so 
easily distinguish between “mercenaries” and “volunteers” in the case of foreigners in the 
Italian armed groups of the nineteenth century, to simply characterize them as “two different 
temporalities which were simultaneously in operation at the heart of the events unfolding”
79
?  
Given that so many studies are still struggling with the question of motivation, less space is 
dedicated to an in-depth discussion of the “transnational” experiences of “mercenaries” and 
“foreign volunteers” alike. 
2.2 (Anti-)Risorgimento historiography and foreign soldiers 
2.2.1 The exaltation of foreign military “valour” 
The presence of foreigners in the armed groups of the Risorgimento is not a totally new topic 
for traditional Risorgimento historiography. This is particularly true with regard to the armed 
actions under Garibaldi, and especially the “Thousand” of 1860, where presentations and 
papers dedicated to only one, foreign component at a time can systematically be found 
throughout the period following Italian unification. There are several issues with the ways in 
which the history of foreign soldiers in Italy has often been presented. Whether they are 
studies written by foreign historians dedicated to their respective national group or by Italian 
historians interested in a specific country of origin from which the foreign soldiers came, 
many studies are biased due to their attempt to prove the existence of a specific Italian-foreign 
"friendship" with the nation of the foreign soldiers under study. More often than not, 
“sympathy” of the researcher toward Italy or the respective foreign country translates into 
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“sympathy” for the foreign actors studied. This results in a “celebrative” tone to the research 
that conveniently suited the programmes of many historical congresses. Therefore, it is not 
astonishing to read that within the context of a historical congress a hundred years after the 
Sicilian Revolution of 1848, “some Hungarian historians”, “accompanied by some Sicilian 
historians, liked to lay down a laurel wreath for [the Hungarian Garibaldian officer] Tüköry. 
Before the herm of the hero, in a suggestive atmosphere, the last words were pronounced, 
exalting a glorious tradition of friendship.”
80
 Here, in 1954, it was still possible to speak of 
the “admirable sacrifice” Tüköry had made, just as it was to still write about the “real bond 
between the two peoples” in 1935, wherein the “braveness” of the troops of the Hungarian 
colonel Dunyov in the “expedition of the Thousand” was emphasized.
81
 
Carryovers of the idea of “national” military “braveness”, however, can still be found 
today. Gábor Andreides, in a recent publication of the “Institute for the history of the 
Risorgimento”, asserts that the “majority of Hungarian exiles fought heroically both in the 
Hungarian War of Independence in 1848-49 and the battles of the Italian Risorgimento.” 
82
 
According to Andreides, Tüköry continues to be the “intrepid Hungarian hero”
83
, just as 
another Hungarian, Count Teleki was still a “likeable, emotive person, rich in humanity”.
84
 
Similarly, according to one Polish historian in 2013 – who used the exact same language the 
Hungarian historian cited above did when praising Tüköky – Francesco Nullo, an Italian 
participant in the Polish January Uprising of 1863, “died gloriously”
85
: “in giving his life, 




Unfortunately, such a “noble” vision of the participants easily translates into taking for 
granted that the motives of their commitment were “noble” and that Italian-foreign 
experiences were “positive”. Hence, in the case of Nullo, it suffices to cite a passage from one 
of his speeches to his fellow Italians in Poland in 1863 to conclude that “the love of liberty 
was the motive that pushed Nullo to action – ‘the knight of liberty’, whose fate makes us 
aware of how much this inestimable valour was able to bring the two countries together.”
87
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From this perspective the presence of a given foreign nationality necessary had an elevated 
military “value” for the respective campaigns. These studies, unable (or perhaps unwilling?) 
most of the time to provide quantitative data to give at least an idea of the numbers of the 
foreigners that participated in a given conflict, necessarily depend on qualitative arguments to 
support their views. Hungarian historian László Pete writes, it is “an incontestable historical 
truth that the Hungarian participants in the Garibaldi expedition have fulfilled a particularly 
relevant role.”
88
 Even in 2013 Andreides uses nearly the same words to conclude: “The 
Hungarian patriots, exiles and soldiers that participated in the expedition of Garibaldi had a 
particularly relevant role. The real grandeur of their contribution within the Garibaldian 
contingent was not determined by their number, but first and foremost by the importance of 
the tasks assigned to them […].”
89
  
2.2.2 A more sober perspective – foreign soldiers in Italy in recent historiography 
In contrast to this basically nationalist view on the military “valour” of the respective national 
components, the dry comment of Lucy Riall that “we must note that – with the exception of 
one or two officers with previous military experience – the foreign volunteers for Garibaldi 
were never a huge help to him and were, on occasion, a positive hindrance”
90
, is indeed a 
breath of fresh air. Rather than perpetuating the “heroic” image produced by Garibaldi’s 
contemporaries, Riall and others have rightly turned this imagery into an object of historical 
research. Riall in her work on the “hero” shows how “the cult of Garibaldi was quite carefully 
conceived, constructed and publicised […].”
91
 The whole “fashioning” of Garibaldi as a 
“romantic hero”, however, fulfilled a very real, specific, and as Riall underlines, an especially 
political purpose, the aim of which was to generate not only a European public that was 
favourable toward the project of Italian unity and independence
92
, and therefore had the intent 
to foster concrete material support (men, arms, money, etc.), both Italian and foreign.
93
 
Consequently, she primarily reads the numerical presence of foreigners in Garibaldian 
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Authors that have more specifically focused on foreign soldiers in the Risorgimento 
and Anti-Risorgimento
95
 have similarly distanced themselves from this emphasis on “military 
valour”. In his dissertation on the mobilization of the foreign officers involved in the pro-
Bourbon “brigantaggio” between 1861 and 1863, Simon Sarlin underlines that “the 
international mobilisation in favour of the king of Naples merits attention not in function of 
its concrete results, but for what we can learn about the aspirations and considerations of its 
agents, about their vision of the world and their modes of commitment.”
96
 Only by doing 
away with the tone of celebration and “valour” that tends to accompany these studies, does it 
become possible to acknowledge various difficulties linked to the commitment of foreign 
soldiers to the Italian causes. As in many other historical cases, many projects to support 
Italian "parties" in the end proved inconclusive and "unsuccessful", and the celebrative 
history, which was oriented toward the "success stories", was naturally less interested in them. 
But the history of failures is part of history tout court, and researching the reasons that 
impeded “success” can tell us as much about transnational history as the successful projects. 
For instance, Sarlin clearly presents the difficulties inherent to the international mobilization 
for the Bourbon Kingdom caused by lack of coordination and/or financial resources. Even 
more important were diplomatic complications, first and foremost the reluctance of the 
conservative powers that “consistently refused to convert their symbolic and moral backing 
into material and effective support […].”
97
  
In fact, there was much friction linked to the soldierly engagement of foreigners on the 
different Italian sides. Already Ferdinand Boyer writes of offences, conflicting national 
feelings and personal rivalries in his study on the French garibaldini.
98
 With regard to the 
Papal Army, Alessandro Mancini Barbieri has similarly highlighted the frequency of 
grievances made by the papal authorities about the supposedly undisciplined character of the 
foreign papal soldiers, among which “drunkenness, harassment of civilians and superiors as 
well as ‘reiterated attempts to carry out acts against nature’”.
99
 Relations in the pro-Bourbon 
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“guerrilla” were also conflict-laden. Sarlin notes a more or less open rivalry
100
 between 
foreign officers “nominated by the monarchy and chiefs of the indigenous bands”.
101
 
The negative picture of these “transnational” contacts must not be overemphasized 
either, especially because these recounts were partially informed by the heavy polemics 
between the different political sides. Perceptions of participants could also change over the 
course of their commitment, as Boyer demonstrates with regard to the case of a French 
soldier, for whom his Italian “comrades” went from being described as “savages” to “good 
children”
102
 as he passed time in their company.
103
  
This all shows that the question of initial motives, however important in its own right, 
is only one part of the history of foreign soldiers. Rather than focusing only on this aspect – as 
still many studies do – we should go further by proceeding with an unbiased and in-depth 
analysis of the transnational experiences and practices of the foreign soldiers in Italy. Instead 
of asking for their “military” contribution, we should ask for their historical “contribution”, 
insofar as the latter has both positive and negative effects on the former. The strictly 
“military” contribution, expressed in terms of “fighting strength”, is only one aspect of their 
history; but even for this specific contribution, it is not enough to simply count their numbers 
or to name their military rank. Concentrating on military “success” alone fails to take into 
account a series of historiographical issues that can be addressed by delving into the history of 
the “transnational soldiers” of the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento. Their history can 
contribute to the question of communalities and differences in terms of “military culture(s)”
104
 
in the nineteenth century; to revealing how both national and legitimist movements were 
linked throughout Europe and what these connections meant for them; and to the analysis of 
how nationalization and internationalism were in fact - as paradoxical as it may seem– 
intimately linked. The history of foreign soldiers in Italy can provide insights into how 
international solidarity was conceptualized in the nineteenth century
105
 and how it was put 
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into practice in an important area, i.e. in military groups. “Transnational soldiers” are a 
showcase for European mobility, and their history enables us to address processes of 
ideological, cultural and military transfers. 
2.3 Foreign participation on the different political sides 
Throughout the nineteenth century we find foreign soldiers present not only in various Italian 
conflicts but also on the various political sides: They were part of militarily organized 
revolutionary attempts between the 1820s and 1850s, they tried to defend the “republics” built 
in Venice and Sicily in 1848 and the Roman Republic in 1849. Many also fought in the ranks 
of the different Garibaldian armed groups in 1859, 1860, 1866 and 1867. During the same 
period, foreign soldiers were also present in the regular Italian armed forces, especially in the 
Papal and Bourbon Armies. 
2.3.1 Foreign soldiers on the pro-national side 
2.3.1.1 The “Invasion of Savoy” 1834 
Exiles from different countries participated in the so-called “Invasion of Savoy” that was 
incited by Giuseppe Mazzini during his time in Geneva in 1834.
106
 Mazzini’s plan was to 
invade Savoy with small, armed groups that were to depart from four different places in 
Switzerland and France. Their action was intended to foster upheavals by the population and 
thus contribute to general revolution. Mazzini counted on the participation of the diasporas of 
exiles present in Switzerland (Italians, French, Poles and Germans) and unemployed Swiss 
workers in this attempt. But much of the operation failed before it had even really begun. 
Thanks to Austrian and pontifical spies that had infiltrated the Mazzinian movement, the 
Piedmontese government was already informed of the plans in August 1833 and ordered 
9,000 soldiers to stand at the ready along the borders. Mazzini, on the contrary, could rely 
only on a much smaller number of participants. Still, the day before the planned invasion was 
to take place, it was calculated that 783 men were ready to set out, of which 160 were Poles, 
70 Italians, 200 Savoyards, 35 Germans, 58 Swiss and 50 French.
107
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participants of the invasion were organized into three groups and counted no more than 
450
108
, of which 300
109
 reached the territory of Savoy, even if some only for a short time.  
2.3.1.2 The “State of Sicily” in 1848 and the Roman Republic in 1849 
Less than fifteen years later, in 1848, foreign soldiers were listed among the defenders of the 
“Sicilian State”, approximately 1,200 of which are French.
110
 The foreign participation in the 
defence of the Roman Republic in 1849 amounted to some 350 foreigners (in the sense of 
non-Italians) in the ranks of the “volunteer” groups, especially those of the “Garibaldian 
Legion”.
111
 However, foreigners are present also among the 12,000 soldiers
112
 of the 
“regular” military of the Republic.
113 
The regular army of the “Roman Republic” was created 
initially from the remnants of the Papal Army, 20-30% of which was still comprised of 
foreigners in April 1848.
114
 Despite the dismissal of many of the foreign regiments of the 
Papal Army in March and April 1849, nevertheless some foreign soldiers passed directly from 
the Papal to the Republican Army or later re-enlisted in the latter. Hence, there is a presence 
of foreign soldiers in the “regular” part of the army, who were enlisted in the papal or 
republican periods, as well as in the “volunteer” groups.  
2.3.1.3 Garibaldian campaigns 
In 1859, the number of Italian and foreign “volunteers” that joined the army of Piedmont was 
roughly 50,000. Among them were the Cacciatori delle Alpi
115
 and Cacciatori degli 
Appennini, with approximately 12,000 men between them,
116
 and the “Hungarian Army in 
Italy” with about 3,200 men.
117
 Together with the Hungarians, according to Anna-Maria 
Isastia, 89 foreigners were enlisted in the regular army and 82 in the volunteer formations.
118
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A year later in the south of Italy, among the first “Thousand” were 33 “foreigners”, while of 
the roughly 21,000 men that came from the north to fight with Garibaldi there were 
approximately 600 English, between 300 and 500 French, 440 Hungarians, just to name the 
most sizeable national groups.
119
 Foreigners were also among those Bourbon soldiers that 
changed sides during the conflict. They were mostly part of the group of the 200 or so 
Cacciatori Esteri, which was integrated into Garibaldi’s approximately 50,000 strong
120
 
“Esercito meridionale”. Attilio Vigevano wrote in 1914 about this foreign Garibaldian 
company: there are “some hundred or more foreigners of different nationality, but mostly 
Swiss and Germans”, who from the Bourbon Army enlisted in the Garibaldian ranks” in May 
1860; it is a “company totally comprised of” Bourbon soldiers, “clothed, armed and provided 
with Bourbon uniforms and equipment, that marches and fights against the Bourbons.”
121
  
Garibaldi’s campaign in 1862, which was headed for Rome, is particularly interesting 
with regard to foreign soldiers; this is because in the case of the Hungarians, those that still 
fought in the Hungarian Legion of the Italian Army, now found that they had to fight former 
“comrades” who remained faithful to Garibaldi and those that had defected over to him on the 
battlefield. After the campaign of 1860, the “Hungarian Legion” was integrated into the 
regular Piedmontese and then Italian Army. As part of the regular forces, they were also used 
to suppress “brigandage” in southern Italy. They were, hence, present in Campania when 
Garibaldi landed in Sicily in July and again in Calabria at the end of August 1862. Tensions in 
loyalty among the Hungarians – between the Piedmontese Army and Garibaldi – led to cases 
in which soldiers changed allegiance from the former to the latter
122
, before the remnants of 
the Legion were ordered to return to Piedmont in mid-August.
123
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there are only single isolated foreign presences. The same is also true for the Garibaldian 
campaigns of 1866 and 1867, where single German presences were counted in the ranks.
124
 
2.3.2 Foreign soldiers in the Bourbon and papal armed groups 
2.3.2.1 Papal Army 
Many more foreigners were to be found in the ranks of various corps of the Papal Army.
125
 
Conscription was abolished in 1815 after which the army depended entirely on voluntary 
enlistment. It was already after the withdrawal of the Austrian troops from the Papal States in 
1831 that the decision was taken to hire Swiss regiments. These “foreign regiments” consisted 
mainly of Swiss nationals, though soldiers from southern Germany were also present.
126
 In 
1860 and 1861 the foreign corps underwent significant reorganization, namely the Papal 
Army created three foreign corps between 1861 and 1870: the regiment of the Papal Zouaves, 
the “Carabinieri esteri”, and the “Roman Legion” or “Legion of Antibes”.
127
 The percentage 
of foreigners varied between a low 21% in 1848 and a particularly high 42% in 1860. 
The regiment of the Papal Zouaves was created in 1861.
128 
The corps had a precedent 
in French colonialism. In fact, the word “Zouaves” comes from the name of the Berber tribe 
of the Zouaoua, which initially provided militias for the Ottoman Army. After the capture of 
Algiers in 1830 some of these militias fought on the side of the French, before being 
integrated into the formation of the Tirallieurs, which consisted of Arabic and Turkish 
soldiers. Because of its origin some referred to this group as “Turkos”. As an elite-corps, they 
participated for instance in the Crimean War (1854-1856).  
In 1860, Belgium and France formed a corps of soldiers called Tirallieurs franco-
belges and sent it to Italy for the defence of the Papal States. On 1 January 1861, the 
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Tirallieurs Franco-belges were merged into the so-called “Papal Zouaves”. Between 1861 
and 1870 the corps saw almost 9,000
129
 enlistments from soldiers of 25 different countries.
130
 
Roughly half of the Foreign Carabineers regiment, founded in May 1860 and with a 
total strength of 1,262 men by 20 August 1870, was comprised of Germans.
131
 Between 1861 
and 1870 there were approximately 4,100
132
 enlistments. 
The “Roman Legion”, or “Legion of Antibes”, with a strength of 1,410 soldiers in 
1870, was a corps of mainly French soldiers. Concurrent to the official withdrawal of the 
French troops from Rome in 1866 in accordance with the French-Italian convention of 
September 1864, Napoleon III “authorized the recruitment of a ‘foreign legion’ to be sent for 
the defence of the Papal States”.
133
 This troop was incorporated into the regular Papal Army 
under the name “Legione Romana” or “Legione di Antibo” (heretofore referred to, as above, 
with the English names), this last name was given because the recruitment office was located 
in Antibes. In July 1870, the “Roman Legion” counted 1,215 soldiers altogether.
 134
 
2.3.2.2 Bourbon Army 
Foreign corps also existed further south. Since 1827, a section of the Bourbon Army was 
made up of four regiments of Swiss soldiers.
135
 Their service was based – as in other cases of 
Swiss mercenaries – on capitulations between Swiss cantons and the country of employment. 
The last Bourbon-Swiss capitulations had expired in 1854, a situation that was resolved by a 
direct agreement between the King Ferdinand II and the Swiss military leaders consisting in a 
continuation of Swiss deployment for another five years. In 1859, however, new capitulations 
were necessary, but that very year the Swiss federal government issued decisive laws to 
finally and effectively ban the long tradition of Swiss mercenaries.
136
 This change was 
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symbolized in the Bourbon case by the decision of the canton of Bern to forbid the use of the 
Bernese bear in the flag of one of the Bourbon regiments. Furthermore, the Swiss government 
meditated upon the possibility of withdrawing the citizenship of those of its subjects that 
continued to work as mercenaries. On 15 May 1859, these tensions led to an upheaval of the 
Swiss regiments in Naples
137
, wherein those Swiss who remained loyal to their ‘customer’ 
fought their rebellious comrades. Later on, the Swiss regiments were reorganized as “foreign 
regiments” under such remaining Swiss officers as Johann Lucas von Mechel.
138
 The rank and 
file were filled by the Swiss soldiers that chose to remain in southern Italy and new recruits, 
fresh from Austria and southern German states. As an integral part of the regular Bourbon 
Army, they took part one year later in the wars subsequent to Garibaldi’s landing in Sicily.  
Other foreigners, however, were engaged in the less regular part of the Bourbon 
defence after 1861: In several places such as the Abruzzi region, the Bourbon government 
supported the creation and guidance of groups of legitimist fighting groups, a “guerrilla with 
the official seal of the dynasty”.
139
 The legitimist guerrilla underpinned the so-called 
“brigantaggio politico”, which continued to call into question the newly erected Italian state 
throughout the early 1860s, before being cruelly suppressed by Italian government troops. 
The Bourbon government, which continued to operate after the creation of the Kingdom of 
Italy, first in Gaeta and later in Roman exile, supported these groups from September 1860 
onwards and well into 1863. It sent out a phalanx of officers, consisting of former officers of 
regular Bourbon troops such as Francesco Luvarà, as well as a handful of foreign colonels 
such as the Alsatian Teodule Emile de Christen, the Spanish Josè Borjés and the Prussians 
Theodor Friedrich Klitsche de la Grange and Karl Graf Kalkreuth, especially brought in to 
guide the heterogeneously composed armed groups in operation. 
2.3.3 The numbers on foreign soldiers in the Italian armed groups 
The percentage of foreign soldiers in the Italian armed groups of the 19th century varies 
considerably between the political sides. Furthermore, the exact numbers given in the 
literature and sources sometimes differ significantly; when they do coincide, the footnotes 
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show that this is more often due to one author copying from another than from original 
counts. For the pro-Italian side especially, exact numbers are sometimes quite hard to obtain: 
In some cases there is a lack of reliable sources for the soldiers that fought with Mazzini and 
later on with Garibaldi
140
. At times, the soldiers’ lists were never appositely created or have 
been lost, or were created only (much) later, often omitting part of the information pertaining 
to each single soldier. Hence, there are only partial numbers with regard to foreign soldiers in 
the ranks of the garibaldini. At others there is only information on some national components, 
as is the case with the “Hungarian Legion”
141
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Table 2.1 – Number and percentage of foreigners in the Papal Army 1848-1870  
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Table 2.2 – Number and percentage of foreigners in the Bourbon Army 1849-1860  
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Table 2.3 – Number and percentage of foreign soldiers in the Invasion of Savoy, the 
Sicilian State and the Roman Republic 1834 and 1848-1849 
Army; armed group Total number of soldiers Foreign soldiers 
Invasion of Savoy – Mazzini 
1834 
783 (Planned for 2 February 
1834) of which 
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Table 2.4 – Number and percentage of foreign soldiers in the Army of Piedmont 1859 
Army; armed group Total number of soldiers Foreign soldiers 
Volunteers enlisted in Turin 
until 25 march 1859 
 
- Integrated into the 
regular army 
- Cacciatori delle Alpi 
– Garibaldi 
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Table 2.5– Number and percentage of foreign soldiers in the Garibaldian campaigns 1860-
1867 
Army; armed group Total number of soldiers Foreign soldiers 
Northern volunteers of the 
Southern Army of Garibaldi 
1860 
 
- First “Thousand” 
- Later arrived volunteers 
 of which  
- Hungarian Legion 
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Only the Papal Army seems to stand out as a singular case, because counter to the tendency 
the percentage of foreigners continued to rise from between 21% in 1848 to a singularly high 
42% in 1860. The other Italian armies and armed groups seem to develop more or less in the 
same direction as most of the other European armies. The percentage of foreigners in the 
army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is still 13% in 1849, but falls to 4% by 1860. The 
percentages of foreigners, for instance, in the “volunteer” units of the Army of the Roman 
Republic (ca. 5% foreigners), the initial Garibaldian Thousand (ca. 3%) and amongst the other 
garibaldini that subsequently departed from northern Italy (ca. 6%) are quite similar. These 
percentages reveal that the supposedly outstanding international fascination with Garibaldi 
did not result in an exceptionally high percentage of actual foreign participation, the moment 
these numbers are comparable to the 5% foreign presence, which was the standard for many 
other contemporary armies.
191
 The numbers for the garibaldini, however, are to be handled 
with special care, since it is unclear in many instances the basis upon which they were 
calculated; this consideration takes into account that in some instances registers were not kept, 
or the information therein was not reliably recorded and in others the soldiers’ registers were 
used little to estimate these numbers. 
2.4 A critical history of the Risorgimento wars 
2.4.1 The “wars of independence” – the nationalist interpretation 
In order to better understand the different contexts in which these foreign soldiers were 
placed, it helps to take a critical look at the Italian wars in this period. The various wars on 
Italian soil in the 19th century
192
 have, in conventional historiography, basically been divided 
into two groups: Three of them – the Piedmont-Austrian wars of 1848/49 and of 1859 and the 
Italian-Austrian war of 1866 – have been understood in the conventional historiography to be 
“guerre d’indipendenza”, i.e. wars of independence. The other group of wars, which does not 
fit into the Italian-Austria context, somehow constitutes the “rest” in conventional 
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historiography. Placed within this second group was the Sicilian-Neapolitan War of 1848/49, 
in which a revolutionary movement that fought for the independence of Sicily from the 
Kingdom of Naples was intertwined with Italian national aspirations.
193
 In 1860, the 
Garibaldian undertaking of the so-called Expedition of the Thousand in Sicily and southern 
Italy, which resulted in a war between Garibaldians and the armies of the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies and the Pope, is also included in this group. Another is Garibaldi’s attempt to 
free Rome and the Lazio, but he was stopped by the Piedmontese Army. The last was the 
event in 1870, when Italian troops conquered Rome against a more symbolic resistance of the 
Papal Army and confined the Pope to the Vatican City.  
2.4.1.1 The first “war of independence” in 1848/49 
On 23 March 1848, Charles Albert (Carlo Alberto), King of Sardinia, declared war against 
Austria. “Volunteers” from throughout Italy participated in this war. Savoy was initially able 
to occupy Austrian Milan, but was later defeated at Custoza between 23 and 25 June 1848. In 
1849, broke out again, lasting three days between 20 and 23 March 1849; this skirmish led to 
the total defeat of Savoy at Novara. 
2.4.1.2 The second “war of independence” in 1859 
After the Piedmontese government had established a secret alliance with France under 
Napoleon III, which provoked an Austrian ultimatum that was then rejected, Austria declared 
war on April 1859. After some victories of the French-Piedmontese side at Solferino and San 
Martino on 24 June, France decided to end the war by signing an armistice with Austria at 
Villafranca, wherein Austrian Lombardy was to be ceded to France. This last then handed 
over the region to the Piedmontese monarchy.  
2.4.1.3 The third “war of independence” in 1866 
On 20 June 1866, Italy – having made a secret alliance with Prussia, which was engaged in a 
war against Austria in Germany – declared war on Austria as well. The Italian army was 
defeated at Custozza and Lissa. Only Garibaldi, with a contingent of the Cacciatori delle Alpi, 
won a victory against Austria just north of Lake Garda. After the Prussians won in the battle 
of Königgrätz/Sadowa, Austria was forced to cede Veneto to France, which in turn handed it 
over to the Italian kingdom. 
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Some historians speak of a “fourth war of independence”, which consisted for them in 
the First World War and led to the annexation of Trentino and Südtirol/Alto Adige. 
All three (or four) wars of independence were thus waged against Austria. In 
retrospect, they seemed to have been the fulfilment of what Mazzini had already taught in 
1832: “OUT WITH THE BARBARIAN: WAR ON THE AUSTRIANS!”
194
 These wars 
seemed to have been national wars in the sense that they led to a unification of the national 
territory. But labelling the wars of independence as national wars is a nationalist interpretation 
in itself. Instead, the annexations were the result of a cession of regions by Italian allies. Italy 
was – with the exception of Garibaldi’s campaign in 1866 –defeated every single time by 
Austria in these wars. In terms of war, the (step-by-step) territorial unification of Italy came 
about as the result of the victories of Italy’s allies, France in 1859 and Prussia in 1866, or 
more precisely the Italian use of opportunities created by foreign victories.  
2.4.2 Italian civil war(s)? 
Against the backdrop of Austrian-Italian opposition, a portion of the wars
195
 that broke out in 
nineteenth-century Italy were very much intra-Italian wars, wars between different Italian 
armies and armed groups: The small wars between revolutionaries such as Mazzini and the 
troops of the respective Italian states, the Sicilian-Neapolitan war of 1848/49, the War 
between Garibaldians and Bourbons in 1860, the war between Garibaldians and Italian troops 
in 1862, the short war between the Papal Army and the Italian troops in 1870, can all be seen 
from a civil war perspective.
196
 Although the “civil war” is one of the least theorized 
categories of war, several publications in the existing literature propose some defining 
features. These criteria make a distinction between civil wars and other types of war such as 
the conventional inter-state war, i.e. war between states, and the extra-systemic war, in other 
words a war in which the combating groups transcend state boundaries.
197
 Whereas the 
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category of inter-state wars underlines the conflict between two different “containers” or 
states, and hence tends to neglect the internal conflicts within the states, the category of civil 
war does the opposite, calling our attention to antagonist structures within a given 
community.
198
 Moreover, civil war breaks with the presupposition on the part of the state that 
it has the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. During a civil war, members of society 
instead attempt to resolve their conflicts through the use of violence, and hence do not confine 
themselves to the legally predisposed state mechanisms of conflict resolution. Furthermore, in 
a civil war, the state goes from being the sole possessor of the legitimate use of violence to 
“just” another party of the conflict.
199
 Under the category of civil war, one can subsume all 
kinds of armed conflicts that are fought within the “container” of a given state, an aspect 
made even clearer by the German word used to indicate civil war, “Bürgerkrieg”: The term 
indicates a war that is fought between different “Bürger”, i.e. different citizens of one single 
political community. When the notion of civil war is applied to the Wars of the Risorgimento 
the inner-Italian conflicts stand out. Instead of automatically subsuming the Wars of the 
Risorgimento into a category of conflicts that were exclusively fought only against foreign 
enemies such as Austria, the internal conflicts that were played out at least during some of the 
Risorgimento wars can be highlighted. For instance, the period between 1830 and 1870 was 
characterized by a consistent stream of failed as well as successful revolutionary attempts, 
which often saw the engagement of revolutionary armed groups with the state’s “weapons” of 
counterrevolution. As sociologist Peter Waldmann has aptly noted, “the distinction between 
civil war and revolution is not an easy one.”
200
 It is possible to note, however, that revolutions 
very often were linked in one way or another to either inter- or intra-state wars, which helped 
to “radicalize” the revolutions.
201
 In my view, when events are spoken of as a revolution, the 
counter-revolutionary side of the story tends to get overlooked.  
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If we take the example of the war of 1860, it is generally narrated only from the point 
of view of Garibaldi’s Thousand. The Garibaldians increased from more than one thousand 
men at the time they embarked in Genoa to nearly 20,000 men (and some women) by the time 
they crossed the Strait of Messina due to the continuous influx of northern as well as southern 
Italians to the cause. In Sicily and southern Italy, Garibaldi’s troops encountered a 
numerically much larger official Bourbon Army; this last counted 100,000 men in total, of 
which approximately half were posted in Sicily and the other half on the continent. Between 
1861 and 1863, the annexation of the south of Italy was called into question by the “political 
brigandage”, a tactic that was supported by the Bourbon King during his Roman exile. The 
history of these and other opponents of Italian unification has often been neglected.  
The armed conflicts between nationalists and the Papal States prior to 1870 can also be 
seen as intra-Italian conflicts. These conflicts occurred during, within and in connection with 
a European-wide conflict: The “European Culture Wars”, in the words of Christopher Clark, 
were “the conflict between anticlerical and Catholic/Ultramontane forces”
202
 and were 
characterized by a radicalization of rhetoric. In the case of Italy, the aspiration to take Rome 
from the Pope and to make it the capital of Italy was – especially after 1848/49 – directly 
connected to a heightened form of anticlericalism, which is emblematically embodied by the 




Another important issue linked with the concept of civil war is that this form of war 
violates the premise that the state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence or force. 
An example of such are the actions planned by Mazzini and his followers, which consisted in 
insurgencies that aimed to incite a general revolution, actions that were then suppressed by 
the various governmental troops. The picture is in some way puzzling with regard to the 
Garibaldian undertakings. In some cases, e.g. in 1859 and 1866, he lead corps of the 
Cacciatori delle Alpi, which were official special units of the Piedmont or Italian Armies; the 
legitimation of their use of violence was derived indirectly from the state’s monopoly on the 
use of violence, which was transferred from the state to his fighting units. The expedition of 
the Thousand, though, was not an officially backed action on the part of the Piedmont 
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government. In 1862, Garibaldi tried to reach Rome from the newly constituted Italian 
regions of Sicily and Calabria in the south. As Christopher Duggan has narrated the event:  
“Already on 3 August the king had issued a proclamation urging Italians not to support 
Garibaldi. But the hope had been that this was merely a plot to keep Paris happy and that 
Victor Emanuel was secretly planning to repeat the trick of 1860: let Garibaldi advance and 
then step in at the last moment, take Rome and ‘save’ the Pope from the clutches of rebels. In 
reality, though, the government was too frightened of Napoleon to risk such a dangerous 
game. […] On 20 August martial law was declared in southern Italy, and a few days later a 
column of 3,500 troops under Colonel Pallavicini was dispatched to halt the rebels [… ] On 
the morning of 29 August […] they [Garibaldi’s 2,500 men] came in sight of Pallavicini’s 
troops […]. Strict orders were given to hold fire: Garibaldi had no wish to shed ‘fraternal 
blood’. But Pallavicini was a professional Piedmontese officer with instructions to treat the 
volunteers as insurgents; he sent his bersaglieri in action, shooting as they raced forward. […] 
Garibaldi was hit twice.”
204 
In this case, Garibaldi’s actions violated the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence of the newly erected Italian state, which only two years before he 
had helped to create.  
For at least some incidents during the Wars of the Risorgimento we can acknowledge 
that the garibaldini challenged the right that the existing states had on the use of violence. 
Moreover we are dealing with intra-Italian fighting that was being carried out between 
different regular and less regular, “volunteer” forces. Two of the criteria that define the 
concept of civil war have hence been fulfilled. But there is another criterion that leads to 
ambiguity in the Italian case to such an extent that perhaps the notion of civil war must be 
dismissed altogether. According to the concept of civil war, the war takes place within a 
single container, i.e. that the war is an intra-state war that takes place in the territory of one 
state and wherein all of the combatants are not only members of this last, they are at the same 
time members of the opposing fighting groups. A civil war, therefore, is a war between rival 
groups that have the same citizenship. Interpreting the Risorgimento as a civil war, in that it is 
too much of a forced interpretation, has hence been rejected by Gabriele Ranzato in an Italian 
anthology on the issue of civil, or “fratricidal wars”: He essentially states that in both the past 
and the present it was recognized that even after Italy was created there were no Italians. As 
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such he asserted that the conditions for civil war were not met because not only was there no 
state, there was no nation.
205
 
The Risorgimento was, however, at least in part, a massive inner-Italian conflict 
between differing ideological positions. While it is possible to take for granted this 
ideological contraposition when assessing the motives of the “leading” figures, an analysis of 
the motives underlying the entry into the war on the part of each individual soldier is of 
course another question, the moment the latter does not necessarily have to correspond 
(totally) to the former. The notion of civil war, however far it may be from being totally 
adequate in describing the Risorgimento Wars, does help to overcome an analysis that 
heretofore has been very one-sided – in its focus on the nationalist groups - and therefore 
encourages a far more serious analysis of the opposing factions than has been carried out thus 
far.  
2.4.3 “National” wars – a “performative” perspective  
The notion of “national wars” may be sustained particularly with regard to the various waves 
of Italian “volunteers” in these conflicts, insofar as unification and the building of a national 
Italian state may have – subjectively – been the aim in this case. In 1848/49 for instance, the 
Italian war volunteers were accompanied into war by the massive production of national 
songs, such as “Fratelli d’Italia”, which exalted national brotherhood; drew upon multiple 
Italian nationalized myths including the Genoese Balilla, the Florentine Ferruccio, the 
Lombard League and the Sicilian Vespers; and, in its refrain, called on the “brothers” to be 
ready to die in the name of the Italian nation. The refrain asked them to die in a military 
campaign, a campaign – the song was composed in 1847
206
 – that was clearly directed against 
what was perceived by the patriots as the “hereditary enemy of Italy”, Austria.  
Wars that aim to unify supposedly national territory are labelled “national wars”; this stems 
from the idea that unification will be the result of these wars. Based on recent studies wherein 
aspects of the military are examined – e.g. acting out gender roles – the expression “national 
wars” can be seen from a performative perspective.  
The expression “national war” may be associated with multiple meanings. At the basic 
level – as I already have noted – wars that aim to unify supposedly national territory can be 
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labelled a “national war” because of the idea that unification will result by means of those 
wars. But in recent studies, another important concept of “national wars” surfaces whereby 
the national validity of military struggle itself is emphasized. As American historian Silvana 
Patriarca observed
207
, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were characterized by the 
widespread foreign as well as Italian perception of the Italian nation as being backward, a 
backwardness that contrasted heavily with another perception of a former historical Italian 
supremacy. The Italian population was, according to this view, characterized by indolence, by 
laziness and a moral degeneration that led to the feminization of Italian men. The highly 
emblematic eighteenth- and still nineteenth-century phenomenon of the “Cicisbeo” – the 
“Cavalier servente” or professed gallant and/or lover of a married woman, who was 
considered effeminate because of his predisposition for luxury, theatre and his inclination for 
fashion – became a symbol of the effeminate Italian.
208
 Consequently, in the nineteenth 
century deliberate "politics of masculinization" were seen as an attempt to remedy the 
feminization of Italian men. According to this view, one important place in which the practice 
of re-masculinization ought to have taken place was in fighting. By military actions, Italian 
men would not only be educated to be real men, but they could at the same time show to 
themselves, the Italian nation and the world at large that they were making a comeback. It is 
no coincidence that the period and the movement that aimed to unify Italy was already at the 
time referred to as the “Risorgimento”, i.e. regeneration. The term insinuated that there was a 
return to their “natural condition”, not only that as foreign rule was overthrown there was a 
return to Italian rule, but also that the Italian people had or were undergoing a process of 
revival or resurrection. The latter logic points to the performative aspect of war itself. War, 
from this perspective, is waged as a form of communication to the world (and, not least, to the 
foreign comrades present in the Italian armed groups themselves) that masculinity was 
“restored”. 
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2.5 The choice of the historiographical object: Germans on the Italian sides – a paradox? 
2.5.1 The point of departure: German-Italian attraction and repulsion 
My interest in the history of Germans in the Italian armed groups of the Risorgimento was 
initially piqued based on the nationalism studies I previously carried out. Research on Italian 
nationalism as well as my own work on the Italian national myth of the Balilla had revealed 
the central role that the negative image surrounding “tedeschi” (Germans) played in the 
process that emotionally charged and injected Italian nationalism with aggression. “Germans” 
that fought on the Italian sides, from this point of view, seemed nearly a paradox. How, then, 
can the participation of “Germans”, especially on the pro-national Italian sides, be reconciled 
with the particularly negative image of the Germans that was prevalent in Italy at the time? 
The word “tedeschi” was used consistently, at least from the 1830s onwards, to refer to the 
“Austrians”, which were seen – due to their dominance over important parts of the peninsula 
– by Italian nationalists as the main hindrance to and enemy of Italian unification, as well as 
the foundation of the conservative reaction in Europe. The negative image that was built 
around the designation "tedeschi" reached similar levels as that which the Germans had built 
around the idea that the French were their "hereditary enemy".
209
 As in the latter case, the 
“creators” of myths did not hesitate to foment negative emotions against the “enemy”.
210
 The 
Habsburg Empire came to be considered the “expansionist force” of the “Germans”
211
, and as 
such “ascended” to the role of the enemy of Italy. But the “Germans” were seen not only as a 
military enemy and a hindrance to Italian unification, but were downright “demonized” as 
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“barbaric”. Through this use of language, the memory of the “barbarian invasions” of the 
Italian peninsula in the fourth and fifth century AD was linked to the dominant role of the 
Austrians in nineteenth-century Italy.
212
 The image of the Germans as “barbarians”, fuelled 
especially by a negative reading of Tacitus’ Germania, was not confined to the German-
Italian case, however; it is found frequently throughout Europe and informs hetero-
stereotypes in various countries.
213
 In Italy, “barbarian” was a word that was applied to 
different peoples as well, and consequently different historical situations were perceived as 
similar anti-barbaric struggles. Nevertheless, due to the contemporary predominance of 
Austrian domination in Italy, the anti-“Germanic” struggle takes centre stage in the nineteenth 
century. In 1832 Mazzini refers to a series of Italian myths, from the battle of Legnano (1176) 
and the Sicilian Vespers (1282), to Masaniello (1647) and Balilla (1746).
214
 Compared to 
other conflicts it was easier for some of these references to be interpreted
215
 as conflicts 
between opposing forces of “Germans” and “Italians”, while in others other foreign-Italian 
opposition seemed to be central. Nevertheless, Mazzini focuses on the battle against Austria, 
concluding: “Say to them: It is up to you to imitate these acts [..S]tretch your hand to 
Lombardy: here are the men that perpetuate your servitude; stretch it to the Alps: there are 




The image of the “Austrians” as “barbarians” also informed albeit more narrowly the 
Italian view of the Austrian military. Carlo Botta in his widely diffused “Storia d’Italia”
217
, 
when writing about the history of Genoa in 1746, designates the Austrian soldiers as 
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“tedeschi” and ascribes to them a particular harshness and avarice.
218
 As Alberto Banti has 
noted, it was especially in Italian memories of contemporary events that the “role of the 
protagonist was given to the Austrian soldier”, who was “responsible for public beatings of 
naked women, unnecessary violence, unreproducible humiliations” of civilians.
219
 In the 
memoirs written by Cesare Correnti on the Ten Days of Brescia in 1849, as reported by Banti, 
there are horrible descriptions of Austrian soldiers forcing “wives and children” not only to 
watch the Austrians set living men on fire, but “to swallow […] the lacerated viscera of their 
sweethearts” as well.
220
 A special place in this barbarian imagery (as well as of that of the 
national “traitor”) is reserved – as Banti has shown – for rape. According to him, the issue of 
interethnic love and especially sexual relationships is central to national discourse. He 
believes that there is a real “obsession” with rape in nineteenth century narrations,
221
 because 
it violates not only the honour of the Italian women but of the Italian men as well, insofar as it 
shows that they were unable to defend “their” (compatriot) women from such assaults.
222
 
“Barbarian” cupidity towards Italian women constitutes not only a threat to Italian “honour” 
but also to the Italian “ethnos”. The “barbaric” foreigners, hence, participate in a logic where 
“the evil ones become irremediably so, and the fact their soul is black is demonstrated by their 
wild inclination to sadistic sexual perversion.”
223
  
Equating “Austrians” with “tedeschi” progressively gained traction also beyond the 
Italian territories of the empire. We find the motto “Morte ai tedeschi” on the walls, for 
instance in 1846 Florence and Ravenna
224
. In 1847, a Genoese newspaper presented the 
“Germans” as both the historical and contemporary “natural enemy”.
225
 “Death to the 
Germans! eternal scourge of Italy and her sons” figures still in 1862 in the libretto of 
Giuseppe Verdi’s “La forza del destino” (The Force of Destiny).
226
  
The negative image of the Germans was noted in Germany as well, leading for 
instance in 1837 to the warning given to Germans travelling to Italy to avoid – on the basis of 
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the “German-Italian national hatred” (contemporary citation) – revealing their German origin; 
more specifically they should avoid presenting themselves as “Austrians” and instead declare 
themselves to be Prussian.
227
 
At first, the participation of Germans in the Italian struggles of the Risorgimento might 
seem equally implausible, given the negative stereotypes of Italians diffused in Germany.
228
 
Already the “Italiensehnsucht” (or longing for Italy) of the Germans (or better: the learned 
Germans) in Winckelmann and Goethe’s time combined the interest in the historic sites of 
Italy with a rather negative image of the inhabitants of the peninsula. The enlightened theories 
on the effects of climate on “national character” had contributed to shape the perceptions 
Germans had regarding the psychological traits of the Italians.
229
 Already in the nineteenth 
century, these perceptions were increasingly transposed into the idea that there were not only 
behavioural, but also physiological differences between the “races”.
230
 Those pictures were 
related to the perception of the south of Europe as an inner-European, “oriental” and 
“feminine” other for North-Europeans.
231
 The Italians were described as cowardly, lazy, 
effeminate, superstitious, to cite only a few of the most recurrent attributes.
232
 The idea that 
the north of Europe was relatively progressive as opposed to the backward, even “decadent”, 
Italy and southern Europe took centre stage. This picture very much informed the “journey to 
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, which developed from the aristocratic “Grand Tour” at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.
234
 The inhabitants of the peninsula often figured here only as an ingredient 
of the “picturesque” – which necessarily included decadence and decay
235
 – if not as sexually 
attractive elements exactly because of their “alterity”.
236
 This was linked to a growing 
German sense of superiority with regard to Italy
237
, which seems to be resurfacing in our 
present debates on the “euro-crisis”, with its revival of the fable of the ant and the 
grasshopper. As Wolfang Altgeld has shown for the period leading up to 1848, despite 
differences across the political spectrum, this negative image held in Germany – and also 
elsewhere – of the “national character” of the Italians was relatively consistent. In the words 
of Christoph Dipper, it formed the “basso continuo” of the German conception of the 
Italians.
238
 Given these particularly negative images of the “other” – the negative German 
image of the Italians as well as the negative picture of the “Germans” in Italy – the existence 
of Germans “fighting” in the Italian ranks seems like it would be a very improbable outcome.  
But the respective reciprocal negative images of the “other” were, of course, only half 
of the story. On the other end of the spectrum lay the positive images
239
 that at times replaced 
– though, only for a while – the negative ones; and often the negative and positive images 
were related to each other sometimes in complex manners. This can be clearly shown, for 
instance, in the case of the image Germans had of Italians between the 1830s and 1870s.
240
 As 
opposed to the “basso continuo” of the negative picture – that in one way or another informed 
every position with regard to Italy – positive Italian images were far more dependent on 
political position. We do not find, however, a clear pattern that runs along party lines but 
rather “conflicting positions within the single camps” that sometimes led to quite “paradoxical 
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 Nevertheless, positive images of Italy were very much confined to 
the liberal and democratic half of the German political spectrum. On this side of the political 
spectrum, moreover, there is a contemporary perception that a "parallel", in terms of political 
and national aspirations, existed between Germany and Italy.
242
 But such ideas were often 
rapidly tempered by geopolitical considerations. For those that did not adhere to a strict 
“kleindeutsche” (the lesser German solution) or anti-Austrian position “Italy” and “Germany” 
could, already at the bilateral, German-Italian level, be seen to be in direct opposition to one 
another. This became clear within the context of the “question of Trento” as discussed in the 
Frankfurt national assembly as well as in the parliaments at Vienna and Innsbruck in 1848.
243
 
In the same vein, Austria’s holdings in Italy could still be interpreted in later times as 
necessary for an “adequate German position in the middle of Europe” to exist.
244
 Perceptions 
of Italy also changed, when it was considered within the context of triangular, and even 
quadrangular geopolitical situations. If Austria and especially France were brought into the 
picture, the perspective could change significantly. This was especially the case in 1859 after 
France and Piedmont had formed their alliance in January of the same year. By this point in 
Germany many not only discussed what was happening in Italy, they also began to deliberate 
their possible direct participation in the imminent war. Among the more obvious and expected 
positions were those put forth by pro-Austrian, anti-Italian and anti-French conservative 
groups, which defended "monarchic legitimacy", many of which – together with others – were 
proponents of the greater German solution, who propounded "defending the Rhine at the Po".  
Then there are others, such as Friedrich Engels, who was pro-Austrian because he was 
anti-French and anti-Bonapartist, and Ferdinand Lasalle who may have been anti-Austrian 
because of his pro-German and anti-reactionary stance.
245
 With Garibaldi’s expedition in 
1860 and the subsequent formation of the Italian nation state German opinion once again 
reflected the position of its main political “parties”. Even more important is the fact that these 
events in Italy were for short periods able to drown out this negative “basso continuo”.  
Liberals and democrats saw in 1860, more or less unbelievingly, that not Germany, but 
Italy “had made it” first. Until 1870, hence before the Franco-Prussian war once again 
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profoundly changed the “mental maps” of Europe
246
, the image of the Italians in Germany 
was very much divided into two groups: the kleindeutsch-liberal-democratic praise of Italian 
unification and the Catholic-conservative-großdeutsch criticism.  
2.5.2 Defining “Germans” and “border cases” 
This study considered “Germans” to be those individuals born and raised in one of the states 
of the “German Confederation” (Deutscher Bund, 1815-1866) with the exception of Austria. 
The study is, however, well aware of the different possible definitions of the term, as well as 
the respective problems linked to any one of these possible concepts.  
The chosen definition is for instance problematic already at a formal level. Whereas 
other studies on foreign soldiers in Italy in the early and mid-ninteenth century can (or at least 
do) quite easily speak of “French” or “British” soldiers in Italy, to use the terms “Germans” 
and “Italians” is of course much more problematic. This is so because in Italy and Germany 
the nation-state was still in its embryonic stages in this period. In strictly formal terms, there 
were no “German” or “Italian” subjects until the formation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861 or 
the “Deutsches Reich” in 1871. Therefore, in terms of formal “citizenship” reference can only 
be made to those of the pre-national, existing states: When thinking of it from this point of 
view, we are not dealing with a German subject but with a citizen of the principality of 
Liechtenstein (part of the German Confederation) for instance, and until 1847 the British 
Army would, if considered at the same formal level, be comparable to the Army of the Duchy 
of Lucca. 
The definition chosen for this study, however, adheres at least partially to a formal 
criterion, insofar as it encompasses those individuals born and/or raised in one of the states of 
the German Confederation
247
, with the exeption of Austria. Therefore, what is decisive for 
this study is not the question as to whether the individuals were in possession of something 
like the “citizenship” of a state, but whether they were born or lived there in their early years; 
in terms of the historical and political debate over citizenship law, this study choses a 
combination of “ius soli” and an early “naturalization”, by underlining the place of birth as 
well as the time spent in the territory of the given state. This definition is also partially based 
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on the analysis of the soldiers’ registers, in which the following information on “origin” of the 
soldiers is normally given: the place of birth, the last residence and often information on 
previous military engagements, and therefore the time spent in different territories. 
The primary reason for the exclusion of Austria in this definition – but of course not in 
terms of its historical role in Italy and for the “German” soldiers studied – lays in its function 
as a direct warring party in Italy. The research interest is not about soldiers enlisting in the 
army of their “own” country of origin. It is for this reason that Austrians in the Austrian army 
are excluded.
248
 The Austrian army did not consist, however, in Austrians alone; there were 
“Italians” and soldiers from states of the German Confederation in the Austrian ranks as well. 
Some of the Germans in this study, for instance, were at one time soldiers in the Austrian 
army. Despite many similarities and interdependencies, however, subjects of other German 
states that fought in the Austrian ranks have been excluded. To include them would have been 
to divert too much attention from the German-Italian (military) relations upon which the study 
focuses; it would have inserted the study far too much into the context of German history 
alone, right into the heart of the historiographical debate about the formation of the German 
nation state, which revolved partially around a großdeutsche (with Austria, or at least its’ 
German-speaking territories) and kleindeutsche solution (with neither Austria nor its 
predominantly “German” territories). It is however important for my study to underline that I 
do not believe that the großdeutsche solution was historically impossible, nor that the 
“kleindeutsche” outcome was “natural”. I also do not believe that the idea that the 
contemporaries of the early and mid-nineteenth century had of “German” individuals 
necessarily excluded (German) Austrians. 
 In fact, caution must be taken not to read the past through the lens of the historical 
outcome of this process. At the same time however, it would be wrong to neglect or overlook 
elements that, vice versa, pushed toward the “kleindeutsche” solution.
 249
 This study tries to 
take the German complexities in this regard into consideration. The important role that 
Austria played, for instance, for Catholic Prussians will be equally taken into account as the 
“slippery slope” inherent in the construction of the term “tedeschi” as the word assigned to 
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mean the Austrian enemy in Italy, the effects of which also could apply to the soldiers from 
other German states as well.  
At the same time, just because the nineteenth century was the formative period not 
only of the nation state, but of national identity at least in Italy and Germany, one of the aims 
of the study is to see how closely the soldiers that have been identified by this chosen 
definition regarded themselves as Germans, but also whether they identified with regional 
identities, which could be seen as opposed or, instead, linked to the idea of the nation. 
Furthermore, the study explores the intertwined effects of self-image and the external images 
that were triggered by German-Italian contact. In the end, the study should reveal as well, 
what these “German” soldiers had or did not have in common, and looks at the specificity of 
German soldiering in comparison to other foreign-Italian cases. The longer the soldiers were 
away from Germany, the more we must ask the level of their “Italianization”, in terms of their 
integration into the Italian society. Some of the foreign soldiers lived abroad or in Italy for 
quite a long time. Some married Italian women, and some were “naturalized” and/or tried to 
join the new Italian Army. Furthermore, some tried to actively “Italianize” themselves, for 
instance when the Bourbon officer Ludwig Richard Zimmermann undersigned the dedication 
of his book as “Luigi Riccardo”.
250
 
 Every definition, however refined, leads to disputable inclusions and exclusions. On 
the basis of my definition, for instance, a series of cases will not be considered in depth. For 
instance, the sons of binational German-Italian couples who were born in Italy and entered 
Italian armed groups will not be discussed. A specific example of this is Enrico Mayer, born 
in Livorno to a German father and a French mother, who took part as a volunteer in the first 
Italian War of Independence in 1848: Mayer did not obtain his Italian citizenship until 1860. 
As a result of his kinship, he played a key role as mediator between the Italian, German and, 
in this case, also French sides.
251
 Among the cases that are included in our sample, are special 
cases, “borderline cases” that are, as always, particularly interesting and revealing. Among the 
Papal Zouaves, for instance, we find sons of Italians that emigrated to Germany, among 
which the three brothers Leopold, Alfred and Heinrich Marzorati from Aachen.
252
 Another 
“borderline case” is the Mazzinian Harro-Paul Harring. Born in Danish Schleswig in 1798, 
Harring studied painting first in Copenhagen and then in Dresden, where he first came into 
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contact with the German Burschenschaften (student associations). He wrote and published 
both in Danish and German, as well as in other languages. While he was trying to establish 
nation states, he himself led a life very much between the national groups.
253
 
2.6 Research contexts 
A comparative study of German soldiers across the Italian political spectrum must necessarily 
incorporate very different strands of historiography. Already studies that have concentrated 
more narrowly on foreign participation on one Italian side, or those dedicated to one foreign-
Italian case, be it on the pro- or anti-Unitarian side, must necessarily depart from the 
historiography on nineteenth-century Italy as well as one or more other “national” 
historiographies. For various aspects of the history of foreign soldiers in Italy we have to 
change between, as well as bring together, different “traditional” historiographies. 
Furthermore, given the various aspects involved in the history of the foreign 
participants under scrutiny, we must change historical perspective. Thus, it seems obvious 
from the start, that “national history” at least partially informs the reasons as to why Germans 
left for Italy. Ute Frevert pointed out that “the European actions of solidarity for the 
independence movements between 1820 and 1870 were highly motivated by domestic 
political concerns: Either they served, as in Great Britain, for purposes of self-scrutiny, or, as 
with Germany, to stimulate their own aspirations for unification.”
254
 Similarly, Lucy Riall 
underlined in reference to the foreign soldiers under Garibaldi, that “internal politics and 
preferences had always played a significant role in defining foreign support for Garibaldi: 
resistance to Napoleon III in the case of France; and a strident Protestantism […] in the case 
of Britain and the USA”.
255
 Rather than just “national” reasons to enlist or to hire foreigners 
in Italy, perhaps we are also dealing with specifically “transnational collective sentiments”, 
with ideas of “international friendship and fraternity”
256
 that transcended the “national” in that 
it constituted “non-national” elements of motivation as well. Some authors ask us to view 
foreign participation in the Risorgimento or Anti-Risorgimento as episodes in the continuity 
of different “European”
257
 movements, from an “international of nationalists” and/or 
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democrats to the “international” of legitimists and (Ultramontane) Catholics. This perspective 
necessarily requires a return to the history of political “ideologies” in the nineteenth century; 
therefore, a comparative study such as this must take into account the history of the different 
and contrasting ideologies present at the time. The history of German (and Italian) 
Catholicism, but also of German “Protestantism” – as far as it informed the pro-national 
foreign soldiers – and the historiography on monarchism and legitimism are as important for 
this study as nationalism studies and the history of the political “centre” and the “left”. 
If we move away from the perspective of the issue of motivation and direct our 
attention toward the experiences and practices linked to the foreign soldiers, still other 
historiographical contexts come into play. On the one hand it seems fair to assume that the 
longer the foreigners remained in Italy, the more “Italian” history per se has an influence on 
them. On the other hand, the study will argue that we need to “dirty our hands” far more with 
military history if we wish to fully understand the experiences of these soldiers. Moving into 
the sphere of military history is a particularly delicate matter: A “military history” of the 
garibaldini and especially of the “regular” armies of other pre-Unitarian states than Piedmont, 
remains very much to be written.
258
 This information is necessary however, as it will be 
argued, the moment not just the transnational experiences are asked for, but also the clashes, 
transfers and hybrid “innovations” that were generated by the foreign-Italian military 
commitment. Indeed, the question of eventual specificities in the history of foreigners, or even 
more narrowly of Germans in the armed groups of the Italian Risorgimento and Anti-
Risorgimento, can only be addressed once an understanding of the history of non-foreign 
soldiers in these groups has been acquired. The same may be said for the question of possible 
transnational transfers, for which it is necessary to a certain degree to have an idea – even if 
only as an analytical “construct” – of a “before” and an “after”. In other words, a comparison 
must be made. Rather than highlighting the differences and problems between comparative 
and transnational history in terms of “Galton’s problem”, here as elsewhere, the aim is to see 
how comparisons, transnational perspectives and especially “entangled histories” are 
intimately linked: “In order, as a historian, to recognize what is happening during a transfer, 
one must compare the following: the position of the object under investigation in its old 
context with that in its new context, the social origins of the intermediaries and of the affected 
parties in one country with those of another, terms in one language with those of another, and 
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finally the interpretation of a phenomenon within the cultural context from which it comes 
with that in which it has been introduced.”
259
 
2.6.1 Nationalism and Risorgimento studies 







One node of the scientific debate centres on the question of the (dis-)continuities of 
nationalism with national identity in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, especially during 
Italian fascism: Positions that assume central continuities go hand in hand with a strong 
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criticism of an orientation that focuses on “Risorgimento values” today.
262
 Alberto Mario 
Banti has claimed the existence of a “national discourse” that according to him was common 
to the two classical pro-Unitarian “factions”, democrats and liberals. Furthermore, he stresses 
that rather than viewing the nation as a “voluntary” association of people, “national 
discourse” very much placed the idea of “kinship” between the members of the national 
community at its centre and, therefore, the nation was considered a form of extended family. 
According to Banti, this biological and ethnic definition of the nation had already begun to 
spread from the French Revolution onwards, and was a position accepted as well by the 
“left”. Whereas in his first book on the issue he concentrated on “national discourse” only in 
Italy
263
, in a subsequent publication he tries to demonstrate that a similarly constructed 
“national discourse” also operated in other European countries during the same period.
264
 For 
other authors, positions of this kind are anachronistic in that they read the early and mid-
nineteenth century through the lens of “the chauvinism and authoritarianism of the end of the 
nineteenth century”.
265
 In contrast to Banti, they place more emphasis on the democratic 
contents of national discourse
266
 or hypothesize the parallel and opposing existence of at least 
two national discourses, a democratic and a liberal one, during the Risorgimento.
267
  
This discussion, however, is basically in line with debates on other “national” 
nationalisms and nationalism studies in general. Much of the older literature on nationalism is 
informed by various “typologies” of nationalisms. Some authors have underlined more or less 
contemporarily existing, though very different forms of nationalism. Friedrich Meinecke’s 
differentiation between a German Kulturnation (a nation based on the sharing of a common 
culture) and a French Staatsnation (a nation more or less based on the political will of its 
members to build a nation-state) is to be collocated here, and still today informs the 
dichotomy between a supposedly typically German “ius sanguinis” and a French “ius soli”.
268
 
Typology also informed the idea of a supposedly distinct difference between a “progressive, 
emancipatory”, “liberal” nationalism – sometimes even termed appositely as “Risorgimento 
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nationalism” in the European historiographies
269
 – and a conservative, chauvinistic, “integral” 
form. In many cases the typology was considered the basis upon which the idea of a historical 
development was formed: According to this position, there was a decisive shift in the late 
nineteenth century from a basically “left wing” to a “right wing” nationalism. These positions 
go hand in hand with the emphasis that is placed on the differences between nationalism in 
the nineteenth century and the nationalism inherent in Italian fascism or German national-
socialism; according to these authors, early and mid-nineteenth century nationalism is 
essentially different from racism, simply because they make a distinction between what they 
consider to be a basically “voluntaristic” nationalism, characteristic of the early and mid-
nineteenth century, and an “ethnic” nationalism, which developed only subsequently.  
Many doubts, however, have been expressed with regard to the thesis of a stark 
difference between “left” and “right”, earlier and later nationalisms. In Germany for instance, 
Dieter Langewiesche argued against the “pedagogy of concepts”, against pitting a “good” 
nation against “bad” nationalism, “good” patriotism against “bad” nationalism, as well as a 
“good” nationalism against a “bad” nationalism. Instead, he emphasizes that nationalism 
“comprises […] and delivers both: participation and aggression”, even if “in different dosages 
in the different societies and in different historical times”. According to Langwiesche, it is 
hence misleading to “make a demarcation between an only emancipatory, still innocent 
national thinking of early times against a degenerated nationalism of later times.”
270
 It is 
enough to think of the “Franzosenhass” (“hatred of the French”) of Ernst Moritz Arndt in 
1813, the German songs on the Rhine in the 1840s
271
, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn’s vision of a 
“great Germany” which incorporated “Switzerland, Holland and Denmark”
272
 or the 
aforementioned construction of the “Germans” as “barbarians” in Italian nationalism to call 
into question this “good-bad” divide: “As in the case of the other nationalisms”, writes Hans-
Ulrich Wehler, “the element of a fundamentalist enmity against a supposedly ‘hereditary 
enemy’ was constitutively part of German nationalism from the beginning, which [however], 
due to its close relationship with early liberalism and already with national-democratic ideas 
saw itself as a philanthropic reform movement.”
273
 Banti’s emphasis on the European 
“ubiquity” of ethnic nationalism as well as on its continuity from the early nineteenth to the 
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, seems to be only the last, even if highly controversial, slap in the 
face to the positive visions of nationalism. 
Instead of discussing all the nodes of the substantial debates on Italian nationalism
275
 
and Banti’s contribution, I will concentrate on two points that in my view merit further 
discussion, and which are particularly important for the object of this study. First, it seems 
that the issue of continuities between the nineteenth century and the past (i.e. previous 
centuries) is still underexplored; we will see how much pre-nineteenth century traditions 
continued to inform the armies and armed groups of the nineteenth century. Second, it is 
opportune to discuss the analytical concepts, including an assessment of the pros and cons of 
the concept of “discourse” with regard to established concepts such as political opinions or 
ideologies as well as their differences: In these terms, for instance, it will be argued that the 
postulation whereby national discourse can sufficiently and directly explain national 
movements is highly problematic. 
2.6.1.2 Cultural and social epistemologies 
Part of the contentiousness of the “new” historiography of the Risorgimento is associated with 
its transition toward a more cultural analysis. With this change, a series of new objects and 
new analytical conceptions took hold. Some of these conceptions rendered the already 
established ones problematic, among which “subjectivity”, “conscience”, “intentions”, 
“experience” or the supposed opposition between “production” and “reception”. Were 
Risorgimento historiography to continue treating new theoretical paths on issues like 
resistance, conflict, pluralities and change, it would enable this branch to maintain its strong 
relationship with international debates, “foreign” methodologies and cross-cultural 
comparisons – a reality that doubtlessly has been very prolific for Risorgimento 
historiography over the last two decades. The theoretical possibilities created by concepts 
such as “production of practices”, the crossover between different discourses, or slightly 
subversive performative repetition have not by any means been exhaustively treated. A clear 
demonstration of these shifts can be made in the case of “private” writing
276
 and the 
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“experience” of subjects, where, in contrast to a tradition in which experiences are seen as 
expressions of a kind of pure individual subject, some historians continue to emphasize that 
the importance of social and cultural guidelines must not be forgotten or overlooked, nor 
should the links between the “self-writing” with the fulfilment of collectively constructed 
roles, be they “private” or “public”. Indeed, much of the current historiographical production 
has shown how the Risorgimento affected the “private” sphere as well as the “public” sphere, 
to such an extent that the two can no longer be separated.
277
 
2.6.1.3 Discourse and political opinions 
On the basis of well-established views on what was quite a difficult and long process of 
“nationalization” in the European societies, a heated debate erupted over the characterization 
of the Risorgimento as a “mass movement”.
 278
 One of the reasons this debate was so fierce 
seems to reside in the fact that – on both "sides of the debate" – two historical objects were 
too easily confuted. I think that it is important to distinguish conceptually between “national 
movements” and “national discourse” – regardless of whether this distinction is made with 
reference to Germany or to Italy. The national movement is characterized by its well-known 
open or secret associations, the structures that allow us to speak – a bit anachronistically – of 
the political “parties” of democrats, liberals or monarchists in the nineteenth century. The 
second object is constituted by the pan-European “national discourse”: Pan-European is not to 
be understood in the sense of a “European identity”, but rather because “national discourse” 
was, despite significant differences, similarly constructed within each nation throughout 
Europe
279
. The point is, however, that these two historical objects, “national movements” and 
“national discourse”, do not completely overlap, and hence we cannot directly derive the 
strength of the pro-Unitarian movements from a study of “national discourse” or vice-versa. 
The studies on the forms of organization, the media, the political-ideological positions and the 
networks of the national movement are by no means obsolete. Why is this so? 
First, it would be good to remember that the introduction of the term “discourse” into 
the field of nationalism studies only really makes sense if we describe at least partially 
another “reality” with the term that cannot fully be grasped using just the existing terms such 
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as “nationalism” or “national movement”. Banti in “La nazione del Risorgimento” explicitly 
links his considerations to Michel Foucault – as well as others, such as Propp – by quoting 
him, or by being inspired by him for instance in chapter headings (e.g. “Archaeology of 
national discourse”). Nevertheless, in his second book Banti uses other words as well, among 
which “discorso risorgimentale” or “nationalism”. In my opinion, however, it is important to 
emphasize that "national discourse" is a distinct concept from others such as "nationalism" 
and "national movement", and hence for me the confutation of the various concepts – whether 
in Banti’s work or in that of other authors – is highly problematic. 
This is so precisely because several theoretical assumptions are connected to the 
concept of “discourse” that might prove very useful for empirical research. Speaking of a 
“national discourse” in the Foucauldian sense means something different or “more” than just 
the plurality of empirically existing linguistic “utterances” on the nation (states). These 
“utterances” according to Foucault – he differentiates between “utterances” (“énonciation”) 
and “statements” (“énoncé”) – are not the “discourse” itself, but only the necessary empirical 
objects for the study of “discursive formations”. “Discourse”, in other words, comes through 
in these utterances, but is something (at least partially) different from them. The aim of an 
analysis of “discourse” is to elucidate the respective boundaries of what factually can be said 
at a certain historical point, and what cannot. At the same time, the penetration of society by 
“discourse” also means – and this is an important node in the Foucauldian theory of power – 
that it becomes extremely difficult to express oneself outside certain forms of speech or to do 
certain things in other ways than is required by “discourse” without being utterly dismissed. 
According to Peter Schöttler, Foucault therefore focuses, “instead of on domination-
free and tolerant communication, […]focussing on invisible and non-violent coercions, which 
pervade society or parts thereof and provoke, such that only that which is normally said, is 
what culturally and historically could be said.”
280
 In other words, discourse – in this 
theoretical sense – is a historical “a priori”, beyond which the single speaker cannot say 
anything, without running the risk of being regarded as odd. The subject, in this conception, is 
informed very much in an unconscious way by discourse as structure; in fact Foucault speaks 
of the “positive unconscious of knowledge”
281
, which is historically variable.  
It is on this theoretical basis that a transposition of the political-historical differences 
between liberals and democrats into two or even more contemporarily existing “national 
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discourses”, namely a democratic “national discourse” and a liberal one, is not entirely 
convincing. Not because the differences between liberals and democrats were not important 
for understanding Italy in this period. On the contrary, the political differentiation into these 
“parties” is central in many regards, in terms of their differing political ideas on state-
formation, or in their use of the media, the forms of their associations etc. But the concept of 
“limits” to what can be said” does not cleave so much to the idea of contemporarily existing, 
totally opposed positions on the same object (the “nation”), if one is not prepared to suppose 
the existence of a segmentation of society into “containers” that hardly communicated, if at 
all, with each other. The heuristic value of the concept of “discourse”, hence, is diminished, if 
it is used as a label for the different political “opinions”. As discussed above, the decisive 
differences between liberals and democrats are not being called into question in terms of their 
ideas on the concrete construction of the nation-state, mine is simply a request to intensify the 
debate on the theoretical concepts we all use in our day-to-day research activities. 
The theoretical changes that have occurred in the study of European nationalisms 
during the few last years, from nationalism as a political ideology to national discourse, 
without doubt are a push in the direction toward asking which discursive elements are 
common to the different “parties”. Perhaps we are dealing with communalities in terms of the 
symbols used by different sides, but that take on different meaning: As Lucy Riall has 
underlined, “the meaning of symbols can change while their outward (linguistic or visual) 
structure remains the same”
282
 But perhaps we are actually dealing with communalities in the 
form of common discourse as well. This then leads to – going beyond Banti’s position as 
well– the question if “national discourse” has penetrated into the political “camps” that have 
traditionally been seen as opposed to nationalism in the form of a political programme of (this 
kind of) state-formation.
283
 Hence, a new phase of reflection must be made with regard to the 
relations between “national discourse” and the various political “programmes”. The aim of 
this study, with its comparative perspective, is – despite other interests - to contribute to this 
debate.  
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2.6.2 The “Anti-Risorgimento”: legitimism and Catholicism 
Anti-Fascist Resistenza and the Risorgimento
284
 are the two most important fundamental 
myths of modern, united and republican Italy. The separatist Northern League (Lega Nord) 
has tried to directly attack these myths. In September of 2007, Umberto Bossi, the leader of 
the Northern League, referred to Garibaldi as “an imbecile”. For Bossi it was an error to 
follow the Piedmontese monarchy and Garibaldi, who presented himself as a man of the 
people but at the same time was, as Bossi underlined, paid by the Piedmontese monarch. In 
reference to the 1847 written song “Brothers of Italy” (Fratelli d’Italia) – which has been the 
official anthem of the Italian Republic since 1946 – Bossi added: “We do not want to be the 
slave of Rome.”
285
 Along the same lines, groups of “loyal Bourbon subjects” have engaged in 
book publications
286
, in conferences such as the “traditionalists’ conference of the loyal city 
of Gaeta” (“convegno tradizionalista della fedelissima città di Gaeta”) that held a “dinner with 
a Bourbon menu” and also a “mass of intercession for his majesty, Ferdinand II of Bourbon” 
in the Basilica di Santa Chiara in Naples (2009). Networks of Catholics with their respective 
websites, at times in harmony with either the southern or the Leagues’s interpretation, do not 
accept the defeat of the Pope’s territorial sovereignty following the destruction of the Papal 
States in 1870 – which resulted in the confinement of the Pope to the Vatican City – and try to 
reinterpret the Risorgimento as a “Civil War” between mostly loyal Roman Catholics or 
Italians and a small number of anti-religious or anti-Catholic disturbed free-masons. 
Ironically, these positions do not take into consideration that they are strengthening rather 
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than weakening the idea that there is only one single Italian “container” (see the discussion of 
the concept of “civil war” above). One of the main exponents of this train of thought, the 
historian Angela Pellicciari, regularly publishes invectives against the usual interpretations of 
the Risorgimento in journals like “La Padania” or “Studi Cattolici” under polemical titles 
such as “The Dirty Linen of the Thousand”.
287
 
Within the context of historiography, less instrumental but challenging interpretations 
nonetheless, such as those of the Neapolitan journalist Gigi Di Fiore, consistently push for a 
“history of the victims” of the Risorgimento to be researched, a history that would take into 
account the often neglected opposition to unification in the nineteenth century.
288 
In terms of 
content, these publications are in fact mostly variations of the two arguments identified by 
John Davis as characteristic of “anti-risorgimental” literature: The first of these assumptions 
consists in claiming that wide strata of society, were not favourable toward the 
“Risorgimento”, but remained loyal to the monarchies and the papacy. The second, instead, 
sees the Risorgimento as the work of a small elite of “Jacobins, masons and liberals, which 
aimed to destroy the papacy and menace religion.”
289
 
These harsh polemics formulated by contemporary “anti-risorgimental” authors that 
are more than less external to academia, necessitate a historiographical reconsideration of the 
various opponents of national unification.
290
 In terms of quantity of works, the primary focus 
of Risorgimento historiography has always been directed toward the pro-Unitarian sides of 
the Italian political spectrum, often leaving the topic of the “opponents” to historians that 
work outside the narrower field of Risorgimento studies, or to those that study the opponents 
only as such: i.e. as adversaries of national unification and nationalism.  
The nineteenth-century “Anti-Risorgimento” was formed primarily of legitimist 
supporters of the monarchies and the defenders of the Papal States.
291
 Legitimist and pro-
papal positions and actions, however, were closely linked. Simon Sarlin clearly shows how 
exponents of both the pro- and the Anti-Risorgimento believed that the “Roman question” 
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was closely connected to the case of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
292
 These two were also 
connected at the organizational and even personal level, from the committees that sustained 
the Papal and Bourbon Armies and armed groups
293
 to soldiers that changed sides from the 
Papal to the Neapolitan Army
294
, or, later to the pro-Bourbon “guerrilla” groups.
295
 
It is from the perspective of a “new political history” and the suggestions of cultural 
history that I would propose the history of the opponents to be integrated into the proper 
mainstream of Risorgimento historiography.
 
Interest in a more general picture of the political 
culture of the nineteenth century that asks for differences and communalities across the 
political spectrum, would not only provide the possibility of asking again how important the 
political divides actually were, but also to evaluate – which is important for the political 
discussion of today as well - whether the Catholic and legitimist sides really provided 
alternatives to nationalist culture, and if so, what form these alternatives took on. In doing so, 
we can discover for instance some “modern” aspects of legitimism and Catholicism
296
 – such 
as their use of media and their communication with the public
297
 – a “modernity” of the 
opponents to Italian unification that nevertheless is an equally “problematic” modernity in its 
continuities with later times. My research project aims therefore to explore the mobilization, 
military practices and effects linked to the armies of the different sides, hence broadening the 
view from the pro-Unitarian party to the – mostly unexplored – Catholic
 
and Bourbon Armies.  
A look at the century from the perspective of political movements, factions, and 
parties tends to prompt us to detect any potential differences that may be linked to the 
political programmes of the opposition. From the perspective of “culture”, the picture is more 
complicated. Without doubt, national discourse was informed by cultural borrowings from 
religious and other traditional fields. The astonishing quantity of structural communalities 
between “nationalism” and “religion” has rightly been underlined in nationalism studies; they 
were so many, in fact, that some see “nationalism” as a type of “political religion”.
298
 The 
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“sacralization of the nation” went hand in hand with the conceptualization of national history 
as a “holy text”; national rituals and festivities were very much inspired (as well) by churchly 
liturgies; and “Christology” clearly informed the image of national heroes and heroines. But 
the relation between religion and nationalism is far more complicated. The interweaving 
issues of religious confession with nationalism in Germany
299
 for instance informed the 
already mentioned debate on the “kleindeutsche” or “großdeutsche” solution.
300
 Were the 
former to have prevailed, the predominant role of Prussia and of Protestantism would have 
prevailed, and therefore it is not astonishing that Catholics primarily sided with Austria and, 
in terms of national unification, took the “großdeutsche” perspective. The topic of discursive 
relations between religion and nationalism becomes even more complicated when possible 
transfers from the opposite direction – i.e. the transposition of nationalist content to religion 
as opposed to the transposition of religious content to nationalism discussed above – are taken 
into account. The confrontation between religion or the denominations and nationalism 
sometimes fostered the development of partially new cultural forms with which religion 
reacted to what was possibly an all too successful nationalism. However, it is possible to see 
that alongside a nationalization of the Catholic
301
 and legitimist opposition, there was also a 
“nationalization of the contents of Christian faith”.
302
 These complex relationships are the 
reason why, as Gilles Pécout has stated, “the anti-liberal volunteers who made the 
Antirisorgimento an original and distinct element of the international counter-revolution have 
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2.6.3 Transnational history 
It cannot be said that the international dimension was neglected by Risorgimento studies. 
Classic Risorgimento historiography has always been attentive to the international dimension 
in the exact sense of the term, which looks at the role of the other European states in the 
Risorgimento process. Furthermore, much recent historiography on nationalism has shown the 
massive circulation throughout Europe of national myths and constructions. These mutual 
borrowings and adaptions might, at first, seem to produce a paradox: Whereas national myths 
claimed to be “national”, they were in fact far less “national” than those constructing the 
myths wanted the public to believe. The respective national literatures informed the others 
precisely in their national themes and the elements of their myths (the parallel between 
“gavroche” in France and “Balilla” in Italy comes to mind here), so much so that Anne-Marie 
Thièsse could speak of the “Cosmopolitisme du national”.
304
 These transfers were based on 
the European-wide circulation of cultural “products”. The information guaranteed by periodic 
publications, with their correspondents in European capitals, only added to this. The cultural 
elites that read these publications were at the forefront of the construction and diffusion of 
national myths, thus ensuring that there were borrowings and adaptions. The role of European 
cultural circulation played in the formation of national myths is, however, only one aspect of 
the general, seemingly “paradoxical” finding that, in fact, as Gilles Pécout has written, “[i]n 
Europe’s long nineteenth century, no cause was more international than that of the nation.”
305
 
Even that which in some definitions is considered as 'transnational', i.e. the relations between 
non-state actors from different national societies, has been noted by Risorgimento 
historiography. Unfortunately, the actual presence of foreigners in the Italian Risorgimento 
was often evaluated separately or on the side and was used to demonstrate or prove the 
international solidarity for and hence the legitimacy of the struggle for unification; these 
studies, however, did not substantially add anything to the understanding of the workings of 
national history. This is problematic insofar as the conflict-laden nature of many of these 
Italian-foreign relations tends to be forgotten. New research, however, has begun to make the 
attempt to account for these issues, especially in the field of exile-studies.
306
  
What we mean by the term “transnational” merits some explanation
307
the moment it is 
used in very different senses within the literature.
308
 The sociologist Ludger Pries for example 
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gives a “narrow” definition of “transnational”; he reserves the word exclusively in reference 
to enduring “transnational spaces”, which develop their own systems of symbols, their own 
language, their own values, and a new identity that supersedes national groupings.
309
 In stark 
contrast, historian Kiran Patel’s definition is one in which “transnational” contact does not 
totally supplant national groupings.
310
 He believes that the term “transnational” is anchored in 
the concept of the nation and has argued that it should be used only for those situations that 
transcend national boundaries in which national grouping, be it in terms of the nation-state or 
national identity, retains an important role. Using the term “trans-national” in lieu of 
“transnational” might make Patel’s distinction clearer; the hyphen accentuates both semantic 
dimensions of the term. While “trans” refers to the dynamics that occur beyond national 
borders and to the processes of perception, transfer and interweaving, “national” reminds us 
of the role of national groupings as part and parcel of these dynamics. To rely exclusively on 
the term “transnational” (without the hyphen), in the sense of transcending the nation, 
encourages us as historians to underrate the role of the nation. This leads to the risk that the 
impact that the “idea” of the nation had since the nineteenth century will be obscured. Indeed, 
the role the nation played in the perceptions of the actors that are being studied, even while 
these last were in communication with other national groups should not be ignored or 
overlooked: “If the nation does not play any role in the imagination of actors […] a trans-
‘national’ history does not make much sense.”
311
 
To form an adequate picture of foreign soldiering it is equally important not to forget 
about the frictions and fractions that often were linked to foreign-Italian contact. Taking into 
consideration the clashes and polemics linked to the foreign commitment is a necessary 
antidote against the formation of an a priori positive view of that which is “transnational”. 
Kiran Patel characterizes this as the “translation of the utopian potential” from the 
“international” to the “transnational”, but rightly warns against the risk of forgetting that 
transnational constellations are not void of cultural misunderstandings, relations of power and 
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violence or social inequality. He concludes that “without a value-neutral [the Weberian 
“wertneutral”], social-historically informed concept of transnationality no critical 
transnational history is possible.”
312
 In the same vein, Margrit Pernau has underlined that 
“mobility transcends boundaries, but it also generates […] boundaries.”
313
 These tensions will 
be taken into account in this study of the German soldiers.  
Existing transnational networks had an important influence on the decision to 
volunteer for a foreign war. At the same time, the commitment was itself an intrinsic part of 
the "networking". Therefore, the human networks formed by the democrats with their hubs in 
exile
314
 in Zurich, London, Paris or Brussels or those of the Catholics, the extent of which 
reached all the way to the individual parishes will be taken into consideration.  
As the study transitions from the topic of mobilization and recruitment to the 
experiences and practices linked to the military commitment of the foreign participants, other 
issues typical of the “transnational perspective” will be addressed. Generally speaking, the 
relationship between other forms of (international) mobility
315
 and the Risorgimento must still 
in part be analysed; only the “Grand Tour”, the “journey to Italy”
316
, and the attraction Italy 
and Greece held for gay men
317
 have been addressed by historians. The “orientalizing gaze” 
foreigners turned toward Italy, especially that of foreigners and Italians in regard to southern 
Italy, was intimately linked to these forms of mobility, even if the concrete dimension remains 
to be clarified: In contrast to the colonial imagery of the times, many foreigners did not equate 
southern Italy with Africa, but saw it instead as a “half-way” point between Europe and its 
neighbouring continent to the south (or to the “east”). Many southern Italians themselves– as 
part of the new Italian administration – partook in creating the “southern question”.
318
 The 
analysis of foreign-Italian “perceptions” will be accompanied by an examination of the effects 
promoted by these practises on the translation processes in a broader sense
319
, as well as on 
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the circulation processes and on the failed and successful cultural transfers
320
 regarding 
ideological, national or military assets. Furthermore, the history of transnational contact or 
social space, which existed alongside the emergent national societies will be examined: Was 
there, for example, a feeling of “trans-national camaraderie in arms”?
321
  
Finally, given the background generated by the existing works with a “transnational 
perspective” on the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento
322
, a study of foreign soldiers that 
were physically present in Italy must necessarily look into the specificities of their physical 
presence for transnational processes as well. In other words, the actors that were physically 
present as a specific “medium” for such transfers must be addressed. This type of analysis 
leads directly to “body history” within the context of gender history
323
, and to issues of 
“performativity” in particular.
324
 Studies that look at the (mutual) staging of military groups – 
within one single army or between opposed armies
325
 – provide insights into the 
communicative and “performative” aspects of military life that specifically consisted in 
frequent rituals of “visibility”, from parades to reviews. Furthermore, there is a number of 
new military histories that focus for instance on military training, military clothing or body 
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, to which we should give a “transnational twist” by analysing 
circulation and transfers in the mentioned regards.  
2.6.4 Military history 
Military history, however, is very much absent from the newest historiography on Italian 
nationalism, the Risorgimento and foreign participation in it. This may be a result of the 
particularly difficult status “military history” holds with regard to general historiography. 
There is a long tradition where the history of war(s) has been written for the purpose of a 
“scientification” of war itself and can be traced back to the early modern history of Europe at 
least. As such, military history was integrated into the broader “war sciences”.
327
 It was 
institutionalized very much by the military organizations themselves. The Prussian general 
staff, for instance, had a “historical/war historical department” 
(“historische/kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung”) since 1816; Piedmont created a “Historical 
Bureau of the Army” (Ufficio storico dell’esercito) in 1853; and Italy, in addition boasted 
such centres for the Italian Navy as of 1913 and the Air Force since 1926.
328
 This early 
institutionalization of "military history" has contributed to the perception that this last is a 
form of "warmongering", a perception that partially continues to persist today. University 
history, until very recently, has mostly held its distance from the field of military history. The 
affixed adjective “military” has seemed to many a sort of “Arcanum” that has had to be given 
a wide berth.
329
 Therefore, military history has been traditionally written by authors who work 
within military institutions themselves. In Italy, for instance, their predominance – according 
to Piero Del Negro – lasted well into the 1960s, and is marked by the “hegemony” of Piero 
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 Pieri’s “Storia militare del Risorgimento” (Military History of the Risorgimento), 
published for the first time in 1962, is the only comprehensive military history of the 
Risorgimento to date
331
; this publication, however, is still very much interested in the history 
of strategies, tactics and in particular in the description of battles.  
But there are some exceptions to this general rule. Already in the nineteenth century, 
several university-based historians including Ludwig Quidde or Hans Delbrück opened the 
debate on “militarism” and/or “militarization”. This debate led to a continuous stream of 
publications, the sheer number of which was surpassed in the field of military history only by 
books on the First World War. Regarding the history of these concepts, militarism as a term 
was used to designate a whole governmental system. At times it was considered separate and 
distinct from the term “militarization”, which in this case signified the formation of politics or 
society according to military needs and ideas, while at others the two terms were used 
synonymously. Historians such as Otto Hintze and Gerhard Ritter used “militarism” as a 
relational term for pondering the weight of the military organizations in relation only to the 
state, whereas others like Hans-Ulrich Wehler or Ludwig Quidde also focused on the social 
and economic relations of the military with the rest of the society. Until recently, a gap 
existed in the periods of time that were taken into consideration: Whereas “social 
militarization” has been rejected by many recent authors as a description for eighteenth 
century Prussian history, an entire series of studies on “militarism” – including the works of 
Wolfram Wette – have confined the concept to the late nineteenth and twentieth century, 
hence reinforcing Ritter’s view wherein he denies the links between imperial militarism and 
its (Prussian) prehistory.
332
 For Italy, an issue of the journal “Memoria e ricerca”, in the 
declared attempt to explore new connections, the title of the issue echoes the “Ritterian” 
conceptualization of the term, confining it to state-military relations, and reproduces his 
disregard for the early and mid-nineteenth century by ‘Europeanizing’ Ritter’s conception of a 
late development of “militarism”.
333
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It is only in the late 1980s that the war history of the Risorgimento begins a slow 
reconditioning, exemplified best by Mario Insnenghi’s seminal work “Le guerre degli 
Italiani. Parole, immagini, ricordi 1848 – 1945” (The wars of the Italians. Words, images, 
memories 1848-1945), with its focus on the cultural history of wars in Italy.
334
 
2.6.4.1 Risorgimento history and the military 
A more circumscribed military history of the Risorgimento, however, is mostly non-existent. 
But a series of issues in recent Risorgimento historiography “cry” out, so to say, for a more 
detailed look at military institutions. In the newest historiography publications, participation 
in the Risorgimento wars is taken as one of the most important effects of national 
discourse.
335
 This is particularly so for the figure of the “war volunteer”, which takes centre 
stage. But what, in my opinion, seems to have been overlooked thus far is the fact that this 
Risorgimento activity was mediated through military institutions. Furthermore, since Italian 
“decadence” was said to be noticeable first and foremost in the Italian lack of military 
abilities, and since this “Risorgimento” was intended to improve this aspect in particular
336
, 
the Risorgimento must have been a military “Risorgimento” as well. The concept of Italian 
military “degeneration” was primarily constructed as a delay in comparison with northern 
European countries and armies in particular. Italy to a great extent directed its proof of 
“regeneration” toward other nations; the "bravery" that was manifested by Italian soldiers was 




This was principally due to the fact that these foreigners, the foreign soldiers in 
particular, were the ones who published books and newspaper articles in their own countries. 
In this regard, it is enough to think of the phalanx of European authors that wrote about their 
Garibaldian adventure in 1860 – from Alexandre Dumas and Wilhelm Rüstow to Jessie White 
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Mario – and the numerous newspaper correspondents from the Italian battlefield – such as the 
German Hans Wachenhusen, the Hungarian Ferdinand Eber or the Englishman Charles Stuart 
Forbes (these last two were part of the Garibaldian Army just as Dumas and Rüstow had 
been).  
Furthermore, rather than presuming an opposition exists between revolutionaries and 
military figures, it is important to understand that many of the revolutions that characterized 
for instance the 1820s broke out and flourished especially in military settings – e.g. the 
pronouncement of General Rigo in Spain; the support given to the Carbonari by the regiments 
of the Neapolitan Army in 1820; and in Piedmont, the revolution “had been confined almost 
entirely to the army”.
338
 Most of the Italian (as well as other European) attempts at 
insurrection during the 1820s and 1830s saw military personnel take centre stage, from the 
Neapolitan general Guglielmo Pepe in southern Italy to the Piedmontese captain Anibale 
Santorre di Santarosa in Piedmont in 1820, from the Piedmontese officer Carlo Bianco di 
Saint-Jorioz – who had published a widely circulating book on guerrilla combat as a form of 
national insurrectional warfare in 1830
339
 – and the Napoleonic officer Gerolamo Ramorino 
during the Mazzinian attempt to invade Savoy in 1834, to the Austrian officers Attilio and 
Emilio Bandiera in their Calabrian episode of 1844. The fact that legitimist armies, both in 
terms of military and more strictly police interventions, were at the forefront in repressing 
insurrections and revolutions “focused the minds of patriots on military problems.”
340
 From 
their continuous failings, pro-Risorgimento leaders learned the lesson that they had to 
improve their military organization.  
Of course the question arises as to how much the organizational forms adopted by the 
pro-Unitarian side differed from or adhered to those of the “regular” armies of the states. 
According to Lucy Riall and Adrian Lyttelton, for instance, the military and war practices of 
the “irregular”, Garibaldian armed groups differed considerably from those of the “regular” 
armies of the time. In contrast to the latter, the Garibaldian way of making war was, according 
to Lyttelton, a “popular and democratic style of war”, characterized by the “downplaying of 
distinctions of rank – the constant intercourse between the leader and his followers and his 
place in the front ranks of the battle, the neglect of the formal rituals of discipline in drill and 
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 Lucy Riall similarly believes that the “military culture” of the garibaldini was 
basically different from the regular armies: “The Italians vindicated their honour and 
masculinity by making war, but as volunteers, they refuted the codes of conduct, social rank, 
seniority, even the norms of war.”
342
 Between the regular and irregular armed groups, she 
sees this as “conflicts between military cultures”, which furthermore “reflected and reinforced 
in their turn the rival discourse regarding the nation”.
343
 This, however, is a vision somewhat 
in conflict with the argument made by the military historian Giorgio Rochat, who on the basis 
of a narrow and neat definition of terms, stated that “Garibaldi’s [wars] were never guerrilla 
or peoples’ wars”, even if they had some of the characteristics typical of “peoples’ wars”, 
“primarily with regard to recruitment”.
344
 A clear-cut divide between “regular” and 
“irregular” armed groups seems unlikely as well if the fact that the two were often related to 
each other is taken into account. Pro-Unitarian activities from the 1840s to the 1870s were 
increasingly “concerted” with the efforts of the regular armies: Volunteers in the Italian-
Austrian wars of 1848 and 1849 fought not only for the nation, but often as well in the name 
of or even officially on behalf of their respective governments (whether they were monarchist 
or revolutionary), and many of these regiments were deployed together with the various 
regular regiments present at the time. The Garibaldian troops of 1859 and 1866 were 
detached, but were nevertheless in fact an official part of the Piedmontese/Italian Army. And 
the Southern Army amassed by Garibaldi in 1860 not only heavily relied on Piedmontese 
Army regulations, he handed over the south to the Piedmontese State and Army, wherein the 
complex relationship between the “volunteers” and the regular army was symbolized in the 
complicated story of the absorption of the Garibaldian soldiers into the new Italian Army.
345 
All these elements call for a comparative military history of the Italian armed groups that also 
integrates the debates on military history in other European historiographies. 
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2.6.4.2 War or military history? 
Those positions in the international debate on militarism
346
 that focused on the relations 
between military organizations and society are directly linked with the more recent 
redefinitions of military history, which have been proposed under such titles as “new military 
history” or “war and society”-approach
347
 or “(neue) Militärgeschichte in der Erweiterung”
348
 
(“[new] military history in extension”). The English-speaking historiography does not 
differentiate between “war history” and “military history”, and therefore the “war and 
society”-approach is equated with the “new military history”.
349
 However, it seems to me that 
there are decisive differences (among communalities) between the approaches that focus on 
“war” and those that concentrate instead on “military” matters. In the case of Risorgimento 
historiography, much has been written over the last few years on the role war has played in 
national discourse, its role in the cultural and political driving forces of the Risorgimento 
activists or – more recently – with regard to the legitimist and papal mobilization. But even 
beyond Italy’s borders, nationalism studies have often been linked to the discussion of “war”, 
and hence have addressed, so to speak, the “bigger” societal question, especially against the 
backdrop represented by the “totalization of war” concept, which pulls ever more parts of 
society into the orbit of war and war making. War, from this perspective, progressively 
became a “state” that encompassed the whole of society. For these “bigger” questions, 
military history seemed to be too small in scope, especially when confined to classic military 
history topics such as strategy, tactics or the mere organizational details of the armies. It is 
right to criticize such a military history. But fortunately, the “new military history” took great 
steps in the direction of a cultural history of military institutions.
350
 How soldiers were “eating 
and starving, obeying, deserting, dying […] or the front brothel was used”, for example, not 
only interested military historians
351
, it began to interest them a great deal in these last few 
years. 
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In this reasonable shift away from “classic” military history, however, one runs the 
risk of "throwing the baby out with the bath water": There are still good – and even “new” – 
reasons not to confine oneself to the “discourse of war” in society at large, but to research the 
military institutions themselves. If, as argued above, the “wars of independence” cannot be 
seen as the direct causal explanation of Italian independence, and even if unity could have 
been the motivating factor underlying a soldier’s decision to enlist, one must ask what other 
meaning this military commitment could have had, and especially what role membership in 
the institution of the military played for the soldiers – and as mediated by them – for society 
at large. This becomes even more necessary, given that the duration of actual combat, as with 
many wars in the nineteenth century, was quite short in Italy. The word “volunteers” seems to 
implicitly suggest that a more or less short period of time is spent in the ranks, i.e only the 
time that is strictly necessary to fulfil an imminent, concrete and specific “goal”. One of the 
questions of this study is whether membership in the military was really as short as the term 
seems to imply. In any case, we can assume that the longer the membership, the more the 
soldier would be influenced by the specificities of the military as an institution. Furthermore, 
as military sociology has underlined, it is especially during times of peace, when the military 
can be described as a “cold organization”, that the military is informed by the society at large 
as an “environment” and, in these states, also reciprocally informs society:: “The rigidity of 
military socialisation and the scope of military institutions […] are based in the necessities of 
war, but they are effective as well in the military everyday life in peacetime.”
352
 In other 
words: The socio-cultural role of the military goes well beyond acts of violence; one may, 
with good reason, ask for a “history of war that speaks of killing”
353
, but the socio-cultural 
relevance of military institutions is not confined to this, nevertheless central, function; 
Foucault’s studies on the military as an institution of “disciplinization” come to mind here.  
What sometimes runs the risk of being forgotten in “war history” is the fact that 
despite the more or less intensive penetration of “war” into society on the whole, a large 
portion of violent acts are nevertheless executed within the context of specific, precisely 
military institutions; and that modern warfare is (also) characterized by institutions 
specifically created to carry out at least part of the violent practices. These institutions are just 
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as much the result of “discourse” as the other elements of the “culture of war”. And like them, 
they are only reproduced – or not reproduced – in practice. 
2.6.4.3 The cultural turn and institutions 
Since the “cultural turn” that also underpins the “new Risorgimento history”, many studies 
have focused on aspects of the language that the actors employed when speaking of Italy, the 
nation or the Risorgimento (which is, as we know, a contemporary concept). Much of the 
research within this specifically cultural Risorgimento historiography adheres to the 
“linguistic turn”; in doing so, considerable achievements have been reached by calling into 
question already established “certainties” of (social) Risorgimento history by basically 
inverting the causal relations between “social” reality and the linguistic “concepts” of the 
contemporaries at that time. The “cultural turn” was in fact very much informed by language 
philosophy and linguistics. But even if it is appropriate to emphasize the role of language – 
especially in the case of history, in which the role of textual artefacts is paramount – there is 
still a risk that the analysis will be confined to the “linguistic” utterances of historical actors. 
As Doris Bachmann-Medick in recognizing the “linguistic turn” as the “mega-turn”, she 
underlines that the “turns” that would follow (such as the “iconic” or “performative turn”) 
have begun “reintroducing step by step the dimensions of culture, lifeworld, history and 
especially practice, and by that concentration only on language in the linguistic turn have 
been overshadowed, even suppressed.”
354
 In the same vein, Peter Burke in his summary on 
“cultural history” goes well beyond an analysis of just language, by also placing emphasis on 
“rituals, material culture, and the history of the body or of emotions.”
355
 The point that I wish 
to make here is that there is no reason to exclude organizations/institutions from a genuinely 
cultural historiographical programme. Interestingly, the role Foucault attributed to institutions 
goes against the conception for which "discourse" is narrowly boiled down to a question of 
"language": “Seldom is Foucault’s assumption received, for which such contexts of speech 
form solid relations with institutions so that the production of sense and social situation of the 
participants of discourse are intimately linked.”
356
 Foucault was highly interested in 
institutions, as his books on the birth of the clinic or the birth of the prison so clearly testify; 
his book “Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison” also discusses the institution of the 
military and uses military sources in order to shed light on the processes of “disciplinization”. 
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Over time, Foucault was very interested in more than just the “outspoken”, as becomes clear 
in his concept of the “dispositif”
357
, which is the entirety of “discourses, institutions […] laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements […], in short, the said as much as the unsaid”; 
these are the elements that constitute the dispositif, which is “the system of relations that can 
be established between these elements.”
358
 The aim is to bring together language, linguistic as 
well as non-linguistic practices and institutions, because their interweaving is the cause for the 
effects of “power”. Therefore, according to Foucault, institutions should be analysed in their 
relation to those forms of power and knowledge that, however, transcended them.
359
 
The military is both a (formal) organization and an institution in the sociological 
sense. It is an organization, insofar as it serves – from the top-down perspective – a certain 
goal by organizing human resources, in this specific instance, in the use of violence or force. 
But the goals of the human elements of a given organization do not necessarily have to 
correspond to this ultimate, overarching goal. The “military” organization is characterized by 
a high level of “formal”, hence normative rules, that are codified for instance in general 
service regulations or laws and decrees that range anywhere from the supply of food, to 
payments or to military criminal law. At the same time, the military constitutes an 
“institution” in the wider sociological sense: “An institution is a set of behaviours patterned 
according to one or more variously codified and differentially enforced rules […]”
360
 These 
rules govern the behaviour of the people within the institution and their interactions with each 
other and result in the condition for which “the practices of the other in a certain situation is – 
to a certain degree – expectable”.
361
 For the members of an institution, these last form to a 
certain degree a kind of “world” that is not identical to everyday life in society at large. An 
analysis that fails to incorporate the role of military institutions, hence, runs the risk of 
“forgetting” that this specificity is a “lifeworld” in and of itself.  
2.6.4.4 Militarization of society/“Socialization” of the military 
Another important question is whether “belligerence” and even “militarism” was inherent in 
the worldviews of the different factions of society already in the early and mid-nineteenth 
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century. Christian Jansen wrote about the “specific bourgeois, liberal and even democratic 
alternative militarism”, which was “based on different values” than those characteristic of 
aristocratic-elitist militarism, “but time and again amalgamated with it […]. […] The 
militarization of European societies during the nineteenth century […] was created not only 
‘from above’ but a decisive portion was created by society itself, especially as a result of the 
rising, bourgeois middle class.”
362
  
Whereas much has been written on military-to-civilian influences, for instance in the 
“militarization” debate
363
, less attention has been paid to the inverse, i.e. civilian-to-military 
influences.
364
 Instead, the point of departure of many traditional and even most of the recent 
military histories still tends to be the unquestioned supposition “that war making can be 
placed in a tidy little box of information that stands alone, unconnected on some essential 
level to the vicissitudes of its cultural context.”
365
 Only a few studies have researched the 
cultural responses from inside the armies that were triggered by general cultural change in 
terms of conceptions of nationhood, gender or a general “moralization” of war. 
2.6.4.5 Definitions – the military and the soldier 
The term “military institutions” chosen in this study takes on a broader acceptation than the 
usual definition given of “military” as authorized by and dependent on a state. The activities 
of military organizations in this wider sense can be differentiated ideal-typically from the 
“direct” forms of combat carried out by individuals and groups according to the following 
factors, which essentially amount to a space that is by trend separate from that of civilian life:  
 
1) The implementation of a clear hierarchy of command from the top down linked to the 
differentiation into higher and lower ranks that are attributed with significantly 
differing levels of “power”.  
2) The deliberate integration of military expertise and military knowledge into the 
organization, even that which results from past armed conflicts characterized by 
                                                 
362
 Christian Jansen, "Einleitung. Die Militarisierung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert," in idem, 
ed., Der Bürger als Soldat. Die Militarisierung europäischer Gesellschaften im langen 19. Jahrhundert. Ein 
internationaler Vergleich (Essen: Klartext, 2004), pp. 4 and 11. 
363
 From the comprehensive literature see, e. g., Berghahn, Militarism; Wette, Militarismus in Deutschland; 
Mondini, "Militarismo e militarizzazione". 
364
 See the exemplary work of Ute Frevert, even if perhaps she equates “bourgeois” thinking too easily with the 
concept “civil” (i. e. anti-military): Ute Frevert, A nation in barracks. Modern Germany, military conscription 
and civil society (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2004).  
365
 Susan R. Grayzel, "Across battle fronts. Gender and the comparative cultural cistory of modern European 
war," in Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor, eds., Comparison and history. Europe in cross-national 
perspective (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 82. 
85 
 
significantly different aims and purposes. This can take the form of imitating 
regulations between politically differently collocated military organizations or the 
deliberate co-optation of military experts from other armies. 
3) The tendency to divide the organization into different corps or sections that are 
differentiated from one another by their different fighting techniques and/or tactical 
purposes. 
4) The more or less continuous armament of large numbers of fighters. The single fighter 
does not fight with what is on hand, but with a weapon that has been provided more or 
less centrally from a stockpile of a more or less reduced number of types of weapons. 
5) The compulsive organization of time, with fixed events repeated at regular intervals, 
mostly on a daily basis. A tendency for the group to form “a place of residence and 
work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society 




6) A separate system of disciplinization and punishment, symbolized in the issue or use 
of special military criminal codes. 





Of course, not always all aforementioned factors were fulfilled completely by the armed 
groups that this study takes into consideration. The case of the invasion of Savoy in 1834 is 
but one example. But even here, where factors 6 and 7 were absent, factors 1 to 5 were more 
or less present: military leaders of the various national corps of exiles present in the conflict 
as well as those chosen to oversee the whole operation were specifically chosen on account of 
their previous military expertise (factor 2). Even if all of the participants were to fight in 
terms of “infantry” tactics, various national corps and combinations thereof were previously 
assigned different tactical aims – including distorting the state’s police and military forces to 
rousing popular revolt (factor 3). Furthermore, arming these forces had been organized in 
advance by providing large quantities of the same weapons (factor 4). With regard to the other 
armed groups examined in this study, the aforementioned factors were also more or less 
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fulfilled. The questions “how far” and “in which way” this was the case, opens interesting 
paths of historiographical inquiry, for instance with regard to the conception that there was a 
supposedly greater level of democratization (factor 1) in the Garibaldian army of 1860 than 
was present in the state's armies, or even with regard to the search for military expertise 
throughout Europe that was present in both state and non-state (see the invasion of Savoy, or, 
though more complicated, the expedition of the Thousand in 1860) military organizations of 
the time.  
2.6.4.6 Soldiers’ experiences, the history of everyday life, lifeworld 
Within the context of the “New Military History” and a “Military History from Below” recent 
historiography has tried to catch up with these dimensions of the experience of soldiers. The 
initial impetus for this alteration in the approach to military history sprang from a growing 
unease with the traditions of classic military history (history of battles, strategies and tactics) 
and, since the 1980s, from the stimulus provided by the “history of everyday life” 
(Alltagsgeschichte). In the beginning, those authors trying to write a history of daily life 
predominantly used a rather simple approach, basically retelling what the historical subjects 
themselves had recounted.
368
 This was a departure from a naïve understanding based on how 
experience was (and even now is) considered in everyday speech, and it considered 
“individual experience as the expression of personality and [… as] independent from social 
guidelines.”
369
 Subsequently, more theoretically informed approaches were chosen that took 
into account the fact that individual actions and experiences are at least partially informed by 
collective structures, be they economic, social or cultural. Different epistemological theories 
have made claims regarding the nature of experience, from the sociological-social 
psychological “frame analysis” developed by Erving Goffman to the theories on discourse for 
instance by Joan W. Scott to Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. Under the topic of concrete 
action, Alltagsgeschichte could provide insight into the question of how cultural “meaning” 
was literally put into practice in two ways: i.e., how “meaning” was attributed to practice on 
the one hand, and how practices were animated by “meaning” on the other. Within this 
framework, recent military histories tend to highlight how the “concrete” experiences and the 
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everyday life of soldiers individually were in line with the general frames of war
370
, or how 
they were coined by collective ideas, discourses and ideologies. And if we draw on the 
“practice turn” in historiography
371
 it is possible to see how specific discourses were  
(re-)produced and altered in the everyday lives of soldiers. Repeated practices are, according 
to some authors
372
, the place within which historical change occurs wherein a "performance" 
is capable of slightly altering and therefore subverting a given historical meaning. Practices in 
this sense include non-verbal communication, such as visual signs, emotions and – 
particularly important for the military – physical behaviour. 
2.6.4.7 A comparative military history 
Military historiography should be open to transnational and comparative analysis
373
 more than 
it has until now. The predominance of the national focus on military history is mainly caused 
by two reasons: the first is linked with the specific traditions of this field, and the second is 
based on features of the past itself. The institutionalization of military historiography 
contributed to narrowing the perspective to the national armies. In the German case, the 
debate on ‘militarization’ was initially a specific manifestation of the Sonderweg’s debate, 
wherein the supposed uniqueness of “Prussian militarism” was defended. Hence, a 
comparative argument of sorts was made, but an explicit comparison with other national cases 
was not really carried out. Even Wolfram Wette in his recent book on militarism focuses on 
the German case; he adds only a few short comparative remarks in a three-page chapter about 
France
374
, citing one of the exceptions to the dearth of comparisons in this field, namely, the 
work of Jakob Vogel on German and French militarism.
375
 Another reason for this national 
focus is caused by the past itself: At least from the 1830s and 1840s onwards, the armies had 
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been progressively and increasingly nationalized in terms for instance of recruitment
376
 and 
the legitimation of war. However, the correct diagnosis of the nationalization trend of 
European armies in the nineteenth century resulted in the infelicitous neglect of the 
interconnections between different national armies in many campaigns and even more so the 
continuity of the presence of foreign groups and/or single foreigners in the various national 
armies. Only very recently has interest in the known examples of a clear “multi-nationality” 
of nineteenth century campaigns seemed to have been renewed, as may be demonstrated by 




2.6.5 A gender and body history of the Risorgimento armies 
Already in the eighteenth century images of gender roles were crucial within the armies: For 
the French case, the importance of the evocation of women as “enemies of discipline” was 
decisive for unit cohesion, and through the creation of the anti-ideal of the “effeminate” 
soldier it was possible to ensure that duties were carried out.
378
 As in other fields, the question 
arises: how much – in a kind of militarization in the eighteenth and nineteenth century – did 
the military topoi inform the ascending national discourses? There is no doubt that nineteenth 
century nationalisms were heavily gendered, just as there is no doubt that images of 
masculinity were important for life in the military.  
Two important cases can be made that add nuance to the position that identifies the 
Risorgimento with a conception according to which men and women were assigned to strictly 
“separate spheres”: First, it is important not to reproduce a gendered hierarchy of practices 
inherent in nationalism in the practices of current historiography, by adopting the nineteenth 
century view that female practices were “only” auxiliary; instead, many of these practices, 
even those located within the confinements of nineteenth century gender roles were in fact 
central. Without them there would have been neither (counter-)revolution nor war, be it on the 
pro- or on the anti-Risorgimento side. The crucial role of women in the Risorgimento, 
however, is still an under-researched topic, despite a number of important conferences and 
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publications that have been dedicated to this topic.
379
 Alongside this argumentation, however, 
it has been noted that some female practices of the nineteenth century transcended the 
boundaries of the “separate spheres”. In doing so, these authors push for a revision of the 
predominant interpretation of the gender issue in Risorgimento historiography, whether by 
challenging the existing interpretations of nineteenth century gender discourse and/or by 
calling attention to the differences between the existing discourse and actual female and male 
practices. Much empirical and analytical work remains to be done in this field, however. With 
regard to women participating as soldiers in the Risorgimento wars, for instance, a closer look 
at practices and mutual perceptions could help to clarify how much their presence destabilized 
the consolidated gender dichotomy of the time: for instance in the case of women dressed as 
men, it could be argued that not every act of “cross-dressing” was necessarily subversive.
380
 
Another argument against an overly strict vision of gender hierarchy in the 
Risorgimento could be deduced from positions in the sphere of masculinities. At least at the 
dawn of the nineteenth century, masculinity still seems to have been seen as hugely 
“problematic”, rather than heroic and perfect.
381
 Here, yet another reason could be found for 
the existence of the “politics of masculinization” in the nineteenth century. 
Ute Frevert observed that the army of the nineteenth century was a “school of men” 
because it was a male organization and a “school of masculinity”, insofar as it taught men to 
behave in a certain (and no other) way that was regarded as “manly”.
382
 Masculinity was not 
only measured by assessing moral attitudes and psychological character, but also by 
behavioural criteria that were linked mostly with bodily practices. As “schools of 
masculinity”, the armies taught lessons that consisted to a high degree in exercises aimed at 
controlling the body, suppressing bodily needs as much as possible, developing physical 
strength, and integrating each individual soldier’s body into a military simultaneity with those 
of the others.  
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The study of the German soldiers in Risorgimento Italy will therefore analyse the 
various Italian armies as groups of men, an analysis which due to the relational character of 
gender conceptions, cannot be carried out without delving into the practical and discursive 
role women held. Although women were often officially excluded (by military criminal law 
and service regulations) from the narrower circles of soldiers, for instance in the barracks, 
there were exceptions: when some soldiers entered the military and war they brought their 
wives along.
383
 Due to the real actual presence of women, however, one might ask whether it 
is right to use the concept of “homosocial groups”
384
 for the armies studied here. However a 
sort of “male Arcanum”, where women were present only seldom in “flesh and blood”, did 
indeed exist. A study of armies as “homosocial groups” however, could also shed light on the 




In the State Archive in Rome, I consulted all of the volumes pertaining to all the foreign 
regiments of the Papal Army since the 1830s. The information in these volumes abounds, as 
will be demonstrated in this study. In the same Roman archive, organizational material on the 
Papal Army and its foreign regiments in particular, was consulted. In Naples, I was able to 
analyse the correspondence between the last Bourbon king, Francesco II, and the officers that 
led the various legitimist ‘guerrilla’-groups that fought in 1860 and 1861; these documents are 
part of the “Archivio Borbone” housed in the State Archive in Naples. I have yet to return to 
Naples to collect the information in the army registers, which unfortunately were inaccessible 
when I was there in 2009. In Liestal Switzerland (Archive of the Canton of Basle Landschaft) 
I was able to consult the personal estates of the Garibaldian Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow as 
well as copies of the estates of Johann Philipp Becker. In Münster, the descendants of the 
Papal Zouave Franz von Korff gave me access to his personal estates; in Düsseldorf I was 
able to study the workings of regional recruitment structures for the Papal Army in Prussian 
Rhineland. In Basle, I was able to study the rich archives of the “foreign regiments” of the 
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Bourbon Army from 1859 to 1860 that General Johann Lucas von Mechel brought home with 
him to Switzerland. 
The sources for the thesis can be grouped as follows: First, the participant lists. They 
provide an important foundation upon which the reconstruction of the socio-biographical 
background of the German soldiers was based. Second, archival material on the organization 
of recruitment and the army in general, and any such material that mirrored army life has been 
analysed. Third, the archives in Germany provided not only personal estates, but contained 
organizational data regarding the more general background of mobilization and recruitment as 
well. Fourth, a long list of published works of the soldiers, for instance the writings of the 
Mazzinian Harring, the Garibaldians Rüstow and Haug, the papal soldier Eickholt, the 
German papal military chaplain Anton de Waal, the Papal Minister of Arms, Hermann 
Kanzler or the Bourbon officer Klitsche de la Grange have been used, as well as 
contemporary publications on the German soldiers by other authors. Together with 
corresponding Italian sources these documents have rendered it possible to investigate the key 
issues of the research project pertaining to this trans-national space of contacts.  
 
Overview of the sources 
Army registers 
Legal sources 
Administrative material of the Italian armies; Ministries of War 
Archival sources on the German organization of recruitment 
Publications and ego-documents of German participants 
Mirroring publications of Italian/other foreign participants 








Part 2 – The enlistment:  






3 Political and cultural mobilization 
Much has been written in recent years on the issue of cultural and political war mobilization 
in the nineteenth century. Nationalism studies in particular, for Germany as well as for Italy 
and elsewhere, have highlighted the strong connection between national discourse and the 
legitimization of and mobilization for (national) wars.
386
 Recent studies however have also 
analysed the form and content of the mobilization of the various opponents to national 
unification. Counter to the view wherein the emphasis was placed almost exclusively on the 
strictly political opposition to liberalism and nationalism, these studies reveal how the 
“success” of these last stimulated legitimist and Catholic opponents to adopt new and even 
“modern” forms of political communication.
387
  
This valuable historiography forms the basis of the following chapter. But given the subject is 
the mobilization of “foreigners” for the Italian “parties”, a partially different perspective from 
that of the existing literature must be taken. It seems quite obvious that Italian nationalism as 
a whole can only explain with great difficulty the mobilization of foreigners to the cause. 
Similarly, German nationalism can explain the mobilization in favour of the Italian case only 
if the discursive elements linking the two nations are found. Only in doing so can the seeming 
paradox of the “internationalism of nationalism” in the nineteenth century be elucidated. At 
the same time, there are elements in the political communication of the two sides – the 
nationalists and the opposition – that could operate/behave in an "international" or 
"transnational" manner. The following chapter will examine these issues from a comparative 
perspective.  
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3.1 The feeling of injustice and the barbarian 
One of the main ways in which violence is legitimized is by making the distinction between 
an offensive manoeuvre (normally conceived of as an illegitimate action) and a defensive 
manoeuvre (normally considered to be a legitimate action). Therefore, when Umbria and the 
Marche were transferred from the Papal States to the Piedmontese after these last won the 
battle of Castelfidardo in 1860, many Catholics interpreted the action as an act of “robbery”; 
they did not consider it to be legitimate. The Pope himself spoke of this as an act of 
“robbery”, of “snatching away” in the allocution “Novos et ante” he gave on 28 September 
1860 before the consistory.
388
 This assertion was taken up by Catholics all over the world. In 
1861, the thirteenth “general assembly of the catholic associations of Germany” in Munich 
voted, passing an address that protested the “robbery of the Holy See”
389
, the “eldest, most 
honourable and most legitimate possession in the world”
390
. The address went on to underline 
the legitimate reasons for the Papal States to exist in that they guaranteed the independence of 
the pope from "any [...] worldly power".
391
 The annexation of significant parts of the Papal 
States to Piedmont (i.e. Italy) was not only considered a “robbery”, but an assault on the 
concept of legitimate “property” that would lead to the “endangerment of the inviolability of 
every property, the overthrow of every right, the downfall of the thrones, the death of the 
liberty of the people and the ruin of Christian society.”
392
 These words basically conformed to 
what the Pope had said in his allocution of September 1860, in which he underlined that, if no 
action was taken against the “impious usurpation”
393
 of his lands by the Piedmontese Army, 
“there would henceforth be no security for any legitimate right.”
394
 According to the Pope, the 
defence of these rights is the nexus that ought to bind together the Pope and the monarchs: 
“All sovereigns must therefore be persuaded that their cause is intimately connected with ours  
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and that in coming to our assistance, they are providing equally for the preservation of their 
own rights and of ours.”
395
 After this assertion, the Pope then sent out a call for the sovereigns 
of Europe to “lend their assistance”.
396
  
In Germany, during the Catholic assemblies of 1867, the seminary professor Christoph 
Moufang held speeches in Münster and Cologne entitled “The battle over Rome and its 
consequences for Italy and the world”
397
 in which he tried to mount support for the Pope 
amongst German Catholics. In Münster, Moufang claimed the independence and liberty of the 
Papal States were a “right of Catholic Christendom” in contrast to the theiving attacks of the 
“Italian revolution”.
398
 A year before, in Cologne, Moufang asserted that the Pope embodied 
the “idea of justice”, because he sustained the right to property, and in so doing he fought for 
universal justice, for “the rights of everybody. When he says: what I do possess, as Pope, as 
King, as private citizen, nobody is allowed to take from me, neither the Emperor in Paris nor 
the Italian nation nor a congress of princes. What is mine is mine, and he who takes it is a 
thief. Therefore, he is protecting and defending the rights of everybody.”
399
  
While in the case of the Papal States a real military attack occurred in 1860, and 
therefore they were able to legitimate their position quite easily, the pro-Unitarians had to 
apply another type of strategy of legitimization. Nationalists tried to present the domination of 
their nation by a foreign state as a kind of ‘structural violence’, as Galtung conceptualized it, 
that prevented the national population from fulfilling their putative national needs. Thus, 
according to Italian nationalists Austria was the aggressor and not the Italian nationalists, who 
were waging war on it. By claiming the legitimacy of the right to national self-determination, 
military attacks that were generally negatively connoted took on positive connotations when 
the nationalists were perceived to defend a right, and this right in particular. At the same time, 
not faced with the problem of an immediate military attack from the enemy, in order to justify 
their actions nationalists turned to describing the other forms of violence the foreign 
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dominators supposedly committed. And the nationalists were very good at highlighting all 
sorts of foreign aggressions: the Austrians were accused of committing acts of robbery, 
damaging land and property, and raping Italian women. This approach is directly linked to the 
strategy of slandering the adversary as much as possible. The tedeschi, i.e. the Germans – a 
term that was widely used by Italian nationalists in reference to the Austrians – therefore, 
were depicted as barbarians, that came, as one nationalist put it, “from who knows which 
forest in Germany.”
 400 
The element of denigration is particularly important: If the adversary is excluded from 
civilized humankind, not least by accusing him of having committed many uncivilized forms 
of violence, the “battle” may be perceived and framed as being one of “civilization” against 
the “uncivilized”.  
Liberals and democrats at times also described Catholicism to fall “outside” the 
bounds of “civilization”. As Manuel Borutta has underlined, already since the Enlightenment, 
“Catholicism was ‘orientalised’ by progressive Europeans, excluded from the universal 
process of history and civilisation, and explicitly associated or identified with ‘primitive’ and 
‘static’ cultures in Africa, America and ‘the Orient’.” The syllabus of errors from 1864 or the 
dogma of papal infallibility from 1870 only confirmed and reinforced an already established 
view among German liberals, who saw “in Catholicism an outmoded, alien and grotesque 
religion that was incapable of progress and belonged to a lower level of civilisation that 
therefore had to disappear.”
401
 In Italy, Garibaldi was at the forefront of at least anti-clerical, 
if not anti-Catholic
402
 polemics. As aforementioned, he decried the “religion of the priests” in 
Rome in 1861. In 1870, his novel “Clelia, or the government of the monk” came on the 
market, divulging and commenting on the concupiscence of a cardinal for a Trasteverian 
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 Anti-clerical – or even anti-Catholic – sentiment was also expressed by some of the 
Garibaldian soldiers. The German Garibaldian Rüstow, a protestant, wrote in 1860: “It goes 
without saying – a truth every reasonable human being understands offhand, that a church 
regime can never fulfil the requirements to which the civilized nations of the new Europe are 
entitled. Theocracy, which cannot err […] excludes absolutely any progress […].”
404
 
3.2 The religious dimension 
The “religious” dimension, here, took on the form of confessional legitimizing speech. 
Inflicting losses to Papal territorial authority was a good way to strengthen German cultural 
Protestantism. Conversely, applying this type of logic to the opposite side, in the event pro-
Catholic proponents were to win the war against the Italian revolutionaries, the position of 
Catholicism would be strengthened in Germany, as well. Especially in Germany, confessional 
viewpoints were intimately linked to the European Culture Wars. 
But despite this confessional tone, the religious aspect was an important ingredient of 
the mobilization efforts made on all sides in a much wider sense. Military violence was often 
legitimized with arguments that relied on the purportedly divine origin of the state order put 
forth by the various sides. 
Many legitimists and monarchists still saw the various aggressions carried out by the 
Mazzinians, Garibaldians and the Italian army to be an assault on the sovereignty of the old 
monarchs, which was believed to have been conferred by God. They justified the violence 
they ordered to suppress nationalist aggressions by resorting to the traditional idea of the 
divine right of kings. At the time, most monarchs,
405
 as well as a segment of their supporters 
continued to invoke the topos that kingship was conferred “by the grace of God”. In the 
circles of those that joined the Bourbon royal family in Roman exile after the capitulation of 
Gaeta in February 1861, Simon Sarlin has identified two distinct factions, the 
“constitutionalists” and the “ultras”,
406
 which closely mirrored similar monarchist factions in 
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other countries. With regard to the “ultras”, at least, tradition “was indeed the only watchword 
capable of galvanizing the masses attached to their king and their religion.”
407
 
Monarchical legitimism and that of the king-pope were often intimately linked, both at 
the level of mobilization and at the factual level of, for instance, cases of soldiering in their 
respective armies. At least from 1860 onwards, when the Papal States were physically 
attacked, Rome intensified its efforts to mobilize Catholics throughout Europe and beyond to 
defend the Papal States. In 1860, Pius IX sent out a call to arms to the Catholics of the world. 
This attempt may be traced to a Belgian ecclesiastic with a military background, Xavier de 
Mérode, who became the pro-Minister of Arms in 1860: de Mérode developed the idea of a 
‘ninth crusade’, wherein all the Catholics of Europe would be called to defend the territory of 
the Holy See. In France and Belgium the message was further propagated by a group of 
bishops; soldiers, money and arms were also sent from these two countries to Rome. In the 
German states, the ‘brotherhoods of Saint Michael’ were created to organize similar support 
for Rome. In the defence of the Papal States, typically legitimist thoughts were further 
enhanced by a specifically theological elaboration to explain the underlying reason for why 
territorial power had been bestowed upon the Pope by God: namely, it guaranteed his 
freedom, and hence independence, from other worldly monarchs.
408
 
This argument figured in the catholic writings that urged Catholics to support the 
military defence of the Pope through the procurement of money and soldiers. One professor 
from the theological faculty of Salzburg in his tract entitled “Why does the holy father need 
an army?” published in German in 1868 and translated into Dutch the same year
409
 – wrote 




It was debated whether the legitimacy upon which papal rule was established over the 
Papal States stemmed from the worldly or the religious-theological foundation; this occurred 
not only in non-Catholic circles, but also within Catholicism as well. Some tried to keep the 
issue in the shadows: The concept of “property” as it was often used in regard to the argument 
of the “robbery” of the Papal States is in a certain way able to circumvent the question of 
whether this property was in itself legitimate. The debated "nature" of the legitimacy of the 
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Papal States was alluded to in an address given by the German Catholic Assembly of 1861 to 
the Pope. Therein an ambivalent position was expressed according to which the worldly 
possessions of the Pope are characterized as follows: "although worldly, they are provided to 
the Church and are a necessary condition ordered by God" so that the Pope may fulfil his 
various roles.
 411 
The religious dimension was very important for the other sides of the conflict as well. 
One example in particular is of Mazzini and Mazzinianism. As Simon Levis Sullam has 
argued, part of Mazzini’s argument lay in the idea that the nation was an institution planned 
by God: “its existence depended therefore above all on God. And the sovereignty as well as 
the historical role that the nation is called upon to realize, is the people’s, but it derives from 
God: that is to say, it does not derive from below, but from above.”
412
 The international 
solidarity between members of different nations was partially based on the conviction that not 
only their own nation-state but the nation-states of others would be the fulfilment of a divine 
plan. 
3.3 Martyrs 
In 1860, immediately following the battle the myth of the “martyrs de Castelfidardo” had 
begun to circulate, first in France and then progressively and ever more rapidly to the rest of 
the Catholic world.
413
 In a series of Catholic pamphlets released in 1867, the fresh news of the 
victory of the Papal soldiers in the battle of Mentana (3 November) were expressed using 
terminology that was similar to that of the adversary: “Out of the tombs of Mentana and 
Monte Rotondo drifts air of spring and resurrection, because the blood of the martyrs never 
flows in vain in the church.”
414
 Despite the “birth right” of religion, so to say, to the topos of 
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the martyr, this closely reflected the words used in Garibaldi’s anthem: “The tombs are 
uncovered, the dead come from afar, / The ghosts of our martyrs are rising to war […].”
415
 
As with nationalism, fiction pieces played an important role in mobilizing Catholics as 
well.
416
 From 1862 onwards several publishers as well as Catholic newspapers in Germany 
presented a translation of a novel by the Italian priest Antonio Bresciani under the title 
“Olderich, der päpstliche Zuave”.
417
 Bresciani was co-founder and editor of the Jesuit journal 
‘La Civiltà Cattolica’, a journal “that was born precisely to counterbalance the very successful 
press of the opposition, and to cultivate a public opinion that was faithful to the “good 
cause”.
418
 Even if many Catholics believed that novels were even more “evil” than 
Romanticism itself
419
, the overwhelming success of the novel led Bresciani to appositely 
design a series of novels for the “Civiltà Cattolica”. Given that the novel seemed to be the 
medium of the day, he sought to create “good ones”, including passions, but only of “the 
noble, pure, generous” sort.
420
 The novel “Olderico” was first published in 1861 in episodes 
in the journal, but the following year it was printed again in book form in Italian; at the same 
time it was translated into several European languages, among which French and German. In 
Germany, different editions by several publishers were put on the market and sold in mostly 
Catholic cities like Regensburg, Münster and Paderborn.
421
  
Bresciani supposedly directly quotes real letters of Papal Zouaves, which were taken 
from French and Belgian newspapers as well as private sources. He then incorporates them 
into the conventional plot of a novel.
422
 The main characters of the novel are the young 
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 from Brittany and Jakobine
424
, who “grew up together”, because their families 
were friends; but later “this brotherly affection changed step by step into passionate love, 
which, though based on mutual respect and virtue, never went beyond that which is 
allowed.”
425
 The novel begins with the announcement of the marriage between the two and a 
letter arrives revealing to Jakobine that Olderic has decided to travel to Rome, to join – “for 
the defence of the states of the Holy See” – the ranks of General Lamoricière.
426
 Throughout 
the book, Jakobine vascillates between states of heavy sorrow or even what we today would 
call deep depression
427
 for the departure of her lover and the dangers he must face and pride 
for having a “martyr” as a bridegroom. In these internal battles, Jacobine at times berates 
herself for feeling upset by Olderich’s departure and for fearing that he could die. But what 
always wins out in the end are her religious beliefs and pride. At the beginning at the novel a 
nun explains not only why she should not chastise herself for her “weakness” but also that 
“those young men” defending the Pope are martyrs “before the Lord”.
428
 The novel, following 
the narration of Jacobine’s inner struggles, goes on to relate Olderich’s experiences in Italy. 
The novel goes on to strategically alternate long historical accounts – for instance on the 
papal General de Pimodan – with the evolution of the story of the two protagonists; the author 
does so also to increase the suspense surrounding the moment in which Olderich is 
purportedly fatally wounded and Jacobine's reaction once she finds out about it. 
In the end, Olderich does not die but is saved; the novel ends upon Olerich's return 
after a convalescent stay in an Italian peasant's home. Though the novel ends before the 
wedding, it ends with the promise of one, that and the promise of "a new, happy family"
429
 
Bresciani’s novel is characterized by a series of repeated topoi throughout. Olderich, before 
meeting the pontiff, prays in the Chapel of the Confession in St. Peter’s Basilica, “with all my 
ardour to the great saint to provide me with the ardent spirit that provided the martyrs with the 
power to sacrifice their blood and their lives to the tyrants in the name of their belief. Today 
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the church is treated with hostility by the tyranny of the Godless; today, too, she will find her 
martyrs who will triumph over new tyrants.”
430
 Throughout the book, papal soldiers are 
portrayed to have shed their blood for their religion, as martyrs, which ensured for them “the 
secure way to heaven”
431
.  
One scene relates a conversation between generals Lamoricière and Pimodan. 
Lamoricière praises the Zouaves, noting that they were used to studying
432
 and therefore 
intelligent enough to understand by themselves what their leaders wanted. At the same time, 
they fought “for a holy cause”, dying for the Pope and the church, and they knew that this was 
"martyrdom" for the testimony of Christ.
433
 In his chapters describing the battle of 
Castelfidardo of 1860, where many indeed lost their lives and the Papal Army was defeated 
by the Piedmont troops of General Cialdini, Bresciani wrote: “[… We do] have one name for 




A key feature ascribed to the Zouaves of all countries was their “tender” age. For 
instance Bresciani writes of those who fought in 1860: “Some of them were only seventeen to 
eighteen years old and they had never left their home [before]. Their soul was much stronger 
than their body.”
435
 Bresciani uses such descriptions as the “young men’s great solemn souls”, 
the “noble, young people”, the “young volunteers”.
436
 To be young was associated with being 
pure: Bresciani considered them to be living in an essentially impure century, in a “dirty 
century” characterized by a “new general flood of sins”, an epoch of “carnal lust” and 
“immorality.”
437
 These “youths” are said to have shouted, as they loaded their rifles, “I, at the 
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433
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434
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435
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 “Diese Jünglinge … riefen: ‚Ich, beim Pfeifen der ersten Kugel, werde ich, während ich feure und meinen 
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But idealism is not enough to win a war. In fact, Bresciani often comments the lack of 
military training of these youths: And though they "possessed more noble-mindedness, self-
sacrifice and good will than had skill with arms and experience in military exercises, they had 
still to adapt to camp live.”
439
 Sometimes, Bresciani presents religious fervour as a hindrance 
to good fighting, and propounds a more cool-headed approach towards the war. He asserts 
that having more experience at warfare would have been better
440
: “This heroic youth was 
admittedly full of enthusiasm and good will; but they have never before participated in any 
war and do not know what words such as turn about face in time, to disperse, to gather, to 
fight in the wedge, square, echelon, flank and front formations mean.”
441
 The lack of 
experience lay, as Bresciani wrote, at the basis of consistent efforts to improve military 
education, for instance by integrating experienced Swiss veterans form the Papal Army into 
the regiments of the Zouaves: “Nearly all of Lamoricière’s volonteers understand nothing of 
war; to educate them as quickly as possible, the General took the greater part of their officers 
and non-commissioned officers including the corporals from the legions of veterans to 
distribute them amongst the companies of new arrivals.”
442
 
The cause of the fighting is depicted in terms of a crusade, a parallel which Bresciani 
let Olderich himself feel upon his arrival to the harbour of Civitavecchia, where he is imbued 
with a “holy interior joy” that is comparable “to the feeling with which the hearts of the 




Much space in the novel, including a special chapter, is dedicated to the courage of the 
mothers of the Zouaves. Much like Olderich’s fiancée, Jakobine, the mothers in the novel, at 
times, oscillate between their motherly attachment to their sons and their religious beliefs. On 
the surface, sending their sons to fight seems to contrast with the strong motherly bonds 
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underlined by the recent exaltations of motherhood in Catholicism. The veneration of Mary, 
as expressed in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception and the Blessed Virgin Mary of 
1854, was closely connected to this exaltation of motherhood; but, it must be noted, Mary had 
also sacrificed her son. The act of sending their sons into the battle in Rome was, therefore, 
legitimized by the rationale that these sons belonged to God: “By delighting us with children 
Divine Providence only entrusts them to us, only to refund them on its demand.”
444
 And in 
another passage, a mother writes: “But are those children not just a pledge in our hands, 
which God entrusted to us, to ask them back at his own discretion?”
445
 Hence, it is possible 
that the mothers “themselves call upon their children to enter such a fight”.
446
 In the book, the 
Pope’s cause against the “revolution” is equated with God’s cause. By sending their children 
to fight, these mothers are now perceived as the perfect examples of fortitude winning over 
motherly feelings: “What belief! What devotion to God! What grace of heart! What courage! 
What knightly souls!”
447
 Were their sons to fall in battle, the mothers in Bresciani’s novel 
would take pride from being the “mothers of martyrs.”
448
 Bresciani specifically writes about 
one mother: “Her sorrow was silent, nearly gleaming, and she seemed to say: I am a happy 
mother, my son is in heaven, and for the sake of Christ he was killed.”
449
 
But the act of giving back their children to God by providing soldiers for the Papal 
Army did not signify that the primary role of mothers was forgotten: Indeed, this was to 
watch over the purity of their sons. Hence, Bresciani includes recounts of the letters that 
mothers sent to Rome asking their friends to monitor their children's lifestyles. As Bresciani 
seems to cite from one mother’s letter: “I do not think that at Rome there are only saints. 
Quite the contrary, I am convinced that in the Eternal City young, tender, and easily reachable 
souls, are exposed to many temptations.”
450
 Therefore, they requested that friends keep an eye 
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on their sons in order to keep them, as Bresciani writes, “as noble and chaste as they 
themselves have sent them to the Holy Father.”
451
  
Bresciani also places emphasis on the supposed fact that many Zouaves came from 
noble families, or in his words, “nearly all were as noble as they were rich”.
452
 In Bresciani’s 
book a general comments with a figure of speech on the fallen soldiers of Castelfidardo: 
“What names! One could believe one was reading an invitation list to one of the court balls at 
the times of Louis XIV.”
453
 The author goes on to emphasize the dichotomy between the life 
befitting a noble’s standing and meagre camp life: at home, Bresciani wrote, they have a 
“crowd of servants”; here, they “work like day labourers”.
454
  
This exaltation of the noble origins of the Zouaves in terms of status and souls 
contrasts sharply with the way they were characterized by the Garibaldian and Italian enemy. 
Bresciani’s novel also speaks of this: “Such men, the admiration of the Catholic world, the 
fame of their happy fatherland, it is they that one dares call a crowd of mercenaries, 
hypocrites, rabble without roof and home, a horde of foreign drunkards, paid cowardly 
murderers that one must eradicate like wild animals.”
455
 Bresciani cites other, similar 
characterizations that he took from speeches from the Italian General Fanti for instance.
456
 By 
supposing the economic motives of the pro-papal soldiers, the pro-national forces directly 
attacked the foundation upon which the images of martyrdom and sacrifice were based. 
Economic disinterest was an important ingredient in the topos of “sacrifice”. The German 
Catholic Mösinger wrote about the papal Zouaves, stating that they “often served at their own 
expense”.
457
 The distinction between differently motivated foreign soldiers was a consistent 
feature of the contemporary polemics between the political sides of the Risorgimento: 
whereas one army’s “own” foreign soldiers were often described as ideal-driven and noble-
minded, those of the opposing side were demonized as “mercenaries”.
458
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3.4 Personality Cults 
3.4.1 International personality cults 
On all sides, single figures were subject to a process of heroization. This is how Garibaldi’s 
international reputation was established
459
, and likewise how the cult of the Pope was 
increasingly amplified. The situation in which the last Bourbon monarchical couple was 
forced to withdraw to the fortress in Gaeta in early September 1860 was, similarly to the 
processes applied to Garibaldi and the Pope, used to highlight their sufferings and sacrifices. 
Lucy Riall's analysis of how Garibalid's image was contemporaneously constructed and 
diffused alongside each of his actions is exemplary. She has underlined the rather active role 
that Garibaldi had in “fashioning” his own public image, and she has stressed the practical 
aims that this image was intended to fulfil in mobilizing various forms of support for the 
Italian “hero”.
460
 Similar processes of “personalization” are also evident on the opposing 
political sides. But in this case, such “modern” forms of communication were a rather new 
“weapon”. For the kings and the Pope to appropriate this "role of the charismatic hero" and to 
provide them also with a "plebiscitary" legitimation
461
, was risky according to Volker Sellin, 
because this move in itself was a “symptom of a crisis” of the dynastic legitimation of 
authority; but “charisma remains ever a revolutionary force even in the hands of a dynastic 
sovereign. If it fails, he cannot return to the old guise of traditional legitimacy.”
462
 
With regard to the pontiff, the establishment of a cult of the currently reigning Pope 
must be considered within the context of the “Romanization” of the Catholic Church in the 
nineteenth century. The Ultramontane Catholic factions were those, in particular, who pushed 
to re-establish an orientation towards Catholic hierarchy and toward the reintroduction of the 
monarchical principle into the church. In opposition to the Episcopalian tendencies that were 
very much a mark of the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century saw the rise of a 
countermovement that aimed to establish the absolutism of the pope and his policy over the 
role of bishops and “national churches”, these last being Gallicanism in France, Febronianism 
in Germany, or Josephinism in Austria.
463
 One of the most important ways in which this shift 
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of power over to the Pope manifested was through the use of symbolic policies.
464
 More than 
ever before, a religious cult of the actual Pope was established. Partially new religious 
practices informed “devotions to the person of the Pope”
465
, which were increasingly able to 
function as a direct bridge between Catholic lay people, especially the non-bourgeois strata of 
the confession, and the Roman centre.
466
 In the novel “Olderic”, the relationship between the 
Pope and the masses, as well as between the Pope and his soldiers, is depicted in terms of a 
father-son relationship. During a ceremony, the masses are said to give Pius IX “the name of a 
father and a king by shouting unanimously: ‘We want our Pope, cheers to our Pope-king!’”
467
 
In fact, the frequency with which the Roman administration organized events that were linked 
to the institution of the papacy increased, and the administration actively tried to transform 
them into mass gatherings. In 1867, for instance, the Pope announced that there would be a 
celebration of an anniversary set for 29 June: 1800 years had passed since the death of the 
martyrs Peter and Paul in the year 67. Roughly 150,000 pilgrims adhered to the call from 
Rome, among which 500 bishops and 20,000 clergymen.
468
 "[F]or the first time in the history 
of the papacy, the Pope extensively used public audiences"
469
, and now public appearances 
had become an important ingredient in these modern forms of personal cult of the Pope. The 
imagery of “suffering”, “martyrdom” and “sacrifice” were particularly effective in terms of 
political communication here and elsewhere. During the German catholic assemblies of 1867, 
the seminarian Christoph Moufang underlined that the Pope should not be a worldly king 
“that always has peace on earth and an unsullied possession and an undisturbed reign. No! He 
should have, as others that carry a crown, his burden and his cross.”
470
 In a long passage the 
author supports the cult of Pius IX. He states “I might still experience that he, as a canonized 
Saint, will be venerated on the altars.”
471
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According to Moufang, the fact that the Pope is persecuted and suffers because of the 
battles he must face only contributes to the love that is felt for him by Catholics. As Jörg 
Seiler has shown, the image of the suffering Pope was very much fuelled by accentuating the 
corporality of the Pope; the effect was intensified by the fact that he was the first Pope that 
could be – and was – photographed. The result was, according to Seiler, the establishment of 
a kind of “somatic solidarity” between the Pope and especially the lay people.
472
 This 
corporal and emotional kind of joint suffering, of joint feelings and mirrored emotions is for 
instance evident in the address that the general assembly of the catholic associations sent to 
the Pope in 1861: “We share with you the pain brought about from the suffering and 
persecution […], we share with you the outrage […] we are scandalized about the perfidy and 
malice […]”
473
 These forms of communication were more modern than they were old; 
according to Christopher Clark “the result – in the short term at least – was a drastic 
personalization of authority that knew no contemporary parallel and anticipated in some 
respect the totalitarian cults of the twentieth century.”
474
 
The topos of sacrifice and the idea of “martyrdom” were present on all political 
sides.
475
 Ernst Haug, General of the Roman Republic in 1849, for instance, dedicated his 
Roman memoirs to Mazzini with the following words: “You know how brotherly I suffer 
your pain with you […].”
476
 These topoi were very pronounced in the cult that came to be 
formed around the Bourbon monarchical couple, especially after they pulled back to Gaeta, 
although they could only partially inform the engagement of foreign soldiers given that the 
cult developed after many of them had already arrived in southern Italy.
477
 All of these 
“mythical” figures aroused a certain degree of fascination abroad. They helped to create well 
beyond the bounds of Italy the “desire to participate in the epic of the Italian nation”
478
, or, 
with regard to the opposite side, the desire to contribute to “the powerful array of opposition 
that the Italian national movement encountered in Europe”.
479
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3.4.2 National figures and personality cults 
At times, it was possible some of these figures lent themselves to a specific European state or 
regional context as well. This was the case with the wife of the last Bourbon king, Marie 
Sophie of Bavaria.
480
 The anthology of poems dedicated to her and published in 1861 in 
Munich, with a page at the beginning of the book announcing an “album of Gaeta”, and a 
dedication to the “heroine of Gaeta”, is most emblematic.
481
 In the foreword, the “sacrifice 
and dedication” of Marie Sophie is highlighted, as is her role in holding up morale amongst 
the Bourbon troops present at Gaeta and especially her care for the wounded in the military 
hospital
482
; an etching of this last was added. The poems contain variations of these topics 
throughout; but of course the case of Marie Sophie is used to highlight German as well as 
Bavarian patriotism. At times Marie Sophie is depicted as a German: this is so in the poem 
entitled “A German woman”, where she is depicted as a “German princely daughter”
483
; in 
another poem, her “German” loyalty is emphasized, a loyalty that ensures she stays with her 
husband “until death” do them part.
484
 Other poems call attention to the fact that Marie Sophie 
came from Bavaria; often, however, allusions to Bavaria and Germany are to be found 
alongside one another in the same poem: “From Bavaria's old dynasty you come / from which 
produced more than one real German woman / more than one courageous ancestor.”
485
 
Similarly, for papal mobilization, the fact that the papal Minister of Arms, Hermann 
Kanzler, came from Baden was frequently highlighted especially in German publications: 
“Already on the 15
th
 of November [1867], 450 members of the Catholic Casino in his 
[Kanzler’s] hometown Bruchsal sent him an address full of warmth and ardour and expressed 
properly their thankfulness, their joy and their just pride. General Kanzler is indeed today the  
 
 
                                                 
480
 On her see Franco Valsecchi, "Marie Sophie. Königin von Neapel," Zeitschrift für bayerische 
Landesgeschichte 44, no. 1 (1981): pp. 381-96; Sarlin, Légitimisme en armes, especially pp. 199-200. 
481
 „Gaeta-Album“; „Der Heldin von Gaeta“. Johann Baptist Vogl and Friedrich Wolf, eds., Gedichte an Ihre 
Majestät Marie Sophie, Königin beider Sicilien, geb. Herzogin in Bayern. Mit dem Porträt Ihrer Majestät der 
Königin beider Sicilien (Munich: s. n., 1861). 
482
 See, e. g., the poem by Edward Dorer-Egloff, "Die Krankenwärterin," in ibid., pp. 16-17, as well as the 
engraving of Marie Sophie in the military hospital, on the insert between pp. 16 and 17. 
483
 „[..D]ie deutsche Fürstentochter“ Heinrich von Höfen, "Eine deutsche Frau," ibid., p. 6. 
484
 „Die Deutschen üben Treue“; „Ich bleibe bis zum Tode zur Seite, Gatte, Dir!“ Edward Dorer-Egloff, "Der 
Kronenwechsel in Gaeta," ibid., p. 15. 
485
 “Aus Bayern’s altem Herrscherhause bist, / Das mehr als eine echte deutsche Frau, / Das mehr als einen 
tapfern Ahnherren zählet.” Gilardone, "An die Heldin von Gaeta," ibid., p. 40. 
112 
 
pride of Catholic Germany.”
486
 Another pamphlet stated: “The commander of the papal army, 
Kanzler, is – for the glory of the German name – a German, born in Bruchsal in Baden.”
487
 
3.5 Interclassist armies as legitimating factors 
Another important topos that all sides used was their supposed social inclusiveness in terms of 
the social origins of soldiers. Even legitimists had learned that a supposedly social inclusive 
“approbation” of their cause was an important device in the "fight" to win the public opinion's 
favour. The number of supporters was important, but particularly so was the fact that they 
came from all strata of society. Hence, even the legitimists were keen to show – at least in 
their political communications – that theirs was also a “peoples’ war”
488
, fought by soldiers 
convinced of the legitimist cause. In his report to the Pope on the battle of Mentana in 1867, 
for instance, the papal Minster of Arms Kanzler underlined “the competition with which all 
Catholic nations wanted to be represented in your troops, and how many families (from the 
most illustrious to the most humble) pushed to enlist their own children.”
489
 Here, as 
elsewhere, legitimism and Catholicism had begun to move towards new forms of 
legitimization, in this case popular consent. In this sense, the volunteer was a potentially 
“democratic” figure that according to these texts also existed on the conservative side, 
wherein “democratic” was intended to mean wide-reaching consensus, as in being socially 
inclusive. This confirms the theses that there was an astonishing ability on the part of 
monarchism (Volker Sellin) and European Catholicism (Christopher Clark) to modernize. 
3.6 Romanticism, Adventure 
In this endeavour to create consensus, Romantic culture played a major role, with its 
tendencies towards the exceptional, the individual and the adventurous, and a quest for the 
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“exotic”. Assuming that the aim of the engagement was primarily to go to warrant that 
secondary factors were that this war was located abroad in another country – in Italy – and 
specific armed forces were involved. If, on the other hand, the aim of the engagement was 
primarily to go abroad, and joining an Italian army was a good opportunity to do so, this may 
be interpreted as the desire to do something exceptional, which is normally referred to as 
“adventurism”. The two “explanations”, “appraisal of war” and “appraisal of the exceptional 
experience”, are linked to important discursive formations of nineteenth century. 
Adventurism,
490
 as a form of escapism was a decisive part of Romanticism: “The romantic 
individual was not satisfied with its condition; he pined for the desire to be different and 




Many reports by German soldiers – from all political sides – often hinted that 
partaking in the conflict in Italy would provide a kind of additional "dividend" or benefit, i.e. 
the possibility of visiting Italy. Enlistment seemed to some to be an (especially economically 
advantageous) way to see the world, including Italy and/or Rome. Before they were deployed, 
some seemed to have entertained such “touristic” intentions
492
; at least these last were 
amongst the reasons given by some of the German soldiers for their move to Italy. For them, 
the possibility of visiting Rome and the Papal States was an important incentive – to be able 
to visit classical and/or religious sites. The first of the two is evident in Gustav von 
Hoffstetter’s writings, a soldier who fought in the ranks of the Roman Republic in 1849. He 
describes his fighting in Rome with allusions to antiquity; by committing to fight on the side 
of the Roman Republic, the “dream of his youth” to fight on the Campus Martius with 
“Roman younglings” was coming true.
493
 The second of the two is confirmed by papal officer 
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3.7 The role of associations 
3.7.1 German Ultramontanism at the roots of recruitment for the Papal Army 
The mobilization and recruitment of Germans for the Papal Army was connected to activities 
of German Catholicism, especially its “Ultramontane” factions. The word ‘Ultramontanism’ 
was originally an expression of denigration for those who were, in the eyes of others, too 
favourable toward Rome, “across the mountains”. Still today, the expression is used for those 
who “look southwards from north of the Alps […] to get answers from Rome in nearly all 
questions having to do with religious beliefs or mores”.
495
 The word was used first in France 
to make a distinction with Gallicanism, which recalling the “Episcopalian” traditions of the 
French Catholic Church, aimed to establish a national Church that was less influenced by 
Rome. An anti-Gallican movement developed in the 1820s, with such exponents as Félicité de 
Lamenais, that saw the Pope as the primary guarantee of the liberty of the church and was 
therefore named by his opponents to be an “ultramontane”, gazing toward the south of the 
Alps. In Germany, the creation of a Rome-oriented faction of Catholicism was facilitated by 
state-church conflicts. In 1837 the actions taken by the Pope and the Bishop of Cologne 
against theological professors clashed with the position upheld by the Prussian government 
that these last were civil servants. At the same time, a debate surfaced about how to handle 
interfaith marriages in Prussian Rhineland. Both led to the so-called “Cologne Event” 
(“Kölner Ereignis”) or “Cologne turmoil” (“Kölner Wirren”), culminating in the 
imprisonment of the Bishop of Cologne on the part of the Prussian authorities. The 




However, from what we know of the church historian Ignaz von Döllinger, there were 
still important segments of Catholic society, especially Catholic lay circles – for instance at 
the universities – that doubted not only the dogmas of infallibility and jurisprudence of the 
Pope but also, like Döllinger himself, the necessity for the Pope to have a mundane state. In 
this sense, Ultramontanism was only one of the political and theological positions that existed 
in German Catholicism at the time: “Against the self-stylization of Ultramontanism as an 
expression of Catholic unity, Ultramontanism has itself only ever been a faction, and for a 
                                                 
495
 Denzler, Das Papsttum, p. 93. 
496
 Lönne, Politischer Katholizismus, pp. 77-80. 
115 
 
long time only a small ‘radical minority’”
497
. Non- or even anti-Ultramontane positions, such 
as the continued preponderance of enlightened visions of Catholicism, were expressed for 
instance in the so-called Hermesianism of the professors at the Catholic universities, the very 
same group against whom the Cologne Bishop had stirred discontent among the students in 
the 1830s. 
What is important here is the fact that Ultramontanism was increasingly able to 
directly reach the non-bourgeois strata of society. The bourgeois class, however, seemed to 
remain more hostile to its principles, a fact that is often overlooked given that bourgeois 
Catholics were frequently not included in research sets on Catholicism.
498
 
In other words: Mobilization in support of the Papal Army seems to have been an 
element of German Ultramontanism, though Ultramontanism did not go unquestioned, and 
important segments of German Catholicism (especially within the universities) did not adhere 
to this authoritarian orientation towards the Pope. 
From 1848 onwards, Catholic associations burgeoned in Germany: On 23 June 1848 
the “Association of Pius for religious liberty” (“Piusverein für religiöse Freiheit”) was 
founded in Mainz; similar organizations were built in the same year in Aachen, Cologne, 
Bonn and Koblenz, in Hessen and then in Silesia and Tyrol. The second cathedral festival 
held in Cologne (“Kölner Dombaufest”) on 14 August 1848 was used to organize the first 
assembly of German Catholic associations, the first “Katholikentag”, which was then held on 
3 October 1848 in Mainz. Here the various catholic associations presented themselves. For 
instance Adolf Kolping held a speech on the new Catholic associations for journeymen, 
associations which in 1862 already counted 60,000 members. At the Catholic general 
assembly in Regensburg in 1849, some had already begun to speak of the duty of all Catholics 




3.7.2 Peter’s pence and the Archbrotherhood of Saint Michael 1860-1870 
At the beginning of 1860 in Ireland the first attempts were made to reintroduce Peter’s Pence. 
The name Peter ’s pence was originally used in relation to sums paid by the Anglo-Saxon 
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kings to Rome, a practice that was kept until the advent of the Anglican Church, which was 
financed by a tax levied on the subjects. Contemporaneously to the recruitment of Irishmen 




In March 1860 the Historisch-Politische Blätter published a long article on the Peter ’s 
pence. The editor Johann Edmund Jörg wrote about the activities in Ireland, Vienna. and 
Westphalia as signs that not only petitions but material support as well was being organized 
by the Catholics: “The more the external power of the papacy must do without the crumbling 
support of diplomacy, the deeper it is rooted in the hearts of the Catholic people. This is the 
great turn that is going on around us.”
501
 Already in the first months of 1860, pastoral letters 
from German bishops were written in support of the Holy See containing lists of signatures 
against the policies of Cavour. The Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Rauscher, also took up 
the idea of collecting money for the Pope. The Viennese “Archbrotherhood of the holy 
archangel Michael” was officially founded as a prayer association, the aim of which was to 
collect the Peter’s Pence. In the statutes of a St. Michael association in Freiburg from 1891, it 
was said: “The association of the Holy Archangel Michael, founded in Vienna in the year 
1860 by pious Catholics, and approved by the Holy Father Pius IX the 7
th
 of March 1860, has 
the aim to work to strengthen genuine Catholic convictions, especially for the sustainment and 
defence of the Apostolic See in Rome as the centre of Catholic unity. The members oblige 
themselves to say devout prayer […], and those who are able to do so will give alms of at 
least five pfennigs monthly.”
502
 On 9 March 1860, the Pope began granting indulgences, 
which were to be handed over to the members of the associations. The first St. Michael’s 
associations outside Austria were built in Westphalia, in Münster and Paderborn, and in 
November 1860 they were built in Cologne and Trier upon pastoral decree from the bishops 
of the two dioceses.  
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The choice to institute associations connected to Saint Michael was significant for 
three reasons. Michael was a “military saint, the leader of the hosts of heaven”.
503
 In the Book 
of Revelation of the New Testament, Michael fights the dragon (Rev 12, 7); Joan of Arc is 
said to have received visions of the Archangel Michael instructing her to liberate France; and 
in modern times Saint Michael is increasingly represented in military clothing, such as armour 
or a mail shirt.
504
 Despite the fact that “cults” of Saint Michael existed in many countries, in 
nineteenth-century Germany he was increasingly transformed into a quintessential “German” 
saint. Already after the so-called Wars of Liberation we find in the work of authors and artists 
the underlying idea that there was “a tradition of the archangel in German history. Already at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century [… many were] sure, that the archangel Michael has 
had a role as national patron since earliest times”.
505
 But it was not just as a “German” saint 
that Michael came to be seen. He also continued to be seen as a saint that fought “evil”, which 
led in the 1840s to the use of his image against revolution, in protection of the divine right of 
kings. In this sense Saint Michael was seen “as guarantor of a greater German-Germanic 
[großdeutsch-germanischen] unity […].”
506
 In sum, he was seen as a “German”, a militant, if 
not a “warrior” saint
507
 with anti-revolutionary, “großdeutsche” attributes by organized 
Catholicism in Germany, and especially for Ultramontanism, he was a near perfect symbol.  
In 1862, the general assembly of the Catholic associations was held in Aachen. On the 
evening before the official session opened, the seminary professor Christoph Moufang gave a 
speech that came to be known as the “men’s speech”, in which he claimed that there was a 
need for ‘real men’ in the Catholic movement to take up the battle for the national equality of 
Catholicism, as well as the fight for the independence of the Pope. During the assembly a 
declaration was voted to found an association for the publication of inexpensive (not more 
than nine Kreutzers) ‘contemporary pamphlets’ (‘Zeitgemäße Broschüren’) which then 
became very popular in Germany. In the final resolution it was stated that the Catholics were 
not enemies of progress but did abominate revolution. They protested their denigration as 
anti-patriotic, which was linked to being labelled as ‘Ultramontanes’, and declared that the 
“devotion to the Holy See has never compromised the greatness and glory of the 
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 With regard to the Pope, they claimed he should be in full possession of his 
worldly dominion and declared that – because of the enduring challenges to the Pope’s 
dignity, liberty and independence – it was necessary to pay the Peter ’s pence, which the 
members of the Catholic Associations should continue to do and encourage others to do so as 
well.  
In November and December 1867, large Catholic assemblies were held in Mainz, 
Münster and Cologne. The general assembly of the Catholic associations in Germany, 
resembled that year in Mainz, passed an address stating that, “in the face of the actual 
dangers, the maintenance of the [Papal] Army, which is necessary to protect the person of the 
Holy Father and his subjects, is a common matter of the Catholic world”
509
; in Münster, an 
address by the general assembly of the diocese repeated these words. The assembly went on 
to resurrect the confraternity of St. Michael, “whose task it is to incite praying for the Holy 
See and to collect the Peter’s Pence from its members”; and it proposed that others should 
take up membership. All this activity was, as they explained, necessary because “the 
conservation of the worldly possessions of the Holy See” guarantees “the freedom, dignity 
and independence of the head of the Catholic church.”
510
 
The issue of the Papal Army was taken up as well by Christoph Moufang in the 
speeches he held during the Catholic assemblies in Münster and Cologne in 1867 and 1868. 
Although he acknowledged the fact that the first popes did not possess their own mundane 
state, Moufang perceived that later popes had been endowed with this territory by God, 
whereby their temporal and religious power was merged. Because of this, any requisition of 
papal terrain was seen as an action that went directly against God’s will, Moufang drew also 
on the “myth of the battle of Castelfidardo” by underling that the little army of the Pope 
fought courageously in 1860. He went on to say that it had been the “more than highly clever” 
September Convention that had suggested: “the Pope should build himself his own army.”
511
 
Even if it was small, this little but ‘real’ army, as Moufang explained – without however 
                                                 
508
 “[…] daß die Ergebenheit gegen den Heiligen Stuhl zu keiner Zeit die Größe und Herrlichkeit des Vaterlands 
beeinträchtigt hat.“ "Entschließung der Generalversammlung katholischer Vereine Deutschlands [1862]," in 
Dietmar Stübler, Deutschland - Italien 1850 - 1871. Zeitgenössische Texte (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitäts-
Verlag, 2007), p. 186. 
509
 “Angesichts der gegenwärtigen Gefahren ist die Erhaltung der Armee, deren der heilige Vater zum Schutze 
seiner Person und seiner Unterthanen bedarf, eine gemeinsame Angelegenheit der katholischen Welt. Es ist eine 
Ehrensache für jede Nation, in dieser Armee vertreten zu sein: deutsche Männer können ihr Leben keiner edleren 
Sache weihen.” N. N., "Kirchliche Rundschau," Der Katholik. Zeitschrift für katholische Wissenschaft und 
kirchliches Leben 47 (1867), p. 767. 
510
 Ibid., p. 768. 
511
 “Der überkluge September-Vertrag von 1864 hat festgesetzt, daß der Papst sich eine eigene Armee bilden 
solle.” Moufang, Der Kampf um Rom, p. 7. 
119 
 
mentioning the name of the battle of Mentana that had been fought some months before – was 
able to win a war against the Italian and Garibaldian troops. Nevertheless, the possibility that 
the Pope would once again be attacked was great enough that Moufang foresaw a kind of final 
battle between the 'revolutionary' forces and the forces of ‘law’. Moufang went on to propose 
three activities to the Catholics in Germany: to pray, give alms and protest, for instance by 
signing a petition to the Prussian king. In Cologne, Moufang gave an even more militant 
speech, stating right from the outset that compared to times of peace, it was “even nicer to 
enter into battle for the holy cause of religion.”
512
 He went on to describe himself and his 
listeners as "Ultramontanists".
513
 He then characterised the battle of Pius IX against the 
revolution as being one of ideas: “the idea of justice”, “the idea of the independence of 
religious authority”, and the “idea of unity and togetherness of all peoples in Christendom”.
514
 
To Moufang, Pius IX embodied the idea of justice because he sustained the right of property. 
The idea of independence of the spiritual authority was being challenged by the revolutionary 
forces, because, as Moufang claimed, their aim was not so much to make Rome the capital of 
Italy as it was “principally to destroy religion by depriving the highest religious authority of 
its independence”.
515
 Moufang went on to describe that the idea of unity of all people in 
Christendom would manifest in the support of all nations for the Papal Army, especially by 
sending soldiers: “Look at these youth; from all countries they have come running; but those 
are no Frenchmen, Italians, Belgians, Germans etc., that are loyal sons of the mother Church.” 
By shedding their blood together, they formed a “blood-bond among all Catholics.”
516
 
Moufang reached the conclusion that the Germans – as had the French, the Spanish, the 
Belgians and the Dutch – should engage in the fight by providing money, prestige, prayers, 
blood and sacrifice: “There is nothing greater than to contribute to great things and to engage 
the best, what every human has, his life and blood, for a great cause.”
517
 Enclosed in the 
printed version of his speeches is a “Programme of the Catholic people’s policy in the Roman 
question”, which is far more moderate in its suggestions than Moufang’s actual speeches 
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were. The programme calls for a guarantee of the territory of the Pope as it was delimited at 
that time and develops a programme of “neutrality” of the Papal States, which is best 
translated as the military inviolability by other states. Were this measure to be guaranteed, this 
inviolability would render unnecessary the “assertion of this right by force of arms” and 
would make possible “the reduction of the Papal Army to a minimum sufficient to guarantee 
the internal order” as well as the reduction or even end of the sacrifices made on the part of 
the Catholics to contribute to the finances of the Papal States.
518
 In sum, this “neutrality” 
would “allow” the Pope “to execute his mission of peace and to lay aside the sword and to 
elevate his hand only for blessing.”
519
  
3.8 National Legions for Italy 
The aforementioned general assembly of the Catholic associations in Germany that 
reassembled in Mainz in 1867 voted an address within which it stated: “in the face of the 
actual dangers, the maintenance of the [Papal] Army, which is necessary to protect the person 
of the Holy Father and his subjects, is a common matter of the Catholic world. It is a point of 




The battle of Montelibretti on 13 October 1867 was instantly “mythologized” on the 
Catholic side. On 20 October 1867, just seven days after the battle had concluded, the French 
Catholic newspaper “L’Univers”
521
 wrote: “this military action is one of the most beautiful 
that one can imagine, and the military feats of the Catholic world are enriched by a sublime 
page.”
522
 The journal narrated little anecdotes of single soldiers in the Zouaves who were of 
different nationalities: an English corporal, “Colingrigy” (Alfred Collingridge from Oxford, 
register no. 2915); a Belgian corporal Mercier; a Roman “clairon” (hornist/trumpeter) called 
Mimi; a Dutch “De Jonghe” (the “terreur des Garibaldiens”; Pieter Jong). Regarding the 
Bavarian Joseph Alois Bach, the journal wrote: “Sergeant-Major Bach, a German-Swiss, was 
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particularly conspicuous. He was bathed in blood, but it was the blood of the enemy. He 
himself had not received a single scratch.”
523
 This anecdote about “bloodied” Bach found its 
way – together with some of the other stories – into “The Crusaders of Saint Peter”, which 
was published in 1868 in “La Civiltà Cattolica”. Here, following the example of “L’Univers”, 
the anonymous narrator proved quite capable of “catering” to the needs of the different 
nationalities present among the Zouaves by singling out the “bravery” of individual national 
soldiers: the French Arthur Guillemin and Urbain de Quélen, the Dutch Pieter Jong and the 
German Joseph Alois Bach.  
Bach is described in “The Crusaders” as “a Bavarian with a grave appearance, of cool 
and implacable courage, for whom danger is a spur”. He was said to have shot “in the 
Prussian way” by his comrades, i.e. shooting while lying on the ground, and to have had 
“heroic determination”.
524
 But the story about Bach also travelled from the centre to the 
“periphery”, from Rome to Germany. In the Bavarian Catholic weekly “St. Josephsblatt” a 
short story appeared in December 1867 called “The courageous Palatine”, which also 
recounted Bach’s “bloodbath”.
525
 Again, the same episode was also found in the German 
narration “The Fighters for the Apostolic See in the year 1867”, authored by Andreas 
Niedermayer, which was published in 1867 in the abovementioned popular Catholic series of 
pamphlets. Here, the episode of Bach is wrapped up with the transcription of a telegraph, that 
according to Niedermayer Bach sent home the day after the battle: “Sepperl [pet-name for 
Joseph] well and healthy; have become officer on the battlefield.”
526
  
The stories about the papal soldiers were linked in some narrations to the typical topos 
of asymmetrical forces in battle, for instance that 86 papal soldiers "won" against a much 
greater enemy force, as was said of the battle of Montelibretti. Making an implicit reference to 
the entire Garibaldian force – and hence mistakenly taking the total number of Garibaldians 
(roughly 1200) for the actual number (approximately 300) – that were present at 
Montelibretti, the English papal Zouave Joseph Powell wrote in 1871: “This engagement and 
victory, having thus been won against such fearful odds as thirteen to one, is worthy of being 
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ranked by the side of the most glorious achievements recorded in history, for although the 
engagement may not have been so very important in its immediate results – on account of the 
small number of men engaged on both sides – yet it is not always on account of its results that 
an achievement is immortalised – witness the devotion to death of Leonidas, and three 
hundred Spartans, at the pass of Thermophylæ – but it is heroism and valour which cause a 
brilliant action to shine with lustre, and to adorn, in vivid colouring, the page of history.”
527
  
Bach’s “heroism” was acknowledged by the conferral of a special “honorary sword”, 
that from his home region of the Rheinpfalz (“Rhenish Palatinate”, part of Bavaria at that 
time), was sent to him in Rome the following year.
528
  
The widespread plans to create either one or several military corps for foreign nationalities in 
Italy followed the same logic that was applied when nationally diversified stories were 
developed in this period. Underpinning these plans for “national legions” was not only the 
exaltation of solidarity with the respective Italian parties, but almost always the idea that such 
legions would serve a purpose for their own nation. The Italian experience was seen as a type 
of preparatory pilot for (counter-)revolutionary war in the countries of origin. 
The invasion of Savoy that was planned by Mazzini in 1834, originated out of the idea to 
bring together national “regiments” of the various exiled Diasporas present in Switzerland. 
The initial military organization began precisely with these different national groups. 
Therefore, for instance, “the Polish in Switzerland began to organize militarily […] in the 
spring of 1833” and the military organizations they assembled in exile were called 
“companies of the Polish Republic”. Equally, the German exiles were asked to create a 
“German corps”.
 529
 The provision of “national legions” for the different Italian armed groups 
was a very widespread idea. This holds true not only for the pro-Unitarian side, from the 
Hungarian and Polish Legions in 1848 to the failed projects by Johann Philipp Becker to form 
a “German Legion” for Italy in 1848/49 and 1860-1861, but also on the other side of the 
political spectrum. In all of these cases it seems to have been the dominant desire to build 
battalions of more or less “homogenous” nationality.
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The presence of other nationalities functioned as the accelerator for these plans. The presence 
of other nationalities had been noted with regard to the Papal Army and was transformed into 
an argument: “Should Germany and Austria lag behind these nations? I think Germany and 
Austria, because of their history, should have preceded the other countries.”
530
 Another 
commentator took this observation a step further: “It is really high time, that we, so many 
millions of Catholics in Germany, participate strongly in the greatest battle of our times, that 
we give from our property, what we can spare, and that we provide a ‘German Legion’ for the 
glorious fighters for the Apostolic See.”
531
  
National grouping remained central even in texts that were dedicated to multinational corps. 
The periodical Catholic Historisch-politische Blätter, for instance, in a fine example of 
European cultural circulation, published in 1868 a German translation of a French report on 
the Dutch group of soldiers within the multinational Papal Zouaves, together with a German 
translation of their Dutch song. Here, the commitment of Dutch soldiers to the papal defense 
was presented as a “heroic” national deed and the sign of a purportedly typical Dutch tradition 
of providing “martyrs” for the Catholic Church; the Dutch were described here according to 
the way national discourse in the nineteenth century understood the nation to be an extended 
family and a type of biological kinship: “It is always and everywhere this way in the life of 
the church. A family has given to heaven an apostle, a martyr, a crusader, and therefore God 
laid into the blood of this kin in some way a germ of motivating force, which sooner or later 
will give rich fruits. A people exsanguinates itself in the great battles for its religion; one day 
we will see burgeon from its womb strong and heroic souls.”
532
  
In the aforementioned song of the Dutch Zouaves, to fight for the Pope was portrayed as a 
national deed, wherein much nostalgia for the “old Bataver” was conveyed: “For him, we left 
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3.9 The “brotherhood in arms” of the peoples  
Another element common to the texts that pushed for an international mobilization for the 
Italian parties were the concepts that specifically highlighted international bonds. In fact, 
internationalism has a history in the same manner that nationalism does. Collocated within 
this category are earlier concepts including the idea of Christian brotherhood, 
“cosmopolitanism” or “world citizenship” (Immanuel Kant) and “universal brotherhood”, but 




The Christian “brotherhood in Christ of all believers” concept was translated by 
thinkers of the Enlightenment into the concept “cosmopolitanism”. The enlightened idea of 
“cosmopolitanism” secularized the Christian concept. In at least some of these enlightened 
visions, the “citizenship of the world”
535
 was considered automatic. There was no need for 
intermediation by smaller collectivities nor was there a need for the “fraternization” between 
humans. Christoph Martin Wieland was a proponent of this position.
536
 But, according to the 
philosopher Bertram Kienzle, this conception can also be found in Immanuel Kant. Kienzle 
maintains that the conception of a federation of states that is normally associated with Kant 
based on his essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (“Zum Ewigen Frieden”) of 
1795 is only the second best option Kant provided in solution to the situation of perpetual 
wars. It is only in the event that it is not possible to establish a “world republic” that a 
federation of the states and international law step in; however, they are “a negative surrogate 
of the positive idea of a world republic, which [however] encounters opposition by the 
peoples.”
537
 This, real or imagined
538
, idea of automatic world citizenship became 
increasingly “unpopular in the early nineteenth century among most European patriots and 
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The federalist-fraternizing version of international brotherhood, for instance, may be 
found in the texts and rituals that are connected to the “diffusion” of the French Revolution in 
Europe. But as occurred in the case of “national” brotherhood in France, the “international” 
brotherhood was quickly attributed a more political, revolutionary and “aggressive” twist. A 
"second' brotherhood had already been attached to the French national brotherhood and was 
based on the differentiation between "good" and "bad" subjects, i.e. between those that 
undoubtedly took sides with the revolution and the republic and those who did not. This 
second “brotherhood” is directed against a clear enemy: the European counter-revolution; it is 
at the same time, however, politically exclusive, “rejecting all actors who do not authentically 
profess themselves to belong to the revolutionary movement.”
541
 The rather complex interplay 
between different “brotherhoods” – the national brotherhood already conceptualized as 
“natural”
542
 and the revolutionary brotherhood – is quite evident here. The concepts and 
rituals of “fraternization” aim to discriminate or make a distinction between who is and who 
is not part of the revolutionary “brotherhood”. "Fratricide" becomes comprehensible when 
looking at it from the perspective of the "natural" national brotherhood: to murder a “traitor” 
is to kill a national brother, not a brother in the revolutionary sense: “Be my brother or I will 
kill you” (“Sois mon frère ou je tue!”) or – possibly only from 1848 onwards, “And if you do 
not want to be my brother, / I will bash your skull in.” (“Und willst Du nicht mein Bruder 
sein, / so schlag ich dir den Schädel ein.”)
 543 
It is important to bear in mind this complex relationship between “brotherhoods” in 
the endeavour to understand the international declinations of “brotherhood”. The more 
aggressive, revolutionary “brotherhood” was already present during the French invasion of 
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non-French territories in November 1792. When this fact is taken into consideration, it is 
possible to understand the “voluntaristic” outlook of the idea of fraternization with other 
peoples. Like any individual, any people is free to decide whether or not it wishes to become 
part of the militant political brotherhood, but in the event it chooses not to, it must face the, 
even potentially lethal, consequences. Hence, the “right of self-determination” is 
contemporary to an international “principle of counter-intervention”.
544
 In reality, however, 
the ways in which the French conquered parts of Europe grew progressively more distant 
from the right to self-determination. The idea of international brotherhood, however, was so 
pervasive that it was increasingly used by the opponents of the revolution and the French as 
well. From Königsberg, Baron vom Stein wrote in 1813 that “the Russian armies were 
received as brothers and liberators” by the Prussians.
545
 Similarly, the idea of “brotherhood” 
was expressed in the treaty of the Holy Alliance in 1815 in relation to the bonds between the 
reactionary monarchs. The treaty declared that “the Three contracting monarchs will remain 
united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity […].”
546
 The choice of these words, 
however, closely reflects the formula used in the Fête de la Fédération of 14 June 1790 (“to 
remain united by the indissoluble bonds of fraternity”
547
). But in the case of the Holy 
Alliance, these words are transposed and applied to the international level and in reference to 
the allied monarchs; nevertheless, this specific “brotherhood” was, in an authoritarian-
paternalistic manner, extended also to their respective peoples.
548
 
3.9.1 The democratic brotherhood of peoples 
Despite this “usurpation” on the part of the political enemy
549
, liberals and democrats 
continued to make use of the idea of “the brotherhood of peoples”, especially in the 1830s and 
1840s, but in concomitance with other terms and concepts. This is exemplified in the way in 
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which Giuseppe Mazzini handles the issue of inter- and transnational bonds. Mazzini, like 
other authors of his time
550
, does not abandon altogether the concept of “brotherhood”, but 
often goes on to speak of “humanity” in its place instead. By using the latter, Mazzini 
distances himself from “cosmopolitanism”, which he believed held connotations of “disregard 
for national diversities.” According to him, the ubi bene, ibi patria [of cosmopolitanism] is an 
immoral absurd”.
551
 In the motto of the Young Europe association (“Liberté, Egalité, 
Humanité”) the word “humanity” is attributed the place that “brotherhood” occupied during 
the French Revolution. But Mazzini also makes use of variants of the word “brotherhood”, 
among which “human brotherhood” or “brotherhood of peoples”. A rather complex usage of 
the word “brotherhood” can be found in the texts that were directly connected to the Young 
Europe. In fact, there are four different variations of the term – the brotherhood of 
humankind, the brotherhood of associations, the brotherhood of individuals, and the 
brotherhood of collectivities.  
Mazzini applies the word “brotherhood” to the inter- and intra-association bonds of 
Young Europe and also to the whole of humankind. In other words, he combines the two 
traditional uses of the word, the universal and corporative.
552
  
But Mazzini again duplicates these two meanings attached to the word, because with 
regard to both the universal and the corporative levels, it is possible to place emphasis on the 
brotherhood of individuals (of human beings in general; or, more circumscribed, of just the 
members of Young Europe) or on the brotherhood between national collectivities (of the 
nations in general; or of the national associations that comprised Young Europe in particular). 
Thereby, as aforementioned, four partially differing, qualified concepts of brotherhood can be 
distinguished. The first two conceptions revolve around the concept of brotherhood at the 
universal level (universal-individual; universal-collective), whereby humankind is considered 
a “law of God”. On the one hand, universal brotherhood has an “individualist” acceptation: 
“By the law of God and Humanity all men are free – all men are equal – all men are  
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 On the other hand, universal brotherhood can be seen from an inter-national 
perspective, which Mazzini describes in a phrase that rigorously mirrors the previous one: 




The following two conceptions refer to the “corporative” level, i.e. the level of 
“association(s)” (corporative-individual; corporative-collective). But here, as before, a 
distinction is made within corporative brotherhood between the “individual” and the 
“national” levels. On the one hand, there is the individual acceptation: “There will be 
brotherhood between the initiates of Young Europe. All will have a double set of duties to 
carry out, and rights to exercise”.
555
 And on the other hand, there is the “national” version, the 
brotherhood between the national committees: It is they that “form the brotherhood”, they that 
“fraternize”. 
According to the acts and statutes of Mazzini’s Young Europe (1834), Italians and 
foreigners become brothers by way of the nations they belong to. Even if the statute of the 
organization mentions the brotherhood of all men under God’s law, in the case of the 
organization itself the Italians, Poles, Germans etc. become brothers only by way of their 
national associations. There is no possibility, then, to become a member of Young Europe if 
not by means of one’s respective nation. This national “mediation” of the formation of 
“brotherhood” is also central for Mazzini’s conception of the “universal brotherhood” of 
humankind. The conferral of brotherhood via national mediation is reminiscent of the 
exclusively 'derivative character' of the "brotherhood" the peoples enjoyed via the Holy 
Alliance that existed between the reactionary monarchs. The Holy Alliance served as a 
blueprint for Mazzini, more than is often acknowledged. Indeed, the Holy Alliance informs 
his conception of “brotherhood” even with regard to the (important) conceptual details. He 
mentions this himself, when in 1849 in an article entitled “The Holy Alliance of Peoples” he 
writes: “The treaty of 1815 […] was the first acknowledgment of the power of a new and until 
then unheeded element, an enforced homage paid to the solidarity of the nations, to the unity 
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of European life; it was a false and tyrannous application of a true principle, of that principle 
which is the soul of our belief, which declares the collective life of humanity. It was our part 
to give that principle its legitimate application […].”
556
 In the following passages, Mazzini 
literally replaces the word “princes” (monarchs) with “peoples”: “It was the part of 
democracy, in opposition to the banner upon which the men of 1815 had inscribed God and 
the Princes, boldly to raise on high the banner bearing the device of God and the 
People[s].”
557
 And shortly thereafter he underlines: “Nations are the citizens of humanity, as 
individuals are the citizens of the nation.” According to Mazzini, the nation is the 
“intermediate term between humanity and the individual […]. Without the nation there can be 
no humanity […].”
558
 Nations are the constitutive parts of humanity, and the individual 
consequently is indirectly incorporated into humanity only as a result of this last’s 
membership to a nation. Nations (or national associations) decide whether or not to cultivate 
the fraternization with other nations. The national associations were to send only one delegate 
to the Central Committee of Young Europe
559
; the single individual member has no decisional 
power on this level, but only has the right to make “proposals”.
560
 Mazzini’s 
conceptualization implied that at this organizational level “fraternization” between single 
individuals of different nationality was not possible, nor was it possible between a single 
individual and another nation. 
In its entirety this conceptualization even at the inter-national level for the most part 
conforms to what George L. Mosse has written on the concept of friendship and nineteenth-
century nationalism, namely that the nation – or in this case the brotherhood of nations on the 
corporative level - restricts and dictates who one’s friends (and, hence, one’s brothers in a 
metaphorical sense) can be.
561
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At the same time, the national associations and the nations can be “traitors” according 




This is not just the “principle of counter-intervention” as in “nations disposed to help 
each other in the name of solidarity and brotherhood”
563
, but it also asserts the right to fight 
nations that acted against “la fraternitè humaine”.  
3.9.2 The cult of international brotherhood of the 1830s and 1840s 
The appellative “brother” is frequently used in democratic circles as well as between 
exponents of different “nations” at least up to the revolutions of 1848/9. Ernst Haug, General 
of the Roman Republic in 1849, for instance, dedicates his Roman memoirs to Mazzini with 
the following words: “You know how brotherly I suffer your pain with you […] Soon times 
will come which will wrest the club of Cain from the peoples, when north and south in the 




To apply the appellative “brother” to an international context is but one sign of the 
“international brotherly cult”
565
 of the 1820s to 1840s, which, however, always originates 
from the idea of a brotherhood of peoples. This “transnational” cult is also based on a 
bountiful artistic production, that is found largely in Romantic literature and art, from the - as 
well (homo-)erotically
566
 inspired - Philhellenism and Philitalism of Lord Byron or August 
von Platen to the “Polophil” songs of the 1830s and 1840s that were popular for instance in 
Germany.
567
 This “international brotherly cult” reaches its apex right around the time of the 
revolutions in 1848/49, i.e. the “spring of the peoples”. But the revolution is also a time when 
this idea of international solidarity is called into question by the heavy tensions between the 
“nations”, which lead to “oblique fronts. In the battle for or against new nation states all of a 
sudden revolutionaries from different nations were standing against each other in a hostile 
way, and on the other hand, in the sign of common national-political claims, alliances were 
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built between revolutionaries and anti-revolutionary governments.”
568
 This is particularly true 
for the German case; two instances exemplify this: the emblematic, negative decisions taken 
in the Frankfurt national assembly with regard to the Poles; and the negative decisions of the 
Frankfurt and Vienna assemblies over the German-Italian question of Trentino.
569
 
Around the same time, the idea of international brotherhood is taken over by the 
growing labour movement; for many, the international solidarity of labourers is the 
quintessential realization of the “brotherhood of peoples”. The concept of international 
brotherhood on the political left, however, remains strongly anchored in the concept of the 
nation. Karl Marx, despite his attempt to spark the revolution of the labouring class, “without 
ever reflecting on why”, never called into question “the continued existence of the nation even 
after the revolution […]. In short, Marx continues to use the category of the nation without his 
own good reasons for that use.”
570
  
Nevertheless, socialism could in some way be conceived as a competitor to 
nationalism/internationalism, insofar as it could substitute “national solidarity with class 
solidarity”.
571
 Giuseppe Mazzini, for instance, while sympathetic to the political organization 
of labourers, and having expressed his own views on more circumscribed social policies, 
feared these forces would draw the attention away from the democratic and national aims that 
he advocated. And vice versa, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, despite the fact that “the 
existence of the nation-state was crucial” for them as well
572
, they took a stance against 
Mazzinian aims because in their view they abstracted the “masses” and extracted them from 
proletarian revolution. This seems to be the context within which they began to move away 
from the concept of “brotherhood”, which for them carried too much of an interclassist 




Nevertheless, the idea of the “brotherhood” of free peoples – or those yet to be freed – 
survived well into the liberal, democratic and socialist peace movement of the second half of 
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the century. Opposition to this “federalist” conception of humankind was, if at all, to be noted 
among anarchists.
574
 According to Michael Bakunin, for instance, both the Mazzinian and 
Garibaldian “nationalism” was nothing more than a “bourgeois patriotism”.
575
 
Until the end of the century, nationalism and internationalism, as well as war and peace, 
would not be considered totally opposed concepts by many. This is still evident in the 
interconnected history of the “First International”, the “International Workingmen’s 
Association” (1864-1872) and the peace congresses of the same period.  
Many of the participants believed that institutions for the peaceful settlement of conflict 
between nations, along with other ideas for the future of “Europe” or “humanity”, could be 
introduced only once “tyranny” (monarchism, occupation by foreigners) had been 
overthrown. These beliefs are evident for instance in the programme proposed by Garibaldi 
while he was the honorary president of the “Congress of peace and liberty”, which already 
hinted at the problem in the title. Garibaldi proposed a programme with 12 items: “1. All 
nations are sisters; 2. War between them is impossible; 3. Any disputes arising between 
nations should be judged by a congress; […] 12. Only a slave has the right to wage war 
against the tyrant.”
576
 As Maurizio Degl’Innocenti has written, for “Garibaldi, a peaceful 
international order is the arrival point, but it implicated first and necessarily a process of 
liberation and emancipation against any tyranny (political, social or religious). Against the 
tyrant, against the oppressor, for their own freedom and that of the people, for the 
independence of the nation, the war is not only admissible but necessary. This was the theme 
of the just war.”
577
 
3.9.3 Brotherhood and the military 
Words taken from the field of “brotherhood” as well as from the broader semantic field of 
similar concepts were particularly important within the context of military groups. Armies 
were one of the most important means with which to put into practice the concepts of 
solidarity and brotherhood. The textual artefacts of international mobilization drew heavily on 
precisely this combination of “brotherhood of peoples” with a “brotherhood” put into 
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practice. Baden revolutionary, Johann Philipp Becker, wrote in November 1860 to Garibaldi 
that his initiatives of 1848/49 put into practice the “brotherhood of peoples”: So as not to 
leave the brotherhood and solidarity of the peoples a dead word, in 1849 I concluded treaties 
with the provisory Sicilian and Roman governments, relative to organizing a German and 
Swiss legion.”
578
 Even if, for reasons of time, Becker’s initiative led only to the presence of a 
few German soldiers in the ranks, he returns to the “brotherhood of peoples” again in 1861 
with his call “To the Germans” to form a “German legion” in the event a new Garibaldian 
activity should arise. As he reveals in a letter to Marx, such a “German legion” should also 
serve the aim “of having ready a well-organized military corps accustomed to war” in the 
event of a “revolution” in Germany.
579
 According to Becker, Austria was the common enemy 
of the Italians, the Germans – and so here he adopted a kleindeutsche (i.e. lesser Germany) 
position out of political concerns – the Hungarians, the Poles and the “meridional Slavs”. By 
becoming “friends with each other”, these nations could “become sincere allies in the future.” 
Becker concludes his appeal to the Germans with the words “Long live Germany free and 
united! Long live Italy! Free and united! Long live the Alliance of Nations!”.
580
 On 22 March 
1861, Federico Bellazzi – who was part of the committee that was planning future military 
actions in Lazio and Veneto – wrote a reply to Becker, applauding him for having expressed 
his favourable vote "for the unity and liberty of Germany and Italy and the Alliance of the 




The topos of the “brotherhood of peoples” was also used on the opposite political side. 
The Catholic publicist Andreas Niedermayer uses a mix of international and interclassist 
solidarity in his “The Fighters for the Apostolic See in 1867”, which was published in the 
aforementioned widely diffuse series of German “Catholic pamphlets”: “Every day brings 
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new confirmations of the heroism in the army of Pius IX, in which, united in the defence of 
the same ethic values, princes of royal blood fought alongside the Rhenish journeyman, the 
French and Belgian nobleman alongside the son of a shepherd and peasant from Switzerland 
and Holland.”
582
 But he also saw the Pro-Minister of Arms Hermann Kanzler, a general from 
Baden, as the “pride of German Catholicism”. He went on to underline that in terms of “cold 
blood, security, rigour and military tactics” the best corps was that of the Papal carabineers, 
“to which many Germans belong”. And although it is somewhat in contradiction to the 
international character of the Papal Army that he had previously underlined, Niedermayer 
expressed that German Catholics should form a “German Legion, wherein the best and most 
noble German youth would serve as a guard for the Pope against the Italian bandits.”
583
 
Similar slippage between the universal unity of Christendom or Catholics and nations is also 
evident in Moufang’s writings, such as when he speaks of the “idea of unity and cohesion of 
all peoples in Christendom”.
584
 According to Moufang, in the last 20 to 30 years “an idea, 




War is one of the forms in which the “brotherhood of peoples” is put into practice. At 
the same time, common fighting is seen to be the basis for the more circumscribed idea of 
“brotherhood of arms”, which establishes reciprocal duties that go beyond a single military 
campaign. Already at the individual level, to fight together in this period was often perceived 
to be the beginning of a special loyalty between soldiers that continued in time following the 
first fight together. Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow in his memoirs on the southern Garibaldian 
campaign addressed his “comrades in arms” when he wrote: “As I stood with you, the sword 
at my side, as long as there was something for us to do, and for your good, as I wanted, I want 
now, returning to my own fireside, to continue to fulfil with my pen the duties that the 
brotherhood of arms impose.”
586
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The idea of duties of loyalty that stem from a “brotherhood of arms” was also actively 
applied to the nations from which these soldiers came. Giuseppe Garibaldi wrote for instance 
to the wounded Hungarian soldier Istvan Türr in June 1859: “The Magyar blood has been 
shed for Italy, the brotherhood that must knit together the two peoples in the future has grown 
[…].”
587
 Similarly, after the January Uprising in Poland in 1863, he wrote to Polish emigrants 
in Florence: “For you, that you have shed your blood on the battlefields of the Italian 
redemption, it is right that Italy is moved […].”
588
 For Garibaldi, this idea of reciprocal 
military “debts” between nations is very strong. Even if he himself – excluding his earlier 
participation in South American campaigns – only enters a foreign battle again in 1870, small 
groups of Italian Garibaldians had in fact already gone to join the fight in other countries, as 
did Francesco Nullo who left for Poland in 1863.
589
 
This idea of an international bond based on the experience of fighting together also 
progressively took hold in Catholicism. In 1867, Moufang spoke in Cologne about the 
“mighty bond, that all of a sudden” had pervaded “all of Christendom! And the blood that for 
this cause is flowing in such a noble manner establishes a blood-relationship between all 
Catholics […].”
590
 At the same time, however, he underlines that “the blood that the 
courageous Dutchmen in the Papal Army have shed for the holy cause of the Church was 
German blood.”
591
 How can this seemingly contrasting "blood" imagery be reconciled? It 
seems to me that there are two, contemporaneous concepts of “blood-relationship.” On the 
one hand, there is a blood-relationship that is considered to be inherent to the nation – even if 
Moufang’s ´reference to the Dutch clings to the remnants of the debates over the concrete 
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borders of the German nation – that corresponds to the ideas of common kinship and blood, 
which Banti identified as being intrinsic to national discourse already since the early 
nineteenth century.
592
On the other hand, however, Moufang – when he spoke of international 
bonds – makes reference to the rituals of forming a “blood-brotherhood”, rituals of 
“fraternization” between two individuals that are not akin to each other. The “blood-
brotherhood” of this type was an important topic at the time, especially for amateurs and 
professionals of those nascent fields dedicated to “Germanic” history – such as “Germanic” 
archaeology or parts of “Germanistics” – that especially revolved around the different sources 
of the “Song of the Nibelungs” (Nibelungenlied).
593
 “Blood-brotherhood” in the sense of the 
“Germanic” ritual was considered to be a “chosen relationship, wherein the participants 
partake in a ritual and form an indissoluble alliance, which can also be extended to the 
respective tribes”.
594
 What is important here is the fact that nineteenth-century authors tend to 
consider this blood-brotherhood to be an “artificial”
595
 (as in constructed) relationship, while 




Both the “brotherhood of arms” built by a first collective fight and the “blood-
brotherhood” formed between individuals – or “nations” – by the common “shedding of 
blood” entail future duties or responsibilities. These images are the foundation of the idea that 
a bond exists between nations that goes well beyond one single fight. This conception of 
“loyalty” is the reason why, in the context of “transnational soldiers”, “brotherhood of arms” 
and “blood-brotherhood” behave like important topoi of international mobilization. They do 
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so because they contain the promise that the commitment of foreign soldiers on the part of 
one nation will, in the future, be "paid back" in kind by the receiving nation, should the 
former ever need help with its own national cause. 
These topoi revealed themselves to be excellent mobilizing devices to attract foreign 
participation in a national conflict, but often proved to be mere lip-service when the 
foreigners called on those very nationals to reciprocate the service rendered. Rüstow guessed 
as much when he wrote about a speech that Garibaldi had given, describing it as a “deceptive 
sermon on the nationalities” (Nationalitätenschwindelpauke) based on the “solidarity between 
the freedom movements of every nation”. According to Rüstow, Garibaldi spoke of the 
Hungarians and the English who had come to help Italy and about the duties and 
responsibilities to help the Hungarians in their battle that had come of that aid. Rüstow, 





The political and cultural mobilization of the different Italian “parties” was based on their 
respective combination of different modes and contents of political argumentation and 
symbolic communication. While some of these elements could be used in an a-national 
manner, others were specifically formulated a precise link between foreign national discourse 
and the respective Italian case, and thus literally highlight inter-national bonds (i.e. bonds 
between nations). Romanticism fuelled the desire to push beyond the limits. A form of 
“escapism”, adventure and travelling were two interconnected means with which this drive 
could be accomplished. Whether they really constituted the primary motivating factor for 
enlistment in Italian armed groups or not, many German soldiers left Germany with images of 
Italian landscapes and monuments in their mind’s eye; the typically Romantic foreign and 
Italian image of Italian decadence may have made Italy especially interesting from a 
(bourgeois) Romantic perspective. If soldiers had the time to do so (which was generally 
more probable for officers than common soldiers, they visited the monuments that were to be 
found on the routes their armies were following. Often the choice of what to visit was 
informed by their political stance, which is most obvious in the case of Rome, where there are 
two overlapping and intersecting, but nevertheless partially distinct visitors’ maps: that of 
ancient Rome, and that of religious Rome. Depending on what type of education they had 
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received, some of the German soldiers already had a clear idea of the itinerary on these maps 
well before they came to Italy; therefore the maps and their itineraries constituted yet one 
more reason to join one of the respective armed groups. 
All sides developed elaborate personality cults, which were increasingly able to reach 
wider strata of society not only in Italy, but abroad as well. With regard to such figures as the 
Pope, Garibaldi or the wife of the last Bourbon king it is right to discuss the extent of their 
European reach. Of note are the ways in which the lives of these personages were presented 
and communicated: the emotional and the corporal aspects in particular take centre stage here 
in that through their use the aim was to stimulate a similarly emotional and corporal reaction 
in their followers (or, in the words of the “Stearns”: in this way, their use established the 
“emotional standard”, i.e. the specific emotions that were to be felt in reaction to specific 
news about these people
598
). As with the description of the (foreign) soldiers in the press or in 
novels, the topos of sacrifice was in this instance of paramount importance. The detailed 
narration of suffering – used by all sides – aimed to kindle a physical reaction that makes 
manifest the shared suffering. These personality cults are considered to be very “modern” 
forms of political communication; they foreshadowed the authoritarian and fascist “cult of the 
leader” that would develop in the twentieth century. It is important to note, however, that the 
personality cults of the nineteenth century at least partially functioned at the global level as 
well. Economic disinterest, taken to the extreme of corporal suffering caused by deprivation, 
was a fundamental part of the idea of “sacrifice”. That this was the case becomes evident the 
highly emotional reactions to accusations made by the opposing party that one's soldiers were 
governed by economic motivations: By insinuating that the soldiers of the political enemy 
were motivated by the desire to earn money, it was possible to attack the imagery of 
martyrdom and sacrifice at its core. 
Alongside essentially a-national mobilizing factors there were elements at the trans-
national level that established connections between that were functioning in a trans-national 
way, by establishing concrete links between the respective Italian party and the various 
European nations. In the German-Italian case, as in others, “minor” personality cults were 
built up around figures that stood symbolically for a specific connection between Germany 
(or another foreign country) and/or its regions and the respective Italian party. The heroization 
of the papal Minister of Arms, Hermann Kanzler from Baden, or that of the wife of the last 
Bourbon king, Marie Sophie, are but two examples.  
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In these cases, regional and national identities are not placed in opposition with each 
other but rather are interconnected.
599
 Within the same text it is possible to find, for instance, 
that although it is noted that Kanzler came from Baden, he was also “the pride of Germany”; 
Joseph Alois Bach is seen to be a courageous Palatine, who however behaved in accordance 
with the “Prussian” military way; and Marie Sophie is considered a member of the 
Wittelsbach family, but is at the same time portrayed to be a quintessential “German” woman 
due to her “German loyalty” to her husband. 
As this examination of the semantic field of international brotherhood and similar 
concepts has shown, solidarity was increasingly based on national grouping. The 
“brotherhood of arms of the peoples” and the concept of the common shedding of blood of 
different nations was used as an important metaphor to bind together the respective Italian 
cause with national thought in Germany. The promise to reciprocate informed both of these 
specific concepts of brotherhood; it connected nationalism and internationalism in a special 
way. Interestingly, this specifically national way to perceive transnational solidarity also 
began to take hold in Catholicism as well, and gradually replaced the traditional 
“cosmopolitism” of the (Catholic) Church.  
The idea of international brotherhood “travelled” however back and forth across 
between the political lines. This is a conceptual variant of the frequent phenomenon of 
copying from the adversary. In this case, Marco Meriggi’s observation as to what was the 
effect of the Holy Alliance’s use of the concept of brotherhood in 1815 does not seem to be 
accurate. According to Meriggi, this was a “process of neutralizing a concept and a word by 
its assimilation into the vocabulary of a political field different from that of origin”.
600
 
Although the concept had been transplanted from one context (nationalism) to another 
(Catholicism), it was not just the outward symbol (the word "brotherhood") that was copied, 
but also in part the vision of the world, i.e. the idea that humanity primarily consisted of 
different nations; in other words, Catholicism in some way assisted, rather than hindered, the 
process of nationalization. Even within Catholicism, some spoke of substituting the traditional 
diplomacy of the states with the “diplomacy of the peoples”, and in so doing partially drifted 
away from the theological elaboration of an a priori universal brotherhood in Christ.  
The ways in which solidarity were conceptualized is, at least theoretically, only one 
possible way in which to imagine the solidarity among people and beyond national borders. 
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This aspect risks being forgotten, when authors use the concepts of “solidarity” or 
“brotherhood” without additional qualifications insofar as these words as they stand alone still 
sound good to our ears. However, during the period studied here a qualifier was nearly always 
attached to these concepts: “brotherhood” becomes “brotherhood of arms”, “brotherhood of 
the peoples” or even “brotherhood of arms of the peoples”, and “blood-brotherhood” becomes 
“blood-brotherhood between nations.” Here, solidarity was primarily considered a 
relationship between nationally defined collectivities, which led to the widespread diffusion 
of projects of a “representation” of foreign nations on the different Italian sides. These rather 
qualified ideas of solidarity had assigned a crucial place to national discourse as well as 
military violence and inherently contained specifically military obligations of reciprocity. As 
aforementioned, nationalism and internationalism alike have a history over the course of the 
centuries. Throughout the nineteenth century, a decidedly “trans-national” idea of 
“brotherhood” predominates; although solidarity crossed national borders at the individual 
level between people of different nationalities, it was primarily conceived of as existing 
between nations. 
It was also evident that enlisted soldiers were not necessarily directly reached by the 
type of political and cultural mobilization discussed thus far. The following chapter will 
demonstrate how the recruitment structures, enlistment conditions and economic rewards 
could all be equally or alternatively important for the enlisting soldier. This is not to say that 
cultural and political mobilization was not a necessary element for the practical outcome 
(foreigners enlisting in the Italian armed groups). But rather that mobilization could come 
about through more indirect routes as well. The decisive role of associations in the 
recruitment efforts highlight how there was often a kind of “recruitment of recruitment”: If it 
is true that the members of the associations, i.e. the people most active in organizing support 
in Germany for the Italian ”parties”, had often been directly influenced by cultural and 
political mobilization – all one has to do to see that this is true is refer back to the 
demonstrated recurrence of the central topoi discussed in this chapter in both the texts 
presented above and those written at the local level – this is not necessarily true for the single 
enlisting soldier.  
The way in which the specific ways of conceiving “human” solidarity in this period 
influenced the ways in which this very “solidarity” was carried out will be examined in the 
following chapters no. 7 and 8. These topoi of “solidarity between nations” partially informed 
the actual forms of military organization chosen for integrating the foreign soldiers into the 
Italian armed groups, while at the same time they excluded other theoretically possible 
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military organizational forms. Even more so, the ideas of a “brotherhood of arms of the 
peoples” influenced the mutual perceptions of and experiences between foreign and Italian 









4.1 Legal obstacles to foreign recruitment 
As part of the measures to keep up their military capacities, most European states tried to 
prevent their subjects from joining foreign military service. These legal barriers are often 
overlooked by the historiography on foreign soldiering.
601
 This erroneously suggests that 
entering foreign armies or recruiting foreign soldiers was an “easy promenade”. With the 
legal obstacles in place, actually the opposite was the case, even if the intensity of legal 
barriers gradually changed over the centuries. 
Given the situation with mercenary recruitment during the seventeenth century and 
especially the issues that arose in connection to mercenary forces in the Thirty Years' War, 
European states began to enact laws to prohibit the recruitment of soldiers on their territory by 
foreign powers. They did so while continuing to recruit foreigners for their own standing 
armies. Sanctions were initially established for both the recruiters and the potential recruits. 
Criminal law governed the sanctions directed against recruiters. The kinds of sanctions that 
could be applied to the potential recruits could be corporal or confiscatory in nature, or could 
even result in imprisonment or the withdrawal of the individual's status as citizen. The norms 
were distributed across different areas of law, from the regulations on emigration or local 
citizenship to general and/or military criminal codes. They also differed in circumstantial 
validity (i.e. in times of peace or war), with regard to the addressees (recruiter, co-helpers, 
confidants, innkeepers, recruits) or in the degree of criminality of the attempt. To join a 
hostile foreign power was punished more severely, and most often resulted in the death 
penalty. The imperial Recesses of the sixteenth century already contained extensive 
regulations in an attempt to prevent recruitments into the ranks of hostile powers. They 
prohibited any recruitment of soldiers that would then be deployed against the Empire, its 
Estates or its subjects in general
602
; in order to enforce this ban, a procedure was instituted 
whereby the foreign recruiters had to ask for official permission prior to begin recruiting. This 
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permission would be granted only in the event that the recruiter deposited a guarantee that the 
recruited soldiers would not fight against the empire and its estates.
603
  
The Imperial Estates also began to subject foreign recruitment to a similar process of 
prior permission or by banning them altogether. In Württemberg, for instance, a “Placat” from 
1625, “concerning the ban of entering into foreign military service” was directed against the 
potential recruits as the addressees of the regulation. In spite of the broader title of the law, 
however, the Placat did not exclude the possibility to recruit in the case the sovereign’s 
permission had been granted. Within this context, only if this permission had not been granted 
would the foreseen “penalties on body, honour and property” take place.
604
 The decree voted 
in the Council of the city of Hamburg for the first time in 1655, which was repeated in the 
years 1661, 1665, and 1666, was more extensive in terms of the elements of offence 
considered. It declared that “hereby all foreign recruitment in this good city and its territories 
is prohibited, repealed and abrogated” and that innkeepers should neither house foreign 
recruiters nor recruits, but instead report them to the Council.
 605
  
Henceforth, similar bans were a frequent subject of the codifications of the Empire and 
the Imperial Estates, even if they continued to differ in terms of addressees and the elements 
of offence. The sheer number of such patents, edicts and mandates in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries is enormous, but the frequency of their repetition even in one and the 
same territory hints at the fact that foreign recruiters continued nevertheless to operate 
throughout the empire and that the governments were unable to keep the problem under 
control.  
Still in the nineteenth century all European states continued to prevent the recruitment 
on their territory of their nationals into foreign armies. The regulations of this matter were to 
be found in the general criminal codes, in the military criminal law and war articles, but also 
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in emigration patents and laws on citizenship, in the rules on issuing passports and identity 
papers, and last but not least in those rules specified in the aforementioned laws governing 
desertion, which often applied not just to those who had actually been conscripted, but even to 
those that had not been conscripted but were still liable to serve. For the purposes of this 
study
606
, these regulations are best understood by differentiating between those directed 
against the recruiters and those targeting the recruits. 
4.1.1 Measures against the recruiters 
The rules against recruiters, as aforementioned, were articulated in a number of legal sources. 
For instance, the emigration patent of 10 August 1784 regarding the hereditary lands of the 
Hapsburgs forbade all foreign recruitment. The foreign recruiter was to be regarded as a "false 
recruiter" (“Falschwerber”) to be punished not only in the civil courts but also in military 
courts according to military law, even if the recruiter was a civilian. According to the law, 
which applied both in times of peace and in war, i.e. the “War Articles” (“Kriegsartikel”)
607
 
the punishment for this offence was “hanging next to a main road.” Subjects that reported the 
“false recruiters” to the authorities, instead, could expect a reward of 100 ducats.
608
 A partial 
revision of the regulations came into force with
 
a decree issued by the Habsburg Imperial War 
Council in 1821. These revisions only regarded those subjects that were not members of the 
military, while members of the Austrian Army were still subject to the older rules. As a result 
of this differentiation, members of the Austrian military that aided foreign powers to recruit 
locals should still be punished "according to martial law, even in times of peace", and hence 
should be hanged. For those subjects that were not in the Austrian military, however, the 
penalty in peacetime for attempted foreign recruitment was reduced to five to ten years of 
compulsory labour in building fortifications, while for completed acts of recruitment, the 
penalty was reduced to between ten and twenty years (“Schanzarbeit”). Even for civilians, the 
punishment was adjudicated according to military law and took the form of typical military 
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punitive action. In times of war, however, even civilians were judged under the more severe 
parameters that applied to military subjects and would be hanged.
 609
  
4.1.1.1 From general bans to bans on the recruitment of domestic subjects and soldiers 
While in the eighteenth century most of the bans on foreign recruitment were still 
comprehensive in the sense that there was no differentiation made between foreign and 
domestic subjects when dealing with recruiters and recruits, the respective laws of the 
nineteenth century were mostly limited to punishing the recruitment of domestic citizens for 
foreign armies. But the complicated system of laws and regulations created important legal 
loopholes.  
In Prussia, one legal loophole was created when the general Criminal Code of 1851 
was passed. Up until that point, the General State Laws (Allgemeines Landrecht) of 1794 
punished foreign and domestic recruiters who recruited for a foreign, though not adversary, 
power, with two to four years of prison in a fortress (§ 143 ALR), independent of whether or 
not the recruiter had recruited Prussian or foreign subjects. The new Criminal Code of 1851, 
however, altered this punishment, reducing the penalty to between three months and three 
years (§ 111), but only with regard to the recruitment of Prussian subjects or for inciting or 
helping a Prussian subject to desert. The recruitment of non-Prussian subjects, therefore, was 
not forbidden under the new Code, given that the corresponding regulations of the Landrecht 
were explicitly abrogated by the new criminal law.
610
  
The legislation in the Kingdom of Württemberg created an even more complex 
situation: What was referred to as “His Majesty’s Law” of 1810 established penalties of 
between four to ten years of prison only in the event that Württemberg’s civilian citizens 
recruited for foreign armies within Württemberg itself. Instead, foreigners, military members 
and Württemberger subjects that recruited for foreign armies beyond Württemberg borders, 
and generally all recruiters in times of war
611
 fell under the jurisdiction of the military 
criminal code of 1818, which, however, in its art. 47 established a ban only on the recruitment 
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of Württembergian soldiers for foreign armies, wherein such recruiters could be handed a 
sentence of between four to twelve years of detention in a fortress. Hence, between them, 
these two legal sources failed to regulate the recruitment of Württembergian civilians on the 
part of foreign recruiters, who therefore could count on impunity. The loophole was noted by 
the criminal law professor Robert Mohl from Tübingen, who tried to resolve the problem 
dogmatically by pleading contra legem in favour of the continued validity of the older 
interdiction on foreign recruitment.
612
 Regardless, throughout the nineteenth century the 
punishment of foreign recruitment in Württemberg continued to be based on legal sources that 
had been in force for more (eighteenth century according to Robert Mohl) or less (early 
nineteenth century) time. The general Criminal Code of 1839 only contained regulations on 
recruitment for and aid given to the enemy and the encouragement of desertion.
613
  
4.1.1.2 The criminality of trial – measures against the advertising of foreign recruitments 
Even the sheer attempt to recruit for foreign/enemy armies constituted an offence. Therewith, 
the states took measures not only against foreign recruitment offices on their territory, but 
also against newspaper advertisements that announced the locations of such offices and the 
conditions of recruitment. To provide one example, in Bavaria acts ”advertising recruitment” 
were forbidden, as was any other “invitation to a Bavarian citizen to enlist”. Even general 
calls that do not target individual people and how they are issued sometimes by organized 
recruitment offices must be regarded as an [criminal] attempt”
614
, “provided of course […] 
that from the call itself or the circumstances it becomes clear that it really intends to recruit 
also Bavarian citizens or to direct them to recruiters.”
 615
  
The Prussian military code of 1845 recognized the offence of aiding and abetting 
desertion (§ 111). According to the military criminal code, the punishment of this offence 
should follow the penalties foreseen for desertion itself. 
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In the military criminal code, the punishment of this offence was equal to the penalties 
reserved for desertion itself. Therefore, in times of peace (§ 95), according to the number of 
attempts, the punishment could vary from six months to fifteen years of imprisonment in a 
fortress; in times of war (§ 9), the first attempt was punished with six to ten years of 
imprisonment in a fortress, but in cases of recurring violations the death penalty would be 
applied. 
4.1.1.3 The role of recruitment permits 
The general Austrian criminal law of 1852 explicitly banned only those foreign recruitments 
that operated “without special governmental consent”. In a similar fashion, some German 
states did not punish all foreign recruiters altogether, but left at least the possibility that they 
could obtain governmental permission.  
In the Kingdom of Bavaria, the general ban on every type of foreign recruitment as 
regulated by the military criminal code of 1813 was replaced by a ban only on the recruitment 
without permission of Bavarians in the new Criminal Code of 1861.
616
  
Such permission for foreign recruitment was, however, not always easy to obtain. The 
retired Austrian General Mayerhofer for instance, who was commissioned by the papal 
government to negotiate with Bavaria to obtain this permission, had to leave Munich in 1860 
without results after having attended several meetings with high-ranking officials of the 
Bavarian government.
617
 In April of the same year, a certain Georg Sodeur from Lindau (a 
Bavarian city along the shores of Lake Constance) had to face a trial in Munich for having 
failed to obtain permission to recruit and , hence, for recruiting Bavarians for the army of the 
Two Sicilies. His lawyer resorted to a rather clever defensive strategy: He placed emphasis on 
the friendly relations between Munich and Naples – he most certainly had in mind Francis II’s 
Bavarian spouse – and also on the Bavarian position with regard to the Papal States, of which 
Naples could be seen as an important supporter. The lawyer’s use of arguments based on 
international relations and diplomacy was not without result: After the trial, the Bavarian king 
exerted his right of clemency and reduced the punishment from one year of imprisonment in a 
fortress to only four months of prison.
618
  
Officially, however, neither here nor elsewhere in Germany were official permissions 
for recruitment to the Papal Army granted. Even the Austrian government, in 1860 and again 
in 1868, denied granting official permission to recruit Austrian subjects for the Papal 
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 The official backing of papal recruitment structures in Austria – at least those that 
aimed to recruit Austrian subjects – was consciously avoided. Nevertheless, the respective 
political sympathies of the governments or monarchs carried some weight, as was seen in the 
case of Sodeur’s pardon by the Bavarian king; these sympathies, however, were linked to 
diplomatic and “geostrategic” questions. European states tried to influence the legal practices 
regarding the recruitment of “foreign soldiers” in other states by means of their diplomacy
620
, 
and more than one permission was most likely not granted due to fears that such permission 
would result in foreign policy issues. 
4.1.2 The bans against recruits 
With regard to the rules governing domestic subjects that enlisted in foreign armies, the 
connection that exists in the contemporary laws between foreign enlistment and emigration 
must be noted. Through this link, the development of the rules on foreign enlistment was very 
much influenced by the developments in emigration laws and liberties. This connection 
between the two spheres was already established for instance in the 1784 emigration patent 
for the Habsburg hereditary lands: Here, domestic subjects that enlisted in a foreign army 
were, in times of peace, regarded as “real emigrants” and punished accordingly. Having been 
captured on Hapsburg territory, they had to face several years of public work, or, once this 
form of punishment had been abolished, prison; in every case any eventual personal property 
was confiscated. To carry out these punishments effectively, the relatives and residents of the 
“emigrant’s” native hometown were obliged to report when a subject was returning to Austria 
so that the authorities “could prevent a repeated escape.”
 621
 To enlist in a foreign army in 
times of war, however, was seen as an act of “treason” and punished accordingly.
622
 
Prussian subjects that enlisted abroad similarly had to face the penalties for illegal 
emigration. The Canton System instituted in 1733 introduced prohibitions on the emigration 
of conscripts and more general prohibitions on an individual’s unauthorized departure from 
the territory; with regard to the penalty, several months were in place for the possible return 
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4.1.2.1 Noble privileges in terms of military duty, emigration and foreign (military) service 
In the states of the German Confederation in the nineteenth century, important parts of the 
nobility enjoyed several specific privileges with regard to emigration and entering into foreign 
service. The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire led to a reduction in the number of states 
and reigning powers, which was counterbalanced by the conservation of certain privileges 
especially for those members of the nobility that had been dispossessed of their sovereignty in 
the Act of Confederation ("Deutsche Bundesakte") of 1815. The number of privileges differed 
according to the status they held when the Empire was still in place. The group granted the 
most privileges was the heads of those former states that had ceased to exist in 1815, namely 
the “Standesherren”.
624
 These were the nobles
625
 that had enjoyed imperial immediacy 
(“Reichsunmittelbarkeit”) and were directly represented in the Reichstag, i.e. had held the 
status of an imperial estate (“Reichsstandschaft”), but that had lost their sovereignty by being 
mediatised when the empire was dissolved (i.e. mediatization in the narrow sense and so 
between 1803 and 1815). Article 14 of the Act of German Confederation of 1815 (“Deutsche 
Bundesakte”) established a list of privileges: despite their mediatization and loss of direct 
political power, they were to be regarded as “part of the high nobility in Germany” and hence 
to be regarded as equals to the remaining reigning families of the new German Confederation; 
they retained the “unrestricted freedom to take up residence in any state belonging to or living 
in peace with the Confederation”; they enjoyed “exemption from all military obligation for 
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 See, for instance "Edict no. 9, 29 of January 1754," in Novum Corpus Constitutionum Prussico-
Brandenburgensium Praecipue Marchicarum, Oder Neue Sammlung Königl. Preußl. und Churfürstl. 
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und Churfürstl. Brandenburgischer, sonderlich in der Chur- und Marck-Brandenburg, Wie auch andern 
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 The primary reference work is Heinz Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren. Die politische und gesellschaftliche 
Stellung der Mediatisierten 1815-1918. Ein Beitrag zur deuschen Sozialgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1964). 
625
 Already in the literature of the time, the meaning of the word “Standesherren” varies between the more 
specific – and according to the Act of German confederation, legally correct – designation of these figures as the 
“heads” of their respective families and the broader acceptation that includes their families in general. Later on, 
however, the distinction between the “heads” of the family and other family members is as important legally as it 
seems to be complicated at the concrete level. 
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themselves and their families”; and they still held some jurisdictional rights and the 
“supervision over church and school matters, and also over charitable foundations”.
626
  
All single German states passed laws to accept and confirm the provisions in the Act of 
Confederation regarding this privileged group of the Standesherren. They and their families 
were granted the right to establish domicile (“Aufenthalt”) in any state of the confederation or 
in those countries at peace with the latter.
627
 According to the legislation of Bavaria and the 
Grand Duchies of Hesse and Baden, the Standesherren were even allowed to enter foreign 
civil or military service, as long as they were not already part of the civil or military service at 
home. All of the states also confirmed the exemption of this special group of nobles and their 
families from military duty.
628
 
These privileges contained some very important exclusive rights for the 
“Standesherren” class in regard to German noble, foreign soldierly engagement. Not only the 
Standesherren themselves, but also “their families” were declared to be absolutely exonerated 
from every military duty that had been established – even if differently – in each of the 
German confederated states.
629
 They were also exempt from remaining limitations to 
emigration that were dictated by the respective laws of their new sovereign state, insofar as 
they were free to take up residence in any state of the Confederation or in any state living in 
peace with the latter. In the legal commentaries of the time, this right was also seen as to 
contain the right to take up (civil or military) service in these countries. In other words, the 
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§12, p. 84. Bavaria: "Edict die staatsrechtlichen Verhältnisse der vormals Reichsständischen Fürsten, Grafen und 
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Fürsten, Grafen und Herren betreffend (Munich: s. n., 1820), §5, col. 191; Grand Duchy of Hesse: "Edict, die 
standesherrlichen Rechts-Verhältnisse im Großherzogthum Hessen betreffend. 29 March 1820," in 
Großherzoglich-Hessisches Regierungsblatt auf das Jahr 1820 (Darmstadt: im Verlage der Großherzoglichen 
Invaliden-Anstalt, 1820), §A7-A8, p. 127. Baden: "Edict, die standes- und grundherrlichen Rechtsverhältnisse 
im Großherzogthum Baden betreffend. 16 April 1819," in Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und 
Regierungsblatt (Karlsruhe: in der C. F. Macklotscehn Hof-Buchdruckerey, 1819), § 3, pp. 2-3. 
628
 "Edict die staatsrechtlichen Verhältnisse der vormals Reichsständischen Fürsten, Grafen und Herren 
betreffend (Vierte Beylage zu der Verfassungs-Urkunde des Königreichs Bayern, Tit. V, § 2)," §11, col. 195; 
Hesse, "Edict, die standesherrlichen Rechts-Verhältnisse im Großherzogthum Hessen betreffend. 29 March 
1820," §A8, p. 127. Baden, "Edict, die standes- und grundherrlichen Rechtsverhältnisse im Großherzogthum 
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 This addresses the complicated issue – in light of the typical split-off of different ramifications of noble 
families – regarding who was to count as a family-member of the more restricted “Standesherren”. 
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“Standesherren” were the social group that, from the point of view of legal restrictions, could 
most easily join foreign armies. As Heinz Gollwitzer has aptly noted, the military career was 
an important way to "accommodate" family members, such as the second-born or members of 
the secondary branches of the family, during this period in which the noble families began to 
lose their power through the mediatization process. In fact, many of the Standesherren took 
service in foreign armies, from the French Army to the British and Russian armies.
630
 
Furthermore, the ius patronatus of the Standesherren and the facility with which they 
could institute “charitable organizations” may have been of decisive importance within the 
context of the noble initiatives to mobilize and recruit for the Italian “parties”. 
Moreover, it is important to see that some of these privileges were granted by the Act 
of Confederation to another group of nobles as well: the so-called “Reichsadel” (imperial 
nobility) or “Reichsritterschaft” (imperial knighthood), i.e. the imperial nobles, which had 
imperial immediacy, but – in contrast with the Standesherren – did not have their own full 
vote in the Imperial Diet (Reichstag).
631
 That, purportedly, they were the descendants of the 
“imperial knighthood”, which had a special military role in former times, constituted perhaps 
an ingredient in their own perception that they were a special military caste. However this 
may be, it is important to note – a fact often overlooked by historiography, which has always 
focused on the “Standesherren” – that the German Confederation Act of 1815 granted to this 
group of nobles not all, but some of the privileges of the former, namely – and explicitly
632
 – 
the freedom of taking residence in every state of the German confederation or in those foreign 
states “at peace with it”; the moderated right to preserve their own laws of succession in 
regard to their possessions; and finally, ius patronatus. Even if the Act stated, that “[t]hese 
rights will, however, only be practiced in accordance with the regulation of [confederated] 
state laws”, according to the jurisprudential literature of the time, it was understood 
nonetheless that these rights were not to be subject to the will of the respective confederated 
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193. 
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Bundesakte vom 8. Juni 1815," in Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte, ed. Ernst Rudolf Huber, 3 
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But in fact, different from the case of the Standesheeren, the particular laws in the 
German states differed with regard to how this “Imperial Nobility” and even each state’s 
remaining nobility were treated. In regard to imperial nobility, Bavaria for instance declared 
that they could not enter foreign service without monarchical consent, and all restrictions 
established by the law on emigration applied even to them.
634
 The regulations in Baden, 
however, were totally different. There, an edict from 1824 declared: “They [the former 
nobility of imperial immediacy] have the unrestricted freedom to take domicile in every state 
that is part of the Confederation or that is at peace with the latter, or to enter its service, but 
both only with the caveat of the obligation to military service […]. The change of domicile 
and entering into foreign service has to be notified to the sovereign.”
635
 In other words, given 
that in Baden as elsewhere, the imperial nobility was – unlike the Standesherren – liable to 
military service, Baden restricted this group of nobles only as far as regarded its military 
duties; in every other case, a simple notification to the monarch on their intention to establish 
their domicile or to enter a foreign service sufficed. In this instance, the monarch could not 
veto – as was the case in Bavaria – these movements of the nobility.  
4.1.2.2 Freedom of emigration and foreign military service 
The situation changed after the revolutions of 1848/49, due to legal developments on 
emigration especially for the non-noble population. Implicitly (in the legal literature of the 
time) or explicitly (in the codifications themselves) to join foreign armies was equated with 
emigration; in the same manner that the right to emigrate asserted itself during the nineteenth 
century, the freedom to enter foreign military service also expanded.  
While some of the states’ legislation regarded the entrance of their subjects into the 
service of foreign states – and hence, in the opinion of the legal literature of the time, civil as 
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well as military service in a foreign country
636
 – to constitute a completed act of 
emigration
637
, others’ legislation literally counted foreign military service amongst the acts 
that were equated with an effectuated emigration. This is not to say that those individuals that 
entered into foreign civil or military service effectively left their home country forever. Rather 
it is intended to underline the fact that from a legal standpoint, by equating foreign service 
with emigration, the existing legal conditions for emigration, whether in terms of constrictions 
or in terms of legal consequences, applied to foreign civil and military service as well. 
Consequently, the debates on the “right on emigration”
638
 and the fact that this freedom was 
gradually anchored in the constitutions of the time had a decisive influence on the question of 
foreign military service. Quite early on, for instance, Württembergers who wished to enter 
military service in a foreign country could invoke the guarantees of their constitution of 1819: 
“Every citizen is free to emigrate from the kingdom without paying any emigration tax, as 
soon as he has informed the authorities of his plan, corrected his debts and other obligations, 
and after having made adequate insurances that within a year he will not do service against his 
king and fatherland […]” (§32). Many of the earlier eighteenth-century laws prohibiting entry 
into a foreign military service had therefore lost their validity: “They [these earlier laws] 
threaten subjects that let themselves enlist without governmental permission […] but of 




The Frankfurt Constitution from 1849 established a general right on emigration as a 
fundamental right: “The freedom of emigration is not limited by the state; emigration taxes 
cannot be imposed.” (§136). The text in article 10 of the constitutional draft of the Prussian 
                                                 
636
 As a subtype of “foreign service”, foreign military service was still interpreted according to the law on 
German citizenship from 1913, the “Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz”, which was valid until 2000, see 
for instance Kay Hailbronner, Günter Renner, and Hans-Georg Maaßen, Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht (Munich: C. 
H. Beck, 2010), §28, note 4. 
637
 See how both are already connected for instance in the Prussian "Gesetz über die Erwerbung und den Verlust 
der Eigenschaft als Preußischer Unterthan, sowie über den Eintritt in fremde Staatsdienste vom 31. Dezember 
1842," in Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preußischen Staaten (Berlin: zu haben im vereinigten Gesetz-
Sammlungs-Debits- und Zeitungs-Komtoir, 1843), pp. 15-18. 
638
 For the previous French debates in the years 1791 and 1792 over freedom of emigration and the issue of bans 
on emigration within the context of the fear that reactionary monarchists would gather outside France see Ladan 
Broumand, "Emigration and the Rights of Man. French Revolutionary Legislators Equivocate," Journal of 
Modern History 72 (2000): pp. 67-108. For the debate on emigration in the Frankfurt Assembly see Michael 
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(Stuttgart: Metzler 1976), pp. 102-45. 
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diese Bestimmung ist natürlich durch das Auswanderungsrecht und das Recht in fremde Dienste zu gehen, 




Constituent Assembly (“Charte Waldeck”) was identical, as was the text of the constitution 
octroyée of 5 December 1848. In the most relevant constitution (“revised constitution”) of 1 
January 1850 (insofar as it was valid until 1918), the right on emigration was only limited by 
Prussian military service: “The freedom of emigration can be limited by the state only in 
reference to the compulsory military service. Taxes on emigration will not be applied.”
640
 
Similarly, “[n]early all German states incorporated the right on emigration in their 
constitutions […].”
641
 In consequence to the 1849 Frankfurt Constitution, many German 
states also renounced their previous tradition of exacting emigration taxes.
642
 The tendency to 
no longer perceive the act of being recruited for a foreign army – if this was an act of free will 
and did not violate any duty of military conscription in the homeland – as a breach of law was 
common to the legal codes and legal literature of the time.
643
 The stance also significantly 
changed with regard to “sujets mixtes”, i.e. individuals with dual citizenship. The opinion 
gradually took hold in the legislative processes and the legal literature that this category of 
people could not be punished, because they had “in both states the right and the duty to 
contribute to defence, so that for them ‘treason’ cannot be assumed.”
644
  
Interestingly, the Catholics also cited the new constitutional liberties to cast the 
recruitment for the Papal Army in a legal light. In 1868, the steering committee of the 
Viennese Archbrotherhood of Saint Michael sent an address to the Austrian Emperor Franz 
Joseph I, asking that “it may be clarified by the governmental authorities that the recruitment 
of Austrian subjects for the Papal Army is not subject to any obstacle.”
645
 Mösinger in the 
same year wrote of the legal obstacles against papal recruitment in Austria: “How can it be 
forbidden to the Austrian Catholics on the basis of their so highly praised constitution that 
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 Jan Ziekow, Über Freizügigkeit und Aufenthalt. Paradigmatische Überlegungen zum grundrechtlichen 
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which has already for a long time been allowed to the Catholics of all other countries?”
646
 
Both the petition and the invocation of the constitution by Mösinger did not help, and the 
petition to the Austrian monarch was refused by the Minister of national defence and public 
safety; but in his refusal the Minister made clear, “that according to the fundamental state’s 
laws any citizen is granted free self-determination, according to the legal conditions.”
647
 In 
other words: While (at least civilian) Austrians who were recruited for the Papal Army were 
not considered to be a problem by the Austrian government, official backing – as 
aforementioned – was cautiously avoided. 
4.1.2.3 The influence of military duties on penalties 
The limit to the general right on emigration was however in one instance carried over; this 
limitation was inserted into the later constitutions of other German states, and hence after 
1848/49, was frequently the only limit placed on the right on emigration
648
: those (still) liable 
to military service could not exercise this right. The Prussian Criminal Code of 1851 
remained within the boundaries established by the “revised” constitution of 1850, when it 
stated in §110: “He who without permission leaves the royal territories and tries therewith to 
avoid entering the [Prussian] standing army, including a man of the Landwehr on vacation 
who emigrates without consent, will be punished with a fine of between fifty to one thousand 
taler or prison from one month to one year.”
649
 The additional penalty of the confiscation of 
estates as established by the following paragraph, however, was never exercised due to the 
general ban of this form of punishment in the constitution (art. 11).
650
 From a legal 
perspective, the Prussian case did not greatly differ from that of other German states, because 
here as elsewhere the “most common requirement for the right of emigration [in the 
constitutions of the German states] was to have fulfilled one’s military duties.”
651
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This assessment of the legal situation regarding foreign military service and its 
nineteenth-century trend toward the mitigation of sanctions, however, is not complete. One 
must take into consideration the situation for which an increasingly large portion of citizens, 
aside from the soldiers currently serving, were at an increased risk of penalties for desertion 
as a result of the extension of compulsory military service in some countries. The reason for 
this is that not only the avoidance of active military service, but also, increasingly, the 
avoidance of the various military reserve duties or departure in times of granted leaves of 
absence from the military constituted the offense of desertion. In Prussia, the paragraphs on 
desertion (§§91-112 of the Military Criminal Code of 1842
652
) were applicable to several 
groups of people: actual conscripts, reservists and the various contingents of the Landwehr. 
For the soldiers on active duty in all of these contingents (standing army, Landwehr, and – 
theoretically – the Landsturm
653
), desertion was assumed already after one day in wartime or 
two days in times of peace of unjustified absence (§92 alternative 1). But reservists and 
soldiers on official vacation who joined a foreign army also incurred the risk of being 
punished for desertion: §94 explicitly stated “Desertion is assumed, until proof of the 
contrary, in case of vacationists with an undetermined leave and reservists, […] if they 
emigrate without permission or enter foreign military service” (the italics in the cited §94 are 
mine).
654
 Leaving Prussia, but also already and explicitly enlisting in a foreign military 
service was considered to be an action that justified “such a presumption, that the accused can 
avoid punishment only by proving the contrary.”
655
 Even a man of the Landwehr, the Prussian 
type of militia, who was on leave most of the time with only very short intervals of service, 
would be punished for desertion were he to emigrate without permission or enter into the 
service of a foreign army.
656
 A handbook on the Prussian military laws published in 1829 
explained: “The soldier in the military reserves must be regarded as a deserter if he emigrates 
                                                 
652
 Eduard Fleck, Kommentar über das Strafgesetzbuch für das Preußische Heer [1845] (Berlin: Verlag der 
Deckerschen Geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei, 1856), §§91-112, pp. 113-132. 
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 “[..E]ine solche Präsumtion begründen, daß nach Feststellung dieser Thatsachen der Angeschuldigte nur 
durch den Beweis des Gegentheils die Verurtheilung wegen Desertion vermeiden kann.” Ibid., p. 117. 
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without having been previously discharged from the military by the military authorities. 
Instead the man of the Landwehr [must be considered a deserter] in the case he emigrates 
without prior consent of his provincial government and without proper notification to the 
district sergeant.”
657
 In later years this principle was upheld, even though the statutory basis as 
it applied to members of the Landwehr was transferred from the special paragraph (§94) to 
the general paragraph (§91) on desertion. Based on this change, some commentators posited 
that it was no longer possible to punish men of the Landwehr on vacation, whereas others – 
among which the arguably most influential commentator of the military criminal code, 
Eduard Fleck – argued that it was certainly still possible, but with a reversal of the burden of 
proof. In 1856 Fleck wrote that men of the Landwehr “can only be punished during ordinary 
peacetime for desertion in case of arbitrary absence from their place of origin, if by legally 
admissible evidence it is shown that by this absence they had the intention to withdraw 
entirely from their military duties.”
658
 The Prussian military reforms after 1860, with their 
inclusion of the three younger classes of the Landwehr into the standing army and the 
increase of time that the reservists spent in the infantry, resulted in the increase in the number 
of Prussians that ran the risk of being punished for desertion. Only older men (more 
theoretically) liable to service in the Landsturm were not subject to the risk of being punished 
for desertion for the simple fact that they were normally not called to serve, except by the 
monarchical requests of 1813 and 1914. 
Desertion – from active service, from the reserves, from a leave in the standing army 
or from the (as of 1860, the Torso-)Landwehr - was considered military misconduct. What is 
particularly important here is that the jurisdiction over this concrete offence and only a few 
others lay with the military courts and not the civilian courts, even for those men on leave.
 659 
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This special jurisdiction of the military judicature was confirmed in 1867 for the North 
German Confederation in its entirety.
660
 A Prussian, and later, North-Germans in general, 
incurred the risk of being punished for desertion even before actually entering into service; it 
was enough to be selected, as a recruit or member of the Landwehr, from the group of men 
theoretically liable to service, which in German was “ausgehoben” (“lifted”)
661
; only after an 
individual had fulfilled every possible military duty and was officially dismissed from 
military duty, was he no longer at risk of being punished for desertion.
662
  
By controlling emigration, the Prussian state attempted to prevent the departure of 
those who were liable to military service. Consequently, the strict requirement to register and 
deregister when changing the place of residence in the monarchy was established, and hence it 
was possible to automatically assume desertion in the case of emigration without permission. 
Until 1867, this permission had to be obtained from the military authorities and later from the 
civil bureaucracy in the form of an emigration consent, which implicitly comprised not only 
the dismissal from military service but also the loss of citizenship. 
In Württemberg as well, to provide another example, military personnel were subject 
to limits on emigration, despite the overarching general freedom to emigrate. The prohibition 
to emigrate included not only all Württembergers that had already been drafted, but also all 
those who were liable to military service and for whom it was still possible to be drafted: in 
other words, all men between 22 and 32 years of age
663
 that had not already fulfilled their 
military duty by actually serving this entire time, or in the form of the “one-year-
volunteering”, or by providing a substitute.
664
 But this ban was – as elsewhere – difficult to 
reinforce. After all, the state threatened the “recalcitrant military population” that did not go 
to its physical examination or show up for service, with a prolongation of duty of one to two 
years; to enter foreign military service, it was explicitly stated, was to be regarded as an 
“aggravating circumstance” in the decision on the degree of the penalty for desertion (Art. 92 
point 3 of the Conscription Law). Moreover, the Württembergian state tried to maintain its 
hold on the “military population” by explicitly enacting a special regulation with regard to 
citizenship: in the event an individual joined a foreign military service without permission, a 
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subject’s citizenship would not be removed, so that upon his return home he could still be 
subject to military service at home. 
John Torpey sustained, that border controls, the restrictions on emigration, and the 
development of methods of identification for people as “restrictions of personal freedom of 
movement” were traditionally linked not only to issues of social policy, but also to the 
question of “who could be required to perform military service and how they could be 
constrained to do so.”
665
 But as discussed above, there were significant developments with 
regard to these issues. Before the nineteenth century, states tried to attack foreign recruitment 
from every possible angle, criminalizing the recruiters as well as the recruited, the recruitment 
of nationals and foreigners in their territory, and that which was foreign in general as well as 
more specifically the recruitment efforts of their adversaries. The nineteenth century saw 
instead a shift in the focus. The attention was turned not only toward nationals but more 
precisely toward those who were liable for conscription, even if this group could be – due to 
some very extensive conscription systems – quite big. Regardless, the debate on the “right to 
emigrate” “, and the respective codifications in the constitutions and other laws, led to a 
decisive relaxation of efforts to control the movements of at least those Germans who were 
not liable (or were no longer liable) to conscription. Thus the legal possibilities to join foreign 
armies increased.  
Associating foreign military service with emigration, however, did not have just 
positive effects for those who were actually recruited. Alongside this depenalization of 
emigration, this association meant that the recruit ran the risk of facing legal consequences for 
their emigration: the loss of citizenship, which depending on the state became an automatic 
consequence for all those who enlisted in foreign militaries, and at times only for those who 
had not first asked permission.  
It is important to remember, however, that many of the “foreign soldiers” in Italy had 
already broken laws before (and sometimes long before) making their Italian commitment: On 
the one hand, information in the soldiers' registers regarding previous foreign military 
engagements reveals that many had already travelled, in Europe and the world, for varied 
lengths of time.
666
 On the other hand, those who came to Italy from their various locations of 
exile were often more or less "outlaws" in their home countries, at least until they were 
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rehabilitated, and therefore, may have been less sensitive toward accruing further legal 
consequences. 
To this must be added – in the case of pro-Unitarian recruitment – the ambiguous 
political status of some of the Garibaldian armed groups, the moment that in some instances 
an official link to the army of Piedmont/Italy did not exist. Consequently, in some European 
capitals there were debates on how to consider the garibaldini in legal terms.
667
 But some 
states resorted to bans on foreign recruitment in the legally ambiguous cases. In 1849, for 
instance, France and Piedmont both forbade the establishment in their port cities of camps for 
the assembling recruits for the Sicilian revolution.
668
 
There were two motives as to why recruitment offices were often placed in border 
regions: the first was to more easily recruit from more than one country, and the second was 
to avoid legal issues connected to a nation’s legislation on foreign recruitment and emigration. 
Recruitment offices were inevitably located in those states where foreign recruitment and 
emigration legislation was the least restrictive. Therefore, recruitment offices operated in 
Feldkirch in Austrian Vorarlberg
669
 near Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria, and in Saint-
Louis along the Rhine and Altkirch in France, which were both very close to Basel and 
Baden. These legal geographies were important even for the recruitment of the garibaldini: 
According to one source, a couple of Bavarian deserters in 1862 first fled to France before 
being shipped to Italy together with the recruited French soldiers.
670
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4.1.3 A biographical example – Wilhelm Plum and the baggy-style trousers 
Documents from the Department of Internal Affairs of the Prussian governmental district of 
Aachen that are now kept in the State Archive of Nordrhein-Westfalen offered up a rather 
complex story. The main characters and elements are: A Catholic pastor, an unknown 
clergyman, an alleged vagabond and his mother, various levels of the Prussian government 
and, most importantly, an odd pair of trousers. In 1868, to begin citing a letter from the 
Foreign Ministry in Berlin, a certain Wilhelm Plum, born 18 January 1833 in Roetgen near 
Monschau in Prussian Rhineland, turns himself in at the Prussian Embassy in Rome, claiming 
that he still has the duty to be available for the military reserves in Prussia. He declares that he 
wished to leave the Papal Army within which he was serving at the moment. Going through 
the arguments in the longish enquiry ordered by Berlin and carried out by the Chief 
Administrator of the district, Plum is deemed “furbo” (or “crafty” and “wily”) as the Italians 
would say. The enquiry goes on to assert that Plum “had feigned illness so well, that he has 
been […] released from the 1st Rhineland infantry regiment No. 25 in Hadersleben as being 
unfit for military service; this decision was confirmed by the departmental-substitution-
commission in 1865 […].”
671
 But according to Berlin, Wilhelm Plum was not the problem; he 
was only the symptom of a problem that was already mentioned in the letter that Berlin sent 
to the governmental district. Berlin wished to know how the decision to enter the Papal Army 
was maturated and therefore requested that the royal government of Aachen “clarify the 
truthfulness of the statement which” Plum “[…] made about the influences that induced him 
to enter the Papal Army and to refer the result”.
672
 According to the report from the local 
administration, the statement Plum, himself, made points to a certain Pastor Fischer in 
Roetgen. Without calling Fischer to make a statement, and after having heard only Plum’s 
version, the Chief Administrator of the district declared, “to date, I haven’t had any 
information on any activities of Pastor Fischer of Roetgen that goes against §111 of the 
Prussian Criminal Code and even now – notwithstanding the diverse enquiries undertaken – 
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have not come up with any facts that could corroborate the statement Plum made against 
Pastor Fischer.”
673
 But the administrator’s interrogation of Plum’s mother is intriguing: 
“On behalf of Plum’s joining of the Papal Army, his mother […] has made the 
following statement: Her son Wilhelm had gone […] to Pastor Fischer and asked him for a 
certificate to join the Papal Zouaves again; but Pastor Fischer had refused that wish directly. 
But because she wished to have her son – who caused her only sorrow and trouble – removed 
a while again from here, she had sent her daughter Regina to Pastor Fischer with the same 
request; the latter was denied as well. After this, her son had vanished; on 10 December he 
returned to her, dressed in peculiar fancy military trousers; she asked him where he got these 
trousers, and he answered that he had received them in Aachen from a clergyman who had 
also provided him with a letter of recommendation for Pastor Fischer, so that he was now in 




But the Chief Administrator continued to remain firmly convinced: Wilhelm Plum and 
not Fischer was the problem. According to the “local” version of the story, it was rather 
“Plum’s own tendency to be a vagabond that inspired him to allow himself to be engaged by 
the recruitment office in Brussels for the Papal Army. Hence, I have until now abstained from 
calling upon Pastor Fischer to make his own statement regarding the accusations brought 
against him by Plum.”
 675
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But who is Wilhelm Plum? Why is he a problem for the local administration? And 
why does he wear trousers that seem strange to his mother? From where did he get these 
trousers? And who is the unknown clergyman from Aachen that Plum mentions to his 
mother?  
Johann Wilhelm Plum, in accordance with the biographical sketches included in the 
letter from the local authorities in Monschau-Roetgen, not only feigned illness to be 
discharged from his reserve duties in the Prussian army, but he also tried to join the Papal 
Army twice, and also at least once to get away from it. Moreover, when he was 16 years old, 
Plum was handed over to the public work house in Braunweiler; in 1851 he was punished for 
being a vagabond and fined to another stay in the workhouse. None of this “bettered him in 
any way and he continued to have an unsteady life”.
676
 In 1853, Plum tried to join the 
Prussian military but was destined to remain in the reserves. Later, he was picked up in 
France and brought by the French authorities to Baden, where he faced police custody in 
Pforzheim and was later handed over to the 1
st
 battalion of the infantry regiment of Coblenz. 
From the military service in Coblenz, he deserted repeatedly, “and served in the French and as 
well in the papal service in 1860, where he was then captured by Piedmont I think”, [here the 
Administrator shows his knowledge of international politics] “at Castelfidardo. Having 
returned home, he was handed over to the military authorities and had to face a prison term of 
three years and eight months.”
677
 It is after this, in 1865, as aforementioned, that Plum feigned 
illness and in doing so preserved himself from having to serve his reserve duties in the 
Prussian military. “Even if totally healthy, Plum has shown no inclination for work; he once 
again resumed his old industry of providing himself with clothes and money by issuing 
begging letters and walking around”
678
 like a vagabond. In September 1865, Pastor Fischer 
gave such a begging letter to the mayor, but Plum fled directly, and “because he now knows 
that Pastor Fischer was the informer, he wishes henceforth to take revenge on the latter.”
679
 If 
this recount was true, it becomes clear why Plum was the problem for the Administrator and 
not Fischer. In other words, the local Administrator was more interested in fighting the local 
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problem of beggars and vagabonds than he was in knowing who was responsible for papal 
recruitment; at the very least he was not willing to blame one of the local pastors.  
The question of the strange trousers is easy to resolve, because almost certainly they 
are the baggy-style trousers of the French or Papal Zouaves. The question as to where Plum 
got them is more difficult to answer. According to his mother’s statement, he got them in 
Aachen. It is very likely that Plum ran into an organization managed by locals to support the 
Pope, the structure of which is partially revealed by later notes found in the same file. 
Eulenburg, the Minister of Internal Affairs wrote directly to Aachen some months later: “Of 
those personalities, that handle the recruitment for the Papal Army, the Catholic Pastor 
Schneider at St. Peter’s Church [most probably Saint Peter in the centre of Aachen] and the 
owner of a foundry in Wallstreet, Oster(n) [Schmitz and Oster Foundry, Wallstraße 55, 
Aachen] were identified.”
680
 Eulenburg asks the local authorities to open enquiries with 
regard to the mentioned figures. But the local police could find no trace of any pastor who 
went by the name of Schneider nor did they find “any proof” that Oster, breached in any way 
§111 of the Criminal Code. 
But the statement made by the factory-owner Oster leaves room for doubt. In fact, he 
states, “in the last weeks ca. 130 to 150 people – most of them from this district and around – 
have been at my place, and uttered that they wanted to join the Papal Army and that they 
wanted to know from me what they should do. I answered that I couldn’t help them. […] To 
those persons I declared […] that in Belgium there were committees, to which they should 
turn. […] The fact that the mayor [of Aachen] Contzen as well as the count of Nellessen sent 
those people to me is due to the fact that I am Cashier of the committee for the alms for the 
pope and that I am in written contact with Rome.”
681
 On the same paper, below, we find a 
revealing passage: “Following special instructions from the Head of the Police, Hirsch, Mr. 
Oster was informed about the illegality and punishableness of the indicated acts and – upon 
reading out loud paragraphs 110, 111 and 114 of the Criminal Code – he was seriously 
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ihnen nicht weiter behülflich sein könne. […] Den Umstand, daß sowohl durch den Herrn Oberbürgermeister 
Contzen als auch durch den Grafen von Nellessen die betreffenden Leute zu mir geschickt wurden, erklärt sich 
dadurch, daß ich Cassirer des Comités der für den Pabst bestimmten Gaben bin und mit Rom in schriftlichem 
Verkehr stehe.” Verhandelt Aachen den 19ten Dezember 1867, in: LA NRW, Abteilung Rheinland (Düsseldorf), 
Regierung Aachen, Militärwesen, signature B no. 1436, Militaria; Deserteurs. 
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cautioned that he should abstain from all activities related to the recruitment, transport, 
support of people from here for the Papal Army.”
682
 It is from a different source, that it 
becomes clear that Oster underplayed the aim of the committee in his statement. In the 
proceedings of the general assembly of the Catholic associations from 1868, it is recorded that 
in October 1867, the mayor of Aachen, Johann Contzen, formed an “association to provide 
Papal Zouaves” (“Verein zur Gestellung päpstlicher Zuaven”).
683
  
4.2 Army recruitment in nineteenth-century Italy and foreign mobilization 
Contrary to a widely held belief associated with the idea that general conscription existed, the 
armies of the nineteenth century continued to be supplied with recruits through a mix of 
different forms of recruitment. General conscription in Italy was only instituted in 1861, but 
some of the Italian armies prior to unification had instituted some form of conscription, even 
if this did not apply to all subjects. 
4.2.1 Piedmont 
The army of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia consisted of a combination of professional, 
formally “voluntary” and conscripted soldiers. Conscription, albeit with many legal 
exemptions such as for Sardinia and the possibility to either provide a substitute or to pay an 
exoneration tax, was re-introduced again in 1816. There were two distinct types of soldiers in 
the army that varied in proportion throughout the nineteenth century: These were the 
permanent and “provincial” soldiers. Permanent soldiers served for eight years and were, until 
1839, recruited according to the premises of a professional army, i.e. with formally voluntary 
enlistments. The “provincial” soldiers however were a product of military conscription. Their 
name derived from the Piedmontese provincial militias of the eighteenth century, even if in 
the nineteenth century all soldiers – permanent and provincial – served together in mixed 
regiments. Until 1831, provincial soldiers in times of peace had to regularly serve for four of 
every sixteen months over a period of twelve years in total. In times of war, all provincial 
soldiers had the duty to join in active service. Therefore, in times of peace, the Piedmontese 
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army comprised roughly 16,000 provincial and 8,000 permanent soldiers between 1815 and 
the 1830s.
684
 In 1831 and 1832, a series of new laws significantly altered the configuration of 
the Piedmontese Army. The duty of provincial soldiers now consisted of two consecutive 
years, after which they were placed on leave; in the first eight years they could be called back 
to active duty, and in the following six years they remained in the wartime reserves. Where 
before the ranks of the permanent soldiers were filled only through voluntary enlistments and 
the conscripts' substitutes, the possibility was introduced, and later converted into law in 
1839, to enlist conscripts into the ranks of permanent soldiers.
685
 
The new regulation inverted the previous proportions of the two groups of soldiers, 
and now the permanent soldiers were to count 16,000 men and constitute the bedrock of the 
army against only 8,000 provincials.
686
 The last Piedmontese Army reform of 1854, with its 
new law on the recruitment of the army
687
, however, formally inverted the percentages of the 
two groups once again, even if in practice they tended to converge in terms of length of 
service. The army now consisted of few permanent soldiers signed on to serve eight years, 
many conscripts with five years of active duty and six years in the reserve, and the greatest 
portion of conscripts that were given only forty days of instruction before passing directly into 
the reserve.
688
 The new Italian Army of the 1860s adopted this last Piedmontese Army 




Within the context of the “second war of independence” of 1859, volunteers were 
incorporated according to the Piedmontese regulations. The volunteers were integrated on the 
one hand into the regular Piedmontese regiments, and on the other they joined specifically 
formed volunteer corps, such as the Garibaldian Cacciatori delle Alpi. The Piedmontese law 
on the conscription of 1854 regulated the volunteers in the first instance. In fact the volunteers 
were integrated into the regular army as “permanent soldiers”, and therefore initially signed 
on for a period of engagement of eight years. As Anna Maria Isastia has shown, the length of 
engagement was a contentious issue, because already “the first enrolled volunteers 
immediately manifested scarce enthusiasm for a norm that penalized them well beyond their 
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 Already in January 1859, exceptions were made, but by the end of the month, 
the period of engagement for all volunteers was again fixed at eight years. Despite new 
attempts to introduce exceptions, the “major part” of those enlisted between the end of 
January and mid-February was “constrained to serve the eight years”.
691
 In February, the 
volunteers enlisted in the regular army with different periods of engagement, before the 
period was fixed for all at one year in March. This measure was not retroactive and therefore 
applied only to those soldiers who enlisted from that moment forth, and not to those that had 
enlisted under the longer terms of service.  
However, at least for non-Piedmontese subjects – i.e. individuals who were not from 
Piedmont or from the newly acquired Lombardy – who had signed up under the longer terms 
(before March) a decree was issued at the end of July that permitted them to leave the army if 
they so chose, independently from the duration they had originally signed up for.
692
  
For the separate corps of volunteers, the Piedmontese government decided to anchor 
its practices in the laws governing the national guards, and in fact the volunteer corps were 
organized at the local level. For the volunteer corps, a period of engagement of one year was 
foreseen. With regard to Garibaldi’s Cacciatori delle Alpi – formed with the volunteers 
assembled in the depot of Cuneo – the official proposal was that they be considered 
“volunteers of the local national guard of Genoa”
693
, even if this city was a 150 km away. 
4.2.2 Papal Army 
While the Piedmontese Army was comprised of both locally conscripted soldiers and formal 
volunteers (as permanent soldiers or as “volunteers” of the specific volunteer corps for 
instance in 1859), the Papal Army was entirely comprised of formal volunteers. In the Papal 





, the Papal Army had two “foreign regiments” 
that consisted mainly of Swiss soldiers but also southern Germans and others from other 
regions.
696
 Even if these regiments were officially disbanded in the spring of 1849 by the 
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, some of their soldiers enlisted in the Republican Army, in the same way 
that other Papal Soldiers sided with the revolutionaries. Immediately after the fall of the 
Roman Republic, in July 1849, the restored papal government formed a new army. A law that 
was passed in 1852 sanctioned the presence of foreigners in the Papal Army. This law was 
valid right up until the dissolution of the Papal States in 1870.
698
 Two line regiments in the 
infantry consisting entirely of foreigners were instituted in 1855
699
; others were created in 
1859.  
In 1860, the Papal Army seems to have been in particularly critical condition, and at 
best poorly prepared for war. Acknowledging these conditions, and in anticipation of the 
imminent wars as the political atmosphere steadily worsened in Italy, the Papal Army was 
reorganized between April and September 1860 with the aim of creating a force capable of 
going to war. For just this purpose, the French General Christophe Louis Léon Juchault de La 
Moricière was hired. He was an experienced officer, who had fought for instance in the 
French campaign in Algeria. The papal administration under La Moricière recruited heavily in 
other European states and even beyond to build up this new army, increasing the percentage 
of foreigners from 24% (in 1859) to 42% (in August 1860).
700
  
Within this context, more or less linguistically homogenous battalions of foreigners 
were created: a Belgian-French battalion of skirmishers, a German-Swiss battalion of 
carabineers, and an Irish battalion named after St. Patrick. The new Papal Army, augmented 
mostly by this foreign recruitment reached its total strength of roughly 20,000 men when it 
went to war in 1860. In the aftermath of Garibaldi’s Expedition of the Thousand, on 11 
September 1860, the Piedmont troops of General Cialdini entered the Papal States. On 18 
September 1860, in the battle of Castelfidardo near Ancona in the Marche, the papal soldiers 
under the command of the French General Lamoricière and the Austrian De Pimodan were 
defeated. The result of this battle was the cession of Umbria and the Marche to the new Italian 
state, the former having voted already at the beginning of the year in favour of unification. 
This defeat was later elaborated into the myth of the “martyrs of Castelfidardo” and was 
spread first in France, and then rapidly to other countries as well.
701
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The imminent application of the September Convention in 1864
702
 prompted yet 
another reorganization of the Papal Army. The Convention, which had been stipulated 
between Italy and France, agreed upon the withdrawal of the French troops of guarantee from 
Rome; the move of the Italian capital from Turin to Florence, rather than to Rome; and the 
respect of the remaining papal territories on the part of the Italian state. Sceptical that 
particularly this last point would be respected, the Papal Army underwent a transformation 
that was intended to enable it to face nearly alone
703
 probable attacks from Italian forces. The 
third article of the Convention speaks of “Catholic volunteers”, stating that the “[…] Italian 
government will make no protest against the organization of the Papal army, even composed 
of foreign Catholic volunteers, sufficient to maintain the authority of the Pope and tranquillity 
both at home and on the frontier of the Papal States […].”
704
 
Despite the reorganization of the Papal Army in 1861, the initial idea of 1860 to group 
the foreign soldiers into more or less nationally or at least linguistically homogenous 
battalions continued to inform the reality of the main foreign regiments between 1861 and 
1870: The 1860 French-Belgian battalion (“tirallieurs franco-belges”) was transformed in 
1861 into the corps of the Papal Zouaves, resulting in a strong French presence and only a 
limited German, Swiss or Irish presence throughout this period. During this period, what had 
been ideated as the “German” battalion, the “carabinieri”, continued to be comprised of 
mainly Swiss and German soldiers. 
4.2.2.1 ‘Conditions’ of engagement, enlistment periods etc. 
According to the law of 1852 governing the foreign regiments in the Papal Army
705
, it was a 
necessary requisite to be of the Catholic faith. This, however, was not the case before: In the 
soldiers’ registers of the papal foreign corps of the 1830s, there is a pre-printed field labelled 
“religion”, and in fact there were some Protestant soldiers listed in the ranks.
706
 In the pre-
stamped registers, for instance, of the “carabinieri esteri” from 1861, there is no longer any 
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field to denote the religious confession of the enlisting soldier.
707
 Nevertheless, it seems that 




Initially the duration of engagement was set at 4 years with the possibility to reengage 
for the same period.
709
 This was changed after 1860, and it became possible to enlist between 
six months and two years (in the Zouaves) and one to four years (as in the corps of the 
Foreign Carabineers until 1869), with the possibility to then extend service by similar lengths 
of time thereafter.
710
 Every new recruit received an engagement gratification, and every 
soldier was regularly paid.
711
 The law also foresaw that nobody would be deployed to fight 
against their nation of origin.
712
 
4.2.2.2 Recruitment offices 
The papal government made use of recruitment depots especially in France and Austria: 
Pontarlier, Marseille, Nantua, Saint-Louis and Altkirch in France, and Feldkirch in Austria. 
Given the escalation of the situation in Italy, temporary recruitment offices were erected 
throughout Austria in 1860 to cover nearly all corners of the Empire. In France, an additional 
office opened in Paris, and others opened in Italy, in Ancona and Civitavecchia.
713
 The lack of 
official recruitment offices in the other German states than Austria was a result of the legal 
restrictions on foreign recruitment and the fact that permission had been sought by the papal 
administration but not granted. Hence German recruits had to travel on their own initiative to 
the recruitment offices that were found along the German borders. The depot in Feldkirch in 
Vorarlberg was particularly important for German recruits because of its geographically ideal 
position near various states such as Württemberg, Baden and Bavaria
714
 as was the office in 
Saint-Louis along the Rhine: Nearly all Germans present in the corps of the Zouaves, for  
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instance, had joined the Papal Army by signing on at this last, with its strategic geographical 
position along the border with Baden.
715
  
Work in the recruitment offices was often carried out by soldiers and officers that were 
not papal subjects. Maintaining such a network of offices, to ensure they functioned, the 
payment of transportation costs or of the premiums of engagement necessitated a lot of 
money. The offices were to try to accommodate the recruits in local barracks, and, when that 
was not possible, they were to stipulate contracts with local hostels, and local bread 
distributors. These contracts had to be countersigned by the Ministry in Rome in the event the 
fund established for the recruitment office was exceeded (Art. 36). Consequently, the archival 
records of the papal Ministry of Arms on the correspondence sent to Rome by the recruitment 
offices primarily contained invoices and inquests for payments for every type of spending 
(invoices for hostels, train tickets, etc.).
716
 Only after 1860, when there were larger groups of 
soldiers to transport to Italy, the system was changed, and the papal administration began to 




4.2.2.3 Catholic recruitment associations 
Alongside this official recruitment organization, various Catholic committees worked in 
different European countries. They contributed by sending men to Rome, as well as 
munitions, money, cloth for uniforms, and even tobacco for the papal soldiers. For example, 
one pamphlet from 1867 had a page that gave information on how to support the cause: 
whether by communicating the wish to join to the parish priest or by donating to the priest or 
one “of the committees dealing with the collections for the Papal Zouaves” a specified sum of 
money “for which the whole year of a Papal Zoauve can be sustained”.
718
 
In October 1867, the mayor of Aachen inaugurated an “association to supply Papal 
Zouaves” (“Verein zur Gestellung päpstlicher Zuaven”).
719
 In practice, roughly 13% of the 
German Zouaves (see p. 246) were from Aachen or the nearby town of Eupen. There were 
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sixteen "Academic Committees for the Support of the Papal Army" located in the universities 
of such cities as Münster and Paderborn. They spread information on the military situation of 
the Papal States, collected money, and encouraged voluntary enlistment.
 720
In the universities, 
in such cities as Münster and Paderborn, sixteen 'Academic Committees for the Support of the 
Papal Army' spread information about the military situation of the Papal States, collected 
money and encouraged voluntary enlistment. 
A printed form from the “Association of Catholic Noblemen from Westphalia”
721
, 
dated 4 December 1867, was used to ask nobles to subscribe for the sustainment of Papal 
Zouaves: “The unjust robbery attacks of bands of people hostile to religion against the Papal 
States have shown clearly the necessity of an army that is loyal to the H[oly] Father. […] To 
the Catholic nobility of Westphalia it was unfortunately not granted to be present under the 
flag of the Holy Father in the last battles. More so, the signatories are convinced of the wish 
of the Catholic fellows of rank to help the H. Father in the necessary augmentation of his 
army. The signatories dare therefore to ask their Catholic Westphalian fellows of rank to sign 
for the recruitment of Papal Zouaves for two years […] and ask them as well, as far as they 
can, to incite others to this subscription.”
722
 The cost to sustain one Papal Zouave for two 
years amounted to 134 talers, but the pamphlet specified that it was also possible to provide a 
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Image 4.1 – Subscription pamphlet of the Westphalian nobility for the provision of Papal 
Zouaves, 1867  
 
Source: VWA, Personal Estates of Franz Xaver von Korff-Schmising-Kerssenbrock (1838-1910), Bri. N. 
XVI-3. 
4.2.3 The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies consisted 
nearly entirely of formally voluntary soldiers that enlisted for long periods of service. Until 
the 1820s there had been no formal general conscription and each township would 
independently choose its own small contingent of citizens to send to the army. In 1823, 
however, conscription was reintroduced and was subsequently reformed by the laws of 1834 
and 1837. From this time forward, all men between the age of 18 and 25 were liable to 
military service for five years of active service and another five years in the reserves. 
However, only a limited number of conscripts effectively entered the army. Not only all the 
islands, including Sicily, were exempted from conscription but many occupational groups 
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were as well, as among which public servants and the clergy. The number of conscripts 
requested in comparison to the quotas of professional soldiers was so small that conscription 
may have functioned primarily as the means with which military service as a profession was 
promoted at the local level.  
In accordance with this predominant professional character of the Bourbon Army were 
the capitulations with Swiss cantons to provide the kingdom with four regiments throughout 
the century. In the opinion of both historiographers and contemporaries, these soldiers 
constituted the best part of the army. The following exclamation within the context of a 
parade of the Swiss in Naples is attributed to King Ferdinand II (1830-1859): “These are 
soldiers! But ours, what are they? They are salad!”
724
 In 1859, however, due to decisions 
taken in Switzerland, the crisis surrounding the tradition of hiring out Swiss soldiers came to a 
head.
725
 After the “revolt of the Swiss” on 15
 
May 1859 in Naples
726
, the Swiss formations 
were dissolved that August, and the soldiers were left the option either to return home or to 
stay in southern Italy. The formally “Swiss” regiments were replaced at the end of 1859 by 
new “foreign regiments”. The ranks were filled by those Swiss soldiers that had chosen to 
stay and by newly arrived recruits, mostly from Austria and southern German states. 
Recruitment began in January 1860, after an apposite protocol was issued by the Austrian 
government at the end of December 1859. The main recruitment office was located in Vienna, 
but in spring Neapolitan officers were to be found throughout the Austrian empire looking for 
recruits. The protocol from December guaranteed the official backing of the Austrian 
administration, but nevertheless the provincial authorities were asked to avoid publicizing this 
fact; similarly, despite the fact that recruitment offices had been opened on Austrian soil, 
newspaper announcements or the publication of informational material by the Neapolitan 
government had been explicitly forbidden.
727
 In terms of eligible recruits, it was stated that 
only Austrian subjects without (any further) military duty could be enlisted, together with 
recruits of other nationalities. The head of the Neapolitan recruitment effort, the Swiss 
Colonel Hess von Schmidegg, was ordered not to enlist “northern Germans, namely 
Prussians, nor […] Hungarians, because one holds them not to be reliable, too easily irritable” 
for political reasons.
728
 In August 1860, the new “foreign regiments” in Bourbon service 
consisted of some 4,200 soldiers, two thirds of which were Austrians, and the rest were Swiss 
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and southern Germans. These regiments were deployed against the Garibaldian “Southern 
Army” at the end of May in Sicily
729
, again 1 October during the “battle at the Volturno”
730
, 
and finally in the siege of Gaeta which would last until the end of the year.
731
  
In the same period, the groundwork was laid for the less regular attempts to regain the 
lost territory of the kingdom by fostering and sustaining local pro-Bourbon insurrections by 
sending particularly experienced officers to southern Italy. One of these projects was 
proposed to the king by the Prussian Theodor Klitsche de la Grange. Born in 1799, Klitsche 
de la Grange was already part of the Prussian Army between 1813 and 1815; he converted to 
Catholicism, became a captain in the papal general staff, and left the Papal Army in 1851. 
Since the 1850s he was in Bourbon service, where he organized a “volunteer battalion’s 
brigade” (”Brigata Battaglioni Volontari”
732
). The counter-revolutionary purpose of this troop 
was defined in the “Instructions for the volunteers’ column” at the end of September: “Re-
establish the government of His Majesty and hence remove the authorities erected by the 
revolutionary government, replacing them with either those pre-existing to 20 July or others 
that could guarantee their devotion and determination for the royal government.”
733
 For this 
purpose, Klitsche recruited local volunteers throughout the campaign. The result was a rather 
heterogeneous troop of between 1,500 and 2,000 people
734
: ex-policemen from Sicily and the 
continent, ex-Bourbon regular soldiers, mixed with peasants from the Abruzzi, recruited 
during Klitsche’s campaign.
735
 Luigi Alonzi, nicknamed Chiavone, also fought with Klitsche. 
Alonzi would continue to lead peasant’s groups against the new Italian Army throughout the 
1860s. During this guerrilla war against the new Garibaldian and Piedmont authorities, 
Klitsche’s son Adolfo served as his military adjutant.
736
 After the remnants of Klitsche’s 
“volunteer brigade” left the Bourbon territory on 6 November 1860
737
, Klitsche while in 
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Rome proposed to use papal soldiers and officers for another attempt to regain the Bourbon 
territory in December of that year.
738
  
Like Klitsche, other officers that gravitated around the exiled Bourbon king were 
developing similar plans from the spring of 1861 onwards to provide volunteers for the 
Bourbon cause, especially those from abroad.
739
 These plans were put into practice between 
1861 and 1864 in a joint effort by the diplomats of the Bourbon court in the European 
capitals, officers that had followed the monarchs into their Roman exile and legitimist circles 
in Europe, that were already working to support the papal cause. Together they formed a 
“veritable international secret organization”
740
 to re-establish Bourbon authority. Emissaries 
were sent out to the European cities, among which was Klitsche de La Grange. Officers and 
soldiers were shipped via Marseille and Malta down to southern Italy or Rome. The result was 
a “guerrilla war with the official seal of the dynasty”.
 741
 Among the “brigands” were in fact 
some foreigners, such as the Spanish Josè Borjés or the Prussian Ludwig Richard 
Zimmermann. 
4.2.4 Mazzini’s and Garibaldi’s armed groups 
The commitment of many foreigners fighting with Mazzini or Garibaldi was linked to the 
networks established by European democrats between the 1830s and 1850s in the various 
locations preferred by exiles such as Zurich, London, Paris or Brussels. Mazzini’s failed 
attempt at an invasion of Savoy in 1834 was a first outcome of the idea to bring together the 
various communities in exile in Switzerland and France for a common cause. 
Another case in point is the democrat Johann Philipp Becker, a German exile that 
since 1838 resided in Switzerland and who at various points between 1848 and the 1860s tried 
to assemble legions for the Sicilian State, the Roman Republic or Garibaldi.
742
 
Participant of the Hambach Festival in 1832, Becker was imprisoned for his speeches 
for a total of 11 months. In 1838 he was exiled to Switzerland, first to Bern and then to Biel in 
the canton Bern. Biel was one of the main meeting points of exiles from all over Europe in the 
1830s and 1840s (as was Switzerland in general): Mazzini was in Biel from 1833 to 1837 and 
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may have met Becker there.
743
 Becker obtained Bernese cantonal and Swiss citizenship in 
1847.
744
 In the same year, he participated as an officer on the side of the liberal cantons in the 
Swiss Sonderbund war. On 26 March 1848, in Biel, he organized a meeting of German 
associations in Switzerland, exploring the ways in which to support the revolution in 
Germany. For this purpose the associations founded a “Central committee for the building of 
a German Legion from Switzerland”. Becker prepared a twenty-points instruction on the 
organization of this army.
745
  
There were several missions sent to support the revolution in Germany and to fight for 
the republic of Friedrich Hecker. But, when these attempts failed, Becker along with Gustav 
Struve returned to Biel in September 1848. In January 1849, Becker was expelled from the 
canton of Bern for the publication of his journal “Die Revolution” and went to 
Neuenburg/Neufchâtel, where he continued to pursue this publication with the title “Die –
Evolution”. It was between the 1848 revolutions and the organization of the revolutionary 
army of Baden (“Volkswehr”) in 1849, that Becker first tried to organize German support for 
the Italian cause: In November 1848 the second phase of the revolution triumphed in Rome 
against the counterrevolution. Becker showed great enthusiasm for this and praised Mazzini 
in his paper “The –Evolution”.
746
 His later plan to assemble a “German-Swiss Legion” for 
Italy was fuelled by a number of interconnected elements. First, in Switzerland, where future 
“capitulations” with foreign powers had been banned, while existing agreements – for 
instance with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies or the Pope – remained intact, a petition 
campaign was born to protest the participation of Swiss citizens on behalf of the 
“conservative” powers.
747
 Second, already in January 1849, Mazzini wrote of his idea to 
create such legions to the future Roman “triumvir” Aurelio Saffi: “you should introduce 
practices in which I could help you to assemble foreign legions of Corsicans, Swiss, Germans, 
Poles, and Spaniards.”
748
 Johann Philipp Becker in Biel and August Willich, a member of the 
organized groups of German craftsmen of Lyon, had begun to plan a German-Swiss Legion 
for the revolutionary government in Sicily. This company was intended, in a subsequent 
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moment, to be the kernel of a revolutionary army for Germany. In other words, the German-
Swiss legion was considered to be an alternative to the organization of a German legion for 
the revolution in Germany, which had encountered serious organizational problems, first, 
because of the persecution by the French and Swiss authorities, and second, because of the 
course of the events in Germany. The organization of a German-Swiss Legion on Italian 
grounds, thus, represented not only a chance to support the Italian cause but also to finally 
organize a legion for the struggle in Germany. At the beginning of 1849, Becker and Mazzini 
discussed their plans in Biel.
749
 Mazzini stipulated a contract to regulate the formation of a 
“Germano-Helvetic Republican Legion”. For the single soldier, the conditions resembled the 
capitulations that had been stipulated between the Swiss cantons and the Bourbon monarchy 
and the Pope respectively. The regiment was to fight under Swiss and German flags and to 
prepare the union of Sicily with the Roman Republic, whose army it ought to join afterwards. 
Once the contract was stipulated, Becker began to recruit soldiers. He hoped to attract several 
thousand people. The main terrain for the recruitment was the communities of German exiles 
in Switzerland and France, whose numbers grew because of the success of the 
counterrevolutionary forces in Germany. In Switzerland and in Alsace Becker found recruits, 
and the project was also backed by German exiles in France: A column of German craftsmen 
under August Willich wished to join Becker’s regiment. Several Swiss republicans from 
neighbouring cantons joined in an attempt to counterbalance what, in their eyes, were 
shameful capitulations between Switzerland and the legitimist sides in Italy. Initially the 
recruitment was conducted clandestinely, but later on a press campaign was launched. In 
response to this development, the Swiss Federal Council on 28 March 1849 forbade the 
planned republican legion declaring it to be unconstitutional and to violate Swiss neutrality. 
Nevertheless, Becker, who was urged to move from Neufchâtel to Geneva, continued to 
recruit for the cause. In France, the exiles willing to join his legion were faced with serious 
administrative problems, namely the government was not willing to issue them passports. 
Regardless, Becker with some friends went to Marseille with the intent to put to sea. Here, 
several people – among which Polish émigrés, German craftsmen, Swiss democrats, and 
Hungarians that had deserted from the Austrian army – had gathered with the intention of 
joining the revolution in Italy. Because of the lack of financial resources, the beginning of 
Becker’s expedition was repeatedly postponed. Becker even poured his own money into the 
cause. After the final defeat of the polish revolutionary General Mieroslawski in Catania, 
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Becker stipulated a new contract, this time with the Ambassador of the Roman Republic in 
Switzerland. At the end of April he sent some officers to Rome to clarify the contract. Only 
single isolated participations were the concrete outcome of all of Becker’s efforts. One such 
individual was Gustav von Hoffstetter, who went to serve the Roman Republic. But 
Hoffstetter was able to join Garibaldi’s troops in Rome also because he possessed a personal 
recommendation by Mazzini; in the end, Hoffstetter became Chief of Garibaldi’s General 
Staff toward the end of the defence of the republic. 
Between 1860 and 1862 Becker tried to build up a “German Legion” for Garibaldi 
from Genoa. At the end of January 1861, Becker prepared a text with the title “To the 
Germans” (“Ai tedeschi”) with which he proposed to form German committees in Europe that 
would collect money as well as enlist soldiers in order to have a “German legion” ready in the 
case war broke out once more in Italy, whether this was to take Veneto or Rome.
750
 In terms 
of soldiers, Becker indirectly pushed for the enlistment of experienced soldiers; he specified 
that when the soldiers’ registers were to be drawn up, the committees should include “the 
indication of the duration of service” passed in other armies, “the rank or function occupied” 
as well as the branch of service “to which they had belonged.”
751
 The Legion was however 
never came to pass: For the actual Garibaldian campaign in southern Italy it was too late, 
while in 1861 such a “German legion” would have been, as Mazzini wrote to Becker in June 
1861, too precocious: “Your idea of a German legion is a noble and good idea: it is 
premature. We are searching in this moment for the necessary funds to be able to act. Only 
when the way has been paved, will you be able to bring your idea to fruition. Try in the 
meantime to form the cadres. Be well, your brother Joseph Mazzini”.
752
 
Together with Becker, other people also became important intermediaries in 
establishing contacts between Germany and Italy. For instance Emma Herwegh and her 
husband Georg did so while they were living in exile in Paris and Switzerland. Emma 
proposed that Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow go to Italy and established contact with Garibaldi. It 
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4.3 The officer corps and the traditions of nobility 
When speaking of the history of soldiers it is often important to differentiate between officers 
and common soldiers: In this study, differing patterns may be identified with regard to the 
mobilization, recruitment, pay and provisions, and institutional collocation in the various 
armed groups of the two categories. The history of foreign officers in Italian service is 
characterized by specific facets that are connected to the military function of the officer. 
Since the early modern age, the officer corps has had strong connections to the 
nobility. The right of command in the military had much older roots
754
 than absolutism, where 
the power of the officers was derived from the monarch. Despite the absolutist logic, the right 
of command of the officer can be seen to also derive from the role that the nobility played in 
times of war and in the military in the period prior to the advent of standing armies and 
absolutism. The primary feature lay in the overlap and interlocking of civil and military elites. 
Furthermore, the very legitimation of the position of power of the nobility arose from its role 
in times of war, the moment that ever since “the central Middle Ages, its raison d’être – the 
justification of its privileged position in state and society – had been that it was the fighting 
class. […] In some languages the very words for ‘nobility’ (or parts of it) derived from this 
function: for example chevalerie (French) and cavalieri (Italy). The European elite was in 
origin the men on horseback, the mounted knights who had dominated the battle-fields of the 
Middle Ages.”
755
 According to Morris Janowitz, the “professional armies” of Western Europe 
developed out of an “institutional differentiation” from the feudal or aristocratic model, where 
“civilian and military elites were socially and functionally integrated.”
756
 From the military 
reforms of the Enlightenment onwards, the star of the nobility in the officer corps began to 
wane over the long-term. In many countries, this process of “embourgoisement” was already 
well underway in the nineteenth century: The percentages of officers from noble origin not 
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only varied widely throughout Europe during this century, but also oscillated significantly in 
each country. Historian Karl Demeter noted the high percentages of “noble” officers in the 
Prussian and consequently German armies, suggesting that this was an indication of a specific 
“conservative” tendency; he saw in both armies a “Sonderweg” in military terms, which he 
posed in opposition to the more “liberal” development for instance in southern German 
armies that seemed to be characterized by comparatively higher percentages of bourgeois 
officers. But recent works on Baden and Bavaria have shown for instance that rather than a 
progressive, linear development, different phases can be made out during the nineteenth 
century. With regard to Baden, Karl-Heinz Lutz’s work shows the following pattern: 1) the 
proportional reduction of noble officers between the French Revolution and the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815; 2) the subsequent rise in these numbers until 1841; 3) followed by another 
decrease in the two decades after the Revolution of 1848/49; and 4) finally again a rise after 
the military convention was stipulated with Prussia in 1870.
757
 In Bavaria, Gundula Gahlen 
identified quite similar patterns: 1) An increase in the number of bourgeois officers during the 
Napoleonic period
758
; 2) a decrease in the percentage of bourgeois officers up to 1847; and 3) 
again an increase in the percentage of bourgeois officers between 1849 and 1855. The second 
phase especially reveals that even in Bavaria and Baden monarchs continued to prefer, in 
peacetime and when sufficient numbers were “available”
759
, noble officers to bourgeois 
candidates and hence goes counter to Demeter’s argument that this was only a Prussian 
phenomenon. 
No such numbers exist on the percentage of "bourgeois" and "noble" officers in the 
Italian armed groups. This is another confirmation of the fact that in terms of the comparative 
military history of the pre-Unitarian Italian states much still remains to be done.
760
 No 
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statistics are even available on the generally better researched case of the Piedmontese Army. 
The numbers measuring the social origin of the scholars of the Military Accademy of Turin 
may be used as indicators; here, the noble component decreased from 90% in 1816, to 66% in 
the 1820s, to 55% in the 1840s and down to just 33% in the 1850s.
761
 How this actually 
translated in the officer corps per se remains to be seen. For the new Italian Army, a 
percentage of only 6.5 to 7% of officers with a noble background has been identified for the 
year 1863.
762
 If this astonishingly low percentage of noble officers is verified, we must 
assume – knowing that only some former Garibaldian officers were incorporated into the new 
army
763
 – that the percentages of noble officers in the other pre-Unitarian Italian armies must 
have been particularly low as well. 
Only qualitative data is available on the Bourbon Army. This hints at a traditionally 
low percentage of noblemen in the officer corps: “The major part of the military cadres […] 
especially in the final years of the Kingdom was of bourgeois or petty bourgeois 
provenance.”
764
 “These findings are confirmed by the historiography on the southern Italian 
nobility: Giovanni Montroni, in his study on the Neapolitan nobility of the nineteenth century, 
writes for instance, that the “military career, in southern Italy, did not present itself as an 
option for the young nobles.”
765
 In the Bourbon case, therefore, there is no reason to “speak of 
a military caste originating from the aristocracy and linked to it, even in a country in which 




                                                                                                                                                        
German military history; nevertheless it seems to me that the other pre-Unitarian German armies are covered to a 
much greater degree than in the Italian case. 
761
 Anthony L. Cardoza, "An officer and a gentleman. The Piedmontese nobility and the military in liberal Italy," 
in Esercito e città dall'unità agli anni trenta. Atti del convegno di studi, Perugia 11 - 14 maggio 1988, vol. 1 
(Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1989), p. 185; Anthony L. Cardoza, Aristocrats in bourgeois 
Italy. The Piedmontese nobility, 1861-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 36; Alberto 
Mario Banti and Marco Mondini, "Da Novara a Custoza. Culture militari e discorso nazionale tra Risorgimento e 
Unità," in Walter Barberis, Guerra e pace, Storia d’Italia. Annali 18 (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), p. 432. 
762
 Cardoza, "An officer and a gentleman," p. 187.  
763
 Of the initial “Thousand”, some 200 were integrated into the regular army of Italy according to Cecchinato, 
Camicie rosse, p. 167. 
764
 Argiolas, Storia dell'esercito borbonico, pp. 5 and 141. 
765
 Giovanni Montroni, Gli uomini del re. La nobiltà napoletana dell’Ottocento (Catanzaro: Meridiana libri, 
1996), p. 168. 
766
 Argiolas, Storia dell'esercito borbonico, p. 76. 
184 
 
4.3.1 Patronage and Clientele 
4.3.1.1 The specificity of the Italian foreigners’ corps: the strong royal prerogative 
For the foreign officers in the Italian armed groups, it is important to make a distinction 
between possible appointments in the various regiments of the army – some were assigned to 
a more or less “foreign” orbit, leading troops of mostly foreign origin, whereas others were 
appointed to the head of primarily Italian corps. In the Bourbon and Papal Armies, this 
difference was also important for the formal rules of appointment: The officers of those corps 
that were called “indigenous”, i.e. consisting mainly of subjects of the Italian states, were 
appointed according to the general rules for officers in the respective states. 
The regulations governing the appointment of officers to the foreigners’ corps clearly 
differed from those in the other corps of the Bourbon and Papal Armies. These specific rules 
always regard two specific instances: When a foreigners' corps was first created, the sovereign 
had complete discretion in his choice of officers. Only once the corps was up and functioning 
were the nominations for officer posts, when these last became vacant, subject to a more 
regulated manner of selection.  
In the example of the Bourbon Army, the regulations governing the formation of the 




 battalion of light carabineers and the 
13
th
 battalion of “cacciatori” (skirmishers) – dictated that the initial nomination of the officers 
was totally reserved to the king: “The commander and the officers of every rank are 
nominated by His Majesty, and they are chosen from the individuals that His Majesty believes 
capable for these positions.”
767
 No further concretizations of the prerequisites for this first 
nomination can be found in the regulations. But even once the corps was instituted, the king 
continued to hold more rights in terms of nomination over the foreign corps than was the case 
with the indigenous regiments. Even if the rules of the foreigners’ corps stated that after “the 
first formation, the promotion to the vacant posts of officers […], until there is a new 
regulation, will be made according to the seniority of the various grades”
768
, the extraordinary 
influence the sovereign had over the choice of officers was confirmed by the following 
passages. If the post of commander of a foreigners’ battalion became subsequently vacant, the 
substitute “will be nominated upon the sovereign’s choice out of […the previous ranks] those 
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believed to be most capable and most appropriate.”
769
 For the lower ranks of company 
captains and first and second sergeants, however, nominations by the sovereign had to be 
made “two thirds according to the rank of seniority, and the other third according to merit and 
capacity of the immediately inferior officers […] on the basis of a presentation from the 
commander of the Corps and the proposal of the Inspector.”
770
 Similarly, the “posts of sub-
lieutenants [alfieri] will be sovereignly filled two-thirds by cadets and one-third with non-
commissioned officers.”
771
 The appointment to the first grade of officers, the “alfiere”, was 
however in every case dependent on the outcome of an examination at a pre-established 
foreigners’ cadet school.
772
 This school, which due to the end of the Bourbon State in 1860 
was never instituted, was theoretically meant to provide all “the necessary officers, having all 
that aspire to this rank to come from this school.”
773
 Even the one-third of alfieri that were to 
be selected from the non-commissioned officers had to take the final exam of this cadet 
school. The cadet school was to prepare the candidates with the necessary knowledge for the 
examination, due to the fact that – despite the very heavy sovereign prerogatives in 
nominating the officers – for the “nomination to officer only theoretical and practical 
knowledge will be decisive.”
774
 Non-commissioned officers and caporals “who distinguish 
themselves with good conduct and talent, can – in the proportion of one- to two-thirds – take 
part at the courses of study of the cadets. They will be subjected to the same exams that they 
[the cadets] have to undergo.”
775
  
4.3.1.2 Foreign officers of the Papal foreigners’ corps 
The regulations governing the foreigners’ corps in the Papal Army were not much different 
from those in the Bourbon Army in regard to entrance to the officer corps and promotions.  
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foreigners’ brigade in royal Neapolitan service [1828-1873], sign. 2a.  
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The law from 1852 remained the legal pillar of the foreigners’ corps.
776
 According to the 1852 
law, the Pope reserved the right to nominate – as had the Bourbon King with the institution of 
the foreigners’ corps in 1859 –all generals and officers in the future constitution of every new 
foreigners’ corps; this comprised even the military chaplains and the medical officers (art. 8). 
No further prerequisites were indicated in the law. The first nominations of non-
commissioned officers and caporals were, instead, the prerogative of the commanding colonel 
of the respective corps (art. 12). 
Once the corps were formed, different regulations of this same law were applied with 
regard to the various ranks in the officer corps. Interestingly, it seems – at least on the basis of 
the law – that for the foreigners’ corps no formal examinations were foreseen, with the 
exception of the rank of caporal wherein a series of prerequisites was named: He must have 
been in active service for at least 6 months, and he had to know how to “read and write” as 
well as “the function of this grade defined by the various regulations” of the army. This was 
closest to examination standards that these requisites came, and could perhaps have led to 
formal examination. For the other grades, merit was the prerequisite of promotions. In fact, 
decisions had to be based on another instrument that was already well known in other armies 
and the civil administration in early modern times: the lists of conduct. According to art. 108 
an annual list “of the most meritorious of the corps” had to be issued, based on the 
information provided by “the captains of the companies, the adjutant majors, and the superior 
officers of the corps”. This list had to be approved by the commander of the division as well. 
As with other cases, these lists could include a variety of information: while in part they were 
simple soldiers’ lists, many went much further in the evaluation of the officers and soldiers, 
constituting veritable “lists of their skills, achievements, character and conduct”.
777
 In Prussia, 
for instance, the formerly secret “lists of conduct” from 1848 onwards were substituted by the 
reports on soldier “qualifications” (“Personal- und Qualifikationsberichte”), which, despite 
the fact that their name seems to regard the soldier’s knowledge and expertise, were also to 
contain “a full description of the officer in terms of his personality, character traits, military 
utility and other peculiarities”.
778
 Military leaders were increasingly asked to use this device 
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to evaluate the “whole” person, including a soldier’s morals, personality, character, and hence 
his psychological “qualities” as well. 
However detailed or not they may have been, the “lists of merit” in the foreigners’ 
corps of the Papal Army ought to have functioned as one tool by which an individual could 
rise to officer or be promoted. How much of a determining fact these lists had to be is 
however, insufficiently codified by the law of 1852. There are only general statements, such 
as art. 105 – apparently valid for all promotions – which states that “promotions that are 
dictated by seniority are conditional upon good conduct in every respect and on the ability to 
well maintain the new rank.”
779
 With regard to the nomination of caporals and non-
commissioned officers, it was stated that merit should be the foundation upon which 
promotions were based, without however replacing the annual lists of merit. That there was 
tension between seniority, merit and previously acquired military experience is clear in the 
specific way in which in the rules of the foreigners’ corps of the Papal Army establish how 
the lists of officer seniority of officers should be created. This included the recognition of 
rank and experiences formerly acquired in other armies. The list of officer seniority was to be 
formed by four groups with different status: The first and highest was to include those officers 
that had already been in papal service, with their respective seniority and rank; the second 
group was to contain the officers “that previously served foreign powers”, and internal 
seniority of this group was to conform to the seniority and rank they had in the foreign 
service; the third group is the most curious, since it compiled a list of officers from “non-
permanent troops”.
780
 Lastly, the fourth group included those officers that had not previously 
served in any armed force. With regard to the non-commissioned officers, the lists of seniority 
ought to have been formed in the same manner (art. 114).  
4.3.1.3 Courts and sinecures: Foreign officers and clientele 
As seen above, according to the formal regulations the sovereign had notable decisional 
prerogatives in appointing officers, especially foreign officers. These rights were 
counterbalanced with more formal criteria with regard to the “indigenous” regiments. But 
sovereign rights continued to be greater with regard to the foreigners’ corps. First, the 
monarch could use his third or “terzo di grazia” especially for appointing foreign officers to 
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indigenous regiments. Second, he had nearly unrestricted formal power with regard to the first 
appointment of officers when a foreigners’ corps was instituted. Third, he retained a much 
greater degree of only partially restricted power in his appointments subsequent to the 
institution of the foreigners’ corps. This meant that the importance of patronage and clienteles 
was most likely much higher for foreigners than it was for the regular indigenous corps. It 
was important to be privy to the informal discussions of the commanders and to have access 
to the court so that they might cultivate and win the favour of the sovereign and the relevant 
functionaries. In terms of the modes of entry into the officer-corps, the small sample of 
German officers in the Papal Zouaves shows that at least in these cases no direct appointment 
to the officer positions occurred: All seven had been – for more or less time – simple soldiers 
or non-commissioned officers in the Papal Army prior to attaining their officers’ diploma. 
With the exception of Mousty, all German Zouave officers before being promoted had been 
part of the Papal Army for quite a long period – at least so long that it is difficult to speak of 
them as “military amateurs”; sometimes, as in the case of Bach, they were “amateurs” when 
they joined the army, but became “professionals” over the course of their service.  
Nearly all sovereigns in Europe at the time remained at the top of the military 
hierarchy throughout the nineteenth century.
781
 They saw themselves – and in fact very often 
were – the supreme commander of the armies; to differing degrees they remained important in 
the procedures to appoint officers; they considered the “cadet corps” to be their own personal 
institution, and therefore wished to be regularly informed about their “pupils”. As a result, 
they made frequent visits to these and other military institutions. The court was also the place 
where decisions were made on the conferment of medals of the equestrian orders – these had 
particularly burgeoned in the nineteenth century, as a kind of compensation for the loss of 
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formal noble privileges. Ennoblements were also decided at court, and they were increasingly 
conferred to “brave” officers.
782
  
The case of the Papal Court at Rome is emblematic.
783
 To demonstrate this, it is 
enough to compare the lists of the lay people that were granted one of the three possible titles 
of “chamberlain” with the lists of the soldiers and especially the lists of officers in the foreign 
regiments of the Pope. The three titles were: “Cameriere segreto di spada e cappa 
partecipanti” (“Real privy chamberlain of the sword and cape”), “Cameriere segreto di spada 
e cappa” (“Privy chamberlain of the sword and cape”) and finally the “Cameriere d’onore di 
spada e cappa” (“Chamberlain of honour of the sword and cape”). Those holding the title 
were called on to fulfil ceremonial functions in particular: They were the ushers at the Papal 
Mass, “indicating the reserved places to the guests of honour and the diplomatic corps”; they 
were marshals of order “during the audiences” with the Pope; and they “accompanied heads 
of states and governments or ambassadors for their inaugural or parting visit from their 
Roman residences to the papal apartments.”
784
 When the lists of German chamberlains in the 
nineteenth century drawn up by Hartmut Benz
785
 are compared to the army lists of the papal 
foreign military corps, it is possible to see the many overlaps in the family names on the two 
lists. Some chamberlains had been papal officers, for instance Franz Xaver Graf von Korff 
gen. Schmising-Kerssenbrock, a non-commissioned officer in the corps of the Papal Zouaves 
from December 1868 who became second lieutenant (hence officer) in the corps of the 
“carabinieri esteri” on 20 March 1869.
786
 He became “chamberlain” in 1881, i.e. twelve years 
after his father had become “cameriere segreto” in 1869.
787
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 had served as a papal chamberlain since 1853. In 1877, their brother 
Hubert
791
 became a papal chamberlain as well.
792
 
Furthermore, many who stood at the forefront in the organization to support the Pope 
were papal chamberlains. Of the nobles in the “Association of Catholic Noblemen” in 
Westphalia
793
, many that had started a “subscription for the appointment of Papal Zouaves” in 
December 1867 were already, or later became, papal chamberlains, as had their relatives. 
Signees of the “subscription” for the Papal Army were, for instance, the papal chamberlains 
Burghard Freiherr von Schorlemer-Alst, Clemens Graf Droste-Erbdroste, and Karl Freiherr 
von Droste zu Hülshoff. Some relatives of other signees of 1867 were provided with the title 
of chamberlain as well, namely those from the families von Ketteler, von Twickel, Metternich 
zur Gracht and other members of the Schorlemer-Alst family. One family member, Felix von 
Loë, was even ennobled (and received the hereditary title of a “comes romanus”) by the Pope 
in 1877. Furthermore, even bourgeois supporters of the Papal Army were nominated 
chamberlains or ennobled: On the list of those holding the title of “chamberlain” is Heinrich 
Oster, the bourgeois owner of an iron foundry in Aachen; as aforementioned, Oster came into 
conflict with the Prussian Criminal Code because he had helped possible recruits to find their 
way to the papal recruitment offices (see p. 165 above). The possible new recruits had been 
sent to Oster by the mayor of Aachen and Karl Nellessen, a proprietor of a cloth factory there; 
Nellessen was ennobled by the Pope in 1855, and from 1857 onwards Prussia – despite his 
collaboration in what was still the illegal recruitment of citizens for foreign armies in Prussia 
– allowed him to officially to wear his title.
794
  
Access to the Pope, however, was a decisive feature of the noble officers in particular: 
It confirms that parts of German nobility continued to strongly orientate themselves toward 
Vienna and the Papal Court, and not to the “kleindeutsche” courts. It seems that this 
“freedom” of orientation toward foreign “courts” formed for many nobles a decisive 
ingredient of their struggle to remain important despite the formal reduction of their noble 
prerogatives in the German states.
795
 In the case of Catholic nobility, the entanglement 
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between the Papal Court and papal military careers is most striking. In a circular manner, this 
close connection helped to consolidate their role in German Catholicism as well: Service to 
the Pope increased their standing among Catholics in Germany and lent strength to the 
German “Kulturkampf”.  
This sort of “gift exchange”, where the conferment of titles and ennoblements led to a 
heightened recruiting activity, or, vice versa, the provision of soldiers was “repaid” with titles 
and ennoblements, was by no means an invention of the nineteenth century. Instead, in some 
ways it recalls the practices of the early modern period, such as the conferral of ennoblements 
on recruiters by the Prussian Kings Friedrich Wilhelm I and Friedrich II.
796
  
The “legitimist” side of the Italian Risorgimento was not alone in using gift-exchange 
to attract soldiers. Similar measures were adopted as well on the opposite side, when it was in 
dire need of soldiers. In a law on the military draft that was imposed upon the municipalities 
of Sicily in 1848 by the Sicilian government, a symbolic reward was envisaged for those that 
provided recruits: “Whoever brings to the recruitment councils twenty recruits, beyond those 
that every municipality is obliged to provide […] will have a bronze medal of merit from the 
fatherland and will be appointed as honorary counsellor of the municipality to which he 
belongs.”
797
 The provisory, liberal government of Rome in December 1848, after the 
participation of Roman soldiers in the first campaign in the so-called “first war of 
independence” – which caused the loss of many soldiers – took this one step further. The 
liberal government had allotted a reward of 10 scudi to be paid to whoever provided 10 
soldiers. Furthermore, in the event 20 recruits were brought forward, it announced that this 
individual would be given a rank: “He who presents 20 individuals for enrolment […] can 
have the rank of corporal, if he has the respective ability.” Individuals who brought 40 
soldiers into service would be appointed sergeant, and finally, anyone who brought one 
hundred recruits “can have the rank of second lieutenant”
798
, i.e. an officers’ diploma. 
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Significantly, the Garibaldian officer Rüstow interprets this early-modern connection between 
the recruitment of soldiers and the conferral of an officers’ rank in recompense as a typical 
mechanism for “volunteer forces”: “In a volunteer army the importance of an individual 
depends always more or less on the number of people that this person has assembled. […] 
The commanders of the divisions and brigades, but also the second commanders in the Italian 
southern army [Garibaldi’s “Esercito meridionale”] quite avoided admitting how weak their 
divisions were, and if they had to say it outright, they know enough to speak about their 
depots, that still were left and where they were carrying out recruitment, so that the truth was 
hidden for a long time.”
799
 This confirms two points: First, that issues of “military strength” 
and military “effectiveness” were important for the leaders of the pro-Unitarian armed forces 
as well and that they did not abstain from resorting to clientelist procedures in order to fill the 
rank and file. Second, it reveals that the political convictions of officers could go hand in hand 
with their quest for “personal glory” and the desire to hold important military posts. 
But the gift exchange functioned in another way as well. In the army of the 
secessionist Sicilian revolution of 1848, according to Piero Pieri, roughly 9% of the total force 
was comprised of officers by the end of 1848.
800
 The Sicilian forces were made up of very 
different elements: a “regular” army force, bands formed by the lower strata of society 
(including released prisoners), and the primarily bourgeois national guards of the cities. But 
even the “regular” army was of very mixed origin. Even if in-depth studies of its composition 
have not yet been carried out, it seems that there was a basic difference between this situation 
and that of the Roman Republic in 1848/49: In this last, the Pope withdrew to Gaeta, taking 
with him only a handful of officers and generals, leaving the rest of the regular troops in the 
hands of the revolutionary government. The situation in Sicily was fairly different. Not only 
was the recruitment of Sicilians for the Bourbon Army quite weak – this because the island 
was exempted from the military draft
801
 – but it is also important to note that the “legitimist” 
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Bourbon Army continued to exist, even if nearly all Bourbon troops were withdrawn to the 
continent quite early on. In order to mount a “regular” army, the Sicilian revolutionary 
government had to resort to a series of measures: already in February 1848 the revolutionary 
“comitato generale” (general committee) in Palermo issued a plan for the “Sicilian army”, 
wherein there was to be a rather normal percentage of 3.8% officers in respect to the total 
force of 7,544 men.
802
 A “domestic” recruitment of Sicilians for this new army was launched, 
and in September the Sicilian parliament voted a new law on the recruitment, with a period of 
service between four and six years.
803
 But in the end the number of officers, which as we saw 
earlier amounted to 9%, was far higher than had originally been planned. In reference to 
February 1849, Pasquale Calvi notes: “If the Sicilian army was still […] much to be desired in 
terms of soldiers, it was not poor in terms of officers.”
804
 The revolutionary governments 
distributed commissions to “valorous” revolutionaries, providing them not only regular pay, 
but especially the right to a pension; in other words, many commissions seem to have been 
granted as a sinecure for a number of people. The Sicilian government appointed individuals 
to the officers’ posts that had contributed in different ways to the revolution, and this not 
necessarily in terms of military commitment. Some were decidedly contrary to this practice of 
handing out appointments based on revolutionary merit. The leader of the Sicilian contingent 
in the “first war of independence” and later head of the Sicilian General Staff, Giuseppe La 
Masa, wrote that he, as early as the beginning of 1848, did not agree with this multiplication 
of the officer ranks. He underlined that the formation “of an army can be effectively done 
only by officers with knowledge in theory and practice of military education. I proposed not 
to provide the revolutionaries with another reward than a distinct uniform with a simple name 
or, for the more glorious ones, the distinctive title ‘first soldiers of the nation’ or ‘soldiers of 
12 January’, and leave them at the head of the bands until the regular army was built.”
805
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in the end, the Sicilian Army was not free of this form of patronage. Pasquale Calvi, in 1851, 
specifically accused the new Minister of War, Giuseppe La Farina, of clientelism.
806
 Yet, in 
February 1849, the problem of the easy granting of officers’ diplomas still persisted, so much 
so that the parliament discussed a law, wherein officers would receive their whole pay only 
once their respective corps reached the previously fixed numbers, and in the meantime they 
would only receive two-thirds of their pay; new officers could not be appointed and 
promotions made until every officer that had been nominated was in active service, even by 
assign superior officers to respectively lower posts; and that new “cadres” could be created 
only when the existing ones had been filled with officers, and then only by decision of the 
parliament itself. These measures, wrote Calvi in 1851, were to help to “impede the 
continuation of those incessant and scandalous nominations and promotions that the Minister 
[of War] allowed every day.”
807
  
4.4 Military expertise, professionalization of armies and national military “character” 
Without doubt the introduction of standing armies triggered a process of professionalization 
of the armies that was destined to continue over the following centuries. To make the armies 
permanent was the first step in bringing about an institutional differentiation of the “social 
organization of violence”
808
 from general civil society. “The professional”, wrote Morris 
Jannowitz, “as a result of prolonged training, acquires a skill which enables him to render 
specialized service.”
809
 The concentration on a special vocational activity was the pre-
requisite for the specialization of knowledge in these developing professions. Standing armies 
with their “standing soldiers”, hence, individuals that for many months or years remained 
within the army, were the most obvious sign of a division of labour between civil society and 
the military environment. To “speak of professionalism clearly means that the conduct of 
warfare is given over to men who have committed themselves to a career of service, men who 
are recognized for their ‘expertise’ in the means of warfare. It implies the decline of the 
gentleman amateur.”
810
 Professionalization, i.e. the formation of specialized knowledge with 
regard to specific functions, transformed the officer corps. Whereas there had always been 
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commanders in the military, the nineteenth century saw the “establishment of the role of 
officer as an institution and profession”.
811
  
In a simplified manner, the prerequisites of becoming an officer in the nineteenth 
century basically adhered to two principles: “intelligence” and knowledge on the one hand, 
and “character” on the other. The problem, historically speaking, was that parts of the nobility 
and traditional monarchs were to a certain degree able to legitimize claims for a continued 
noble prerogative in the nineteenth century by equalling the noble estate to “character”. 
Whereas intelligence and especially knowledge were assessed by (military) schools and 
examinations, kings and nobility continued to make use of mechanisms to control the social 
origin of candidates: The king by reserving at least portions of the officer posts to cadets, 
(noble) royal guards, and other people of his choice; and the nobility, especially in Prussia, by 
controlling the selection of candidates in the officer corps itself, or – in other armies – by 
being responsible for evaluating the “character”, “morals” and “conduct” of officer 
candidates. 
4.4.1 The Prussian case 
But the role of examinations was increasing in importance nearly everywhere. In Prussia, for 
instance, the officer career depended on two exams at least: According to the Prussian rules of 
1808, every young man that had reached the age of seventeen could try to be appointed as an 
“ensign with sword-knot” (“Portepeefähnrich”), hence an officer-aspirant. The prerequisites 
were the following: he had to provide a certificate of “good conduct” and pass an apposite 
exam (“Portepee-Fähnrichs-Prüfung”). The candidate was to take the exam before a 
commission of the respective military corps of interest. After 1844, the candidate had to prove 
that his education level was such that he was eligible to enter the last year of "Gymnasium" 
(or secondary school). Hence, already at the level of the exam taken by ensigns (officer-
aspirant) an individual had to be acquainted with some knowledge of German literature, Latin 
and French, the history of Rome and Athens, as well as that of Germany and Prussia, for 
instance. Were the candidate to pass, he would then be issued a diploma of “maturity as an 
ensign with sword-knot” (“Reifezeugnis zum Portepee-Fähnrich”) – henceforth ensign - 
which however was not the same as being appointed to the position of ensign. Only when a 
post became vacant, could the candidate be appointed upon discretion of the commanders of 
the corps. Once confirmed, new ensigns would be sent to the “divisional school”, where they 
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were taught “in the ‘military sciences’, that is: weaponry, artillery, fortifications, elementary 
tactics, field service, petty war [“kleiner Krieg”], military essay-writing, situational drawing 
[…]”. At the end of this education in the divisional schools, which lasted nine months, the 
ensigns had to take a pre-exam that would determine whether they were regarded competent 
to face the “real” officer’s exam. At the same time, the candidates had to serve from between 
five to six months as simple soldiers or non-commissioned officers. Upon completion of this 
period, the officers of the company, the commander of the company and of the regiment had 
to decide whether the candidate was “worthy” to continue in the career and become an 
“officer”, on the basis of an evaluation of such criteria as “conduct”, knowledge and 
performance in service. As established by the law, this exam had to be taken “in Berlin”. For 
those young men attending universities, the time they were required to spend in the military 
before being appointed as ensign was reduced to three months. They could also bypass the 
divisional schools and be admitted directly to the officer’s exam. In any case, however, they 
had to pass the respective exams. 
The level of education necessary to take the two exams (the ensign’s exam at the 
beginning of the career and the officer’s exam) differed between them. This becomes apparent 
for instance in the level of abilities in the requisites regarding the German language: while the 
fenriks only had to have “tolerable writing in terms of calligraphy and orthography”, the 
officer already had to have “the ability and precision to write an essay on military issues”. 
Moreover, such knowledge as “French, so much, that he [the future officer] can translate from 
French into German” was only requested of candidates that would take the officer’s exam.
812
 
Prussia also created an institution for those already appointed officers that wished to 
improve their knowledge. The “General War Academy” (“Allgemeine Kriegsschule”) – 
which was formed from a school that had already been instituted by Frederic II (“Berlin 
School of Inspection” - “Berliner Inspektionsschule”) – was created with the aim of educating 
a portion of the officers in “military sciences”; Carl von Clausewitz was appointed as director 
of the school in 1818. This military academy also served as an important place to prepare 
future officers of the general staff, hence those that would eventually be sent to the top of the 
military hierarchy.  
Although character evaluations carried out by the already appointed officers and 
commanders of the corps continued to play a part, it was clear that general school education 
                                                 
812
 See "Reglement über die Besetzung der Stellen der Portepee-Fähnriche und über die Wahl zum Offizier bei 
der Infanterie, Kavallerie und Artillerie vom 6. August 1808," in Novum Corpus Constitutionum Prussico-
Brandenburgensium, vol. 12, part 1808 (1822), pp. 404-08. 
197 
 
and specific military knowledge was becoming more important. The general level of 
education required, hence at least that of the penultimate class of the “Gymnasium”, may have 
remained low, but low only in comparison to today’s standards: In France, for instance, only 
1% of all 19-year-old men went to take “le bac” in 1820, and in 1909 only 2.4% of the 
population of the same age.
813
 In Prussia, in 1864 only 3.6% of all school-aged children up to 
14 years of age went to secondary schooling.
814
 What is even more important for this study of 
foreign soldiering is the fact that some basic knowledge of French was a prerequisite. This 
was a first step toward the international military world, because French was still the lingua 
franca within this context.
815
 Apart from the establishment of a base level of general 
education required to take the respective exams, a core of “military knowledge” was also 
developed in this period. In fact, it has been argued that the development of the officer career 
in Prussia in the nineteenth century tended to concentrate on more specifically “military 
knowledge”; and the greater the distance from the enlightened ideas of the 1808 reform, the 
more this development moved in this direction. This “military knowledge” comprised not 
only specific skills such as map drawing, fortification or knowledge in weaponry, but in 
general strategy and tactics as well. Together with the aforementioned topics, military history 
was also taught. Apart from the transmission of a very rudimentary level of “general history” 
(wherein political arguments were cautiously avoided), military history took centre stage, and 
“wars and battles” were analysed using an applicatory approach as a means to find clues on 
how to ensure “future success”: “History became the prolegomena for tactics and strategy.”
816
 
4.4.2 The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
The lowest rank of the officer corps in southern Italy was the “alfiere” (from Spanish alférez, 
and from Arabic al-faris, for knight). According to the 1828 rules governing promotions, one-
third of the vacancies in the rank of the “Alfieri” were to be filled by cadets, royal guards 
(military bodyguards), and those nominated by the king. These formed the so-called “terzo di 
grazia”, or the “third of grace” that lay at the complete discretion of the monarch. The other 
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two thirds were to be extracted from the group of sergeants in service (hence the non-
commissioned officers in British terminology, or “Sottufficiali” in Italian, and 
“Unteroffiziere” in German) on the condition they took an apposite exam. Since 1835, it 
seems that two exams were necessary, the first to denote the passage from sergeant to adjutant 
(“aiutante”) - the equivalent to the “ensign with sword-knot” in Prussia – and the second to 
denote the passage between adjutant and alfiere.
817
 
According to one manual, however, the examination strictly concentrated on 
knowledge necessary for service in the respective grade. The candidates were responsible for 
knowing the rules of the very detailed (see the analysis of this regulation in chapter 7) general 
service regulation
818
: in the first exam they had to know, in particular, the rules regarding the 
service obligations of the adjutant, in the second they were expected to know those of the 
officer while on campaign. The candidates were also expected to know increasing portions of 
the regulations on training (only some chapters were required in the first exam, and more 
were required for the second) and were expected to complete a progressively difficult 
examination “on the ground”; furthermore, candidates taking the second exam were 
responsible for knowledge of “plane geometry”, the “solution of arithmetic problems”, of 




Further promotions in the officer corps were normally given out on the basis of 
seniority (hence the amount of time an individual had passed in the rank immediately below). 
But there were two important exceptions: First, as in many other armies, the passage from 
captain to major, the “major’s corner” (“Majorsecke”) was dictated by an exam. And like in 
Prussia, this exam was not only based on the knowledge of the candidate, but also on “the 
moral, political and military conduct” of the future majors.
820
 Second, the king reserved the 
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right to nominate the generals; hence “seniority does not give any right to be promoted into 
the class of generals.”
821
  
4.4.3 Prussia and southern Italy compared 
When the two cases of Prussia and the Two Sicilies are looked at together, two 
“professionalizing” developments may be seen: First, the importance of examinations was 
increasing. In some cases these exams were held before commissions that included external 
members – i.e. external to the military corps to which the examinee belonged. Generally 
speaking, the higher the vacant rank, the more external members there are in the committees. 
These external members were brought in from different corps, or from the centrally 
instituted military schools and academies; at times they even came from outside the military 
sphere. For instance, in the Two Sicilies in 1815, a professor of mathematics of the University 
of Naples was included on the commission that was formed to examine future officers of the 
General Staff.
822
 Second, at least for a portion of the soldiers, the importance of military 
educational institutions was on the rise. This began to compete with the traditional education 
of soldiers and officers, which occurred in situ in the regiments and corps themselves. 
Sometimes intermediate solutions were evident, such as the divisional schools in Prussia, 
where the examination was held at a school of a division that was different from the 
candidate’s and before a “provincial examination committee.”
823
 
But there were decisive differences as well. The Prussian ensigns seem to have been 
more formally educated than their southern Italian colleagues. At least this is what surfaces 
when the regulations on the entrance exam for the Prussian ensigns (that is, for a post that still 
falls below the group of officers) of 1844 is compared with the list of topics for the exam to 
become an alfiere (hence, the lowest rank in the officer corps) in the Two Sicilies (in the two-
thirds portion of the contingent subject to the tests). In the latter, neither French nor Latin, 
neither geography nor history were requisites of the exams. Only in the cadet corps, the 
“Nunziatella”, i.e. the Royal Military College (Real Collegio Militare) in Naples was this kind 
of knowledge included in the educational programme. Here, in 1833, even the German 
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language was included in the curriculum.
824
 But the pupils from the Nunziatella would 
constitute only one third of all of the alfieri.  
On this basis it seems fair to conclude that in terms of formal education, many 
Prussian soldiers were more advanced in comparison with their counterparts in southern Italy. 
They were also educationally advanced in comparison to the officer candidates in other 
German states, such as Bavaria. This was the case despite the fact that in Prussia – as 
elsewhere – portions of the nobility had mobilized against giving the officers too much 
“bourgeois”, “Gymnasium”–esque education, since this would improve the chances that the 
“bourgeoisie” would rise in the ranks in comparison to parts of the nobility, which by contrast 
were very poorly educated.
825
 Apart from the general stereotypes on the “national” military 
character, the issue of education was an argument within the Italian context of hiring Prussian 
and “German” officers.  
For the German officers, the Italian service was a good way to bridge gaps in their 
career ladder. The future papal Minister of Arms Hermann Kanzler had entered the Baden 
cadet corps after secondary schooling, but his Baden military career was interrupted in 1843 
due to reasons related to his Catholic beliefs. In the Papal Army he could continue with his 
military career and eventually reached the highest post. Similarly, the papal officer Franz 
Xaver von Korff was – together with his two brothers – dismissed from the Prussian army, 
where he had served for four years, because he had refused a duel. The continuation of 
military careers in foreign armies was facilitated by many factors. There were similarities in 
the entry and promotion procedures in the German and Italian officer corps as established in 
the formal regulations on military ranking, and therefore enabled the relatively easy transition 
from one army to another. The knowledge of French was a sort of ticket into an international 
military world, i.e. the world of European military notables. This was because French was the 
lingua franca not only at the courts but for military exercises as well (the abundance of French 
words of command used in many European armies is proof enough); it was also the language 
that German officers learned at school and at their military educational institutions. The 
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continuation of careers was especially eased by specific regulations governing the transition. 
For instance, in the rules on seniority in the papal foreigners’ corps, foreigners retained their 
“foreign” military rank upon joining and were inserted into their own seniority systems. 
4.4.4 Stereotypes on national “military character” 
The differences in formal education, however, added to a kind of “Prussian” and/or “German” 
“military myth”. Since the eighteenth century the image of a purportedly “Prussian” or 
“German” prerogative for order took root. This myth was fuelled by the “success” of the 
armies of Frederic II
826
 and the “old Prussian drill”
827
 as well as by the stereotypical ideas that 
circulated with regard to different national characters. A purportedly “German” sense for 
subordination and discipline was a rather common belief in southern Italy for instance. 
Already in 1760, the Duke S. Arpino Alonso Sanchez de la Luna refuted the “French” and the 
“German” military model. According to him, the “Alemanni” were “of a relaxed, suffering, 
subordinated mind, which makes them tolerate any rigorous discipline in such a way that they 
form a law out of the commands of their superiors, and a hint of these suffices, that they obey 
immediately. Therefore they can be directed and guided by a few officers.”
828
 The military 
reforms devised by John Acton in the 1780s, who was invited to Naples by Maria Carolina of 
Austria, were seen from this perspective in 1785 and considered to be too “German”. They 
were “right” for the supposedly typical “German” inclination toward obedience, but would 
not work for southern Italians.
829
 These military stereotypes lay at the heart of national 
stereotypes more in general. Furthermore, as is quite often the case, they did not change much 
over time. Many military authors and leaders of the 1860s and 1870s in Italy resorted to 
consolidated German-Italian auto- and hetero-stereotypes that were strikingly similar to those 
used by Arpino many decades ago. For a series of military leaders and politicians in this 
period, Christoph Berger Waldenegg has shown that many placed emphasize on what they 
saw as being the “calmness” of the Prussian-German population and its soldiers, as well as 
characteristics such as “order, obedience, discipline, sense of duty, assiduity and precision”.
830
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How different, instead, according to the same contemporary authors, the “nature” of the 
members of the “Latin race”. According to the report of the former Garibaldian, and now 
Italian officer Enrico Cosenz on his travels to Prussia and Austria in 1868, the French were 
“more enthusiastic”, while the Prussians were “more disciplined”; similarly, the Prussian was 
rather “cold”, and the French “vivacious”.
831
 Comparably, the Italian General and Minister of 
War (in 1867) Genova Giovanni Thaon di Revel, wrote of the “spiritedness” and “vivacity” of 
the Italian character.
832
 Precisely due to this “belief” in the difference between “national 
characters”, there was significant hesitation as to whether elements of the Prussian military 
order could or should be “imported" to Italy. At the same time, there was also some 
“discomfort, a notable aversion when the German ‘national mentality’ came up”.
833
 
Nevertheless, for instance, Garibaldi asserted at the beginning of the expedition of the 
Thousand, that the “Italian nation still lacks discipline”
834
, while in a report on the “crusaders” 
of the Pope in 1867 in the Catholic periodical “Civiltà Cattolica”, the Bavarian Bach was 
described as being “cool” as well as having “shot in the Prussian way.”
835
 
These military facets of national stereotypes very much informed the motivations of 
the Italian sides that were hiring. The revolutionary Sicilian government tried to attract 
officers and soldiers with some military experience from abroad, not only to fill the gaps in 
the Sicilian Army, but to provide the newly recruited soldiers with an example: “A good 
backbone of veterans hired abroad among the most bellicose and free nations of Europe, and 
introduced into the young army, would have given solidity and alignment to the columns; it 
would have provided excellent heads of columns at need; and it would have created a valuable 
model of discipline and subordination.”
836
 Similarly, Filippo de Boni, who was sent by the 
Roman Republic to Switzerland, perceived the Swiss to be “practically unique in terms of 
instruction and rapid disciplining”
837
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Foreign soldiers were sought out on all sides, and this for a variety of reasons. 
Stereotypes of national military character dictated many of the choices on the hiring side. At 
the same time, armies wanted especially experienced soldiers, even if they had acquired that 
experience in “regular” armies. Especially on the pro-Unitarian side, foreign officers were 
sought out because it was believed they would help to circumvent problems that might arise 
due to the more “irregular” character of the pro-Unitarian armed groups. Foreigners were 
wanted to help train and “discipline” not just the Italians in general, but those that had less 
military experience in particular. These processes were bound to what was sometimes quite a 
desperate necessity on the part of some Germans to find foreign military employment, and 
their Italian careers were partially based on a conscious “brain-drain” to Italy. 
4.4.5 “Wanted” across the political divides: Experienced soldiers and officers 
This quest for (foreign) military expertise was already present in the democratic political 
environments of the 1830s, despite the more radically differing ideas on military organization 
in general.
838
 This desire for military experts was noted (with some irony) by the German-
Danish poet Harro-Paul Harring, who participated in Mazzini’s unsuccessful “Invasion of 
Savoy” in 1834:  
“The patriots in the interior of Italy seemed to want a glorious name leading their movement; 
especially the militaries. Dazzled by the prejudice of the epaulette, if one may say so, they 
absolutely wanted to see a man marching at the head of their tricolour banner whose name 
was already renowned by some feats of arms. [T]hey wanted a name that was not only famous 
in the military annals, but also chivalrous and romantic.”
839
  
In 1848, the brothers Nicola and Paolo Fabrizi recruited roughly 1,000 French soldiers 
for the Sicilian government, among which approximately 700 were from the “mobile troops 
of the French National Guard”, despite the fact that they had “participated actively in the 
suppression of the workers’ insurrections in June 1848.” According to Anne-Claire Ignace, 
this “does not seem to have been an obstacle for the Sicilian commissars, who were eager to 
recruit troops that were already organized and ready for combat. As soon as he heard that 
several of this guard’s battalions were to be disbanded, Paolo Fabrizi decided to recruit 
massively many ex-members of this corps, who were already fully equipped.”
840
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As the registers of the foreign corps of the Papal Army reveal
841
, many soldiers had 
previously served in their national armies, or with the French Foreign Legion in Algeria or 
Mexico, before entering papal service. On the legitimist side, not only did many officers that 
had engaged in the planning of the pro-Bourbon guerrilla resistance have previous military 
education and military experience in the field but so did those who actually fought together 
with the “brigands”. One such example is the German-Austrian Ludwig Richard 
Zimmermann who had been a cadet and officer in the Austrian Army for six years before 
joining the anti-Bourbon “volunteers”.
842
  
The same could be said with regard to the opposite political side. In the case of the 
French soldiers in Sicily in 1848, many had previously experienced combat, according to 
Ignace, especially in Algeria.
843
  
Algeria, in particular, was a complicated nexus of mobility where the political, 
economic and military aspects of Mediterranean and global geographies intertwined all 
together. The port cities, as international nodes of transport, played a crucial role in bringing 
these layers together. A good example is Marseille in France, which was an important harbour 
for all sides: the pro-Unitary forces, the pro-Bourbon activities of the 1860s
844
, but also for 
French colonialism. Due to its positive legislation on exile, France became one of the main 
destinations for European refugees after the revolutions of the 1830s. Many in exile passed 
through Marseille on their way to other destinations in the Mediterranean Sea, especially the 
islands. Marseille, however, was also intimately linked with the French conquest of Algeria 
from 1830 onwards. Not only did many merchants pass through this node, but also the French 
military forces on their way to the Algerian campaigns. The French Foreign Legion, which 
was to be prominently engaged in Algeria, was created within this context. It was created in 
1831 to ”get rid” of the refugees that had arrived in 1830, “by sending them abroad as 
members of the French army.”
845
 Algeria would come to be in “the next 130 years [… the] 
spiritual home” of the Legion.
846
 Together with the French Zouaves, which had been initially 
recruited from the Berber tribes; the Chasseurs d’Afrique, a French cavalry corps; and French 
line regiments, the Foreign Legion was engaged in the Algerian enterprise, which led to the 
victory against Abd al-Qadir in 1847. It was not by chance that the revolutionary government 
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of Sicily, as well as the Papal States, gave precedence to recruitment among the French 
colonial troops, which after 1847 had become to a certain extent dispensable to France. 
Johann Philipp Becker in the spring of 1849 tried to form an expedition for the Roman 
Republic from Marseille. According to Ignace, Paolo Fabrizi “organized a recruitment 




4.5 Pay and Provisions 
Most of the armed groups in this study offered not only regular wages but various other 
elements that added to the income of their soldiers and officers.  
4.5.1 Pay in the Papal Army 
A contract was stipulated between every new recruit and the Papal Army. Until 1860, the 
duration of the contract was for four years with the possibility to renew and therefore to re-
engage. After 1860, different enlistment periods were allowed. Foreigners could, for instance, 
choose to enlist in the corps of the Papal Zouaves for as little as six months.
848
 In the case of 
the “carabinieri esteri”, a new regulation passed in 1869 established that enlistments could be 
for one, two or four years with the possibility to renew enlistment.
849
 The recruit signed this 
contract in the recruitment office abroad (e.g., in Feldkirch or Saint-Louis). Between 1852 
and 1866, the common soldier, the non-commissioned officer or corporal, but not the regular 
officer
850
, upon signing already received their enlistment premium. This was set at 30 Roman 
scudi, which was equivalent (in 1861) to roughly 160 Italian Lire with a purchasing power of 
approximately 390 kilogrammes of bread or about 183 kilogrammes of bovine meat.
851
 20 of 
these 30 scudi had to be paid immediately to the recruit in the recruitment office after he 
signed the contract. The remaining 10 scudi was the soldier’s individual fund for basic 
clothing and shoes. But he also received an extra payment for clothing of 0.017 scudi a day, 
amounting to a maximum individual fund of not more than 14 scudi. The fact that the soldier 
was obliged to pay out of this fund for this basic equipment and any necessary repairs 
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incentivised him to take care of his belongings so that he would have this money left over 
when his term of service expired. In any case, at the end of every trimester, the eventual sum 
of money exceeding 14 scudi was paid out to the soldier (Art. 82). Upon regular termination 
of service, the soldier could take with him this amount of basic clothing and shoes (Art. 83), if 
they were still usable, in addition to the amount of outer wear (winter coat or tunic, pair of 
trousers and a cleaning set) that were granted to every soldier, whose termination was in 
conformity, independently of the balance of his individual mass (Art. 142); a basic set of 
civilian clothing (vestiario borghese) was allocated even to soldiers that were expelled from 
service. In the event of his death, the soldier’s basic clothing was passed to his legitimate 
heirs (Art. 84). Therefore, by being careful with clothing, a soldier could hope to improve his 
or his heirs’ situation, as well as taking with him a bigger amount of clothing.  
From the time the recruit reached his respective regiment in Italy he received wages 
according to his rank (see table 4.1 on p. 207 below). The purely quantitative indication of a 
soldier’s pay in the tables, however, masks some important facts. Making a simple monetary 
comparison between pay as expressed in lire is only indicative, given that the cost of life 
differed considerably from Italian region to region. In 1862, for instance, in the north of Italy 
the price for one kg of bread varied between 0.33 cents in Turin to 0.42 cents in Milan
852
, 
whereas the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istituto nazionale della statistica, ISTAT) 
in its “150 years” series notes that the average for Italy was 0.39 lire per kg.
853
  
In addition to money, every soldier from sergeant major downward was, in times of 
peace, provided with a daily ration of 24 Roman ounces (oncie romane), i.e. roughly 650g of 
standard bread
854
; an additional portion of food was added in times of war
855
, and from the 
narrations of papal soldiers we know that coffee was distributed to them in the morning.  
The tables below reflect wages in peacetime: The second column shows the respective 
pay in monetary units (lire) and the third the equivalent of that pay in kg of bread. The fourth 
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column gives the sum of daily wages and daily provisions of bread converted into monetary 
units (lire) and the fifth the equivalent of this sum in kg of bread. Taking into account that 
bread was provided by the military administration only for the subordinate levels, in the 
fourth and fifth column their pay in monetary units and in kg of bread is 6 baiocchi (0.319 
lira) higher, or some 700g of bread more (this is in fact the quantity of bread that could be 
purchased with 6 baiocchi according to the price statistics available). 
Table 4.1 - Daily pay for foreign soldiers in the papal army in 1852
856
 















kg of bread 
Colonel 
(colonnello) 
15.072 37.067 15.072 37.067 
Major 
(maggiore) 
10.640 26.168 10.640 26.168 
Sergeant 
(sergente) 
0.578 1.420 0.904 2.224 
Corporal 
(caporale) 
0.319 0.785 0.638 1.570 
Common soldier 
(comune) 
0.160 0.393 0.479 1.178 
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Table 4.2 - Daily pay for soldiers in the “indigenous infantry” of the Papal Army in 1845
857
 















kg of bread 
Colonel 
(colonnello) 




11.375 27.976 11.375 27.976 
Major 
(maggiore) 
9.188 22.596 9.188 22.596 
Sergeant 
(sergente) 
0.692 1.701 0.851 2.093 
Corporal 
(caporale) 








0.266 0.654 0.426 1.047 
 
In order to get an idea of how attractive these kinds of wages were, the following table 
provides several examples of workers’ and journeymen’s wages in Italian and German cities 
at the time so that it is possible to make a comparison with the pay of the lower ranks of 
soldiers, and for civil servants in Prussia and so that the comparison may be made with the 
pay given to officers. 
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Table 4.3 – Several daily wages in Italy and Germany in the mid-nineteenth century 
Place Occupation Year(s) Daily pay in Lire 
Varano (Como) Cotton weaver 1847 0.67 – 1.20
858
 
Milan Mason (Master) 1847 1.0 – 1.75
859
 





Essen/Germany/Krupp Iron foundry worker 1850 1.54
861
 














It is important to note, however, that enlistment premiums and regular pay were only 
one part of a soldier’s income. In addition to these, there were many conditions in which they 
were paid a supplement: such as when they were garrisoned in the city of Rome, at the 
seaside, or when they were in a war campaign.  
4.5.2 Pay in the Roman Republic 1849 
During the defence of the Roman Republic, soldiers of the two components of the Republican 
Army, the “regular” and the “volunteer” forces, (some of the latter under the command of 
Garibaldi, had the right to regular pay by the republican government.
865
 Due to the lack of 
coinage the pay was at times made in paper money, especially toward the end of the Republic. 
The daily wages (without supplements) to be paid out to the ranks, from sergeant major 
downwards to the simple soldier, were more or less a continuation of the previous practices 
carried out under the Papal Army. The “National Guards” and Garibaldi’s legionnaires were 
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basically paid the same way the papal soldiers had been: A caporal was paid 11 baiocchi 
(0.585 lire) per day in all three corps (the papal infantry of 1845, Garibaldi’s “legione 
italiana” 1848/1849, and the “guardia nazionale” of 1849), a sergeant received 16 baiocchi 
(0.851 lire), while the common soldier in the National Guard with his 9 baiocchi (0.479 lire) 
received one baiocco more than the 8 baiocchi (0.426 lire) per day that was paid in the Papal 
Army of 1845 and in the Garibaldian Legion. The Garibaldian legionnaires were still 
receiving extra pay in December 1848 for being on the march (“indennità di via” or 
“indennità di viaggio”), which also corresponded to the practices that had been upheld in the 
Papal Army. After 29 April, all soldiers that were engaged in the defence of the Republic, 
whether in the volunteer brigades or in the regular army received the customary extra pay for 
being in a war campaign of daily 5 baiocchi (0.266 lira). After 26 May until the end of the 
Republic at the beginning of July, the daily pay of sergeant majors down to the common 
soldier was again increased by 3 baiocchi (0.160 lira).  
Table 4.4 - Daily pay for soldiers in the “National Guard” of the Roman Republic in 1849 















kg of bread 
Colonel 
(colonnello) 




10.500 25.824 10.500 25.824 
Major 
(maggiore) 
7.875 19.368 7.875 19.368 
Sergant 
(sergente) 
0.692 1.701 0.851 2.093 
Corporal 
(caporale) 
0.426 1.047 0.585 1.439 
Common soldier 
(comune) 




Table 4.5 - Daily pay for soldiers in the Garibaldian “Italian Legion” in 1848/49 















kg of bread 
Major 
(maggiore) 
7.501 18.449 7.501 18.449 
Lieutnant 
(tenente) 
2.899 7.131 2.899 7.131 
Sergeant 
(sergente) 
0.692 1.701 0.8512 2.093 
Corporal 
(caporale) 
0.426 1.047 0.585 1.439 
Common soldier 
(comune) 
0.266 0.654 0.426 1.047 
 
When it became clear that the fall of the Republic was imminent, toward the end of 
June 1849, the idea was cultivated to continue the fight outside the eternal city’s walls, 
“bringing the insurrection to the provinces” that had not been occupied by the French troops. 
Garibaldi held a speech in St. Peter’s Square on 2 July 1849, regarding this plan; it was “his 
best and by far most famous”
866
, of which one version goes as follows:  
“Soldiers who with me have shared until now the toils and dangers of patriotic battles, who 
obtained rich rewards of glory and honour: all you who now choose exile with me, this is 
what awaits you: heat and thirst by day, cold and hunger by night. For you there is no pay but 
toil and danger, no roof, no rest, but absolute poverty, exhausting vigils, extreme marches, 
and fighting at every step. Who loves Italy follow me!”
867
 
There is some controversy regarding the exact words used by Garibaldi, however, 
because, as Giuseppe Guerzoni has written in a critical footnote, “it was most probably never 
written down by anyone. At any rate, every biographer has fabricated the contents of this 
speech as he has liked [...]. The only phrase on which all concur, and which is vivid in the 
Garibaldian tradition, is: ‘I offer hunger, thirst, forced marches, battles and death’.”
868
 Be this 
as it may, the passage that there would be no pay for the soldiers who chose to follow 
Garibaldi does not seem to conform to the ensuing reality, i.e. that the soldiers were paid – 
albeit not much and not regularly, but nevertheless on the basis of a capitulation that 
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established a fixed sum of daily pay. Gustav von Hoffstetter, who followed Garibaldi until the 
beginning of August, wrote down his doubts, “given the not particularly advantageous 
conditions of capitulation for the soldiers and how these were in fact effectuated, not many 
would decide to join a march after two months of fighting […].” Later on, Hoffstetter 
described the funds the Garibaldian troops had with them: “Our war chest contained just 
enough paper money to pay the troops for about four weeks.”
869
 In fact, historian and Roman 
archivist Hermann Loevinson reports that according to the archival material, on 1 July, a total 
of 12,000 Roman scudi (63,840 lire) – even if only, it seems, in paper money – were paid to 
the quartermaster of the legion for the soldiers’ wages and the confection of clothes. Of this 
sum only 300 scudi were left after the departure of the Garibaldian soldiers on the evening of 
2 July, and therefore were repaid by the quartermaster to the military revenue office of the 
army.
870
 The paper money the Garibaldians had with them upon leaving Rome, according to 
Hoffstetter, surely came from this source. However, according to an Italian legionnaire, pay 
was not regular, at least not at the end of the campaign in early August.
871
 
4.5.3 Pay in the Garibaldian campaigns between 1859 and 1867 
With regard to the Garibaldian campaign in 1859, in May the decree of formation of the 
Cacciatori delle Alpi, established an enlistment period of one year. A decree established that 
the wages of both soldiers and officers would be based on the pay of the infantry in the 
Piedmontese Army.
872
 According to the tariffs of 1851, for instance, a common soldier in the 
infantry of Piedmont was paid 0.40 Lira a day, a caporal 0.55 and a sergeant 1.00 Lira.
873
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Table 4.6 - Daily pay for soldiers in the infantry of the Piedmontese Army in 1860 

















The issue of payment is a bit more complicated in the case of the Garibaldian southern 
campaign of one year later. A major problem lay in the fact that in the available sources the 
sums of payment are recorded in different currencies and types of coins. Furthermore, the pay 
is sometimes noted with the name of a coin that had a different value in Sicily than on the 
mainland: the “tari”, which was one-tenth of a ducat in Sicily, but one-fifth on the mainland.  
At least until 1 June 1860 the usual wage paid to the soldier seems to have been of 2 
Sicilian tari, which was equivalent to roughly 0.76 – 0.85 lire including food, or about 1 
Sicilian tari, or the equivalent to roughly 0.38 – 0.425 lire excluding food. According to some 
authors, the first “Thousand” all received the same pay of 45 grana with food and 25 grana 
without food. But the conversion must be discussed: Some convert the 45 grana to 0.85 
lire
879
; on the basis of the official rates of exchange, however, since the introduction of the 
decimal system, 45 grana actually had the value of about 1.91 lire, and 25 grana were equal to 
about 1.06 lire. This conversion seems to be more in line with those authors that have stressed 
that “to a good degree, the officers contented themselves to receive, despite the food received 
in kind, only two francs a day”
880
 – according to the Latin monetary union, then, officers 
received 2 lire a day, the franc being equal to the lira.
881
 Similar numbers were given, for 
instance, by Rüstow, who speaks of the difference in pay between officers and common 
soldiers, and notes the former received “2 francs” a day plus the rations in kind, which were 
worth roughly 70 lira cents, reaching therefore a total of 2.70 lire daily.
882
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expedition from Genoa, similar pay was noted for others as well: for instance one Bourbon 
source writes on the expedition from Livorno on 6 May 1860 that “every volunteer was paid a 




From these sources, hence, it is clear that the pay was most probably not the same for 
officers and common soldiers. Moreover, some leading officers, such as Rüstow himself, had 
negotiated individual pay and pensions.  
Furthermore, the sums that were actually paid out are only one side of the story. The 
other was that quite early on the official right to pay was equated with that in the Piedmontese 
Army. Already by 11 June (so one month after the landing in Marsala), a decree in the name 
of “Italy and Vittorio Emmanuele” was issued in Palermo by Garibaldi as “Commander-in-
Chief of the National Forces in Sicily”, granting the officers – from 1 June onwards – the 
same pay as that of the Piedmontese Army, but established that they were to be paid only half 
of the sum during the campaign, and the second half only at war’s end.
884
 At the same time, 
the non-commissioned officers saw a pay increase; the officers, instead, “for the expenses for 
entering the campaign”, were also to receive “one month of pay” extra.
885
 Seven days later, 
another decree stated that the extra pay for being “in campaign” as well as the quantity of 
food supplied “correspondent to the different ranks” would be that which was established in 
the Piedmontese military legislation.
886
 At the end of June, another decree brought all 
payments, food rations and extra payments –for the common soldiers and officers alike – 
“entirely” into alignment with the norms of the Piedmontese Army. On 22 November 1860, 
yet another decree stated that the officers could henceforth request the half of the Piedmontese 
pay that had not been handed out to them in June.
887
 And finally on 12 November 1860 an 
order of the day established that whoever did not want to continue the military career in the 
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Piedmontese Army could leave with a final gratification of three months (for the soldiers and 
non-commissioned officers) or six months of pay (for the officers).
888
  
Hence, according to the legal sources, wage payments for the southern army in 1860 
initially differed from that of the Piedmontese Army, but seemed to converge toward the latter 
as the end of the campaign approached. Especially in the first month of the campaign in 
Sicily, many were paid – at least for the time being – according to a simple, dual distinction 
between soldiers and officers. In the following months, however, at least legally, the rules of 
payment gradually aligned to those of the Piedmontese Army, even if in June officers could 
only “pocket” half of their pay; nevertheless, they continued to retain their right to full 
Piedmontese payment. The point is that many contemporary sources tend to tell only “half” of 
the story, underlining the conditions of the first month in particular, and insinuating that 
soldiers and officers had contented themselves with “meagre” pay.  
How many, however, really were “content” with their pay, and how many chose to 
renounce part or all of their promised money? To answer these questions, is much more 
difficult than reporting the legal situation described above. In terms of actual payments during 
the campaign, we know that they were made quite irregularly. 
Rüstow reports that – at least in his division, i.e. the 15
th
 (Stefan Türr), “for a time it 
was actually not even possible to pay the officers, so that some of them, who had not brought 
with them from Genoa some savings, would have suffered real shortages without comradely 
help.”
889
 The situation was even worse for the common soldiers. They were paid very 
unregularly, and payments depended very much on the course of the campaign.  
The initial “Thousand”, for instance, seem to have been paid in Genoa before taking to 
sea and then were paid their first wage in Sicily already on 11 May.
890
 It seems the pay was 
deducted from the first requisitions of money in Sicily: While the first expedition had 
departed from Quarto with a cash reserve of 94,000 lire
891
, already on 11 May, the city 
treasury of Marsala, totalling 890.45 ducati (equivalent to 3,784.41 lire) was handed over to 
the Garibaldian Francesco Crispi.
892
 Some historians of the “Anti-Risorgimento” believe this 
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document, signed by Crispi in the name of the “provisional government” and some municipal 
authorities of Marsala – like the subsequent requisitions of money that were made on the 
island – to be a strategy to cloak in a semblance of official conduct what, from a legitimist 
standpoint, was and is considered the continuous robbery of municipal and public treasuries in 
Sicily and Calabria on the part of the Garibaldians. Gigi di Fiore’s observation – that the 
document from Marsala “seemed to be a normal transfer to an already constituted authority. 




Even later, the activities of the Garibaldian Army in southern Italy continued to be 
fuelled not only by the money collected by associations throughout Europe, but also in great 
part by money requisitioned (or “lent”) from the treasuries of Sicilian and Calabrian cities or 
from Bourbon governmental funds, such as the mint of Palermo. Francesco Crispi, nominated 
Secretary of State on 17 May, dedicated much of his work to the aim, described by his 
relative Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi, to “dispossess the legal government of public funds, 
making them flow into the purse of the Revolution.”
894
 As George Trevelyan has noted, of the 
money collected from Agostino Bertani, the cashier of the central committee created to aid 
Garibaldi, five-sixths were in fact transferred to him by Garibaldi from Sicily. This last took 
the money for the most part from the Mint in Palermo (zecca di Palermo): “In this way Sicily 
was made to pay for the liberation of Naples as the price of its own liberation […].”
895
 
In the subsequent campaign of 1862, however, such cash flows to the Garibaldians did 
not exist; consequently, soldiers and officers, who this time were to have identical pay, were 
not paid at all it seems.
896
 In 1867, payments were equally difficult to manage, while before, 
in 1866, due to the official link to the Piedmontese Army, the situation was similar to what it 
was in 1859. 
In sum, in terms of payment there are decisive differences between the various 
Garibaldian campaigns. In campaigns that were directly linked to regular armies – in 1849, 
1859 and 1867 – at least from the legal official point of view, wages were oriented along the 
lines of the tariffs established for the infantry of the regular armies. The southern army of 
1860 constitutes, in terms of payment and in other regards as well, a kind of midpoint 
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between regularity and irregularity. But even in the campaigns of 1862 and 1867 regular pay 
was at least initially foreseen. In 1862, of note is the particularly interesting decision to pay 
the same rate to officers and common soldiers. The actual payments, however, depended very 
much on the financial circumstances. However, it was not uncommon during campaigns of 
the time that wages were not paid regularly and that food was often in short supply; this in 




4.5.4 Foreign and indigenous soldiers treated differently 
Apart from individual negotiated pay, in the Garibaldian armed groups Italian and foreign 
soldiers ought to have been paid in the same way. This was different for instance in the 
Bourbon Army and the Papal Army (up to 1866): The respective laws for the institution of the 
foreigners’ corps had set tariffs that were often higher than those for the indigenous 
regiments. In the Papal Army, according to the law of 1852, for instance the pay including 
food was higher for all ranks in the foreigners’ corps than in the indigenous regiments. 
Table 4.7 – Daily pay for soldiers of the indigenous and foreigners’ corps in the Papal 
Army 
Rank Indigenous – with 
comestibles in Lire 
Foreign – with comestibles in 
Lire 
Colonel (colonnello) 14.000 15.072 
Major (maggiore) 9.188 10.640 
Sergeant (sergente) 0.851 0.904 
Corporal (caporale) 0.585 0.638 
Common soldier (comune) 0.426 0.479 
 
Still, in 1864, a simple soldier in the corps of the Carabinieri esteri was paid one 
bajocco (roughly 5 lire cents) more than his indigenous, papal counterpart.
898
 These 
differences in pay were well known to the non-foreign soldiers of the armies. Protests against 
this “injustice” led finally, in the papal case, to a pay alignment. On 21 June 1866, as part of 
the celebrations of the 20
th
 anniversary of his coronation, Pius IX declared in an order of the 
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day: “A vivid desire, often shown by the indigenous troops”, writes the papal Minister of 
Arms, Hermann Kanzler in 1867, “was to be treated in terms of pay and accessories equally 
as the foreign troops and His Holiness, ceding to the impulses of his heart, notwithstanding 
the restrictions of the state finances, has, the 21 June 1866 […] deigned to satisfy them 
fully.”
899
 The better regulations on pensions and “jubilees” (“giubilazioni”) of the foreign 
regiments, however, remained in vigour, as an apposite decree of the Minister of Arms some 
months later made clear.
900
  
In the Bourbon Army, the former Swiss regiments were traditionally treated better 
than the indigenous troops
901
, and the same may be said of the newly established “foreigners’ 
regiments”. Here, the differences in pay were even more accentuated than they were in the 
Papal Army. 
Table 4.8 - Comparison between the pay of indigenous and foreign soldiers and officers in 
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies
902
 
Rank Daily pay in Lire 
indigenous soldiers/officers 
Daily pay in Lire foreign 
soldiers/officers 
Colonel (colonnello) 13.24 29.47 
Lieutnant colonel (tenente 
colonnello) 
9.60 19.97 
Major (maggiore) 8.20 14.77 
Corporal (caporale) 0.64 1.13 





4.5.5 Incentives to stay 
The simple regular pay was however only a part of the payments soldiers received. As 
aforementioned, there were many situations in which soldiers were paid extra 
(“soprassoldo”), in times of peace or during war campaigns. In the Papal and Bourbon 
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Armies, there were many kinds of supplements: those for being in specific places (Rome, the 
seaside, etc.), for being on the march or travelling, or during Malaria outbreaks, for specific 
duties (in Rome for service during carnival for instance, or in Rome and Naples for 
ceremonial functions such as guards of honour), or sums paid on specific occasions (dynastic 
and papal anniversaries). At least the supplements typical for war campaigns were also paid to 
the Garibaldians in 1849, 1859, 1860 and 1866. 
Furthermore, in the regular armies some of these supplements were added or related to 
sophisticated systems of pensions. What is important to note here is that many of these 
retributive solutions were used as a means to encourage or incentivize the soldiers to stay in 
the respective army as long as possible.  
When a soldier served in the foreigners’ corps of the Papal Army for a long period, he 
would be paid an extra daily sum linked to his rank and the number of years served: this 
ranged between 0.25 baiocchi for a common soldier after 12 years of service and 3 baiocchi 
for a non-commissioned officer after 24 years of service. Another incentive to stay had to do 
with the complicated pension system established in the Papal Army. Pensions for foreign 
soldiers, slightly better than for the indigenous troops
903
, ranged from the “discharge” 
(congedo) to the “jubilee” (giubilazione) to, finally, “pensions” (pensioni). In the Papal Army, 
this last term was only used to indicate payments to heirs of a defunct soldier.  
A certain amount of money was deducted from the daily regular wage payment, which 
went to create a fund for “jubilations and pensions”. For high-ranking soldiers, who were paid 
monthly, 6% was taken from their pay. For the soldiers who were paid on a daily basis, 5 
baiocchi a month was deducted from their individual fund for basic clothing. After having 
completed a minimum of 8 years of service, the whole sum that had been set aside for the 
payments to the jubilations’ and pensions’ fund was given to the lower-ranking soldiers that 
chose to regularly leave the Papal Army at the end of their contracted time. This amount was 
the “discharge” premium (if everything was in order, a minimum sum of 4.80 scudi, with a 
purchasing power of 62kg of bread, would be allotted). The next level in the pensions system 
was the “jubilee”. This was a life-long pension given to the soldier: for foreigners (except 
officers) this accrued after 20 years of service (and for indigenous soldiers this was 30 years); 
only in the event the soldier had been permanently wounded was it possible to receive the 
“jubilee” pension before 20 years of service had been completed (with up to a third of the 
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respective regular pay). After the normally necessary 20 years of uninterrupted service, the 
“jubilee” pension reached half the normal pay, after 25 two-thirds was paid, and after 30 years 
the entire wage was paid. Similarly, in case of a partial or total discharge of the foreign 
regiments by the papal government, the same proportions of pay constituted the pensions of 
“reform” for the officer (with one-fifth under 10 years of service up to the entire pay after 30 
years of service) or for the lower ranks (only after 10 years of service, with one-fourth of pay 
plus a single payment of 2 months of pay for the journey home); in the event of governmental 
discharge before 10 years of service had been completed, the lower ranks were to get 12 
months of pay in one payment without any further pension. It was hence very important in 
monetary terms how a soldier was actually discharged: The best option was always to be 
dismissed “by reform”, because this meant the mentioned sum of money had to be given; 
according to the soldiers’ registers of the Papal Army, a very high number of soldiers left the 
army due to “reform”.  
The “jubilee” or similar “reform” pensions, however, were only payable when the 
soldier, irrespective of his rank, lived in the Papal States or in his home country and when he 
received no other payments for services to other governments except his own. In other words: 
these pensions were not dependent on the age of the soldier, but were paid only when he had 
received no other income from another army – this was also true for the Bourbon Army.
904
 
Pension payments were made through the offices of the state treasury (“cassa 
camerale”) in Rome or other places of the Papal States. The soldier was obliged to organize 
the withdrawal and eventual transfer of the money to the place he lived (Art. 149). Finally, 
what in the laws was called “pension”, was only the payment to widows and other heirs of a 
soldier who had died while in service. The pension was modelled after the “jubilee”, but was 
in fact restricted by the regulations on marriage: they were only payable in those instances in 
which there had been an official papal consent to marry; soldiers entering the army had to be 
unmarried or widowed
905
, and the aforementioned permission to marry was difficult to 
procure. 
These regulations were in place to incentivize the soldier to remain in the Papal Army 
for the whole duration of his enlistment contract. But they were also in place to push him to 
re-engage, seeing as the pay supplements and pensions were dependent on quite long periods 
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of service in the respective armies. Moreover, it is important to note that these regulations 
were also in place for the corps of the Papal Zouaves, despite the fact that they were offered 
the possibility of contracting for six-month periods at a time.  
4.6 Changes of sides and mutual head-hunting 
As the soldiers’ registers reveal, many of the German soldiers in the Papal Army had already 
served in German Armies, in the Foreign Legion of the French Army, and/or in Algeria and 
Mexico before entering papal service.  
When the need for more soldiers arose, the idea of taking them from other armies was 
nearly automatic. Mobilization and recruitment in the Bourbon and Papal Armies were 
intimately connected, and consequently it was not uncommon for soldiers to switch between 
the two. By recruiting soldiers that had already acquired experience elsewhere, states could 
not only enhance their military “strength”, but could also save time and money on training. To 
guide pro-Bourbon volunteers in 1861, the last King of the Two Sicilies, Francesco II, availed 
himself of an old papal colonel, the Prussian convert Theodor Klitsche de Lagrange. Klitsche 
seems to have been chosen precisely for his military experience, as is shown by his 
meticulous military biography written down in the King’s papers that are preserved in the 
Archivio Borbone in the State Archive of Naples: “Captain of the General Staff in papal 
service since 2 March 1831, major 10 August 1831, colonel lieutenant 14 March 1841, jubilee 
in 1851 […]. Soldier for 48 years, officer for 46, and superior officer for 30 years, he was 
present in more than twenty armed conflicts, for one of which, at Rheims 1814, he was 
decorated, hence in a period in which such distinctions were still real.”
906
  
4.6.1 Port cities 
Port cities were important nodes where the recruitment activities of the various armed groups 
overlapped. Many foreign soldiers, in fact, had to pass through ports such as Marseille, 
Genoa, Trieste, and Livorno. With regard to the Swiss that had been dismissed from Bourbon 
service in 1859, Albert Maag writes that already “the debarkation of the transport ships at 
Genoa had given the possibility to the people to pass into Garibaldian service; in Marseille, 
recruitment (this time for Rome and Algiers) was pursued with particular ardour and most 
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Such "radical" changes of sides, from the regular legitimist armies into the pro-
Unitarian and less formal Garibaldian ranks and/or vice versa do not seem to have been 
particularly uncommon. The legitimist writer Giuseppe Buttà writes for instance that many of 
the soldiers of the newly created Bourbon foreign regiments had “previously fought under 
Garibaldi in the Varese area”
908
; therefore, according to this certainly biased author, these 
soldiers had been part of the Garibaldian Cacciatori delle Alpi in 1859. But given the facility 
with which soldiers could change sides, it seems more easily understandable that some 
perhaps in the end no longer knew which cause they were actually fighting for. The historian 
and eye-witness Raffaele de Cesare (he was 15 years old in 1860) writes about the incoming 
foreign recruits for the Bourbon Army: “These Bavarians and Austrians, brought by Lloyd’s 
steamers, debarked at Molfetta, and I remember them well. They were young, full of health, 
and came to serve a cause that they did not understand, and they murmured in a low voice: 
long leeve Caripalde.”
909  
The Bavarian soldier Rottmund is perhaps an extreme example in terms of the number 
of times he changed armies. According to a book he published about his military life in 1863, 




4.6.2 Garibaldi’s “foreign company” 
Many changes of sides as well as desertions happened during times of war. In fact, during war 
deployment it was far more difficult for the military to police the boundaries of the respective 
armies than when the soldiers were garrisoned. Desertion to go join the “adversary” was 
convenient for the fact that by doing so, a soldier could guarantee the continued income, 
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while the “free” deserter who just left the army in general ran the risk of remaining without 
pay. By joining a new army, the deserter could also find protection against the punishments of 
desertion; also, by enlisting with the adversary after having been captured, a soldier could 
avoid the harsh realities of captivity that were still typical of the nineteenth century in the 
period prior to the Hague Conventions. Despite the usual official contracts between states to 
mutually extradite the respective deserters, all armies continued to integrate deserters into 




A case in point is the “foreign Garibaldian Company”, which was part of the southern 
army in 1860. This company was comprised of Bourbon soldiers that deserted to the 
Garibaldian side, a “hundred or more foreigners from different nationalities, but for the larger 
part Swiss and Germans […], a company consisting totally of Bourbon soldiers, clothed, 
armed and equipped with Bourbon uniforms and gear, which marches and fights against the 
Bourbon King.”
 912
 In this case, as in others, whole groups of soldiers would defect over to 
another army. Garibaldi’s famous Hungarian Legion was another such instance. The Legion 
was initially formed by Austrian soldiers, “Hungarian hussars” that deserted to join the 
garibaldini in 1859 in Lombardy.
913
 
Similarly, the German-bourbon soldier Maier reported about frequent desertions of 
officers and soldiers from the bourbon to the Garibaldian army in 1860: “And what did the 
officers, who had sworn to the King never to take service against him, when they got into 




Indeed, many former officers of the bourbon army changed sides before the end of the 
kingdom, and doing so they procured themselves the best opportunities for a splendid further 
military career in Piedmont/Italy.  
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4.6.3 Pay and reciprocal “headhunting” between the armies 
The liberal/democratic forces tried to incite soldiers and officers of the legitimist armies to 
defect and come over to their side during the war. They employed various measures to do so, 
from propaganda to promises of money and a helping hand in organizing the actual moment 
of desertion and passage over to their army. Rottmund experienced this form of liberal 
“agitation” by his adversaries while he was serving in the Papal Army in autumn 1859. He 
wrote that the “non-papal party” succeeded in leading fifteen of his papal comrades to desert 
“with horses and arms”, by providing “money, identity papers and civil clothing”.
915
 These 
measures were again used by the Garibaldians in 1860 in order to increase their own number 
of soldiers. Rüstow recounts that a great number of especially Neapolitan officers defected 
when in Paola – 31 August to 2 September 1860. He specified that he treated them very well: 
“Even if I was aware that my till was nearly empty, knowing Garibaldi’s intentions, I offered 
to pay the royal officers their remunerations for some days if they were short of money.” It 
goes without saying that he also invited them to join the southern army.
916
 Therefore, in 1860, 
it was easy for Rottmund to switch between the Papal Army and the Garibaldian troops. As he 
writes, he and his group of deserters were personally presented to Garibaldi, who “found in us 
enterprising young men and hence we were allowed to enter his troops as corporals.”
917
  
On 25 June of that year, Garibaldi issued an official decree that proffered quite 
impressive sums to Neapolitan deserters: “All soldiers that have deserted from the Neapolitan 
Army and that come to soldier under our flags will – at the end of the war – receive a 
premium of 50 ducats, which in the event of their death will be handed out to their heirs.”
918
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 “[..M]it Pferd und Wagen” ; „mit Geld, Papieren und Civilkleidern versehen“. Rottmund, Erlebnisse und 
Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und 
französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. 
Rottmund], p. 56. 
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 „Ferner, obwohl mir bekannt war, daß meine Kasse fast auf nichts zusammengeschrumpft war, erbot ich mich 
doch, da ich die Intentionen Garibaldi’s wohl kannte, den königlichen Offizieren für einige Tage ihren Gehalt 
zahlen zu wollen, falls es ihnen an Geld fehle.“ Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 
1, pp. 165-166. 
917
 „Wir wurden dem greisen General persönlich vorgestellt; er fand in uns junge thatenlustige Männer und und 
uns sämmtlichen war der Eintritt als Corporale in seine Truppen gestattet.“ Rottmund, Erlebnisse und 
Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und 
französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. 
Rottmund], p. 77. 
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 „Tutti i soldati, i quali disertando dall’esercito napolitano sono venuti e verranno a militare sotto le nostre 
bandiere, otterranno alla fine della guerra un premio di ducati cinquanta, e nel caso di loro morte sarà corrisposto 
ai loro eredi.” "Decreto no. 132 del 25 giugno 1860. Si dà un premio di ducati 50 alla fine della guerra a tutti i 
disertori napolitani che verranno a militare sotto le nostre bandiere (25/06/1860)," in Collezione delle leggi, 
decreti e disposizioni governative compilate dall'avvocato Nicolò Porcelli, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), pp. 69, 
p. 69. 50 Neapolitan ducati was equivalent to approximately 212 lire, whereas the regular enlistment premium in 
the Papal Army was about 160 lire. 
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The foreign Bourbon soldiers were addressed by the Garibaldian side with appositely 
stamped pamphlets in various languages. Already in mid-June, according to a contemporary 
source, “to stimulate desertions among the royal foreign troops, announcements were 
circulated that had been printed in German and French, offering 40 ducats to those that 
deserted with their rifle, and 30 [ducats] without a rifle; and to those that did not wish to serve 
Garibaldi, a compensation and free passage up to Marseille would be given”. But, according 
to this source, “not many passed” over to the Garibaldian side.
919
  
German soldiers in the Bourbon Army were in fact addressed from the pro-Italian side 
with a German pamphlet, prompting the German soldiers to desert and reminding them of a 
“brotherly” duty to stop fighting for the Bourbon cause: “Germans and Italians are brothers. 
Do you want to be an exception […]?”
920
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 “A promuovere la diserzione tra le reali truppe estere si fanno circolare proclami stampati in tedesco, ed in 
francese, offrendo ducati 40 a chi si diserta col fucile, e 30 senza fucile; ed a chi non volesse servire Garibaldi, si 
accorda una indennità, ed il passaggio franco fino a Marsiglia: ben pochi passano fra gl’insorti” Cronaca degli 
avvenimenti di Sicilia. Da aprile 1860 a marzo 1861 estratta da documenti, (s. l.: s. l., 1863), p. 150. 
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 Pamphlet addressed to the “German soldiers in the service of King Francis II of Naples”, presumably from 




Image 4.2 - Pamphlet addressed to the “German soldiers in the service of King Francis II 
of Naples”, presumably from August 1860  
 




Foreigners were sometimes brought into the Italian armed groups with either the “clear 
political project” of inciting their fellow nationals on the politically opposed side to 
“capitulate”, or to “win their compatriots” over to their own cause.
921
.  
Caution must be taken when looking at these changes of sides, which can be 
interpreted as signs of the absence
922
 of, the presence of, or the emergent presence of national 
and/or political motivations. The motivation to change sides could stem from political beliefs 
(Hungarian or Italian nationalist aspirations) just as easily as from less political considerations 
(better pay, better provisions). A deeper analysis must be carried out in order to identify 
which of the two is dominant, acknowledging that “mercenaries” did not necessarily become 
political “volunteers” simply by changing sides and vice versa. To do otherwise risks 
reproducing the polemic classification of the nineteenth century.  
Finally, headhunting was not confined to the recruitment of soldiers from the opposite 
camp, but could also occur within an army. Rüstow writes, for instance, that the commanders 
of the various divisions “had their own recruiting agents”, which without compunction “tried 
to hire from the organized corps of the same army by promising higher pay, nicer uniforms, 
advancements, in short, promised everything possible, which [however] was by no means in 




The presence of foreign, and among them German, soldiers in the ranks of the various Italian 
armed groups was a result of the interlocking between a cultural and political mobilization 
with a concrete recruitment infrastructure across Europe. With regard to general mobilization, 
the pro-national side was not alone in making use of partially “modern” forms of 
communication and argumentation; the legitimists and pro-papal forces did as well. With 
regard to recruitment, however, the traditions of mercenary recruitment developed in the 
previous centuries still partially informed the ways in which the foreigners’ corps were 
created and manned.  
A traditional element of foreign mercenary recruitment were the legal obstacles that 
the European states erected in an attempt to prevent or at least to hinder the recruitment of 
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 Ignace, "French volunteers in Italy," p. 449. 
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 Andrzej Nieuwazny, "Patriotes ou mercenaires? Les légions polonaises au service de la France (1797-1807)," 
Revue historique des armées, no. 260 (2010): pp. 26-36. 
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 „Die Divisionscommandanten hatten ihre Werber, und diese letzern machten sich kein Gewissen daraus, aus 
den organisirten Corps derselben Armee heraus anzuwerben, indem sie höhern Sold, schöne Uniformen, 
Beförderungen, kurz alles Mögliche versprachen, was zu halten keineswegs in ihrer Macht lag.” Rüstow, 
Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 1, p. 124-125. 
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their nationals for foreign armies on their soil. This legal situation was far from static, 
however, and especially from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, there were significant 
developments with regard to foreign recruitment. Already the German Act of Confederation 
of 1815 granted important privileges to formerly “reigning” nobles, in terms of foreign 
military engagement and emigration, namely the freedom from military duties and the right to 
take residence abroad, which included – according to the legal literature of the time and in the 
cases of Baden or Bavaria to specific laws – the right to enter foreign military service as well. 
The right of emigration was granted to another group of nobles as well, the so-called 
“imperial knights”; in terms of foreign military service, many German states privileged them 
(and sometimes their own mediatized nobility) over non-nobles. The nobility, and among it, 
some specific groups of nobles, was the group that from the legal point of view could most 
easily join foreign armies already at the beginning of the century. And they did so quite 
frequently. But by using these privileges, preserving and cultivating their connections to other 
courts – from Austria to France to the Papal States – was also a way for them to (re-)assert 
their “nobility”, a way to “remain at the top”. The case of the papal court was used to 
exemplify how this mechanism functioned, highlighting also the ways in which many 
Catholic noble families were in fact intertwined with it, from the Papal Army to papal titles 
and ennoblements. These interconnections also created a concrete foundation upon which the 
recruitment activities for the Papal Army were established in Germany.  
In terms of legal obstacles, the situation began to change with regard to the non-noble 
strata of society, especially after the revolution of 1848/49. The essentially all-encompassing 
bans on foreign recruitment of former centuries gradually gave way to laws against the 
recruitment of national subjects for foreign armies, or even more specifically only against the 
recruitment of those national subjects that were (still) liable to military service in the 
respective German state. This was a comprehensive relaxation of the legal situation, though 
the inclusiveness, based on the requisites of reserve and militia duties, of the words “those 
liable to military service” must not be overlooked. Nevertheless, by equating enlistment in a 
foreign military service to emigration, the constitutional debates led to the de-penalization of 
enlistment in foreign service for the recruit, while the prohibitions on the recruiters remained 
in place, even if there was a tendency to reduce the gravity of the punishment. By equating 
emigration and foreign military service, however, the consequences for emigration under the 
law now threatened to apply to all those subjects that chose to enlist abroad. 
The recruitment structures in Europe for the Italian armed groups can only be 
understood within the context of the previous traditions of mercenary recruitment. The 
229 
 
placement of recruitment offices along the borders was a direct consequence of the continued 
bans on foreign recruitment described above. The interplay between official recruitment 
structures in Italy and abroad with associations for mobilization and/or recruitment, or even 
those associations that promoted subscription campaigns to “buy” (as in fund) soldiers for 
Italy, shows that infrastructures were important in ensuring the recruitment of foreign soldiers 
was effective. This lies in direct opposition with the idea that foreigners autonomously and 
spontaneously joined the Italian armed groups, which continues to inform some of the works 
on international volunteers. In reality, enlistment, regardless to which side, was not often an 
isolated, individual affair. It was essential for the various Italian sides to “recruit” 
intermediaries, recruiters in a wider sense that directed potential recruits to the official 
recruitment offices. Therefore, in the recruitment phase, it is possible if not likely that 
recruiters were more informed by the forms and content of political communication described 
in the second chapter than the recruits themselves. This is not to say that they did not 
subsequently become so once they had become active soldiers in Italy. 
In nearly all cases, the Italian armed groups offered regular pay, even if this was rather 
modest for the common soldier. Pay and other financial rewards were always contemplated 
for the “Garibaldians” in all their Italian activities, even if to differing degrees and especially 
with differences in terms of actual payment, which at times were partly or even fully deferred 
to later times and/or via paper money that was far from being worth the nominal value. This 
fact is highly interesting for two reasons: First, it contradicts a reality often portrayed by pro-
Risorgimental authors (even to today), that these soldiers received no pay or that this was not 
an important issue.
924
 Second, by extracting data on the wages given to the pro-Risorgimental 
soldiers and demonstrating that the sums paid were basically comparable to the wages paid in 
the regular armies, the opposite of what is often described in the “anti-Risorgimento” 
literature (again, even today) is revealed. The description of the Garibaldian troops as a “band 
of thieves” that pocketed enormous sums of money, therefore, is misleading at least in regard 
to the level of pay these soldiers and many of the officers received. 
The armed groups across the political spectrum offered (despite the effective problems 
in realizing this offer) not only regular pay, but also food rations, pensions, and various extra 
sums – in the case of the Bourbon and Papal Armies, but then for the Garibaldian southern 
army as well. The payment structures in the Bourbon and Papal Armies aimed to incentivized 
soldiers to stay as long as possible in service; this seems to be in contradiction with the 
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supposedly voluntary character of for instance the Papal Zouaves, who could choose upon 
enlisting to sign on for six months only. 
Regardless of the political orientation of the armed group, economic incentives – as in 
previous centuries – were used to increase enlistments. The enlistment premiums offered by 
the Papal and Bourbon Armies were quite impressive. But even the Garibaldian southern 
army in 1860 offered such premiums to the deserters from the Bourbon Army as well. In fact, 
a company of former Bourbon soldiers was integrated into the southern army as a Garibaldian 
“foreign company”, which contained some 70 soldiers from German states. This case shows 
as well that the recruitment of (foreign and Italian) soldiers was fuelled by different sources: 
the recruitment in the recruitment offices of France or Austria and/or mediated by political 
associations abroad; the recruitment at the nodes of international transport such as the port 
cities; the recruitment in the “theatres” of war themselves. This calls attention to the fact that 
there was a mix of different types of recruitment; although there were new methods, long used 
mechanisms of previous continued to hold an important place in the recruitment procedures.  
While the act of enlisting in an armed group or army is not sufficient proof of 
economic motive, neither is the enlistment over time in more than one army. Of course, 
although it is possible that a revolutionary with military experience could have been primarily 
or even solely motivated by political ideals, one cannot discount the fact that economic and 
career motivations seem nevertheless to have been a driving force for many “transnational 
soldiers” in the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento. This shows that often it can be 
misleading to just assume that a foreign soldier fighting for a particular Italian side does so 
only or primarily for a political motive or that a soldier who switched sides at some point 
during the conflict did so only or primarily for a political reason. Aside from only political 
considerations, there is often evidence that other classes of motives have come into play, 
either instead of this first or in concomitance with it. Furthermore, arguments based on pay 
and/or military careers were often used by the Italian armed groups themselves to attract 
foreign and Italian participation. 
As in previous centuries, practices were at work that guaranteed a rank to anyone that 
brought recruits with them; this kind of incentive was evident in the case of the Sicilian state 
in 1848 or the provisory Roman government in January 1849. According to Rüstow, this 
principle seemed to have also been applied in the Garibaldian campaign of 1860. 
On all political sides, soldiers that had previously fought in other armies were quite 
willingly enlisted, and sometimes they were specifically sought out for their (supposed or 
real) military abilities and/or their supposed “national military character”. Stereotypes of the 
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military character or nature of certain nationalities were not an invention of the nineteenth 
century; they had blossomed already at the end of the previous century. In both periods, 
however, these military stereotypes lay at the heart of the auto- and the hetero-stereotypes of 
the nations. While the “decadence” of Italy was said to be primarily visible in the unmanly, 
unmilitary character of the Italians, the Prussian and/or "German" soldier epitomized the traits 
of calmness, order and discipline. The “Prussian military myth” was also fuelled by 
differences in terms of education. At the general level, Prussian officers were expected to 
have Gymnasium-level schooling, and in terms of formal military education they were also 
better prepared than their southern German or southern Italian colleagues. The mutual images 
of the respective military character and/or abilities of a nation were an important ingredient in 
the projects of military exchange, of which supplying German soldiers for Italy, and 
especially hiring German officers, was just one example. The enlistment of foreign officers 
was facilitated by the organizational similarities between the European armies. Because of 
this, the Papal Army, for instance, would recognize the previous rank that a recruit had 
accrued in another army; in this way military careers could be continued. 
By integrating foreign soldiers and especially foreign officers, however, the seemingly 
specific military abilities were not the only thing that the Italian armed groups imported, but – 
as we will see in the next chapter –a tendency to make continuous transnational inner-military 








What was the outcome of this political and cultural mobilization and its combination with 
concrete recruitment structures? The following chapter will present numbers regarding the 
German
925
 participation in the armed groups of the different Italian sides, and in some cases 
statistical elaborations on various aspects of this group as well.  
This chapter relies heavily on one type of source in particular: the soldiers’ registers. 
The quality of this raw material varies greatly between Italian armed groups. In the case of the 
Papal Army, soldiers’ registers were meticulously and regularly kept: names, places of birth 
and last residence, date of birth and the date of enlistment are nearly always listed, are 
normally readable, and are quite precise even with regard to spelling – at least so much so that 
it was possible to verify the places mentioned and which German state and, for the larger 
states of Prussia and Bavaria, which region they were in. 
The entries on the names of parents, former military engagements in other countries, 
advancements in the military career as well as military decorations (often including foreign 
decorations as well) were also very consistently kept. Given the vast quantity of soldiers’ 
registers of the Papal Army, it was necessary from a practical perspective to concentrate my 
research. Ultimately I chose to focus on the foreigners’ corps using the logic that most 
foreigners, insofar as they were foreigners, would have been automatically placed in the 
“foreigners’ corps” and not in the “indigenous corps”. In order to assess the validity of this 
parameter, I looked at multiple registers of the indigenous corps and all of the foreign 
transfers to the indigenous corps. More specifically when looking at the registers of the 
indigenous corps I was only able to verify isolated cases of German soldiers.
926
 When I 
extracted all of the German soldiers in the foreigners’ corps that were eventually transferred 
to indigenous corps the numbers were very limited.
927
 
The situation with regard to record keeping is significantly different on the pro-
national side. Here, the actions carried out within the regular armies must be differentiated 
from those that are carried out without this formal container. For 1859, for instance, 
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 One should keep in mind the definition of “Germans” as is used in this study to mean those soldiers whose 
place of birth and/or last residence was in one of the states of the German Confederation excluding Austria, see 
the discussion of the chosen definition on p. 55. 
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 I namely looked through the complete registers of the Papal Artillery. 
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 Between 1860 and 1870, of the 1,065 German Foreign Carabineers on which a reason for leaving the corps is 
given, only 27 were transferred to the artillery and 8 to the sanitary corps (“infermieri”) of the “indigenous 
corps”. There were no German transfers to other “indigenous corps”. 
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volunteers were integrated in both the regular army and the specific volunteer corps, which 
nevertheless were considered an official part of the Piedmontese Army; Anna-Maria Isastia 
has provided lists of those enlisted and a statistical analysis based on the (quite regularly and 
often immediately) recorded daily reports of the enlistment commission of Turin.
928
 In other 
cases, there are no registers, or there is only partial coverage because there are registers only 
for sections of the armies and armed groups. With regard to Garibaldi’s Italian Legion, which 
fought in the defence of Rome in 1849, it is of note that Garibaldi was reluctant to keep 
soldiers’ registers, as, more generally speaking, he did not want any interference from the 
Roman Ministry of War in the (administrative) affairs of his legion; a soldiers’ register was 
indeed created at the end of March, but shortly thereafter was no longer maintained.
929
 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the extensive archival research carried out by Roman archivist 




In other cases statistical data, although available, is highly problematic. This is the 
case with the various official lists of the “Thousand” that were produced between 1862 and 
1878. The list of 1878, with its indication of professions, is normally the point of departure 
for many historical works. However, the list is patchy in that it only contains the information 
on the professions of some of the soldiers – specifically 744 of 1,089. Even more problematic, 
however, is the fact that the professions were registered only in 1877 and 1878, and therefore 
“when twenty years had already passed” since the actual expedition; hence the professions of 
the participants were those at the time of registry and not the professions of the “Mille” back 
in 1860.
931
 The list of 1878 was produced with the specific intent of granting pensions; the 
calculations of such sums depended on the respective professional status of the former 
members of the Thousand at the time in which the list was created. Furthermore, in this list of 
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 See the lists in the annex of Isastia, Il volontariato militare nel Risorgimento. For those enlisted in the regular 
branches of the army, see pp. 312-528; and for those integrated into the Garibaldian Cacciatori delle Alpi see pp. 
531-630. With regard to soldiers with foreign origin, this data is extracted and treated in Isastia, "Volontari 
provenienti dall'estero". Of note is that Isastia’s lists concern only those individuals enlisted in Turin; the total 
number of volunteers enlisted in Italy in 1859 is estimated at 50.000 in northern and central Italy by Isastia, Il 
volontariato militare nel Risorgimento, p. 261. She gives the same number again in Isastia, "La guerra dei 
volontari," p. 175. 
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 For the administration of Garibaldi’s Italian Legion in 1849 and on the attempts by the Roman government to 
rationalize this record keeping in the face of the opposition posed by Garibaldi and the garibaldini themselves, 
see Loevinson, Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano, 2, pp. 67-75, on the abandonment of 
record keeping in the soldiers’ registers, see especially pp. 67-68. 
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 Ibid., on p. 22, Loevinson gives the information on the regions of origin for 121 of the 180 officers as well as 
for 357 soldiers (elaborated on the basis of information given on legionnaires that needed help from corpsmen or 
hospitalization). Among these, we find 7 officers and 10 soldiers of foreign origin, but no Germans (there were 
only 6 French, 2 Swiss, 3 Hungarian, 3 Polish, 1 Tunisian and 2 South Americans). 
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the “Mille”, the number of individuals whose profession was registered as “soldier” is 
elevated (151 out of 744 for which professions are given
932
). This is consistent with the fact 
that a fair number of former Garibaldians joined the new Italian Army after 1860.  
Eva Cecchinato’s study reveals that for the professional status of the Garibaldians 
in1860 it is necessary to look at the individual files that were produced in this context, some 
of which also contain data on the lives of the “Thousand” prior to 1860.
933
 By integrating this 
information together with that of other sources, Cecchinato is able to demonstrate that 
previous periods of membership in the “regular” branches of states’ armies were not as 
uncommon as our idea of the political “volunteer” would have us believe. 
No continuous and immediate keeping of soldiers’ registers occurred in the case of the 
southern army of 1860, for instance. The confirmed presence of several Germans can, 
nevertheless, be discerned thanks to the database “Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi”, the 
as of yet unfinished joint project between the State archives in Turin and Genoa; the project 
endeavours to bring together the available information in the four archival complexes: the 
"Mille di Marsala", "Archivio militare di Sicilia", and "Esercito Italian meridionale" in Turin, 
with the "Prefettura di Genova, Matrici di Passaporto" in Genoa. The ultimate aim of the 
project is to create a cross referencing system whereby all of the information present in the 
four archival complexes on any given individual is brought together in one single database 
that is accessible online via the official website of the State Archive of Turin.
934
 However, the 
most laborious part of this archival work has yet to be completed: i.e. the information on 
single soldiers that is not in the various registers, but in the letters and material of the army’s 
administration (in the corpus “Esercito meridionale”), has not yet been transformed and 
inserted into the database. Moreover, the sources used for this database are characterized by 
their own strong problems.
935
 Many of the registers preserved in the aforementioned 
complexes are partial, and important information, such as places of birth or last residence, has 
often not been recorded. Even more problematic is the fact that these registers were often not 
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 Ibid., p. 577. As noted above, Miani bases his elaboration on the "Elenco alfabetico di tutti i componenti la 
spedizione dei Mille di Marsala...," Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia. Supplemento, no. 266 (1878): pp. 1-24; 
the source confirms the numbers Miani provides. 
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 Cecchinato, Camicie rosse, p. 28. 
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 http://archiviodistatotorino.beniculturali.it/Site/index.php/it/progetti/schedatura/garibaldini (last accessed: 
05/01/2013). 
935
 On the project and the problems connected to its data, see the respective publications of archivist Paola 
Briante, "Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi," Historia Magistra 111, no. 5 (2011): pp. 144-46; see as well 
Paola Briante, "Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi," Il Mondo degli Archivi on line. Quadrimestrale di 
informazione e dibattito, no. 2 (2011), online via http://mda2006-
11.ilmondodegliarchivi.org/detail/articleid/1178/parentchannel/152/title/Alla_ricerca_dei_garibaldini_scomparsi.
html (last accessed: 05/01/2013).  
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kept during the southern campaign of 1860, but were created later – sometimes much later –
 for the sole purpose of granting medals or pensions.  
Bearing in mind the current state of this project, it is not astonishing that there were 
many foreign “sounding” surnames in the database, but often no information on their origin or 
their residence prior to their Italian engagement. Only with regard to the 193 soldiers of the 
so-called “foreign company”
936
 – hence the foreign soldiers that deserted from the Bourbon 
Army to enlist with Garibaldi – was there enough information to enable a positive 
identification of the Germans and to carry out a statistical analysis. Having extracted the 
names and information on those soldiers and officers of the southern army in 1860 that could 
be positively identified as "Germans" according to the definition specified above, I created 
my apposite lists (see below in the appendix I). 
We similarly know, with regard to the Papal and Bourbon Armies, of single German 
officers that were not (or no longer) part of distinct foreigners’ corps. This was the case for 
instance of Hermann Kanzler, who initially joined the 1
st
 foreign regiment (“1° Reggimento 
Estero”) of the Papal Army in September 1845, but after 1848 held various positions in the 
command of different and “indigenous” corps or in the military administration, to eventually 
be promoted to pro-Minister of Arms in 1865.
937
 Gustav von Hoffstetter was another German 
that gravitated further from a strictly “foreign” orbit as part of the “Lombard sharpshooters” 
(bersaglieri lombardi) in the army of the Roman Republic in 1849. He went on to become a 
member of Garibaldi’s General Staff at the end of the Republic.
938
 Yet another example is 
Theodor Klitsche de Lagrange, who was part of the Papal General Staff of the 1850s and later 
a colonel of the pro-Bourbon forces that operated in southern Italy between 1860 and 1863.
939
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 See Vigevano, Compagnia estera garibaldina. 
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 Piero Crociani, "Kanzler, Hermann," in Alberto M. Ghisalberti and Mario Caravale, eds., Dizionario 
biografico degli italiani, vol. 64 (“Iacobiti-Labriola”) (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 2004), online 
via http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_(Dizionario-Biografico) (last accessed: 21/01/2013). 
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 Andrea Weibel, "Hoffstetter, Gustav von," in Marco Jorio, ed., Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, vol. 6 
(Basle: Schwabe, 2007) online via http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D28076.php (last accessed: 17/08/2013). 
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5.1 Germans in the pro-Unitarian armed groups 
Table 5.1 – Foreign and German Mazzinian and Sicilian soldiers 






Invasion of Savoy – 
Mazzini 1834 














































 = 12% of 
the foreign 





 = 7% 
of the total 
 







                                                 
940








 Between 20 and 25 according to Paul Harro Harring, Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie et sur les derniers 
événements de Savoi, par un témoin oculaire, vol. 2 (Paris: Libraire de M. Dérivaux, 1834), pp. 11 and 42. 
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Table 5.2 – Foreign and German soldiers of the Roman Republic 1849 
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Table 5.3 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1859 






Volunteers enlisted in 
Turin until 25 march 
1859 
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Table 5.4 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1860 






Northern volunteers of 
Garibaldi’s Southern 
Army of 1860 
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Table 5.5 – Foreign German Garibaldians in 1862 
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Table 5.6 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1866 






garibaldini 1866 ca. 40,000
983




Table 5.7 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1867 






garibaldini 1867 ca. 12,000
984
    
  
When all of the information on German soldiers is combined with that of the officers 
on the same Italian side, one cannot fail to notice that the presence of German nationals on the 
pro-national side is very limited. In the invasion of Savoy in 1834 and then in the Garibaldian 
southern army in 1860, the German groups are relatively appreciable, whereas the other cases 
are characterized by single German presences.  
In the case of the southern army of 1860, it is of note that the greater part of the 
German soldiers had deserted from the Bourbon army. These Germans were then integrated 
into one company of the Garibaldian Army. Even three of the eight Garibaldian officers that 
were identified as Germans were part of this company.  
In sum we see that – even if there had been projects to provide Garibaldi with 
“German Legions” – German participation on this Italian side of the conflict never reached 
the levels of the Hungarians, Polish, British and French, each with their respective, sometimes 
quite numerically substantial legions which at various points joined the ranks of the 
garibaldini.  
Only with regard to the larger group of German soldiers in the “foreign company” of 
1860 does it makes sense to carry out statistical research. In terms of states of birth, 34 of the 
63 soldiers in this group were born in southern Germany. This conforms to the expectation, 
when the recruitment of the Bourbon foreign regiments especially in Austria is taken into 
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Chart 5.1 - Germans in Garibaldi's foreign company of 1860: States of birth
 
(Elaboration on the basis of information extracted from the database “Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi”) 
 
5.2 Germans in the Papal Army  
Many more Germans were found in the records of the Papal and Bourbon Armies than on the 
pro-Unitarian side. 
Generally speaking, the numbers of foreigners were particularly elevated in the Papal 
Army. According to Attilio Vigevano, more than half of the army consisted of foreign 
soldiers in 1870, while other sources declared this to be 40%. Vigevano went on to state that 
the greater part was comprised of French soldiers, followed by Swiss, Dutch and Belgians
985
; 
unfortunately for our study, he considered the Germans and Austrians together, which 
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Chart 5.2 - Nationalities of the 7,200 foreign soldiers in the Papal Army in 1870
 




Upon examination of the soldiers' registers, it was possible to obtain even more 
precise numbers. Between 1860 and 1870, Germans are mostly to be found in two of the 
foreigners’ corps of the Papal Army: the Papal Zouaves and the foreign Carabineers.  
Table 5.8 - German soldiers in the foreign corps of the Papal Army 





















1861-1870 ca. 4,100 
(4,910 







5.2.1 “German” Papal Zouaves 
All ten volumes of registers of the soldiers with their 10,901 entries,
989
 as well as both 
volumes of registers of the officers
990
 have been consulted. The information provided therein 
includes: name, last residence, place of birth, date of birth, date of entry in the corps, 




 ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1635-1645. The registers of the common soldiers of the 
regiment between 1861 and 1870 reach a total of 10,920 entries, but excluding all re-engagements and 
annulations this number – according to Jean Guénel – drops to 9,000. Guénel, Dernière guerre du pape, p. 40. 
988
 ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1382 and 1383. 
989
 Due to the various re-engagements this number does not correspond to the number of active individuals in the 
corps. ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1635-1645. 
990
 ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1382 and 1383. 
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profession, promotions, and decorations. The information on the names of places and the 
states to which they belonged at the time of birth or time of engagement has been verified. 
Chart 5.3 – Nationalities of the Papal Zouaves 1861—1870
 




Chart 5.4 - Nationalities of the Papal Zouaves 21 September 1870
 




Of the approximately 9,000-9,500 soldiers actually enlisted in the corps of the Papal 
Zouaves, only 254, were born, or held their last residence in one of the states of the German 
Confederation, excluding Austria. Therefore, the Germans at 3%, were a minor group in this 
                                                 
991
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992
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attraverso la storia del reggimento degli zuavi pontifici, 1860 - 1870 (Perugia: Esperia, 2004), p. 27. 
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corps, which instead was dominated by Dutch (37%), French (24%) and Belgian (18%) 
soldiers, as indicated in the chart above. 
The German contingent of the Zouaves was predominantly comprised of Prussians 
(158 were born in Prussia, and 137 had their last residence there before enlisting in the Papal 
Army), and more specifically of Prussians from the Rhine Province (102 were born in this 
province, and 89 had their last residence there). Though, the group was, to a minor degree, 
comprised of Germans from Westphalia (24 were born there, and 23 had had their last 
residence there) and of a spattering of other provinces (32 were born in these, and 16 had had 
their last residence there). The number of Prussians far outnumbered the Germans from other 
territories in the German Confederation, such as Luxembourg (23 soldiers were born there, 
and 19 had their last residence in the Grand Duchy). 
 
Chart 5.5 - Germans in the Papal Zouaves: States of birth
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers
993
) 
                                                 
993
 This is my own elaboration based on the information extracted from the soldiers‘ registers, ASR, Fondo 
Ministero delle Armi, Matricole, vols. 1635-1645 (soldiers) and 1382-1383 (officers) of the Papal Zouaves. 
246 
 
Chart 5.6 - Germans in the Papal Zouaves: States of last residence 
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
Table 5.9 - Frequency of certain places of birth and last residence of the Germans in the 
Papal Zouaves 
Place Birth  Last Residence 
Aachen  15 20 
Eupen 9 11 
Cologne 9 9 
Munich 4 9 
Wuppertal-Elberfeld 5 3 
Rome 0 7 
Marseille 0 3 
Paris 0 3 
Brussels 0 3 
Vienna 0 2 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
 
The highest number of Germans enlisting in the corps of the Zouaves was born or had 
its last residence in Aachen, followed by the then Prussian Eupen (see Table 5.9 above). The 
most likely reason for these numbers resides in the fact that in Aachen an association 
dedicated precisely to providing recruits to the Papal Zouaves had been erected;
994
 moreover, 
both Aachen and Eupen were near to the Belgian and French border, and the next closest 
papal recruitment office in Brussels was only 150 km away. 
Another point of note arises from the comparison between the place of birth and the 
last residence registered of the recruit: When looking at the number of individuals (38) whose 
last residence was recorded outside of the German Confederation, excluding Austria, it is 
                                                 
994
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possible to observe an indication of interstate mobility of these individuals prior to their 
enlistment in the Papal Army. Of these individuals, 20 resided in France or Belgium, some of 
which had previously served in the French Foreign Legion, and therefore their presence in the 
Papal Zouaves was linked to their previous relationship to the French Army; similarly, those 
that resided in the Papal States (7) were already part of the former foreigners’ regiments well 
before 1860. 
 
Chart 5.7 - Germans in the Papal Zouaves: Age upon entry
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
 
At the time of enlistment, the average age of the German Zouave was 25, the median age was 
24. The most frequent ages to enlist were 25 (26 enlistments) and 18 (also 26 enlistments). 
When considered against the backdrop of the rather diffuse notion that Papal Zouaves were 
extremely young, these findings are quite telling. Although this idea that Papal Zouaves were 
exceptionally young has been perpetuated in contemporary texts
995
 and can still be found in 
today's academic literature
996
, this perception does not hold true for the Germans, or it holds 
true only in part:: In fact, of the 249 enlisted Germans for which it was possible to calculate 
their age at the time of enlistment, 39 were 18 or younger; if it is not an erroneous entry in the 
soldiers’ register of the date of birth, one individual enlisted at 15 years of age (Carlo Kreh 
from Württemberg, whose profession is noted as “merchant” – negoziante). But the average 
                                                 
995
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age to enlist, at 25, reveals that relatively few adolescents enlisted, and for the most part, the 
soldiers in the ranks of the Papal Zouaves were, though young, most certainly adults.  
 
Chart 5.8 - Professions of the German Zouaves 
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
 
Given the detail of the soldiers’ registers it is possible to understand more in depth the 
social composition of the contingent. The chart 5.8 is a visual representation of the entries on 
the profession of the German Zouaves, which were available only for 153 of the German 
recruits. With regard to these professions, most soldiers are recorded as having been a worker 
(operajo) (33). The next largest professional group that is listed is that of student (studente) 
(21), followed by ex-military (ex-militare) (19), landholder (possidente) (14), and tailor 
(sarto) (12). One soldier’s profession was listed as wayfarer (viaggiatore). Alongside the 
nobles (which figured mostly under the entry “landholder” (possidente), there are many 
German soldiers from the petty bourgeois or even lower social , classes; these amount to 
approximately 65% of the total. Of note also is the relatively high number of workers or 
labourers (33); among these were several that had listed their last residence in  
(Wuppertal-)Elberfeld, the early industrialized city in Prussian Rhineland known for its textile 
industry. 
Another piece of interesting information that the data in the soldiers' registers reveals 
is the time spent in the respective papal corps. This was calculated on the basis of the 
following information in the soldiers’ registers: while the date of enlistment has been 
recorded in nearly all cases, it is also rather common to find that the date in which an 
individual left the corps was registered. With regard to the individuals for which both dates 
are given (133), the average time spent in the corps is 605 days (with a median of 597 days). 
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If all of those individuals that did not have a recorded end date are assumed to have served 
until the Papal Army was dismantled, and hence until 20 September 1870, the average time 
spent in the corps increases to 705 (with a median of 545). The real average time of days 
spent in the corps, therefore, must lie somewhere between these two figures; regardless, these 
results are impressive. Despite the fact that Zouave recruits had the option to enlist for as little 
as 6 months, many soldiers re-enlisted multiple times, or directly contracted for longer 
periods. Whether they were real political war volunteers or not, they spent an average of 
nearly two years in the corps; this essentially means that if they were not already professional 
soldiers upon entry into the army, they certainly became so during their stay. ”Duration of 
commitment” is not one of Pécout’s criteria in his definition of the political war volunteer
997
, 
even if at least at first the idea of the political volunteer seems to suggest that the recruit 
would enlist only for a specific campaign. This, however, was not the case for most of the 
German members of the Zouaves. Their political beliefs may nevertheless have been more 
substantial than those who had joined other groups: in fact, the average length of time that the 
Germans spent in the Papal Carabineers was somewhat lower (between 465 and 615 days 
total), despite the fact that they were required by law to enlist for longer periods. Similarly, 
although there were desertions among the Zoauves (10 out of 133, or 7.5%), desertions were 
far more frequent in the Papal Carabineers (319 of 1077, or 30%).  
There were only 35 German enlistments in the Zouaves between 1861 and 1866. The 
rest occurred in the three years between 1867 and 1870. This parallels the general recruitment 
trend of the total Zouave force, which counted between 300-600 men up until 1864 (before 
the September Convention), 1,500-1,800 between 1864 and 1867, and grew to nearly 3,200 
before September 1870.
998
 This trend is also reflected in the increases in the number of 
enlistments of soldiers of other nationalities.
999
 There are most certainly concomitant factors 
that have contributed to this development: firstly, the September Convention of 1864 
authorized the increase in the corps strength and numbers. At the same time, it seems that the 
spread of a “myth” surrounding the battle of Mentana in 1867 and its wide circulation in 
                                                 
997
 “[The] phenomenon of the international volunteer fighter can in its simplest form be defined as the 
spontaneous movement of men who had no initial attachment to any regular or established army, who left their 
own country without having the need to earn money as their sole motivation (which does not mean that they 
would not earn some) in order to serve in a military and political struggle in a country other than their own […].” 
Pécout, "The international armed volunteers," p. 420. 
998
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999
 In the case of the Dutch Zouaves, similarly 78% of all Dutch enlistments between 1860 and 1870 occurred 





 led to an increase in the offer of soldiers as well, which in turn enabled the 
papal government to further increase the number of Zouaves. 
5.2.2 “German” Foreign Carabineers 
Mainly Swiss and German soldiers comprised the “Foreign Carabineers” regiment 
(“reggimento carabinieri esteri”), which was founded in May 1860 and reached a strength of 
1,262 men in 20 August 1870. Between 1860 and 1870 approximately 4,100
1001
 soldiers had 
enlisted in the corps. While the German presence was limited in the case of the Zouaves, their 
number was quite substantial in the Carabineers: 1,516 members of this corps had been born 
in one of the states of the German Confederation excluding Austria and 672 had listed their 
last residence there , Considering the overlaps the total number of Germans amounted to 
1,531.  
In terms of places of birth, most of the German soldiers came from southern Germany: 
the three southern countries of Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria alone account for 1,029 
soldiers. Prussia provided a total of 268 soldiers, of which 31 came from the Prussian Rhine 
Province, 20 from Westphalia, 10 from Brandenburg, 8 from the Prussian Province of 
Saxony, 7 from Silesia, and 2 from Pomerania. 
Chart 5.9 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Countries of birth 
 




                                                 
1000
 See for this p. 101. 
1001
 We find more than 4,910 entries in the soldiers’ registers of the “carabinieri esteri”. If we allow for a similar 
percentage of re-enlistments, double and cancelled entries as in the case of the Zouaves, this should correspond 
to the number given in the text above. 
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In terms of places of last residence, the number of individuals that resided in France 
(472), Switzerland (260), Algeria (50) and the Papal States (21) prior to their enlistment 
seems astonishingly high.  
 
Chart 5.10 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: States of last residence
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
 
If these numbers are then broken down into the respective localities, it becomes clear 
that the last place of residence of these soldiers was often in border (Strasbourg, Basle, and 
Mulhouse) or port cities (Marseille). Basle, Mulhouse and Schaffhausen were very close to 
the recruitment offices of Saint-Louis at the Rhine, and from Marseille ships would transport 
people to different places as well as to other armies in Europe and the world. By stating that 
the recruits were already residents in a foreign country prior to their enlistment, the papal 











Chart 5.11 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Last place of residence in France
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
 
Chart 5.12 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Last place of residence in Switzerland 
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
 
Compared to the social origin of the German Papal Zouaves, the social origin of the 
German Carabineers – both of which are based on the respective entries given on the recorded 
profession of each soldier upon recruitment – was slightly lower than that of the Zouaves; this 
is the case when the number of individuals that had non-artisanal professional status (i.e., day 
workers – giornaliere) and the number of individuals working in the category of least 
remunerated artisans (e.g. shoemakers or tailors) are taken into consideration. 
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Chart 5.13 – German Carabineers: Most frequent professions 
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
 
But the data on professions must be handled with special care. Although it can be used 
to gain an idea of the social background of the soldiers, it should not be taken at face value 
with regard to whether or not these individuals had enlisted after having served previous 
military engagements. Many more individuals than those recorded in the soldiers’ registers as 
“militare” or “ex-militare” (19 in the case of the Germans of the Zouaves and 28 in the Papal 
Carabineers) had already served in other armies prior to enlisting in the Papal Army. Hence, 
these individuals were already accustomed to military life, having served not only in the 
armies of their home countries, but very often those in other foreign countries as well; in fact, 
many had served in the French Foreign Legion, in Algeria (this is explicitly noted in the 
registers for 113 German Carabineers, for instance) or in Mexico (this is explicitly noted for 
39 German Carabineers). Nevertheless, civil professions are listed in the soldiers’ registers for 
many of these “professional” soldiers. 
This becomes all the more evident by examining the subset of German Carabineers 
whose last residence is listed as Algeria. (50). Although explicit information on service in the 
French Legion in Algeria is specified only with regard to 29 Germans, it is possible to assume 
that this is also the case for the other 'former residents' of Algeria as well. Of these 29 
German, who were most certainly former French soldiers, 11 have a civil profession recorded 
in the registers (3 of these were, for instance day workers). Civil professions have also been 
recorded for the Bourbon soldiers that joined Garibaldi and would form the Garibaldian 
“foreigners’ company” in 1860 (specifically, 25 civil professions were listed). Therefore, 
caution must be taken when drawing conclusions based on the entries regarding the 
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professions of these soldiers. While they can without doubt be used to get an idea about the 
social origin of the soldiers – and it seems that these records already functioned in precisely 
this way in the soldiers’ registers – it would be erroneous to interpret the frequency of the 
entries of civil professions as (sufficient) proof that the individuals that enlisted in the army 
were enlisting for the first time. Instead, it must be noted that even those individuals for 
whom a civilian profession is recorded in the registers had frequently served (even for quite 
long periods of time) in other armies before enlisting on the one or other Italian side.  
In terms of age at the time of enlistment, the Germans in the corps of the Carabineers 
do not differ much from the German Zouaves: Even for the Carabineers, the average age at 
the date of enlistment was 25 (and the median was 24).  
 
Chart 5.14 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Age upon entry 
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
 
As shown above, despite the fact that the obligatory minimum period of enlistment 
was longer for the Carabineers, the actual duration an individual spent in the corps was lower 
than for the Zouaves. The average German Carabineer remained with his corps anywhere 
between 465 (for which we have precise entries) and 615 days (if it is assumed that those 
without entry served until the corps was dismantled in September 1870). The reasons to leave 
also partially differed between the two corps. Desertion was far more frequent in the 
Carabineers than in the Zouaves, and therefore, the number of individuals who fulfilled their 
contractual enlistment period was lower. One possible factor may indeed be that the legal 
period of enlistment was longer in the case of the Carabineers. Nevertheless, on the basis of 
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the actual time served in the corps, it seems that the endurance of the Zouaves was “better”; it 
is possible that this was in part due to a stronger (political) motivation. 
Chart 5.15 - Papal Carabineers: Reasons for leaving 
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
Chart 5.16 - Papal Zouaves: Reasons for leaving
 





Table 5.10 - Frequency of some reasons for leaving the two corps 
Reason for leaving the corps German Zouaves German Carabineers 
Desertion 8% 30% 
Enlistment period completed 45% 13% 
Death 3% 11% 
By administrative decision 28% 12% 
(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers’ registers) 
 
5.3 Germans in the Bourbon Army 
As aforementioned, Germans were to be found as well in the foreigners’ corps of the Bourbon 
Army. Some single Germans had previously served in the Swiss battalions in Bourbon service 
until 1859. Following the “revolt of the Swiss” in May 1859, however, many soldiers from 
these corps took their leave; those that left were transported to Switzerland, where for 
instance at Geneva among the 1,317 former Bourbon soldiers there were 52 non-Swiss. Of 
these 52, 24 were from Württemberg and 12 were from Baden. There were also soldiers from 




After the official dismissal of the Swiss battalions in 1859, the decision was made to 
assemble new battalions – now labelled “foreigners’” battalions – which were to be formed of 
two distinct components: the first was to integrate those foreign soldiers that choose to remain 
with the Bourbon Army despite the legal threats emanated from the Swiss confederation; and 
the second, was the creation of a partially new recruitment structure – primarily in Austria – 
to recruit additional soldiers.
1003
 The result was the formation of three Bourbon foreigners’ 
battalions: two battalions of “light carabineers” and one of “jaegers” (cacciatori). Recruitment 
efforts began to truly function only at the beginning of 1860, and these were continued even 
after the first battles between Garibaldians and the Bourbon Army during the summer of that 
same year. On 1 August 1860, according to Albert Maag, the three Bourbon foreigners’ corps 
numbered 4,200 soldiers.
1004
 It is possible to get an idea of the composition of these 
battalions
1005
 by looking at the records pertaining to the 2,077 soldiers that were taken as 
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 Maag, Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten, p. 447. 
1003
 See Blaas, "L'Austria e le truppe straniere". 
1004
 Maag, Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten, p. 430. 
1005
 When I was in Naples for archival research in 2009, the military portion of the State archives (Sede di 
Pizzofalcone) was unfortunately closed for structural reasons. Therefore I was unable to consult the soldiers’ 
registers and only had access to the material in the “Archivio Borbone”, which is housed in the main building of 
the archive. This last archive, however, is more informative and pertinent with regard to the subsequent, more 
irregular fight to regain power in the south of Italy. 
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prisoners of war on 6 January 1861 at the pontifical border: 1,280 were Austrians, 503 Swiss, 
112 Bavarians, 84 Württembergers, 12 Badeners, 18 Saxons, 4 Hessians, 2 Mecklemburgers; 
and there was one soldier each from Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Hanover, Liechtenstein, 
Bremen, and the duchy of Nassau; single soldiers were also listed as coming from Belgium, 
Piedmont, and Sicily; and even 31 Neapolitans were serving in the foreigners’ corps. 
Chart 5.17 - Bourbon foreigners' corps: origin of the soldiers captured in the Papal States, 
06.01.1861 
 





Of the 2,077 soldiers captured, 260 were Germans according to our definition. 
Soldiers from southern Germany were predominant, with 209 soldiers from Bavaria, 
Württemberg, Baden and Liechtenstein. There were also 41 soldiers from Prussia and Saxony.  
If we assume that the composition of the subset of those captured in the Papal States 
reflects that of the entire corps, there would be approximately 504 German soldiers in total, of 
which 217 would be Bavarians, 161 Württembergers, 45 Prussians and 35 Saxons. 
Considering the official enlistment period was four years
1007
, the numbers provided in these 
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 Regolamento per la reclutazione del 13° battaglione cacciatori e de' due battaglioni carabinieri leggieri 




Chart 5.18 - Bourbon foreigners' corps: origin of the German soldiers captured in the 
Papal States, 06.01.1861 
 
(Elaboration on the basis of the numbers provided by Albert Maag) 
5.4 German officers across the political divides 
Only some of the Germans in the various Italian armed groups held the position of officer.  
Generally speaking, officers, from generals to second lieutenants, comprised roughly 
3-5% of the total manpower of the European armies of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.
1008
 This similarity in the percentage of officers throughout Europe is not surprising, 
when considering that the formal organization of armies into corps, from regiment to 
company, seems to have been widespread throughout Europe during this period: The military 
encyclopaedia of Julius Castner from 1882 notes for instance that in “Germany and Russia, 
the battalion consists of 4 companies and 1000 men; in Austria and France of 4 companies 
and 900 men; in Italy 4 companies and 950 men”. Hence there is quite little variation; only 
Spain and Great Britain differed a bit more from this scheme, with “6 companies and 800 
men” in Spain and “10 companies and 1000 men, two of which function as depot companies” 
in “England”.
1009
 The officer-soldier ratio in the British home and Indian armies, however, 
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Berücksichtigung des Deutschen Reiches, Waffen und Festungswesen, Taktik und Verwaltung (Leipzig: Verlag 
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still reflected that of the other European armies.
1010
 In the case of smaller armies, the officer 




The officer corps of the Papal Army contained between 550 (1844) and 485 (1870) 
officers, amounting to a percentage of the total army between 4.4-3.7%. The percentages of 
officers in the army of the Two Sicilies are a bit lower, and in 1857 the officer corps 
comprised 1,334 individuals of 69,160 soldiers (1.9%). 
Table 5.11 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Papal Army  





of officers of 
the total 
Papal 1844 12,531 550
1012
 4.4% 
Papal 1850 17,778 570
1013
 3.2% 
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 "Heerwesen Großbritanniens," v. Löbell's Jahresberichte über die Veränderungen und Fortschritte im 
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Table 5.12 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 



































On the opposite political side, the variation in the quantity of officers compared to the 
total count in the army is greater. The complaints at the time that the promotion of individuals 
to the position of officer occurred too frequently in the case of the State of Sicily in 1848 are 
mirrored by the percentage of officers provided by Piero Pieri, according to which officers 
represented approximately 9% of the Sicilian Army. In the case of the Garibaldian Legion in 
1848/49, the proportion of officers to common soldiers was similar to that of the regular 
armies. In 1860, however, the percentage of officers in Garibaldi’s southern army was 
particularly high, and according to one author, the officer corps comprised 7,343 individuals 
of a total of 52,000 soldiers (or ca. 14%). Here, the proportions in the Garibaldian Army was 
comparable to the European part-time reserve corps or militias, which normally had a higher 
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 This is so only in the three main branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery).  
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 This is so only in the three main branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery). H. O. Killmeyer, Militär-
Geographie von Europa mit den asiatisch-russischen und asiatisch-afrikanisch-türkischen Ländern (Stuttgart: J. 








 Giovanni Delli Franci, Cronica della campagna d'autunno del 1860 fatta sulle rive del Volturno e del 
Garigliano dall'esercito napolitano, vol. 3 (Naples: pei tipi di Angelo Trani, 1870), pp. 328-329. 
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Table 5.13 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Sicilian Army 1848 













Table 5.14 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Roman Republic 1848-49 
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Table 5.15 – Number of officers and their percentage Southern Army 1860 
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 Loevinson, Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano, 2, pp. 32-33. 
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 Loevinson, Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano, 2, pp. 35-36. 
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la sua legione nello Stato romano, 1848-49. Parte prima, con uno schizzo geografico., vol. 1 (Rome; Milan: Soc. 
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Table 5.16 - Number of officers and their percentage Cacciatori del Tevere of Luigi Masi 













If we narrow the focus to the foreign officers, the number of people is greatly 
restricted: For instance, despite the fact that there were between 9,000 and 9,500 enlistments 
in the Papal Zouaves between 1860 and 1870, only approximately 150 individuals could name 
themselves Zouave officers in the same period; the officer corps of the Carabineers of that 
same period counted no more than approximately 85 individuals.  
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 Friz, Burocrati e soldati, p. 238. 
1031
 Ibid., p. 239. 
1032
 ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1630-1634 (soldiers). 
1033
 ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vol. 1381 (officers). 
1034
 The registers of the common soldiers of the regiment between 1861 and 1870 reach 10,920 entries, but 
without re-engagements and annulations this number drops to approximately 9,000-9,500 enlistments. 9,000 is 
the suggestion made by Guénel, Dernière guerre du pape, p. 40, but this number seems a bit too low. 
1035
 This is so, if one accepts a similar number of re-engagements and cancellations as proposed ivi, p. 40. 
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Based on an analysis of the soldiers’ registers, it is possible to extract the precise 
numbers of the German officers in the foreigners’ corps of the Papal Army: 7 served as 
officers in the Zouaves between 1860 and 1870; 21 did so in the Carabineers.
1036
 Of these 
officers, 10 were Bavarians, 9 Prussians, 2 Luxembourgers and 2 Badeners. Interestingly, 
one-third of the officers in the Carabineers were Prussian, hence they were – compared with 
the 18% of soldiers from Prussia in total – slightly overrepresented; as with the common 
soldiers, the last residence of several German officers was listed as being in foreign countries, 
from the Papal States (3) to Algeria and France (2 in total). If we allow for the fact that there 
were other isolated “Germans” among the generals (e.g. Hermann Kanzler, who became papal 
Minister of Arms) as well as several in other corps, the actual number of German officers in 
the Papal Army between 1860 and 1870 cannot be much higher than perhaps 40 individuals. 
Of the papal German officers, some had already served the Papal Army for a long 
time. In fact, a “recent” mobilization can be assumed only for some of them; in the Zouaves, 
for instance, one can assume so for Joseph Alois Bach, Albert Kligge (who joined the 
previous corps of the French-Belgian sharpshooters – Tirailleurs Franco-Belges – in October 
1860), Xaver von Korff-Schmising-Kerssenbrock (who joined in December 1867) and the 
two Luxembourgers Félix Poncin de Casaquy and Victor Mousty
1037
 (who joined in 1860). 
The two brothers Ferdinand and Maximilian Hefner from Bavaria, however, joined the Papal 
Army in the 1850s (Ferdinand in 1854, and Maximilian in 1855
1038
); the same goes for 
Hermann Kanzler, who was appointed as a cadet to the 1
st
 foreign regiment of the Papal Army 
in 1845.
1039
 The Hefners and Kanzler made their entire “career” in different corps of the Papal 
Army.  
But even the officers that joined the Papal Army from 1860 onwards often came from 
previous military engagements and remained with the Papal Army for a more or less extended 
period. Poncin served in the Belgian Army between 1853 and 1860 and enlisted in the Papal 
Army in 1860, only to leave comparatively early in 1862. Korff had served in the Prussian 
Army between 1860 and 1864. He then joined the Papal Army in 1867 and remained there 
until September 1870. Lastly Bach, who had never previously served, likewise arrived in 
1867 and remained until September 1870.  
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 See the appendix I, tables A1.26 and A1.28, pp. 489 and 492. 
1037
 That they figure in this thesis as “Germans” is the result of the definition of “Germans” adopted: Those who 
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 They are a “bourgeois” example of the widely diffused practice of entering a military corps in which there 
was already a relative. Another example from the Papal Army are the Stolberg cousins. 
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 ASR, Ministero delle Armi, soldiers’ register vol. 1371 (1° Reggimento Estero, Ufficiali), no. 36. 
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Nevertheless – and this confirms my thesis that there was often a plurality of motives 
that simultaneously came into play even in one single case – at least with regard to Bach, 
Kanzler and Korff, it is possible to verify from their biographies that they came from very 
devoted catholic families.
1040
 They were, or very much became, military professionals and 
pursued wholly military careers between Germany and Italy, but had nevertheless grown up in 
highly religious families. Perhaps there is no better illustration for this overlap between 
military life and (Catholic) religious belief than a list of “soldier saints” that Korff had with 
him in 1868, and which I found in his personal papers for the year 1868: Herein are also 
named the usual patrons of the respective branches of the armies, from Saint Maurice for the 
infantry to Saint Joseph for the engineer corps. 
Image 5.1. “Calendar of holy soldiers” 
 
Source: Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive Münster, Nachlaß Franz Xaver von Korff gen. Schmising-
Kerssenbrock (1838-1910), Bri. N. XVI. 
 
It is also of note that in the Papal Army, the German officers were not predominantly 
of noble origin. Of the 7 Zouave officers only one was of noble background (Korff); and of 
the 21 German Carabineer officers, only 6 came from noble families. 
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Among the Garibaldians of 1860, on the other hand, – considering the more complex 
archival situation, and the different corps – 8 officers in total were from Germany, 4 of which 
were born in Prussia, 2 in Bavaria, and one officer each from Baden and Luxembourg.
1041
 
Looking more closely at the biographies of these German officers it becomes clear that 
many on this side of the conflict had had previous military engagements as well. Of the eight 
German Garibaldian officers, at least seven had previously served in regular armies before 
they joined the southern Italian campaign.  
Ferdinand Fix from Luxembourg
1042
 had served in the German navy between 1849 and 
1852
1043
, and after his Garibaldian experience he entered the engineering corps of the Italian 
army. Then, in the spring of 1862 he joined, as captain, an infantry regiment of the (northern) 




Ernst Hoffman[n] served as an officer in the Prussian engineering corps, then 
participated in the first Schleswig-Holstein War (1848-1851), after which he joined the 
British service and fought in Crimea and in Africa. After having served in the Garibaldian 
campaign, he joined the engineering corps of the Italian Army, but, like Fix, left to serve the 






Karl Spraul first served in the Bavarian infantry before he joined the British German 
Legion for Crimea. After 1860, he, too, joined an army of the Union.
1046
 
Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, instead, had served in the Prussian engineering corps from 1838 
to 1850 and then became an instructor in Swiss service from 1850 onwards. After 1860, he 
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 Bild and Luigi Adolfo Wolff both served in the Bourbon Army. Wolff’s 
previous military engagements are recorded as the “Roman Army”, “Africa”, and “Italy 1848-
49”. Lastly, Francesco Ulrich had served in the Prussian Army before enlisting with the 
Garibaldians. 
The previous as well as subsequent military engagements of these German officers are 
a clear indication that we are dealing very much with professional soldiers that actively 
pursued military careers, albeit in various armies; some of these officers tended to remain on 
one political side, while others would oscillate. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The identification of German soldiers and officers across the Italian political sides most 
certainly suffers from the varied quality of information in the various sources available. 
Therefore, the study of the “transnational soldiers” of the Risorgimento, especially of those 
that participated in the Mazzinian and Garibaldian campaigns, faces issues that are well 
known to the scholars of the Italian garibaldini.  
While this archival situation must be kept in mind, it seems nevertheless clear from the 
available material that the number of foreign soldiers was the highest in the armies of the 
Anti-Risorgimento. Both in absolute and relative terms, most of the foreign soldiers served in 
the Papal Army. This is not particularly astonishing, considering that the army depended 
entirely on formally voluntary enlistments and that at various and specific points the explicit 
decision was taken to recruit abroad. The numbers show that the combination of political and 
cultural mobilization, the presence of national associations created to support the Papal Army 
or even to provide it with soldiers, resulted in a doubled or tripled papal presence in the 
European states (papal recruitment structures, Catholic clergy and Catholic diplomacy), made 
itself quantitatively felt. The concrete recruitment activities and structures had a clear effect 
on the outcome: this is evident in the case of the elevated number of German papal soldiers 
from Aachen and nearby Eupen, where the presence and activities of an association to recruit 
Papal Zouaves was amplified by the nearby recruitment office; it is also clear in the case of 
the Bourbon foreign recruitment, where the presence of recruitment offices in Austria as well 
as the official decision not to enlist northern Germans led to the enlistment of a high 
percentage of southern Germans. Despite the projects to support Garibaldi, the actual 
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structures to recruit Germans were either created too late (Becker was, so to say, always too 
late) or were not effectively put into practice; the German case was hence different from that 
of the Hungarian, French or British, which had all provided apposite Legions for Garibaldi. 
Therefore, the largest group of German Garibaldians was formed in a very particular way: i.e., 
by deserters from the Bourbon Army. In this way, the behaviour of the Germans was not only 
similar to that of the soldiers that brought about the initial formation of the Hungarian Legion 
in 1859 the Germans were similar to the initial formation of the Hungarian Legion in 1859, 
but also to that of the many southern Italians that enlisted as the Garibaldians approached and 
passed through Sicily, Calabria, Basilicata and finally Campania. 
It is worth noting that the foreign participation in the various Garibaldian campaigns in 
general quite often conformed to the percentages of foreigners in the regular European armies 
of this period. Therefore, contemporary historians must take care not to confuse their 
“transnational perspective” of the garibaldini with the idea of a supposedly exceptional 
“transnational character” of these campaigns. 
More specifically, the previous paragraphs also demonstrate that although the papal 
recruitment was the most successful in quantitative terms, with regard to both the foreign and 
the German soldiers, German recruitment never reached the levels that, for instance, the 
French soldiers did in the same army. Organizational, political, diplomatic and last but not 
least legal reasons were determining factors in this outcome: The fact that there were no 
official papal recruitment offices in German territory, but instead were present in France, 
Belgium and Austria, most certainly influenced the number of German individuals that could 
be attracted to the papal cause. This reality also influenced the regional origin of those 
Germans that did join the Papal Army via the recruitment offices abroad. 
In terms of their distribution in the Papal Army, only a minor portion of the Papal 
Zouaves, but a considerably larger number of the Papal Foreign Carabineers consisted of 
soldiers from the German states, excluding Austria. The relatively small German contingent 
of the Zouaves was characterized by the rather strong Prussian, more precisely Rhenish and 
Westphalian, origin of the soldiers, which brings to mind the early Prussian Kulturkampf. As 
shown in chapter 4.2.2.3, the Rhenish and Westphalian Catholic nobility lay at the forefront 
of the recruitment efforts for the Papal Army, and some of their exponents were themselves to 
be found in the Papal Zouave corps; other Rhenish and Westphalian enlistments were more 
indirectly linked to these activities. The Germans that joined the Carabineers came instead 
mostly from southern Germany. The social origin of the soldiers in these two corps also 
partially differed: While there were some (noble) landowners in the ranks of the Papal 
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Zouaves (even if there were not many in the officer corps), approximately 65% of the German 
Zouaves were artisans and labourers. The German Carabineers, on the other hand were from a 
slightly lower social status, but conversely there were more nobles amongst the Carabineer 
officers.  
Compared with the Carabineers, the Zouaves tended to remain in service slightly 
longer than their German comrades in the other corps. Although they served on average for 
nearly two years – the similar median of days of service shows that this is not an average of 
extremes, the German Carabineers, despite the fact that they had to enlist for longer periods 
than the Zouaves, served for fewer days on average than their Zouave counterparts. Most 
likely also due to their longer contractual period, desertions were far higher in this corps than 
they were in the Zouaves. Nevertheless, it seems that the commitment of the Zouaves was 
more “enduring”, which likely hints at a partially higher political motivation, especially when 
specific economic incentives or deterrents can be excluded by virtue of the fact that the 
payment schemes of the two corps were very similar.  
The enlistment on the part of the German Zoauves and the German Carabineers (but 
also that of the Garibaldian German soldiers and officers) was often not the first. Previous 
military engagements, among which service abroad, from the French Foreign Legion in 
Algeria or Mexico to previous engagements in the Papal Army were frequently recorded in 
the registers. In terms of age, both groups were very similar; each were only partially 
comprised of adolescent boys, but, nevertheless, predominantly counted young adults.  
A comparison of the two papal regiments is of course especially interesting when 
considered within the context of another element: different military corps of the same army 
often had a different level of prestige, and frequently had a different social composition as 
well. Traditionally, not all regiments of the European armies were of the same symbolic 
“rank”; they differed in prestige in the eyes of the monarch, the officers themselves and the 




Differences of prestige and “rank” among the corps of the Papal Army also existed. 
The Papal Zouaves had systematically been “mythologized” and “celebrated” by Catholic 
publications from its very inception; the Zouaves were described as the Pope’s “volunteers”, 
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 See, e. g., Winkel, Im Netz des Königs, especially on the “rank of the corps” pp. 62-66; Lutz, Offizierskorps, 
pp. 112-116; for the case of the Bourbon Army and the exclusively noble royal guards, see instead Giovanni 
Montroni, "I gentiluomini della chiave d'oro," Meridiana, no. 19 (1994): pp. 59-82.  
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and not only as a multinational corps, but also the finest corps of the Papal Army.
1050
 Without 
doubt, this myth, which was fabricated at an early stage, contributed to the successful Europe-
wide recruitment campaigns. From the moment it was created, the corps of the Papal Zouaves 
was conferred upon it a “singularity” in terms of the supposed motivation and social origin of 
the soldiers and officers, which was intimately connected to multimedia-based and also multi-
national elaborations of the military events of 1860 and 1867. The myth of the “Zouaves” still 
surfaces in a somewhat “Freudian” error for instance in Bach’s biography, which was written 
by Jakob Knauber. Knauber writes that Bach, upon his arrival in Rome, was directly 
appointed to the Zouaves. This, however, was not the case insofar as Bach was first appointed 
to the Carabineers. Much like Bach, Korff also switched between the two corps.  
The analysis of the German soldiers and officers suggests that the myth of the Papal 
Zouaves, while important for the mobilization, only partially informed the military reality. 
Some Zouaves had joined the Papal Army well before the events of 1860 and 1867; many had 
also served in different corps and/or different European armies and not the Zouaves alone; 
and many had stayed with their corps for quite a long period and often pursued a military 
career in the Papal Army. In other words, a distinction must be made between the “image” of 
the respective corps that was more or less consciously produced by the contemporaries at the 
time, the effects that this image had on the general and military publics and the actual 
differences that, however – at least based on information extracted on the sample of German 
soldiers – seem to have been smaller than the image created at the time would have us 
believe. 
The history of the officers provides a similarly “sobering” effect as well. Again it is 
important to emphasize that when speaking of officers we are dealing with only a small 
portion of any given army’s total count; the same can be said of the even more restricted 
group of German officers.  
However small their number, there is generally far more and more detailed 
information on, as well as private sources for officers (including those from Germany) than 
there is for many of the rank and file. Hence, it is possible to analyse more in depth their 
biographies, personal networks and affiliations. It is not surprising in fact that officers take 
centre stage in many studies, especially with regard to foreign soldiering. While this can be 
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Dernière guerre du pape, Coulombe, Pope's legion or even Harrison, "Zouave stories”. 
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somewhat justified on the basis of their military role, it is important not to forget about a 
“history from below” of the rank and file of the “transnational soldiers”. Officers and 
common soldiers – due to their specific tasks and institutional placements, but also to other 
differences regarding for instance how they spent their time, the knowledge of foreign 
languages, and last but not least, income – could have had somewhat different experiences 




6 Volunteers and mercenaries: Individual motivation and the classification of warriors 
Delving into the underlying motivation of soldierly engagement in Italy is an 
epistemologically difficult endeavour. First, it is important to underline that “motivation” was 
one of the main topics of the contemporary controversy between the political sides; it was a 
“war of concepts” that revolved around two words: “volunteer” and “mercenary”. Second, the 
question of motives is especially difficult from a scientific perspective, insofar as there are 
serious problems of proof, not to mention the possible existence of different and 
contemporaneous motives. Third, by the fact that in recent historiography volunteers are 
considered indirect proof of the diffusion of national discourse – or, in the more recent 
historiography, as proof of the political conviction of the anti-Risorgimento soldiers – the two 
aforementioned problems become intertwined: If the concepts of the “volunteer” and/or 
“mercenary” are applied in the study of (foreign) soldiers in the Italian armed groups of the 
nineteenth century, we use words that are ubiquitous in the sources. The risk, however, is that 
the words used in the sources become confounded with the words of the analysis thus creating 
confusion. In this way it becomes difficult to maintain critical distance, which is facilitated by 
the use of more analytical concepts. 
The distinction between economically motivated “mercenaries” and politically and 
ideologically motivated “volunteers” was a central feature of the clash between the pro-
Unitarian forces on the one hand and the legitimists and Catholics on the other, i.e. the 
“conceptual political” conflict. The way in which each side characterized the two forms of 
soldiers as well as the words that were used to make a distinction between "ours" and "theirs", 
and specifically "our volunteers" and "their mercenaries", was rather similar.  
6.1 Volunteers and mercenaries – a “war of concepts” 
Each side characterized its “own” soldiers as economically uninterested “volunteers”, and 
described the soldiers of the “other” as being economically driven “mercenaries”. One of the 
demonstrations of proof that a given side's soldiers were volunteers, and therefore only 
politically motivated, was that these (supposedly) renounced their pay. In 1868, the Catholic 
Mösinger wrote with regard to the Papal Zoaves that these last “often served paying their own 
way”.
1051
 A comment made by the papal soldier Eickholt about his mother somewhat 
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contradicted this statement. Apparently Eickhart's mother did not want him to accept payment 
for his service to the Pope. But, when she realized that this was not possible (because a 
regular wage was, as aforementioned, stipulated in the contract) she decided to make personal 
monthly donations to the Pope for the same amount her son earned.
 1052
 On the opposite side, 
for instance Rüstow spoke of his lack of interest in economic rewards: “I soon made an 
agreement with myself to ask for the lowest conditions possible, because I found that it was 
not appropriate to receive money while serving a cause for which I nurtured the highest 
interest.” But despite these words, we know that he was not paid like other officers, but that 
he had negotiated specific conditions, including a “modest” allowance to be paid to his 
family, both during his activity in Italy or in the event of his death, in addition to coverage of 
only the “most necessary” for himself.
1053
 Disinterest in economic rewards was an important 
ingredient of the topos of “sacrifice” so much so, that this created the environment whereby 
soldiers, in demonstration of their support to the cause, were conditioned to display little or no 
concern with regard to economic considerations. Harro-Paul Harring, a participant in the 
invasion of Savoy in 1834, described the typical privations of “sacrifice”. He spoke of his 
comrades as being “the model of abnegation and altruism” and consequently refused, in a 
footnote, to be called a “soldier” seeing that the term was etymologically connoted with 
money.
 
Nevertheless, a bit further on in his text, he specified what sums he had advanced 
from his own pocket during the campaign (157 Swiss francs, “without counting my 
nourishment”), obviously still hoping to be reimbursed in spite of the fact that the “invasion” 
had been unsuccessful.
1054
 This topos of “economic disinterest” did indeed play an important 
role in the debates between political adversaries, but it was also prominent in the debates 
between exponents of the same "party". Within this same context of the Savoy campaign, the 
question of “economic disinterest” was one of the most prominent criticisms advanced against 
the hired General Gerolamo Ramorino insofar as he had stipulated, in previous campaigns, a  
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„Ich war, da ich es für unangemessen hielt, eine Sache, für welche ich das größte Interesse empfand, um des 
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ferner die Zusicherung einer andern kleinen Summe für den Fall, daß ich in Italien den Tod fände, einer Summe, 
die genügen würde, die ersten Bedürfnisse meiner Familie zu decken […],. Für mich selbst aber verlangte ich 
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supposedly “enormous” wage for himself. According to the apparently personally 
economically disinterested Harring, Ramorino had received an enlistment premium of 40,000 
Swiss francs for his role in the “Invasion of Savoy”.
1055
 
Each side of the conflict would couple the heroization of their own foreign soldiers 
with the denigration of the opposite ranks, especially the foreigners, often reserving for them 
the pejorative label of "mercenary". Assumptions regarding the economic intentions of 
soldiers on the opposite political side were not only an effect of but also part of the process of 
the moralization and nationalization of the concept of the soldier, which especially took place 
during the nineteenth century. The Italian Nationalists liked to refer to the papal soldiers as 
“the Pope’s foreign mercenaries” (mercenari stranieri del papa) to polemically mark a 
difference between the volunteer who fought for ideals and the foreign soldier who would 
fight for anybody who would pay him.
1056
 According to Garibaldi, the papal soldiers were 
“mercenaries, waste from all European cesspits”.
 1057 
Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow considered 
them to be “depraved people” fighting only for money or as undisciplined “drunkards”.
1058 
In 
1860, an article in the German liberal journal “Grenzboten” expressed quite a negative 
opinion on the social origin of the foreign Bourbon soldiers: “For the corps of foreigners, the 
Austrian and Bavarian rabble is contributing with a strong contingent, and still now the 
steamships of the Triestian Lloyd bring twice monthly bunches of these warriors to the depots 
of Brindisi and Molfetta.”
1059
 On the other side, Catholics believed the Garibaldians to be 
motivated solely by pay or the hope for war spoils, and were referred to as the “Garibaldian 
thieving horde’.
1060
 The papal brigadier Eickholt described the soldiers of Victor Emanuel II 
of 1870 as “mercenaries”, of which one “could not expect honourable comportment.” The 
foreigners fighting on his side, however, were characterized in terms of voluntarism. 
According to Eickholt, papal soldiers were totally different from the Italian soldiers: “Noble, 
enthusiastic youth were gathering under the yellow-white flags, driven by the most idealistic 
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 This classification into volunteers and mercenaries, in the last instance, 
depended here as elsewhere on the “evaluation of the legitimacy of [the soldier’s …] action 
and his motives […].”
1062
 
The terms “mercenary” and “volunteer” were first and foremost expressions of 
political propaganda in the nineteenth century. These “asymmetric counter concepts”
1063
 were 
this century’s parallel to binary conceptualizations that would be used in later periods: “The 
freedom fighters of the one side were the terrorists of the other.”
1064
 Perhaps it is not true “that 
there was no longer any place for the mercenary in the nineteenth century”, as Andreas 
Herberg-Rothe has written.
1065
 What was lacking however, was the positive perception of the 
mercenary; this negative consideration was already present in the contemporaries of the 
eighteenth century, as Peter Burschel has argued
1066
, and even more so in the nineteenth 
century. In this period, plenty of room was given to the discursive denigration of foreigners in 
the ranks of the adversary, by describing them as mercenaries, and to the idealization of those 
in one’s own ranks as idealistic volunteers. The figure of the volunteer was used as a symbol 
to represent the soldier that was politically convinced of the objectives of the campaigns he 
was fighting in; the volunteer was not just a soldier, but he was first and foremost an 
individual specifically and exclusively motived by political convictions. As such, the term 
"volunteer" was not confined – in terms of terminology or concretely speaking – to the 
democratic or liberal political arenas. What we have before us is a discourse on voluntarism: 
On neither side was the recognition or approval of the economic motives of their soldiers 
“sayable”, but both could and readily did – almost to a coercive degree – characterize their 
own soldiers as idealistically motivated "volunteers".  
6.2 What the agents themselves identified as their motives 
In their own personal accounts, the Germans who fought for Mazzini and Garibaldi, as well 
those who served the Pope and the last Bourbon King tended to highlight their idealist 
motives. This was the case of the German democrats who joined Giovine Europa and took 
part in Mazzini's attempted invasion of Savoy in 1834, which seemed to fulfil Mazzini's hope 
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for the fraternité des peuples
1067
 in a democratic as well as a national sense. Harro Paul 
Harring, the revolutionary from Schleswig-Holstein, emphasized his democratic and 
humanistic motives for this attempted revolution in his Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie et sur les 
derniers événements de Savoi, which he wrote when in exile in Dijon in 1834: “The cause of 
Italy and Savoy was and is still that of humanity, and the enterprise that sadly proved 
unsuccessful aimed to bring liberty and independence to the peoples bent under the yoke of 
despotism”.
1068
 For Wilhelm Rüstow, participating in the Expedition of the Thousand was a 
way to express his general commitment to democracy and the liberty of nations, which he 
wished could be realized for all of them.
1069
 On the other side of the conflict, devotion to 
Catholicism and the conviction that the Pope needed to maintain his temporal powers were 
prominent themes among the reasons given by Germans for fighting in the Papal Army. The 
German papal soldier Eickholt wrote: “As in the case of the crusades, where the call ‘God 
wills it’ resounded all throughout the world … so at the end of the 1860s throughout the 
whole Catholic world rang out the call ‘Up, to Rome’. We’ve come to defend the Holy 
Father, to stand up for his unalienable rights by the sword.”
1070
  
6.3 The place of the volunteer in current Risorgimento historiography 
The prominence of the figure of the volunteer did not end with the polemics between the 
political sides during the nineteenth century. In fact, it is reserved a special place in both the 
older and more recent historiography on the Risorgimento.  
The supposedly elevated numbers of Italian volunteers are used as a kind of proof that 
there was an equally highly mobilizing force of national discourse. But if one is to use the 
term “volunteer” to mean a politically motivated soldier, it is necessary that an analysis of the 
motives of the soldiers be carried out. What is interesting is that to date this type of analysis 
has for the most part been excluded from the research sets. 
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This may be said of Banti and his work. Catherine Brice considers him to be a 
historian whose focus lies in the history of “political mobilization”, and I concur.
1071
 Political 
mobilization is indeed a central topic in some of the debates found in the “new Risorgimento 
historiography”. Banti and Ginsborg's assertion that the Risorgimento was a "mass 
movement" clearly goes against those Italian and international nationalism studies that 
maintain that nationalism did not or only much later on reached strata larger segment of 
society.
1072
 One of the underlying sources of this debate, it seems to me, is that both Banti and 
those that dispute his assertions tend to use synonymously two or three historical objects that 
for analytical purposes, however, would be better – at least initially - to keep separate. In fact, 
they all seem to have very easily equated “national discourse” to “nationalism” to “national 
movement”.
1073
 In doing so, Banti and Ginsborg can claim that there was a “mass movement” 
by deducing its presence from the massive diffusion of “national discourse” as shown by 
Banti in his monographs. In this way, however, they are able to circumnavigate and avoid 
carrying out a historical analysis of the actual organization of this “national movement”. 
Hence, Banti and Ginsborg tend to equate “national discourse” with “national movement”. At 
the same time, their critics tend to do the same between “nationalism” and “national 
discourse”: By using the (“traditional”) argument that nationalism did not affect the non-
bourgeois classes in the early and mid-nineteenth century, they assume that “national 
discourse” did not do so either. 
There are sound epistemological, theoretical as well as empirical reasons against using 
synonymously the historical objects "national discourse", "nationalism”, and "national 
movement” from the outset; this is because to do so would simply be to address one object 
with multiple new labels. As I argued in the first chapter, the use of the concept of discourse 
in regard to the national sphere only makes sense when some of the defining features of this 
concept are preserved. 
With regard to the term “volunteers”, it is important to see that within the 
historiographical context of Risorgimento studies volunteers are considered as a supposedly 
direct, unproblematic confirmation of the extent of “national discourse” on the one hand, and 
of the presence of other forms of cultural and political motivation on the other. Furthermore, 
many authors perceive volunteering to constitute a particularly “Italian” tradition. Eva 
                                                 
1071
 Brice, "Alberto M. Banti," pp. 434-38. 
1072
 For a broad discussion of the intensity and chronology of the nationalization of different social strata, see 
Weichlein, Nationalbewegungen und Nationalismus, pp. 67-88. 
1073
 “Banti’s analysis of nationalism” is discussed for instance by Lucy Riall, even if she rightly underlines 




Cecchinato, for example, speaks about the “voluntary nation” and even “voluntary cities”, 
claiming that “everything was ‘voluntary’ in the Risorgimento”.
1074
 Similarly, Anna-Maria 
Isastia notes that voluntarism “was one of the most significant experiences of the Italian 
unification process and one of the constitutive elements of the myth of war experience that 
has accompanied entire generations of men.”
1075
 Lucy Riall speaks of a “volunteer 
movement”, which according to her “had a powerful and prolonged appeal for young men 
across nineteenth-century Europe. Volunteering offered a new – youthful, energetic, romantic 
– model of political engagement that owed much to the fraternal ideal of the French 
Revolution.”
1076
 She goes on to note the special role of the volunteer in Italian history: “In 
Risorgimento Italy, the volunteer took on a particular military and political meaning.”
1077
 She 
continues, that “in the most crucial moments of the Risorgimento, they [the volunteers] 
personified the Italian nation.”
1078
 But many studies
1079
 – first those of Banti – do not openly 
discuss or address the topic, because, as will become clear in the following paragraphs, the 
problem is in a sense “hidden” behind the concept of the volunteer itself: in fact, the concept 
of the volunteer inherently depends on questions of intent. And simply because the historical 
analysis of underlying intent is particularly difficult in epistemological and empirical terms, 
some believe it better to avoid altogether.  
In much of the work carried out in the last few years, the term volunteer is used 
unquestioningly, suggesting that according to the authors of these studies the motivation of 
the participants in the conflict was adequately clear. Remnants of this assumption can still be 
found in the tendency to label the pro-Risorgimental soldiers “volunteers”, and those of the 
“anti-Risorgimento” “mercenaries” or – less polemically – “professional soldiers”. In this 
sense, it is already a step forward if newer research “detects” volunteers on the legitimist and 
Catholic sides as well.
1080
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The problem regarding how concepts are used, or regarding the lack of problematizing 
them, also persists in the study of foreign soldiers on the various sides of the Italian conflict of 
this period.  
Contrary to the idea of the “nation in arms” principle, armies of this century continued 
– as was shown above – to be supplied through multiple forms of recruitment. Even where 
one or another form of conscription existed, as in the case of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
or Piedmont, a portion of the soldiers continued to enlist on a formally voluntary basis; in 
states without conscription – e.g. Tuscany (until 1855) or the Papal States – all of the soldiers 
were formal volunteers the service of which was governed by contract.  
These formal volunteers are easily confused with the politically driven war volunteer, 
which in the national context is considered proof of the reach of national discourse, or in the 
international context is used in many studies on foreign soldiers in nineteenth-century Italy. 
The encyclopaedias of the nineteenth century, however, already reflected the complexity and 
the confutation of such concepts as formal volunteers, mercenaries (which can formally be 
considered to be “volunteers”), national and political war volunteers, and the Prussian “one-
year-volunteer”.
1081
 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, old definitions have 
mingled with new ones, and after the “construction of the volunteer of the French Revolution 
as a mythical figure”
1082
, the war volunteer was highly moralized in public debates, as we 
have seen above. 
But how foreign soldiers in Italy in this period are to be labelled can be called into 
question. The range of possible positions becomes clear when looking at the ways in which 
for instance Gilles Pécout on the one hand and Matteo Sanfilippo on the other have addressed 
the topic. Gilles Pécout proposed the following definition of the international political war 
volunteer:  
“[The] phenomenon of the international volunteer fighter can in its simplest form be 
defined as the spontaneous movement of men who had no initial attachment to any regular or 
established army, who left their own country without having the need to earn money as their  
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sole motivation (which does not mean that they would not earn some) in order to serve in a 
military and political struggle in a country other than their own […].”
1083
 
In his paper on North American soldiers in the ranks of Garibaldi and the Pope, 
Matteo Sanfilippo expresses his fundamentally opposing criticism, according to which the 
“romantic idea of volunteers motivated only by their political fervour, either revolutionary or 
reactionary, often hides mercenaries, driven by the need of food and shelter.”
1084
  
Sometimes it is more a question of confusion than actual controversy. For instance 
some note that “all British ‘red shirts’ belong to the ‘amateur’, ‘citizen-soldier’ typology”
1085
, 
while according to other authors “many of them had served in the Crimea in 1854 or in 
India”
1086
 ", indicating that they were far from amateurs militarily speaking. 
This leads to the question: what type of soldier were the foreign participants on the 
various Italian sides of the Italian Risorgimento? Are they to be labelled as political 
volunteers, mercenaries, or professional soldiers?  
6.4 Epistemology of the sorter: volunteers and mercenaries 
There is a myriad of terms available to classify ‘weapon-bearers’: soldiers, mercenaries, 
warriors, warlords, partisans, guerilleros, pistoleros, militiamen, war volunteers, regulars, 
combatant, men-at-arms, etc. The terms are based on a variety of connected factors: form of 
recruitment, the type of weaponry, fighting method, type of group they fight for, relation to 
the state, type of adversary, motivation for fighting, payment, and form of armed group they 
are part of.
1087
 In this study, it is not possible to discuss in depth all possible criteria for all of 
the aforementioned terms; instead, I have decided to focus more specifically on the concepts 
of the volunteer and the mercenary, insofar as these concepts are central to contemporary 
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polemics and constitute a major issue in the historiography on both Italian and foreign 
soldiers in the Risorgimento.  
Payment is often thought of being a valid criterion to distinguish between professional 
soldiers and mercenaries on the one side and war volunteers on the other. For John Keegan, 
mercenaries “are those who sell military service for money”.
1088
 Michael Howard similarly 
states that the sixteenth century mercenaries “served any master […] so long as they were 
paid.”
1089
 In this sense, the volunteer seems to be a fighter that receives no pecuniary or other 
form of economic recompense for his engagement, while the professional soldier and 
mercenary do. From this perspective, only a fighter that paid for his maintenance “out of 
pocket” would be a “war volunteer” in the strictest sense of the word. Such a stringent 
definition of war volunteer would necessarily exclude all fighters that had received economic 
rewards, and those who did must in turn be classified as professional soldiers or mercenaries. 
But as we have clearly seen, the foreign soldiers of nineteenth-century Italy were frequently 
paid or were granted at least the right to payment; similarly, other fighters in other conflicts 
that would normally be regarded as war volunteers were paid, one example being the 
members of the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War.
1090
 To regard them as 
‘mercenaries’ would however be “little less than insulting”.
1091
  
Worth noting is the fact that the designation ‘mercenary’ goes – etymologically and 
conceptually – beyond the criterion of payment as such. The issue of payment is intrinsically 
present in the Italian, German, English and French words for the ‘soldier’. This term in 
particular is sometimes used to designate arms-bearer in general, and, following the French 
Revolution, is sometimes specifically reserved for the conscript.
1092
 This may be traced in the 
etymology of the term, which derives from the Roman imperial coin ‘solidus’.
1093
 Even in 
German, the term for the mercenary (‘Söldner’) may be traced back to the same origin. But 
the French, English and Italian word ‘mercenary’ etymologically stems from the Latin “merx” 
for goods, hence, the English expression “merchandise”. It is this etymology that coincides 
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with the analysis of the ‘mercenary’ made by Michael Sikora, who underlines the importance 
of the external perception of the intentions of the arms-bearer, the assumption the fighter is 
governed by venality: “Whether a warrior is to be considered a mercenary or not depends 
essentially on the external valuation of the legitimacy of his actions and his motives. […] His 
[the mercenary’s] actions signify not more than a paid and reified service.”
1094
 Therefore, it is 
not the pay as such that counts as the decisive criterion in identifying who is a mercenary, but 
rather the assumption of the individuals intentions, the idea that he fights only for the pay he 
receives for his service.
1095
 Gilles Pécout’s definition is in accordance with this emphasis on 
intentions; it is not whether or not an individual is paid that according to him defines whether 
an individual is a volunteer or a mercenary, but rather whether that pay is the "sole 




Economic considerations were sometimes quite relevant for the foreign soldiers. 
Before going to fight in Italy, some of the pro-Risorgimento volunteers had lived in exile, 
mostly in France and Switzerland. Financial problems tended to be a chronic and intrinsic 
element of the condition of exile, and fighting in Italy was an opportunity for paid 
employment.
1097
 At times these financial difficulties could even lead to the point where exiles 
would join, against their political beliefs, the service of counter-revolutionary forces (for 
instance as spies) just to secure the means to survive.
1098
  
6.4.1 Foreign origin 
The foreign origin of a soldier is another important element in current typologies of the 
warrior. It has been argued that mercenaries “generally serve foreign powers”
1099
, i.e. serve a 
state/nation that is not their own. According to John Keegan, for instance, soldiers can be 
termed as “regulars” if they “already enjoy citizenship or its equivalent but choose military 
service as a means of subsistence”, while the mercenary is devoid of the citizenship of the 
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country he fights for.
1100
 In other words, mercenaries do not have the “patriotic commitment 
to the state they serve”.
1101
 Within the nationalization of the armies, patriotic commitment 
seems to be the only legitimate motivation of soldiers. However, it would be erroneous to 
perpetuate this view since it is possible that foreigners, too, “could have been motivated by 
their ideals”, even if they were not necessarily “patriotic”.
1102
 By refusing to acknowledge 
that foreigners could also be motivated by ideals, we fall into the trap of nationalist 
argumentation which tends to overlook the possibility that a “transnational” political 
motivation for a cause can exist. 
Even here one comes back to the issue of intentions and intent, insofar as it becomes 
necessary to assess whether there is or is not political "content" that can explain the choice of 
a foreigner to engage. In other words, the foreign origin of the soldier is not a sufficient 
criterion with which to make a distinction between mercenaries and/or professional soldiers 
on the one hand and war volunteers on the other. According to Michael Sikora, it is not the 
foreign origin of a fighter as such that dictates whether they are a mercenary or not, but rather 
the ‘arbitrariness’ of the soldiers’ origin. Only when it is not particularly important what army 
or country an individual is fighting for – indicated, for instance, by a multitude of politically 
different military engagements over the course of a soldier's lifetime – can one perhaps justify 
calling him a "mercenary". 
6.4.2 Form of recruitment 
Another of the criterion used to discern between types of warriors is the form of recruitment. 
Above, the distinction between conscription and voluntary enlistment as a valid criterion to 
distinguish between the volunteer and the mercenary was excluded because both enlistments – 
that of the political volunteer and of the mercenary – are voluntary in nature at the formal 
level.  
Other criteria used in the identification of the war volunteer that are dependent on the 
form of recruitment are equally problematic. Contrary to Pécout’s definition, wherein 
international war volunteering was considered the “the spontaneous movement of men who 
had no initial attachment to any regular or established army”, I have tried to demonstrate how 
the recruitment of foreigners was often actively sought out, and the act of recruitment was to 
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differing degrees well organized by the various armed groups, whether it occurred in Italy
1103
 
or abroad. In the case of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, for instance, Nir 
Arielli has shown how the “spontaneity of the first months of the war was replaced by an 
organized network of recruitment and transport.”
1104
 He then expresses the interesting idea 
that the “reliance on elaborate and secretive recruitment and transport networks distinguishes 
foreign volunteers from other transnational soldiers.”
1105
 While this may be true for the 
twentieth century, this is a problematic assertion for the nineteenth century: Not only were 
recruitment and transport networks typical elements that governed the use and employment of 
“mercenaries” between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries (it is enough to recall the 
recruitment structures in the Swiss cantons), but, due to the various bans on foreign 
recruitment, they were often at least partially secretive as well, (again, all one has to do is to 
recall how Austrian complicity with regard to Bourbon recruitment efforts were still subdued 
even in 1859 and 1860).
1106
 
Regardless, governments, armies or semi-independent operating recruiters nearly 
always had to convince the prospective foreign soldier to enlist, and therefore necessitated 
organizational structures. Non-coercive practices played upon the putative intentions of future 
soldiers, by advertising economic rewards (mercenaries, professional soldiers), career 
prospects (professional soldiers) or arguments based on ideals (war volunteers). In other 
words, recruitment efforts can hint at what the enlisting armies and governments believed 
were the decisive interests of soldiers they wished to recruit: How did they advertise 
enlistment? What was the content of the enlistment contracts? The aforementioned criteria 
help us to gather data that are important for identifying the plausible intentions of potential 
soldiers. The various forms of advertising used for recruitment reveal what the armies or 
governments believed would be the motivations of these people for joining.  
With regard to a soldier’s initial reasons to join, some authors make a distinction 
between distinct “waves” of “volunteers”
1107
, or they identify different motives for officers 
and for the rank and file.
1108
 In her work on the French soldiers in Sicily and Rome in 
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1848/49, Anne-Claire Ignace proposes an interesting typology. With regard to the French 
“volunteers”, she identifies several types: she speaks first of the “political activist whose faith 
[…] was stronger than his military qualities”; and second, of the “military” man, who “if not 
exclusively motivated, [was] at least heavily incentivised by the prospects of promotion and 
Italian career”; and, third, “the old combatant for liberty”, “who combines real military 
experience obtained in the ranks of the French army with a sincere liberal conviction”.
1109
 
However, due to their previous connection to “regular armies”, the last two types that Ignace 
mentions do not adhere to strict definitions of the political war volunteer. In his study on the 
Italian “volunteers” in the Portuguese Army of 1832–1834, Grégoire Bron similarly notes that 
“about half had previously pursued a military career in Italy”.
1110
 Considerations regarding 
their military career could be found in their writings. Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, for example, 
had been expelled in 1850 from the Prussian officer corps because he had sided with the 
revolution, and his decision to serve with Garibaldi was a way to bridge a gap in his career 




These findings on foreign soldiers are in line with some new in-depth studies of the 
biographies and motivations of Italians that joined the armed groups. A rapid look at the 
biographies of Italian revolutionaries of the 1840s – e.g., Guglielmo Pepe, Carlo Bianco di 
Saint Jorioz, Attilio and Emilio Bandiera, to name just a few – shows that many of them had 
in fact had considerable contact with “regular” army institutions, be they the Bourbon or 
Austrian military academies or the Army of Piedmont. As Eva Cecchinato has emphasized, 
there was a significant level of mobility of these individuals between the “regular” corps of 
states’ armies and the various Garibaldian undertakings, both before and after 1860.
1112
 
Contrary to a clear-cut conception of the war “volunteer”, many former participants of the 
campaign in the 1860s sought to enter “regular” service, and of the original “Thousand” more 
than 200 eventually found their way into the “regular” Italian Army, even if many of them 
were not assigned actual military duties. Furthermore, a recent study on several Venetian 
Garibaldians has revealed that many also joined armed groups for generational and family 
reasons.
1113
 These studies hint at the plurality and complexity of the initial motivation factors  
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underlying the choice to join the Garibaldian armed groups. Thus far, studies on the “reality” 
of foreign soldiering in the Risorgimento reveal varying degrees of divergence from the “ideal 
types” of the “political war volunteer” as defined by Pécout. 
When considering the aforementioned criteria all together, it seems clear that the 
question of intentions cannot be overlooked, because it remains fundamental for the 
typological classification of warriors most interesting in our case, namely the differentiation 
between the mercenary and professional soldier on the one hand, the foreign war volunteer on 
the other.  
6.5 Problems of intentional explanations 
But the analysis of motives, for theoretical and empirical reasons, is particularly difficult.  
6.5.1 Problems of proof 
At the individual level, the principal theoretical problem is connected to the difficulties of 
finding acceptable proof of the agent’s intentions. In motivational psychology it is essentially 
accepted that an individual’s “motivation” cannot be directly observed an isolated object, but 
it can only “be unlocked” “via indications”.
1114
 All too often and too easily, we as historians, 
however, tend to accept “utterances about intentions in the sources as proof of these 
intentions”.
1115
 But this is only possible if we believe that our informant is sincere.
1116
 To 
accept the agent’s statements as sufficient direct proof of their intentions runs the risk of 
being naïve: Agents can consciously hide their true motives, or can unconsciously express 
false motives, either because they lack the capacity of introspection or wish to transmit 
another self-image. Therefore, an agent’s statements can only at best be one element among 
others in the methods used to extract indirect proof, which rely on contextualization. By 
assuming an agent’s biographical coherence, we can try to demonstrate that a stated or 
assumed motive conforms to what we already know about the agent and the context within 
which he/she is placed.  
A more specific type of error committed in historical analysis also applies here. It is 
the so-called problem of planning: “The rule that many historians tend to see actions as proof 
of an intention in the case of a striking analogy between plans and actions, has one exception. 
This is the case when planning is attributed the character of a standard. The eventual 
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execution is normally not seen here as proof of specific intent. An important example for this 
category lies with military plans and actions. Because officers are concerned professionally 
with the preparation of wars, their plans cannot be directly taken as proof of aggressive 
intentions.”
1117
 This example is a clear reminder that the fact that foreign soldiers who joined 
groups that fought to accomplish specific political aims does not necessarily say anything 
about the underlying reasons for why these soldiers enlisted. Similarly, according to 
organizational theory, it is not uncommon to find that the aims of an organization do not have 
to correspond to those of its members.
1118
 
The description of an action is not independent from assumptions on the underlying 
intentions. If we look at the German soldiers in the armed conflicts of the Risorgimento, this 
knowledge leads us to bring our analysis into focus: Was it primarily going to war, going to 
war in another country than one’s own, going to war in a particular Italian armed force or just 
in Italy in general? Was it primarily to go far away, to Italy, to the Vatican? In some cases this 
line of questioning can lead us back to the aforementioned possible intentions, as among 
which the economic (mercenaries, professional soldiers), career-oriented (international 
officers), ideological (democratic or legitimist; Catholic and anti-Catholic fighters of the 
“European Culture Wars”), or even legal (fugitives) animating patterns. In all of these 
instances the actions can be explained by assuming that there are plausible “good reasons” for 
them.  
Motivational psychology differentiates between motives and “motivational self-
images”. The latter constitute an interesting object especially for historiography, because they 
are, according to the psychologist Rheinberg, informed not only by one’s “own perceptions”, 
but “as well by influences of socialization, especially by assessments, evaluations and wishes 
of important other individuals and cultural norms.”
1119
 Motivational self-images, in other 
words, are especially open to historical variation. History consists partially of a chronological 
change of the respectively accepted, “legitimate” classes of motives. In our case we have 
noted that a politically defined ideal of volunteerism was present in all political sides of the 
Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento; it conceptually presupposed that the single volunteer 
believed in the political aims of the armed group he was fighting for. Society – on all political 
sides – expected, so to say, the political commitment of soldiers, and therefore this 
commitment began to take centre-stage in many recounts of the historical agents. By too 
                                                 
1117
 Ibid., 115. 
1118
 On the (contemporary) military as an institution and organization, see Elbe and Richter, "Militär. Institution 
und Organisation". 
1119
 Rheinberg, Motivation, p. 199. 
287 
 
easily equating “uttered motives” to “factual motives”, and by the seemingly easy 
interconnection between the description of actions and the assumed intentions, it is no wonder 
that political commitment also takes centre stage in many studies. To claim, as I have done, 
that there were also, at least partially, economic, career-oriented or more specifically military 
motives in operation, seems to be in contradiction with this seemingly easy interlocking 
between self-disclosures, motives, and descriptions of actions. 
6.5.2 Intrinsic, extrinsic motives 
It is useful here to diversify the concept of motives. After some debate on the concepts of 
“extrinsic” and “intrinsic” motives
1120
, recent motivational psychology seems to revert to the 
idea of discrimination between stimulation by purpose and stimulation by activity. Those 
activities that “are executed for the activity alone, and not for the output” are intrinsically 




In fact, in our case of foreign soldiers, extrinsic motivations (pay, political goals) were 
found alongside intrinsic motivations (preference for the military “lifeworld”, the possibility 
of visiting Italy).  
If they did not already have it upon their arrival in Italy, some soldiers seemed to 
acquire a “taste for military life”
1122
 while in the Italian armed groups. Emblematic is the 
aforementioned case of Joseph Alois Bach, who was perhaps much more a volunteer when he 
entered the Papal Army in 1860 than when he left it in 1870.  
War in general and volunteering in a foreign war in particular offered opportunities to 
break with dull daily routine by doing something exceptional. The culture of Romanticism 
gave this kind of desire a much broader appeal.
1123
 Two contexts within which soldiering may 
be seen are the Romantic exaltation of adventure and the search for different forms of 
sociability, in this case within martial and male-dominated societies. Already since Klaus 
Theweleit’s much-debated book about the literature of the German Freikorps was published 
we are aware of the fascination that membership in a male group (a “Männerbund”) can 
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conceivably exert on at least parts of male society.
1124
 This form of “homosocial desire”
1125
 is 
particularly prominent in the military context. Jürgen Martschukat and Oliver Stieglitz, in 
accordance with the studies of Thomas Kühne on “comradeship” in World War II, write that 
the military “Männerbund” cannot be seen just as “an alternative to family and motherly love, 
but – due to its protective, affective as well as (homo-)erotic components – also as an 
analogue structure [to the family], and even as the central basis of the symbolic order of 
war.”
1126
 As Through his analysis of the painting “Léonidas aux Termopyles“ by Jacques-
Louis David, and by underlining the masculine way in which Garibaldi described his wife 
Anita, Alberto Banti has similarly shown that “friendship between fighting men” was an 
important topic in the cultural mobilization for war.
1127
  
Finally, performative objectives – such as actions to overcome national decadence by 
“literally” exhibiting military and manly abilities – may also be seen in terms of intrinsic 
motivation.  
6.5.3 Shared presence of different motives and overdetermination 
Actions not only can be, but are, in fact, very often caused by receiving “multiple stimuli at 
the same time”.
1128
 The Romantic and the political elements could in fact co-exist with the 
quest for personal military glory, and with considerations of career and remuneration. An 
officer like Rüstow, for example, who had been expelled from the Prussian Army, may have 
chosen to join Garibaldi's ranks for a variety of intentions: ideals, career and economic 
considerations. As it has been shown above, the German commitment on the various sides 
was in fact informed by a plurality of motives that ranged from economic to political aims to 
the intrinsic stimulus of army life or adventure. Furthermore, evidence suggests that there was 
often a surplus of such motives: even if one of the aforementioned motives would 
theoretically be sufficient to determine action, frequently different motives were 
simultaneously manifest; hence, in terms of motivational psychology, the situation was 
“overdetermined”. It is far from evident, for instance, whether an economic motivation 
actually precludes a priori the existence of other motivating factors. 
But a plurality of motives and overdetermination becomes problematic when we have 
to choose between concepts that are mainly linked to the presence of one, primary motive. 
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That the “right” concept to name the agent intimately depends on motivational issues is only 
one further example of the known problem that the descriptions of actions are “always linked 
to interpretations and intentions: The designation of an action […] therefore changes 
according to the aim that we see ‘behind’ this action.”
1129
 To assume “psychological 
coherence”
1130
 in the historical actors does not necessarily resolve the problem the moment 
that many of the foreign soldiers for a more or less lengthy period were members of other, 
regular as well as irregular armed groups before they joined their respective Italian armed 
group. Therefore, the agents at time demonstrated “biographical coherence” in their choice to 
lead a military life and at the same time a parallel coherence in their political activities. 
Finally, the emphasis that has been placed on political motivation, so it seems to me, 
also informs a partially instrumental view of the military that is less interested in the “military 
life” as such. The study also proposes to shift this focus by having a more detailed look at the 
“lifeworld” of the military, by asking for the specificities of the subsystem of the military and 
the processes of mutual influences between this partially independent “world” and society at 
large. 
6.5.4 “Unconscious” motives and historiography 
As we have already seen above, motivational psychology differentiates between “basal” 
motives and “motivational self-images”. In fact it is important to see that the image “that the 
individual has of himself and of his preferences, wishes, values and long-living aims”
1131
 does 
not necessarily have to be identical to the actual motives. Even if it is highly problematic to 
adopt this conceptualization from psychology and apply it to historiography – because in the 
former discipline “basal” motives are considered to be quite biological, hence by nature 
“unhistorical”, stimuli
1132
 – a similar differentiation nevertheless exists in historiography as 
well. Carl Gustav Hempel, for instance, underlined that many humans are rational in a double 
sense, because, despite their real reasons, they also cultivate rationalizations.
1133
 
Rationalizations are not a lie insofar as an individual sincerely believes that what they are 
saying is true and real. When an individual writes and speaks of these self-images, it 
constitutes more of an "unconscious" misrepresentation than an intentional lie.  
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The “unconscious” (not necessarily the “subconscious” in the Freudian sense) is an 
important theoretical figure both in psychology and in historiography. In most of the more 
recent psychology it is seen (again?) to be an exception “that one has clarity down to the last 
detail as to why exactly an envisaged target is considered to be so desirable. It is from this 
point of departure that analyses of motivation that go beyond that which is already clear to the 
agent himself become possible.”
1134
 The idea of motives that are unconscious to the agents 
themselves has been a central aspect of classic social history since the 1960s. The words of 
Jürgen Habermas that “history is not exhausted by what human actors mutually intend”
1135
 
was taken up by Jürgen Kocka as the basis of a historiography that reserved some space for 
“structures” of which the agents themselves were not necessarily aware. This was also 
directed against the “idealistic and increasingly ideological concept of liberty, action and 
personality”
1136
 that had been flourishing since the nineteenth century. Many of the recent 
works that were produced after the “cultural turn”, especially if linked to the concept of 
“agency”, tend to astonishingly re-establish the subject in its former central position. In 
opposition to these tendencies, however, some authors continue to underline the need for a 
more structural cultural history. In this sense, “structures are”, as Philipp Sarasin has written, 
“the denomination of something which the subject in his activity does not consciously have at 
his disposal.” Thus Sarasin places a “cultural history informed by theories of discourse” in 
opposition to a “hermeneutic cultural history”, which once again focuses on the subject. The 
difference between the two, according to him, precisely regards “the position of the subject 
and hence his subjective opinions and beliefs within the analysed historical context.” He 
refuses the “hermeneutic cultural history”, which runs the risk of “get[ting] caught in the old 




On the basis of these theoretical and empirical problems in the analysis of motives, I propose 
several conceptual decisions. For studies that focus on the fighters in the Risorgimento (as 
well as those in other cases) it would be constructive to avoid the denomination of these 
soldiers as volunteers right from the outset, simply because this concept tends to hide, and  
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even to cover, a series of ambiguities and problems that are interesting in their own right. 
Instead, I propose that a more neutral term be adopted, such as “foreign soldiers” or 
“transnational soldiers”
1138
, rather than foreign volunteers or mercenaries. These more neutral 
concepts can be seen as generalized terms for soldiers that serve in an armed group not of 
their nation or region. Under these terms, however, it is possible to subsume foreign 
mercenaries, professional soldiers or the political war volunteer. Of course these proposed 
“new” terms are not totally neutral either, in fact all one has to do is remember the etymology 
of the word “soldier” and how it stems from the word “pay”.
1139
 Nevertheless, they seem to 
me preferable, perhaps even in the sense of an initial overshooting, because of course the 
primarily politically motivated war volunteer may have and has existed as well. But by 
choosing to use these proposed terms, we have to justify our subsumption by making a more 
detailed analysis of motivational structures. Otherwise, to speak of “volunteers” runs the risk 
of creating a circular argument, where the term itself seems to prove the predominance of 
political motivation in the actors.
1140
  
The highly moralized character of the concept of the volunteer in the nineteenth 
century and its central role in the political polemics between the opposing sides, encourages 
us to keep the concepts of the sources separate from our analytical concepts; if this is not done 
we run the risk of reproducing the contemporary polemics in our studies instead of critically 
questioning them.  
Finally, it seems to me that the concepts of volunteer and mercenary force us, perhaps 
too much, to produce clarity in terms of intentions, which in reality only seldom occurred. 
This is not to say that studies that focus on the genesis of specific classes of motives are 
obsolete; but their perspective is necessarily different than that which seems to be appropriate 
for concrete studies on soldierly engagement. With regard to the latter, it still seems important 
to recall the difference between motives and motivation: Motivation in this case signifies the 
"aggregation of reasons” that incites an individual to act. And, as this study suggests, these 
motives originate from an entire spectrum of human life and experience. And these motives, 
as well this study is suggesting, are originating from a whole spectrum of human life; they are 
economic, professional, compassionate, political, and psychological in nature (and the list 
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goes on). Each one of these, in differing degrees, can inform the concrete motivation – i.e. the 




Part 3 – The enlisted:  







7 Military experiences and practices 
7.1 “Experiences” and “practices” and the “history of everyday life” 
The following chapter examines the experiences and practices linked to the presence of 
German soldiers in the various Italian armed groups in this period. It aims to bring together 
the substantial literature on historical war and military experiences
1141
 and the theoretical 




. Predominantly two different 
types of sources are used: The legal and administrative sources on the Italian armed groups 
and their foreign soldiers on the one hand and the reports of the German soldiers in Italy on 
the other. 
As was briefly mentioned in the second chapter, different authors from different 
disciplines have addressed the issue of experience. The need for a more theoretically informed 
concept of experience was motivated by the growing unease with the common use of the 
notion of experience as the “authentic” individual understanding of that which is “real”. In 
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contrast to this illusion of reality, some authors have instead underlined how experiences are 
shaped by social and cultural structures. With her article on the concept of “experience”, for 
instance, historian Joan Wallach Scott instigated an intense debate in the field of feminist 
historiography, the reverberations of which continue to resonate within the rest of 
historiography.
1144
 Scott denied that it was possible to challenge the dominant discourses of a 
society by considering subjects to be "reliable sources of a knowledge that comes from access 
of that which is real by means of their experience". Instead, she underlined “the necessarily 
discursive character of […] experiences”.
1145
 The weighty emphasis Scott placed on 
(discursive) structures, however, nearly inevitably leads to new problems inasmuch as 
experiences, according to Scott, seem to be informed by discourse, or, more generally, by 
structure alone.  
To a certain extent, the “naïve” reading of experience as a kind of genuine expression 
of that which is “real” and the opposite position of experience as, so to say, a genuine 
expression of “structure” are the two extreme positions of a continuum that informs all of the 
other positions. All authors that, regardless of their discipline, have contributed to the debate 
on experience, struggle with a basic tension between continuity and change; between 
experience as informed by the reconfirmation of or bringing into being discursive or semantic 
structures; and experience as the wedge that is driven between these structures. The 
theoretical proposals on experience differ according to the relative weight they attribute to 
continuity or change and according to the ways in which they try to connect the two, 
addressing hence the question of where change comes from. Of course these various positions 




Niklas Luhmann, for instance, reserves the concept of “experience” for that which 
explicitly goes against our expectations; his conceptualization of experience, therefore, is 
totally different from that of Scott, who underlines the pre-configuration of experience 
according to precisely those (discursive and internalized) expectations. Among the concepts 
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 See as a recent example Harold Mah, "The predicament of experience," Modern Intellectual History 5, no. 1 
(2008): pp. 97-119. 
1145
 Joan Wallach Scott, "The evidence of experience," in Hames Chandler, Arnold Davidson, and Harry 
Harootunian, eds., Questions of evidence. Proof, practise, and persuasion across the disciplines (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 372 and 377. The text was initially published as Joan Wallach Scott, 
"The evidence of experience," Critical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (1991): pp. 773-97. 
1146
 For a criticism of Scott that aims to rescue “agency” as well as “experience” – seen here as informed 
especially by encounters with others, by communication – see Laura Lee Downs, "If 'woman' is just an empty 
category, then why am I afraid to walk alone at night? Identity politics meets the postmodern subject," 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 35, no. 2 (1993): pp. 414-37. 
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used by Luhmann, “semantics” is the analogy for that which, according to Scott, shapes 
experiences. In the Luhmannian sense, experiences that do not adhere to our expectations do 
not directly change the “semantics”, but rather prompt us instead to change or alter our level 
of observation. Experiences in this sense stimulate us to observe our observations. They 
introduce reflexivity by urging us to think about the “semantics”; this reflexivity can then 
become the basis for a change in the semantics themselves.
1147
  
According to Luhmann, but also such theorists as Pierre Bourdieu or some exponents 
of discourse analysis – who place emphasis on the intersection between different discourses 
or situations where they “fail” – change seems very much to come from a situation of conflict 
or confrontation, to bring to the fore the possibility of different world views, or even to lead 
directly to “symbolic struggles over the perception of the social world”.
1148
 In contrast to this 
idea that change is a result open conflict, however, other authors underline instead the 
importance of slow, subliminal change. It is precisely through “practices” that discourse in the 
Foucauldian or Butlerian sense comes to life. These practices are, for instance for Judith 
Butler, primarily a continuous “citing” of discourse. Due to constantly changing situations, 
however, they are never a totally precise rendition of discourse. According to this position, it 
is precisely from the repetition of practices that change occurs; but for the actors, this change 
is slight, slow, and more or less goes unnoticed. 
When this discussion on “experiences” and “practices” is looked at as a whole, it is 
possible to see the importance of everyday life: Discourse reveals itself not only in more 
restricted linguistic practices, but can be grasped as well by examining other types of action. 
Even more so, without its translation into daily life discourse remains unrealized; the 
pervasive power of discourse becomes evident by its ability to affect everyday life (and 
conversely, its lack thereof is evident when it does not affect this realm). Moreover, if we 
conceptualize change, for instance in agreement with Judith Butler, to be the slight alteration 
in the repetition of practices, an interest in the concrete analysis of practices is the obvious 
result. Even if the aforementioned authors conceptualize practice and agency differently, that 
which Alf Lüdtke has already written holds true with regard to his definition of 
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 See, e. g., Niklas Luhmann, "Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie," in idem and Jürgen Habermas, Theorie 
der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. Was leistet Systemforschung? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), 
pp. 25-100; on Luhmann and system theory in the context of historiography see Frank Becker and Elke 
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an interruption in the symbolic structures and the need to think anew in Sarasin, Geschichtswissenschaft und 
Diskursanalyse, p. 60. 
1148
 Pierre Bourdieu, "Social space and symbolic power," Sociological Theory 7, no. 1 (1989): p. 20. 
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Alltagsgeschichte “as the history of everyday behaviour and experience”, in which “historical 
change and continuity are understood as the outcome of action by concrete groups and 
individuals. Human social practice is shifted into the foreground of historical inquiry.”
1149
 
The experiences and practices linked to the presence of German soldiers and officers 
in the Italian armed groups were, so to speak, informed by different contexts. As will be 
discussed below, a part of the concrete military life of these German soldiers and officers was 
very much informed by the same cadences, duties and problems that Italian or other foreign 
soldiers in Italy also encountered. Furthermore, in order to identify and understand the 
specificities of the practices and experiences of the German soldiers in Italy, it is necessary to 
compare the military life of the Italian soldier with that of the foreigners as well as that of the 
specific group of the Germans. The same holds true when analysing how the German 
presence brought about or triggered change in the Italian armed groups; if one were to note 
where transnational transfers have occurred, one must compare – however “artificial” such a 
logical operation may be in the intertwined world of history – different states, the before and 
the after. Unfortunately, the Italian pre-Unitarian armed groups of the nineteenth century have 
been studied very little and even less so from the point of view of everyday military life. 
There are large gaps in the basic information available on these armies because historiography 
has very much concentrated on either the armies of the Italian states leading up to the 
eighteenth century or – in a kind of history of the “victor” – on the new Italian Army 
following 1861. Only the military history of the pre-Unitarian army of Piedmont – for similar 
reasons – has been studied in more depth.
1150
 A study of the German soldiers and officers in 
the Italian armed groups, however, does not wish to nor cannot completely do away with 
these fundamental lacunae in the military history of the nineteenth-century Italian armed 
groups. It at best can provide a prism for such possible future research.
1151
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 Alf Lüdtke, "Introduction. What is the history of everyday life and who are its practitioners?," in idem, ed., 
The history of everyday life. Reconstructing historical experiences and ways of life (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), p. 6. 
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 This is not totally different in Germany, where the Prussian Army of the nineteenth century was traditionally 
in the historiographical focus. See especially the debate on the role of the Prussian Army with regard to the 
German Sonderweg, first and foremost by Demeter, The German officer-corps. Only recently, the military 
history of the other nineteenth century armies has been studied more in depth, see especially the works on the 
officer corps, e.g., Lutz, Offizierskorps and Gahlen, Offizierskorps. 
1151
 For a call for a new military history of the Italian nineteenth century, see also my publication Göhde, "A new 
military history," pp. 21-39.  
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7.2 The military: a “hyper-codified” world 
The modern military as a social subsystem is characterized by its strong dependence on 
official rules and regulations. Hence, according to the military sociologist Lorenzo Greco, the 
military is a hyper-codified (“ipercodificato”) world.
1152
 The highly codified as well as highly 
bureaucratic nature of the military is especially interesting for historians because it provides a 
variety of sources often unmatched by other parts of society. This variety of sources can be 
used not only for research on the military as such, but for a wide array of other questions, 
which touch upon such topics as nutrition, body or education history. Though, in the case of 
the regulations, the tension between legal prescription and actual execution must always be 
kept in mind.  
In the nineteenth century, military regulations had already reached an extremely 
elevated level of comprehensiveness in the armed groups of the European states. These 
various regulations can be grouped into primarily three distinct categories: 
 
1. Basic regulations, which concerned nearly every aspect of the concrete service in the 
army. For the greater part, they were common to all branches. In general terms, there 
was a trend to diversify these regulations: Whereas the regulations on drills and those 
on other important aspects of military life were still issued together in one single 
regulation during the eighteenth century, over the course of the nineteenth century 
many separate regulations on specific topics were issued.
1153
 Whether they were 
unified or not, these service regulations contained instructions on a vast variety of 
issues, such as for instance:  
 
Regulations on the competences and duties of the different ranks and offices, the 
modes of inspection, the basic activities of troops such as building guards, the way of 
commanding and executing orders, the daily assemblies of the corps, the parades, on 
how to go on patrol, how to keep/preserve order in the places where they were 
stationed, on military hospitals and prisons, on the provision of beds and comestibles, 
on quartering in barracks or civilian households, on basic external features of 
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 Lorenzo Greco, Homo militaris. Antropologia e semiotica della vita militare (Leghorn: Belforte, 2009), pp. 
91-92. 
1153




instruction, on permissions to take leave, on the service of the military chaplaincy, on 
military honours and ceremonies, on the role of the army in civil ceremonies, etc.  
 
Another class of regulations was comprised of  
 
2. Drill books. These books were more strictly concerned with corporal instructions with 
and without arms, on the basic corporal posture of the single soldier, marching at 
military pace, presenting of arms, the formation of tactical groups such as columns 
and so on. That drill books were issued not only in every country but also within each 
country for the different branches of the army ails to transmit the fact that these drill 
books were widely copied throughout Europe. 
 
Lastly, a third type of regulations consisted of  
 
3. Military criminal laws. Although these laws specifically addressed military 
"misdeeds", more stringent penalties were also frequently contemplated for military 
subjects that committed "civil" offenses than for civilians that committed the same 
offenses. 
 
For the Papal and Bourbon Armies
1154
, but also in part in the case of the Roman 
Republic or the State of Sicily of 1848-1849, the first type of regulation consisted of the 
comprehensive general service regulations
1155
 on the one hand, and on the other by single 
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 Even in the case of the pro-Bourbon guerilla groups the officer Zimmermann posted the regulations “on the 
outposts’ service” and the camp and a “short extract from the previous Neapolitan military [criminal] code” and 
began to train the brigands with the “most necessary military movements”. “Ich ließ Vorschriften über den 
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militärischen Bewegungen und Fertigkeiten beginnen […]“. Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen 
Briganten-Chef's," p. 64. 
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 Very comprehensive in terms of regulated issues is the Bourbon “Ordinanza di piazza” from 1831, which 
includes regulations on housing and food rations, military hospitals and prisons, military chaplains, 
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more on the services that were to be performed in the garrison cities, while issues like housing or the service of 
the chaplains were regulated by own, separate and individual regulations. The Bourbon general regulation is the 
Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, il servizio e la disciplina delle Reali Truppe nelle piazze; the Papal is the 
"Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio," in Raccolta delle leggi 
e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello stato pontificio emanate [...] Dal 1° gennaio al 31. dicembre 
1866, vol. 20 (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1866), pp. 406-732. 
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specific regulations such as on housing
1156
 or the military chaplaincy
1157
. In terms of the 
second category of regulations described above, the different branches of the armies had 
distinct and separate drill books, such as those used by the infantry in the Papal Army from 
1858 onward
1158
 or in the Bourbon Army from 1833 onward.
1159 
Finally, the third group of 
regulations was comprised of the military penal laws. In the Papal Army, the same set of 
military penal laws applied to both indigenous and foreign soldiers.
1160
 In the Bourbon Army, 
however, the military penal laws differed according to whether the soldier was in an 
indigenous corps or in a foreigners’ corps.
1161
 On the opposite political side, at least at the 
legal level, the military criminal law used by the regular Army of Piedmont was applied 
(garibaldini of 1859 and 1866), or was based on this last albeit with some changes (Roman 
Republic 1849). In 1860, the decision was made in Garibaldi's Southern Army to apply the 
Piemontese regulations to soldiers that had arrived from the north of Italy and to apply the 
regulations of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to soldiers from the south.  
The general service regulations combined with the drill books and the military 
criminal codes formed a tripartite foundation upon which the administration and education of 
the soldiers at least in the regular armies should have been based. Copies of the three were to 
be present in every place where troops were stationed, together with “a copy of the best works 
known on offence and defence”.
 1162
 Similarly, a copy of the general regulation was to always 
be on hand in each and every squad, as well as a copy of “the one on exercises and 
manoeuvres and the military criminal code.”
1163
 It was common that parts of the basic 
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 Ordinanza di Sua Maestà per gli esercizi e le evoluzioni delle truppe di fanteria, (Naples: Reale Tipografia 
della Guerra, 1833). 
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 "Regolamento di giustizia criminale e disciplina militare," in Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica 
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Sua Maestà pel governo, § 100, p. 18.  
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 “[..C]opia della presente ordinanza, non che di quella per gli esercizj e le manovre, e dello statuto penale 
militare.” Ibid., §1593, p. 246. 
302 
 
regulations as well as of the respective military criminal law relevant for the soldier were read 
regularly to soldiers. Explanations of the paragraphs on desertion were incorporated into the 
instruction given to new recruits. In the Bourbon Army, in the event this section was not read, 
deserters could not be punished; therefore, from 1859 onwards readings of the military 
criminal code had to be noted in the soldiers’ service book.
1164
 
7.3 From dawn to dusk: the history of everyday military life of the (foreign) soldier 
7.3.1 The cornerstones of the day: From the assembly (assemblea) to the curfew (ritirata) 
The general service regulations, which were valid for all corps including the foreigners’ corps, 
can reveal how military life should have been in the respective armies.  
7.3.1.1 The “visita” after dawn  
In the Bourbon Army, for instance, the day of the common infantry soldier began when the 
respective corporal would wake the soldiers up; normally this would occur at dawn between 
May and October, but half an hour before dawn from November to April, so approximately 
between 04.30 and 6.30 a.m. After having dressed and made their beds, the soldiers were 
summoned to the ”visit” (visita) by a drum roll half an hour after their wake-up call; the visit 
took place still in the dormitories or in specially designated places when accommodation was 
provided by civilians. The visit served first and foremost to control which soldiers were 
present, to report on those absent with permission and to note whether there were any soldiers 
missing. At the same time, the visit was a means to control the troops in terms of personal 
cleanliness, correctness and maintenance of the individual bed-places, clothing, equipment 
and arms.
1165
 There was then a second visit before soldiers took their only common meal 
together, known as the “ration” (rancio), at 9.30 a.m. (September to May) or 10 a.m. (June to 
August). New royal ordinances were read out loud during the first visit after the wake-up call, 
whereas the more specific regimental orders of the day were communicated during the 
assembly (assemblea), which was held at 10 a.m. in the winter months or at 6.30 a.m. in 
summer months.  
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7.3.1.2 The parade of the “assemblea” 
The assembly was the daily gathering of all troops that were on guard duty in a garrison, the 
higher superiors such as the commandants, and at least one exponent of each of the other 
contingents not engaged in guard duties (present to receive the orders of the day). The parade 
of the “assemblea” also served to demonstrate the drills and test their effects, to test the 
responsiveness of the soldiers to orders and to simulate the interlocking of different branches 
and squads of the military. 
The assembly consisted of both obligatory and facultative elements. Whereas the 
official call of each corps to control the presence of its own troops, the communication of the 
order of the day and the common parade on the ground – comprehensive of a parade in the 
narrower sense of the word whereby soldiers marched before the commander and the higher 
officers – were necessary parts of every assembly, in addition the commander of the garrison 
could pass in front of the lines to inspect the troops and there could also be manoeuvres to 
simulate war situations. At one point during the assembly, the respective heads of the 
contingents could communicate their reports, of which the commandant of the assembly was 
obliged to give notice to the governor or commandant of the whole garrison. At the end of the 
parade, the order of the day was given: this consisted in the repartition of military services 
and communications on the part of the governor or commandant of the garrison such as 
prescriptions; praise and reprimand; communications regarding orders from higher, civilian 




In the Papal Army parades were similarly an important element of military life; Georg 
von Vollmar wrote that the “time – aside from the exercises – was taken up nearly exclusively 




Parades were an important element of military life in the pro-Bourbon guerrilla groups 
of the 1860s
1168
 and in the Garibaldian actions as well. Rüstow reports on one that took place 
on 16 October 1860 in Caserta in the presence of Garibaldi. To Rüstow’s dismay, the British 
Legion – which according to him was the “most good for nothing, unusable corps of the 
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 – also participated alongside his 15
th
 Garibaldian division. The 
German-Swiss officer wrote that the “15
th
 division was assembled in a parade on the 
esplanade in front of the royal palace […]. On the right flank there was the un-mounted 
personnel of the general staff and the intendancy, followed by the Eber Brigade in two ranks, 
the Milano Brigade, and finally on the left flank the Spangaro Brigade also equally arranged 
in two ranks. The ambulance was positioned in the third column. […] Garibaldi appeared with 
Türr and galloped along the fronts of the ranks; the music was playing; the arms were 
presented. In short, it was a parade that one sees in a standing army as well; but, here, 
everything was nicer: with only a few exceptions all were experienced soldiers, there was 
much red, as well as the different uniforms of the various corps. In short, the picture was more 
vivid than one is accustomed to seeing in a peace parade in Vienna or Berlin.”
1170
 Rüstow 
makes clear as well, that the parades were modes of communication and show, that they were 
typical practices that were to be followed in the intercourse between the corps and between 
the officers and the commander that originated from the regular armies but had to be adhered 
to in the Garibaldian forces as well. At the beginning of the parade, for instance, the officers 
had to ride into the middle of the esplanade to “await the dictator there”. After Garibaldi and 
Türr had visited the troops, the officers were called to gather around the “dictator of the two 
Sicilies” (dittatore delle Due Sicilie
1171
), who “dismounted, and hence all other mounted 
officers had to dismount as well.”
1172
 At this point Garibaldi gave a speech after which the 
troops were required to march past the officer corps and the “hero”.
1173
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7.3.1.3 The leave (libera uscita) and the curfew (ritirata) 
According to the general service regulations common soldiers spent much of the day in a 
military context. In the Bourbon Army, the "libera uscita", or the moment in which those with 
a permit could leave the caserns, was set to begin at 1 p.m. in the winter and 3 p.m. in the 
summer; in other words, up to this moment in the day most soldiers could be found in a 
military environment, either in the barracks, on the appositely created drill grounds, at 
military posts, or the sentry-box. This was even more the case with specific groups of soldiers 
– such as new recruits or those requested to carry out additional exercises and drills – which 
were excluded from leaving the camp altogether or could only leave when accompanied by 
higher ranking soldiers.  
The “retreat” (ritirata) (the German “Zapfenstreich”), or the return to the caserns or 
military buildings, occurred half an hour before dusk. The soldiers were required to be in their 
beds and to go to sleep one and a half hours later during the summer months and two and a 
half hours later in winter months; once silence (silenzio), checks were carried out to ensure 
that no one spoke and that everyone was sleeping alone.
1174
  
Table 7.1 – The time-table of the infantry corps in the Bourbon Army
1175
 
November-April May, September-October June-August 
Wake-up ½ hour 
before dawn 
Wake-up at dawn Wake-up at dawn 
Visit ½ hour after 
wake-up 
Visit ½ hour after 
wake-up 
Visit ½ hour after 
wake-up 
Exercises ½ after the 
visit 
Exercises ½ hour after 
the visit 
Exercises ½ hour after 
the visit 
Assembly at 10 a.m. Assembly at 10 a.m. Assembly at 10 a.m. 
Leave at 1 p.m. Leave at 2 p.m. Leave at 3 p.m. 
Retreat ½ hour 
before dusk 
Retreat ½ hour 
before dusk 
Retreat ½ hour 
before dusk 
Silence 2½ hours 
after the 
retreat 
Silence 2 hours after 
the retreat 
Silence 1½ hour after 
the retreat 
7.3.2 The soldier’s “work” 
Generally speaking the foreigners’ corps were very much integrated into the regular services 
of the infantry. This was, for instance, explicitly established in the 1852 law on the foreigners’ 
corps of the Papal Army according to which “a part of one of the foreign regiments  
 
                                                 
1174
 “All’ora del silenzio dovrà trovarsi immancabilmente nelle camerate onde assicurarsi che gli uomini si 
pongano a letto, dormano soli, e che cessi ogni rumore.” Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, § 1603, p. 247. 
1175
 Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, L'esercito borbonico I, p. 131. 
306 
 
contributes, in the same way as the indigenous troops, to garrison the capital and does service 
there.”
1176
 Furthermore, the regulations that contained prescriptions on what services were to 
be carried out were applicable to the foreigners’ and the indigenous corps alike. This was true 
for the 1854 regulation on the internal services of the infantry
1177
 and the 1866 rules on 
service in the garrison cities
1178




Between the assembly and the curfew, soldiers in the regular armies were required to 
carry out various duties. During peacetime, the military services of the soldiers consisted 
mainly of five components: Executing special single missions (“corvées”), carrying out guard 
duty and providing sentinels at the various posts within and without the military camp, 
forming patrols so as to police military personnel, civilians or sentinels, to be present as an 
escort or as a corps in civil occasions, and finally exercising during drills or parades. 
Troops on guard duty could be commanded to transport wood, coal, oil, candles, or to 
carry out cleaning services or buy the comestibles for the common meal (“rancio”). Even if it 
was underlined in the Bourbon Ordinance, / that every kind of work ordered to be carried out 
by the soldiers “will be considered honourable”, many of the less prestigious tasks were to be 




An important portion of a soldier's time and effort were consumed by his guard and 
sentinel duties:: The papal soldier Georg von Vollmar wrote that in the city of Rome alone 
there were 72 posts that were to be manned each day, “of which the smaller ones take 8, the 
larger ones 30 men […] The most pleasant are the posts at the 12 city gates. Here, the soldier 
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 “Ordinariamente, una parte di uno dei Reggimenti esteri, del pari che le truppe indigene, contribuirà a dare 
guarnigione nella Capitale e vi presterà servizio.” Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato lì 7 gennaro 1852 per 
costituire dei corpi militari speciali d'individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede, art. 118, p. 39. 
1177
 Regolamento sul servizio interno per le truppe pontificie di fanteria pubblicato con sovrana approvazione, 
(Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1854). 
1178
 Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio (Rome: Rev. Cam. 
Apostolica, 1866); these rules were initially published in the law gazette: “Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze 
forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio”. 
1179
 Regolamento sull' esercizio e sulle manovre per le truppe pontificie di fanteria: pubblicato con sovrana 
approvazione; A German translation is Handbuch für die Unterofficiere und Corporäle der päpstlichen 
Fremden-Regimenter enthaltend die Soldaten- und Plotons-Schule in Fragen und Antworten. 
1180
 Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, L'esercito borbonico I, p. 133. 
1181
 “In Rom warden täglich 72 Wachen bezogen, von welchen die kleineren 8 Mann, die größeren 30 Mann 
verschlingen. […] Am angenehmsten sind die Wachen an den 12 Thoren. Hier hat der Soldat die Gelegenheit, 
ein Stück römischen Lebens kennen zu lernen.” Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, p. 113. 
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Guard duties were important in regard to the amount of time soldiers were expected to 
spend executing them, and they were also important in regard to the effort necessary to 
sustain a service that was often corporally and psychically “boring”. Soldiers while on duty 
were expected to remain in one place for long stretches, but always had to be ready to follow 
orders or to immediately take up arms should the need arise, including, for instance presenting 
them to higher ranking officials or when the guards were tested for their readiness. At the 
same time, it was explicitly forbidden to alleviate or make easier the sentinels’ service by 
removing and laying aside parts of the uniform or the equipment
1182
, just as it was forbidden 
to become distracted
1183
: “It is forbidden for any chief of a post to have conversation, to 
gamble in the sentinels’ post or to allow others to do so. He must forbid that this is done on 
the part of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers” as well.
1184
 
Rendering guard duty was hence an important source of boredom, exhaustion and last 
but not least led to the condition where the soldiers were thrown back on themselves. Because 
this specificity of guard service was well known, sentinels were closely and regularly 
controlled by patrols; therefore the military apparatus watched the watchmen.
1185
 
Another important element of service consisted in providing patrols. According to the 
papal soldier Rottmund, especially “around Christmas and New Year’s Day we had to 
perform strong patrol service. The frequently occurring political demonstrations and activities 
of the revolutionary party especially made our service ever more trying because day and night 
plenty of patrols and pickets had to fill the streets of Rome.”
1186
 
Such services as those of sentinel duty, guard posts and patrols in the civil sphere 
clearly demonstrate that the regular military was still used for services of “public order”. 
Studies on German garrison towns in the nineteenth century, for instance, confirm this 
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 “Vieterà che i sotto-uffiziali e soldati tolgano alcuna parte del vestiario o del cuojame, o depongano le armi 
da fianco […].” Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, § 548, p. 94.  
1183
 In today’s armies for instance it is forbidden to watch television or to listen to music, to eat, to drink, to 
smoke, or to carry on a conversation that is not strictly related to service; see the act ZDv 10/6 (Wachdienst), no. 
802, e.g. in: Taschenbuch für die Wehrausbildung/Heer (Regensburg, 1987), F09, p. 3. 
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 “È vietato a qualunque capoposto di tener conversazione, di giuocare nel corpo di guardia o di permetterlo ad 
altri. Egli proibirà che ciò si faccia in quello de’sotto-uffiziali e soldati […].” Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel 
governo, §548. 
1185
 About the system of the “gettoni”, see, e.g., ibid., §§720 and 751. 
1186
 “Gegen Weihnachten und Neujahr hatten wir starken Patrouillendienst zu versehen. Besonders die häufig 
vorkommenden politischen Demonstrationen und Umtriebe der Revolutionspartei machten unsern Dienst immer 
strenger, da Tag und Nacht eine Menge Patrouillen und Piquets die Straßen Roms durchziehen mußten.“ 
Rottmund, Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, 
garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern 
bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. Rottmund], p. 48. 
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auxiliary role of the military in “maintaining order and tranquillity in the public sphere”.
1187
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 Ralf Pröve, Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert, Enzyklopädie Deutscher Geschichte 
(Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006), p. 90. 
1188
 In Rome, for instance, the much-hated “sbirri” (“cops”) were replaced in 1816 with the French-style 
“Carabinieri”, and therefore a police force organized militarily as was the gendarmerie in France. After the 
Roman Republic, they were referred to with the name “Gendarmeria”, but continued to be “included in the 
military forces, even if their duties were exclusively of internal defence.” Subsequently, the finance guard 
(“Guardia di finanza”) and the various civic and – in the revolutionary period – national guards were added to 
the militarily organized Gendarmerie. The citations are taken from Friz, Burocrati e soldati, pp. 84 and 86-89 
respectively. For the history of the papal police between the seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, see, e. g., 
Steven Hughes, "Fear and loathing in Bologna and Rome. The papal police in perspective," Journal of Social 
History 21, no. 1 (1987): pp. 97-116. Both the “Gendarmerie” and the – auxiliary – role of regular military corps 
in policing are signs of a “state military”-conception of the police, as opposed to a state civilian and civilian 
municipal ideal type, as was elaborated by Clive Emsley, "A typology of nineteenth-century police," Crime, 
Histoire & Sociétés; Crime, History & Societies 3, no. 1 (1999): pp. 29-44. For our case it is important to note, 
however, that despite the fact that the papal gendarmerie was first named “carabinieri”, as are the current 
“Carabinieri” in Italy, the similar terms used in reference to several of the foreigners’ corps in the Papal and 
Bourbon Armies (“foreign carabineers”) do not signify that they were ideated as police forces. Nevertheless, as 
we have seen, in times of peace these forces did indeed contribute – as did other, differently named indigenous 
as well as foreign corps – to upholding public order. The historiography on police forces in the nineteenth 
century is differently developed in the various countries of Europe. In Germany, for instance, there was a 
heightened interest in the issue especially from the mid-1980s onwards, wherein the transposal of early modern 
governmental concerns of prosperity (“Policey”) into the more circumscribed police forces dealing with public 
order and “tranquillity” was highlighted. This led to a comparatively wide comprehensiveness of “policed” 
social realities in Germany. For this, see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Wolf-Dieter Narr, "Vom Polizey-Staat zum 
Polizeistaat? Ein Forschungsbericht anhand neuerer Literatur," Neue Politische Literatur 23 (1978): pp. 185-218. 
Subsequently, especially political policing, from the nineteenth century (e.g. the work of Wolfram Siemann) to 
the Weimar Republic, and to a lesser degree the policing of general criminality as well, have been the focus of 
German historians. For our purpose, those works that highlight the complex relationship between military and 
police forces are of particular import. Not only did the French-style military gendarmerie model spread to many 
countries, but even the more strictly circumscribed police institutions were characterized by a great deal by 
military culture. This characteristic was carried well into the Weimar Republic, especially due to the military 
origin of the personnel of these institutions. Hence, the police forces indirectly contributed to the militarization 
of European societies. For a discussion of the major contributions in this field up to the mid-1980s and 1990s see 
respectively Wolfram Siemann, "Polizei in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen, Operationsebenen, 
Wirkungsmöglichkeiten. Mit neuen Dokumenten," in Jörg Schömert, ed., Literatur und Kriminalität. Die 
gesellschaftliche Erfahrung von Verbrechen und Strafverfolgung als Gegenstand des Erzählens. Deutschland, 
England und Frankreich 1850-1880. Interdisziplinäres Kolloquium der Forschergruppe 'Sozialgeschichte der 
deutschen Literatur 1770-1900', München 15./16. Januar 1981 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1983), pp. 68-95; Richard 
J. Evans, "Police and society from absolutism to dictatorship," in idem, Rereading German history. 1800-1996. 
From unification to reunification (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 65-86. On the relationship between 
military and police forces, albeit if only for the Weimar Republic, see from the newer literature Daniel Schmidt, 
"Keine Kommissare. Preußische Polizeioffiziere zwischen soldatischem Selbstverständnis und polizeilicher 
Professionalität 1919 bis 1939," Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 69, no. 1 (2010): pp. 37-58. Historiography on 
the police in Italy has only very recently gained in momentum. There had been some studies on the general issue 
of crime and law enforcement before, though, most notably John A. Davis, Conflict and control. Law and order 
in nineteeth century Italy (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Macmillan, 1988) or Lucy Riall, "Liberal policy 
and the control of public order in Western Sicily 1860-1862," The Historical Journal 35, no. 2 (1992): pp. 345-
68. In 2012, a centre for the history of the police force was founded, the “Centro Interuniversitario per la Storia 
delle Polizie e del Controllo del Territorio”; this is a joint project between the universities of Milan, Bergamo, 
Genoa, Messina, Naples (Fedderico II), Pisa and Siena. The Centre publishes a book series entitled “Stato, 
Esercito e Controllo del Territorio”, from which two volumes in particular are of interest here: Livio Antonielli, 
ed., La polizia in Italia nell'età moderna. Seminario di studi, Messina, 26-27 febbraio 1998 (Soveria Mannelli, 
Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2002); Livio Antonielli, ed., La polizia in Italia e in Europa. Punto sugli studi e 
prospettive di ricerca (Soveria Mannelli, Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2006), neither of which, however, was I able to 
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But the presence of the military in the civil sphere was not confined to patrolling 
alone. The very fact that they were present at an ample number of civil as well as religious 
occasions, the Bourbon and Papal Armies also contributed to the display and visibility of the 
military, and hence the state, in the everyday life of the cities. The sheer number of these 
services becomes evident when looking at a calendar included in the papal military annual 
book of 1867.
1189
 Different branches of the army or parts of different corps were asked to be 
present at multiple religious and civil festivities. Therefore, a company of the infantry had to 
be stationed inside the church of St. Peter while the Pope held mass, from the feast of 
purification of the Virgin (2 February) to Christmas (25 December). Similarly, military corps 
were also required to be present when the Pope celebrated mass in other Roman churches. For 
the feast of ascension, for instance, there were to be placed “pickets along the route that the 
Holy Father takes from the Vatican to St. John Lateran”, while parts of the infantry and 
cavalry were to be stationed in the piazza in front of the church.
1190
 Infantry pickets, together 
with sections of the artillery and the dragoons were placed along the Via del Corso during the 
eight days of the Roman carnival
1191
, which was traditionally the central street of the festival. 
In addition the military could be hired out “for decorating processions, non-military funeral 
processions, sacral occasions, or to assist at academies, receptions, mundane festivities”
1192
, in 
which case soldiers and officers alike were to receive extra-pay from the respective authorities 
or private patrons. 
Private companies were expected to pay for the presence of the troops when they were 
called in to ensure “good order”, for instance during theatre performances or public spectacles 
(spettacoli).
1193
 It is not astonishing, hence, that the papal soldier Georg von Vollmar noted 
                                                                                                                                                        
consult for temporal restrictions. Within the context of this relatively young interest in the history of the police, 
of note are several new questions addressed, see for instance on masculinities and the police in Simona Mori, 
"Becoming Policemen in nineteenth century Italy. Police gender culture through the lens of professional 
manuals," in David G. Barrie and Susan Broomhall, eds., A history of police and masculinities, 1700-2010 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 102-22. See as well Enrico Francia, "La 'cabala' degli sbirri. 
Immagini della polizia nella rivoluzione del 1848," Contemporanea (Bologna) 6, no. 3 (2003): pp. 447-74. It is 
not difficult to foresee a renewed interest in police forces and practices as well as secret services within the 
context of “counterterrorism” and especially the most recent NSA-scandal.  
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 Annuario militare pontificio. Anno 1867 (Rome: Tipografia della Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1867), pp. iii-xii. 
1190
 “Picchetti lungo lo stradale che percorre il S. Padre dal Vaticano a S. Giovanni in Laterano. Truppe di 
fanteria e Cavalleria sulla Piazza di S. Giovanni.” Ibid., p. vi. 
1191
 Ibid., pp. iii-iv. 
1192
 “[..P]er condecorare processioni, convogli funebri non militari, funzioni sacre, o ad assistere ad accademie, 
ricevimenti, feste profane […].” "Decreto relativo alle percezioni straordinarie nel disimpegno dei servizi di 
lucro," in Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello stato pontificio emanate [...] Dal 
1 gennaio al 31 dicembre 1866, 23 vols., vol. 20 (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1866), art. 9, p. 687. 
1193
 “per mantenervi il buon ordine” ibid., art. 12-19, pp. 688-690.  
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Of note however, is the fact that the soldiers always participated in these regular 
services within the context of (or parts of) their respective corps. The papal general service 
regulation, for instance, stated explicitly: “The corps that are garrisoned in one place concur 
between them in the various turns of service, but the officers, non-commissioned officers, the 
corporals and soldiers that find themselves in the same place must always be part of the same 
corps.”
1195
 If we take into account the different uniforms of the corps, the soldiers remained 
distinguishable in the civil sphere, and for many civilians it was additionally clear which were 
the indigenous and which the foreigners’ corps. All of this of course suggests that it was 
possible for civilians to make a comparison of the various corps of one army. 
7.4 Hot and cold/cool – military “emotional standards”, drill and exercise 
When looking at the historiography on the nineteenth-century nationalisms alongside that of 
the military history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, at a first glance there appears 
to be a contradiction between the persistence of a military quest for metaphorically “cold-
blooded” soldiers (best symbolized by what has been called “old drill”, see below) on the one 
hand and the supposedly very “emotionally charging” effect of the legitimating constructions 
in general on the other hand. The extremes “hot” and “cold” and “cool”
1196
 symbolize 
seemingly opposed “emotional standards”.
1197
 In the nineteenth century there was a shift 
away from the cold metaphor of military drill; this is related to the tendency toward, as 
Andreas Reckwitz has written, a “positive, productive emotionalization”, which actually took 
place in modernity and is quite in opposition to the idea of “taming” male emotions in 
modernity according to Elias.
1198
 
Some military historians have identified a series of interconnected changes that 
occurred in society in general and in the military in particular that, according to this position, 
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 “Da in Rom gar nichts ohne Militär vor sich gehen kann, so gaben wir auch noch Theater- und 
Kirchenpiquets.” Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, p. 122. 
1195
 “I corpi che tengono guarnigione in una piazza concorrono tra loro pei varj turni di servizio, ma gli uffiziali i 
sotto-uffiziali, i caporali, e soldati che si trovano nello stesso posto, devono appartenere sempre al medesimo 
corpo.” "Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio," art. 46, p. 441. 
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 Historically, the terms “hot blooded” and “cold blooded” were quite similarly used the way “hot headed” and 
“cool headed” are used today. 
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 Stearns and Stearns, "Emotionology," pp. 813-36. 
1198
 Andreas Reckwitz, "Umkämpfte Maskulinität. Zur Historischen Kultursoziologie männlicher Subjektformen 
und ihrer Affektivitäten vom Zeitalter der Empfindsamkeit bis zur Postmoderne," in Manuel Borutta and Nina 
Verheyen, eds., Die Präsenz der Gefühle. Männlichkeit und Emotion in der Moderne (Bielefeld: Transcipt, 
2010), p. 60. Italics in the original. 
311 
 
also had significant effects on the circumscribed field of military education and military 
training.  
Following the experiences made during revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare at the 
dawn of the century, war became increasingly more “ideologized”. The victories of the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Armies had already contemporaneously been 
interpreted to have been based on a change in the motivation of the single soldier, who went 
from being a mere executor of orders (in the standing armies of the eighteenth century) to a 
politically convinced national or “citizen in arms”. In ideal terms, the highly professional, but 
less, or at least differently, motivated (pay, glory) soldier was to be replaced by the less 
professional, but ideologically motivated soldier. Changes in military education and military 
tactics were associated with this shift. Less orderly battle tactics – appropriated from the 
context of irregular warfare – were well suited to part-time soldiers, as for instance.  
7.4.1 The pan-European drill and the “machine” metaphor 
The fact that for centuries military drill has constituted the basic education of soldiers 
throughout Europe and beyond has long overshadowed the historicity of the phenomenon; 
from the Dutch regulations of the sixteenth century onwards, it became commonplace for the 
various armies to copy drill books. The resulting standardization of drill – from commands (or 
their respective translations) to exercises and movements – rendered it far easier for soldiers 
to change armies on the continent. Despite the circulation and persistence of certain forms of 
drill, historians have lately underlined that “manual drill has a history of its own”
1199
, even if 
changes occurred only very slowly.  
The need for basic training in posture, movements and the execution of orders became 
increasingly important following the advent of standing armies in the sixteenth century. The 
consequent increase in the length of time a soldier was to serve was linked to a decisive 
intensification in military education. Moreover, new fighting techniques were based on the 
machine-like interaction between the single soldiers. In turn, this form of interaction was 
dependent on the habitualization of standardized movements. A sizeable portion of training 
consisted in inculcating the soldiers with a rather large number of these movements, the aim 
of which was to prompt the soldier to automatically execute such movements in response to 
orders: “infantrymen were subjected to regularised drill through which they were taught to 
enact prescribed bodily movements with their arms whenever fixed words of command were 
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 Historians have noted the similarities between this “old” form of drill with 
dancing: Much like the descriptions and recommendations on dance steps, drill books 
prescribed in every possible detail precise bodily movements on how to use and to place parts 
of the body in relation to such factors as height, direction, tension and so forth. Within this 
idea that the soldier, the military corps, and the army in general were a machine with 
interacting and interdependent parts, the emphasis that was placed on the precise interlocking 
of the soldiers' movements very much resembled social (i.e. regulated, couple or group) 
dancing.
1201
 The ultimate objective of this type of drill was not to increase the physical 
strength of the body but rather was intended to cultivate the “perfect” interaction and 
discipline within the army at all levels. This type of training was believed to be the best 
preparation for war, “so that in the chaos of battle they [i.e., the soldiers] would instinctively 
revert to their training, and perform these complicated physical tasks with firmness, speed and 
order […].”
1202
 According to the same logic, firing along the line could be made more 
“effective” by dividing the tasks of firing and reloading to different (groups of) soldiers; this 
approach consequently necessitated a strict interlocking of the diverse respective movements 
necessary to carry out the action. Soldiers were expected to immediately and unquestioningly 
execute their orders by performing the meticulously prescribed movements, they “were 




7.4.2 Political motivation was unnecessary: The precise man 
An active individual motivation, shared values or a “positive” political standpoint towards the 
respective war was not regarded as a necessary condition of being a “good” soldier. Rather, 
the soldier was only indirectly bound to the “aims” of a given war by way of his loyalty to the 
monarch and/or the commander of his regiment. This loyalty was, in this last instance, 
characterized by the traditional feudal reciprocity of duties expressed in a contractual manner, 
which in the long run depended more on a soldier’s conscience than on his emotions.
1204
 This 
“contractual” conception of loyalty, hence without the presence of the “positive” motivation 
of the soldier, also played out in a series of concrete military practices. Sophisticated 
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measures of “outward” control (“close-order control”) were established that revealed the basic 
assumption of the authorities according to which soldiers that lacked this control would 
abscond from their duties: In the battle formation of the line, superiors were placed along 
every edge as a means to hinder soldiers from breaking formation. Hans Delbrück in his work 
already underlined the fact that “close-order control” in the standing armies rendered the 
understanding or conviction of the single soldier dispensable.
1205
 
Moreover, “too much” motivation was even regarded to be dangerous: To keep one’s 
calm not only reduced mistakes and loss of material, it also helped to avoid accidents. Moral 
qualities of the soldier did matter, but only strictly in terms of manners: Already the Oranian 
reforms aimed at transmitting self-control and the inculcation of some basic virtues. What is 
important, however, is that military and not political loyalty was required.  
 “Coldness” or “Coolness”, as in to "keep one's cool", was said to be especially 
necessary in order to handle weapons – the moment being too “emotional” was regarded as an 
important reason that led to the injury or death of the single soldier or even that of his 
“comrades”. In the eighteenth century, personal initiative – which can be seen as an efflux of 
emotional involvement – was considered to be counterproductive, and educating soldiers to 
have a machine-like response to orders was regarded as the best kind of preparation for war; 
this habitus can be described by such words as "cold" or "cool" to indicate the idea that the 
will of the commander passes directly to the physical bodies of the soldiers, for the most part 
circumventing the "brain" and "heart" of the single soldier.
1206
 
7.4.3 New influences: nationalism, emotions and the impassioned soldier 
In contrast to the “calm”, “cold-blooded” qualities deemed ideal for serving in the standing 
armies, a new conception took hold during the Napoleonic Wars: the “mobilization of 
passions”
1207
 is said to have underpinned a new kind of warfare. The skirmish as a less 
machine-like, more dynamic form of combat was introduced at this time and is a symbol of 
this change. The very nature of the skirmish dictated the necessary courage of the individual 
soldier and therefore could not be based on close-order control/drill. Within this combat 
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context, the political loyalty of the soldier became more important. In the final decades of the 
eighteenth century, new impulses were incorporated into the first reformed drill books 
wherein dynamism, as opposed to the machine-like execution of orders, was introduced along 
with the first measures to provide the soldiers with a "moral education": “During the 
concluding decades of the century manual drill was reorganized in such a way that fixed 
sequences of action were no longer practiced and that infantrymen were expected to execute 
dynamic movements. In consequence, manual drill was transformed into an instrument for 
moral and physical education.”
1208
 
The new emphasis that was being placed on the passions of the single soldier was 
intertwined with the diffusion of nationalism. Nationalism addressed and fostered a series of 
emotions in a special way.
1209
 On the one hand, nationalism tried to cultivate emotions 
towards the nation itself, strengthening the “bond” between the individual and the nation 
through, for instance, the forms of “veneration, loyalty, submission and sacrifice” that had 
been appropriated from religion
1210
 or sexual feelings by depicting the nation as a woman. On 
the other hand, a series of emotions, such as hatred and revenge (connected to conceptions of 
honour), were “nationalized” and directed against the “enemies” of the nation, whether these 
last were internal or external to the national territory, whether inside or outside the national 
group. In fact, the opposing directionality of these emotions – i.e. directed at the nation and 
directed at its enemies – was intimately interconnected. The ultimate effect should ideally 
have been a much “emotionalized” state of the individual. But in the actual activities of the 
soldier, these emotions had to be tamed in a way. Garibaldi, for instance, in an order he gave 
the day before his arrival to Marsala in 1860, underlined that the character “of the brave jäger 
has to be based on cool blood” on the one hand, but on “verve” on the other.
1211
 
                                                 
1208
 Kleinschmidt, "Using the gun," p. 618. 
1209
 This was underlined especially from those historians working on national myths. See, e.g., Etienne François, 
Hannes Siegrist, and Jakob Vogel, "Die Nation. Vorstellungen, Inszenierungen, Emotionen," in eidem, eds., 
Nation und Emotion. Frankreich und Deutschland im Vergleich (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), 
pp. 13-35; Rudolf Speth, "Nation und Emotion. Von der vorgestellten zur emotional erfahrenen Gemeinschaft," 
in Ansgar Klein and Frank Nullmeier, eds., Masse-Macht-Emotionen. Zu einer politischen Soziologie der 
Emotionen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), pp. 287-307. Emphasis on emotions in nationalism has also 
been expressed by Banti and Ginsborg, "Per una nuova storia del Risorgimento". A critique on the “hydraulic” 
model of emotions (Rosenwein, Solomon) that lay at the basis of Banti’s work has been advanced by Riall, 
"Nation, 'deep images'," pp. 402-09. 
1210
 Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, "Das emotionale Fundament der Nation," in Monika Flacke, ed., 
Mythen der Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama. Begleitband zur Ausstellung vom 20. März 1998 bis 9. Juni 
1998 (Munich; Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 2001), p. 25. 
1211
 “Il carattere del prode cacciatore deve essere basato sul sangue freddo e lo slancio.” Cit. from Silvio Furlani, 
"Un inedito di Garibaldi. I 'consigli tattici'," in Filippo Mazzonis, ed., Garibaldi condottiero. Storia, teoria, 
prassi (Milan: F. Angeli, 1985), p. 33. 
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7.4.4 Exercising and drill in the Italian armies – the persistence of old models 
A closer look at the available drill books enables us to analyse drill, bearing in mind, 
however, that actual practices may have differed from the prescriptions contained in the books 
themselves. A handbook for the non-commissioned officers and corporals of the papal foreign 
regiments, published in 1858 in German, uses a question and answer format to present the 
"school of the soldiers and the platoon".
1212
 Whereas the orders themselves are given in 
French – this was the case for the foreign regiments of the papal army in general – the 
questions and answers are provided in German. 
Image 7.1. Photograph – Papal Training Camp, Rocca di Papa 
 
This anonymous photograph, taken at the papal training camp of Rocca di Papa, captures a group of 
Zouaves (left) and some infantry line officers (right). Source: Piero Raggi, La nona crociata. I volontari di 
Pio IX in difesa di Roma, 1860-1870, 2 ed. (Ravenna: Libreria Tonini, 2002), p. 165. 
 
 
The first section of the book not only details the movements of the single soldier – 
with which the leading personnel must be familiar for obvious teaching purposes – it gives 
detailed descriptions on how to teach the soldiers how to learn and execute such movements. 
The second section of the drill book moves on to describe the respective movements of the  
 
                                                 
1212
 Handbuch für die Unterofficiere und Corporäle der päpstlichen Fremden-Regimenter. 
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officers and corporals during periods of training and battle. Therefore, the first section 
contains the usual tri-partition of elements pertaining to the “school of the soldier”: posture 
and basic movements of the single soldier without arms; movements linked to the 
management of arms; movements of the soldier when in groups, e.g. marching. The lectures 
first addressed how to establish a basic tense posture of the single soldier, “because the man, 
were he to hunch his shoulders forward and keep his back bent (as is common to peasants), 
would be unable to straighten up or to handle his gun with dexterity.”
1213
 The highly detailed 
descriptions of the movements associated with the (many) orders were clearly grounded in a 
strong anatomical understanding. Hence, in the lecture on the “school-footstep” (Schulschritt) 
– the French “pas d’école” or “pas ordinaire”, hence 76 steps with a step length of 26 inches 
per minute - the following explanation is given as to why the toe should be pointed earthward: 
“…by pointing the foot to earth, the knee is elongated, and the foot is disposed to be brought 
to earth evenly.”
1214
 Already this basic military footstep however, highlights how differently 
these movements were from “natural” body movements, where nearly the opposite applies, 
with a knee slightly flexed and the rear of the foot making contact with the earth first. This 
difference in the type of movement required – like with all the other detailed movements in 
the drill book – had to be assimilated. This requisite is an indication of how learning the 
military drill was still akin to learning social dancing. Within the context of the “school-
footstep”, soldiers were also obliged to keep their feet as close to the ground as possible when 
marching. This was but one prescription of many throughout the drill-book that explicitly 
aimed to increase speed and reduce fatigue and exhaustion through the avoidance of 
unnecessary movements and deployment of strength: in this case “because the soldiers, if they 
raised their foot above what was strictly necessary, would lose time and exhaust themselves 
without advantage.”
1215
 The portion of the quoted text in italics is intended to highlight the 
fact that the maxim of avoiding fatigue, was relative insofar as only those movements ought 
to be avoided that were deemed unnecessary for carrying out the intrinsically tiring 
standardized movements.  
Many of the movements were so complicated, that, as often occurred when learning 
social dancing, the steps were taught in several sessions characterized by increasing levels of 
                                                 
1213
 „Weil der Mann, wenn er die Schultern vorgäbe und den Rücken gewölbt hielte (eine gewöhnliche 
Erscheinung bei den Landleuten) sich weder richten, noch sein Gewehr mit Gewandheit führen könnte […]. 
Ibid., p. 8. 
1214
 „Weil durch das Abwärtsbringen der Fussspitze das Knie gestreckt, und der Fuss disponirt wird, flach auf 
den Boden zu kommen.“ Ibid., p. 15. 
1215
 „Weil die Soldaten, wenn sie den Fuss über Gebühr erhebten, Zeit verlieren, und sich ohne Nutzen ermüden 





 The exact execution of body movements was considered to be so important in 
maintaining order and ensuring the war-machine would work
1217
 that mistakes were punished 
harshly: “In the case of mistaken movements”, it was recommended that the instructor “send 
the soldier to the class of punishment or of instruction, depending on whether the mistake was 
committed as a result of inattentiveness or unskillfulness.”
1218
 
Another recurrent issue in the text was the emphasis placed on the desirability of the 
cool-headedness of the soldiers. For instance, in the lectures on how to load the various 
weapons, it is recommended that the instructor pay attention and ensure that “all movements 
are executed with cold blood and without rush, because he cannot overlook the fact that those 
soldiers who, without apparently hurrying, load calmly and with cold blood, load their rifle 
the best and most quickly because they do not miss the muzzle of the barrel or the rings, they 
bounce the loading better, do not spill the powder and do not drop patrons or capsules.”
1219
 
Ensuring the soldiers are calm and “cold-blooded”, it was said, “is the best measure to 
maintain order in a troop.”
1220
 Accompanying this favour shown to the characteristic of being 
calm was the specification for the instructors that “all remarks and orders should be given to 
the soldiers very quietly to avoid fuss and disorder.”
1221
 
Many instructions in the drill book established close-order control. It specified that the 
higher ranks were to be placed along the flanks, the head, and rear of each squad; experienced 
simple soldiers were to control the movements of one line of soldiers; and “serre-fils” linked 
different squads of a platoon on march
1222
, establishing a chain of control comprised of 
controls of controls.
1223
 In a single squad, the “instructor controls the first row, the chief of 
squad the second, the ‘remplacement’ the third; they ensure that posture of the feet, body and 
                                                 
1216
 See, e.g., ibid., p. 40. 
1217
 See the exact number of paces of the different steps specified throughout ibid.. 
1218
 „Bei fehlerhaften Bewegungen die er selbst wahrnimmt, oder die ihm von dem Plotonschef und den 
Serrefiles angedeutet werden, verschickt er die Fehlbaren entweder in die Straf- oder in die Instructionsclasse; je 
nachdem der Fehler aus Nachlässigkeit oder aus Ungeschicklichkeit begangen worden.“ Ibid., p. 112. 
1219
 „Dass alle Bewegungen mit Kaltblütigkeit, und ohne Übereilung vollzogen werden, indem ihm nicht 
entgehen kann, dass die Soldaten die, ohne scheinbar sich zu eilen, die Ladung ruhig und kalten Blutes 
vollbringen, ihr Gewehr am besten und am geschwindesten laden, da sie weder die Mündung des Laufes, noch 
die Ringe verfehlen, besser die Ladung stossen, kein Pulver verschütten und keine Patronen oder kapsel [sic] 
fallen lassen.“ Ibid., p. 61. 
1220
 „Kaltblütigkeit […] ist das erste Mittel für die Ordnung in einer Truppe […]“ Ibid., p. 94. 
1221
 „[…] alle Bemerkungen und Befehle sollen den Soldaten leise übertragen werden, um Lärmen und 
Unordnung zu verhüten.“ Ibid., pp. 199-200. 
1222
 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 91-94. 
1223
 See, e.g., ibid., p. 78. 
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The machine-like execution of orders was the aim, which becomes clear, for instance, 
in the following passage: “141. Why should no man still move after the command stand 
attention, even if he was not yet aligned? To get accustomed to evaluating his line of direction 
quickly, and to insert himself in the latter without hesitation.”
1225
 
The aspects of training that are absent are also quite interesting: Building corporeal strength 
was perhaps a by-product of the mechanical drill, but training that pointedly aimed to increase 
physical strength, for instance in building muscles, was not mentioned at all in the papal drill 
book.  
7.4.5 “Democratizing” armies? Exercise and drill in the Garibaldian armies 
The topic of exercising and carrying out drill is especially thorny in the case of the 
Garibaldian undertakings.  
At the formal level, it is opportune to recall the different official relationships the 
respective Garibaldian groups had with the regular army of Piedmont/Italy.
1226
 The 
Garibaldian soldiers of 1859 were an official, albeit special, force in the Piedmontese Army; 
they were not only “trained by officers of the Army of Piedmont”, but the rules and 
regulations of this regular army should also have applied to them as well.
1227
  
The soldiers’ training in the southern army of 1860 depended even more than usual on 
the respective superiors of each corps the moment official guidelines for the education of the 
Garibaldian troops were never issued.
1228
 Rüstow, for instance, established his own regime of 
exercises and drills for his corps; he commanded his brigade to exercise already in Genoa, and 
upon its arrival in southern Italy, he ordered several days of basic training:  
                                                 
1224
 „Der Instructor beaufsichtigt das erste, der Plotonschef das zweite, und der Remplacement das dritte Glied; 
sie sorgen dass die Stellung der Füsse, des Körpers und des Gewehrs immer richtig sei, und dass alle 
Bewegungen lebhaft und dicht am Leibe vorbei vollzogen werden.“ Ibid., p. 102. 
1225
 „141. Warum soll auf’s Commando fixe kein Mann mehr rühren, auch wenn er noch nicht ausgerichet wäre? 
Damit er sich angewöhne, seine Richtungslinie schnell zu beurtheilen, und ohne Zaudern in dieselbe 
einzurücken.“ Ibid., p. 73. Italics in the original. 
1226
 For this, see p. 167. 
1227
 Isastia, "Cacciatori delle Alpi," p. 175. 
1228
 In terms of military criminal law, however, the complicated decision was taken to subject “the Italians of the 
continent” to the Piedmontese military criminal law, while the Neapolitan code before 1849 (so, before the 
second Restauration) was to be applied to “the islanders”. Regardless, both groups would be guaranteed the 
milder penalty of the two laws. In fact, not even adherence to this decision was ensured, simply by the fact, as 
Rüstow reports, that he was not provided with and could not himself find a copy of either law. See "Decree from 
17 May 1860," in Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni governative compilate dall'avvocato Nicolò 
Porcelli, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), no. 8, pp. 9-10. On Rüstows decision to exert “arbitrary but just” 
disciplinary measures, see Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 1, p. 107. On the 
issue of comparative military criminal law see the dedicated chapter 7.5 below. 
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“I thought of dedicating only two days to making the soldiers familiar with how to handle a 
gun and with the elementary movements; then two days of exercise in the battalion should 
follow, a further two days of manoeuvres in the brigade, and finally two more for exercising 
in the division with an associated field manoeuvre.”
 1229
  
In terms of time, this was of course far less than the soldiers of the regular armies were 
subject to, these last of which drilled for months. In spite of this temporal difference, even 
Rüstow’s basic training – regardless of all of the different ideas he had on organizing the 
military into Swiss-type militias – replicated the usual tripartite education of the “school of 
the soldier”: individual movements, gun handling, followed by training exercises pertinent to 
the interrelation of the different military corps. In fact, as Rüstow wrote in his “military 
handbook” in 1858, for him exercising in basic movements remained a decisive part of 
military education, even if he abhorred “exercise pedantism” (Exerzierpedantismus), and 
consequently there should be avoided “all ridiculous playing around with an unnecessary dull 
accuracy and precision in the execution of irrelevancies”.
1230
  
7.5 Disciplinary measures and military criminal law – “indigenous” and “foreign” soldiers 
The means available to punish soldiers, be this in terms of the disciplinal power of the officers 
or be it in terms of military criminal law, must not be overlooked.
1231
  
With regard to the foreign regiments of the regular armies, military criminal law
1232
 
was traditionally a prerogative of the special foreigners’ corps. Generally speaking, there were 
                                                 
1229
 „Ich dachte nun etwa zwei Tage dazu zu verwenden, die Leute mit der Handhabung des Gewehres sowie mit 
den elementaren Bewegungen bekannt zu machen; dann sollten zwei Tage Bataillonsexerciren, ferner zwei Tage 
Brigadenmanöver ausgeführt werden, und die beiden letzten Tage wollte ich auf ein Divisionsexerciren und 
damit verknüpftes Feldmanöver verwenden.“Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 1, 
p. 110. 
1230
 „[..D]aß bei seiner Uebung alle lächerlichen Spielereien mit einer unnützen geisttödtenden Genauigkeit und 
Präcision in der Ausführung von Nebendingen vermieden werden sollen […].“ Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, 
"Ausbildung," in idem, Militärisches Hand-Wörterbuch nach dem Standpunkte der neuesten Literatur und mit 
Unterstützung von Fachmännern (Zurich: Friedrich Schultheß, 1858), p. 53. 
1231
 Military criminal law was partially differentiated according to rank; this holds true – at least at the legal level 
– for the Garibaldian undertakings as well. 
1232
 For the history of military criminal law in nineteenth century Germany, see Sylvia Kesper-Biermann, "'Jeder 
Soldat ist Staatsbürger'. Reformen im Militärstrafrecht in Deutschland 1800 bis 1872," in Karl-Heinz Lutz, 
Martin Rinke, and Marcus von Salisch, eds., Reform - Reorganisation - Transformation. Zum Wandel in den 
deutschen Streitkräften vor der preußischen Heeresreform bis zur Transformation der Bundeswehr. Im Auftrag 
des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010), pp. 131-51; for Italy during the same 
period, see Carlotta Latini, Cittadini e nemici. Giustizia militare e giustizia penale in Italia tra Otto e Novecento 
(Florence: Le Monnier, 2010). On the Bavarian legislation see Hubert Schmid, Die Gesetzgebungsgeschichte des 
Militärstrafrechts für das Königreich Bayern zwischen 1806 und 1900. Zugl. Augsburg, Univ., Diss. (Munich: 
Kommissionsverlag Uni-Druck, 2000); on the papal military criminal code of 1842, see instead Carlotta Latini, 
"La giustizia militare pontificia tra privilegium fori e specialità giurisdizionale. Il processo militare e l’inchiesta 




four possible solutions: The first, which left the procedural and substantive competencies to 
the regiments themselves, was a feature common to the armies of the condottieri of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The second applied the substantive general (and/or general 
military) criminal laws of the hosting country but preserved the procedural competency of the 
regiments. Like the second, the third possibility, which was characterized by special criminal 
laws issued specifically for foreign regiments without touching their procedural prerogative, 
was typical of the following centuries.
1233
 The fourth, wherein procedural and substantive law 
were applied equally to foreigners and indigenous troops, was really a quite late development.  
7.5.1 Military criminal law and foreigners in the Papal Army 
In the foreign regiments of the Papal Army, there was a shift from the second to the third 
solution in the nineteenth century. For the papal Swiss regiments the (last) capitulations from 
1825 had established that for the more specific criminal law, the Papal Codes were fully 
applicable in terms of substantial law, but they were to be applied by the superiors of the 
Swiss regiment itself
1234
: “Should one of the guards commit a crime, God forbid!, a criminal 
court […] judges according to the contents and procedures of the criminal laws that exist for 
the Papal Army.
1235
 In Naples, the punishments of foreign soldiers were not based on the 
general military criminal law (as established in 1819), but instead on the published draft of a 
special criminal code for the Swiss regiments of France from 1817.
1236
  
In terms of how the more strictly (not merely disciplinary) military criminal law 
applied to the foreign regiments, the recruitment law from 1852 is quite vague: “The foreign 
corps administer the military judicature within their own corps on the basis of the criminal 
code and the respective methods of procedure, which the commander of this corps will 
propose and submit to the revision of the Ministry of Arms for the purpose of receiving the 
                                                 
1233
 For the conception of the three solutions, see Pietro Vico, "Diritto penale militare," in Enrico Pessina, ed., 
Enciclopedia del diritto penale italiano, vol. 11 (Milan: Società editrice libraria, 1908), pp. 58-60. 
1234
 Judgments passed down by superiors in a given regiment, at least in the first level, was, however, also a 
feature of many general military criminal laws of the time. 
1235
 See art. 136-138 of the capitulation with the canton of Bern in: Neue Sammlung der Gesetze und Dekrete des 
Großen und Kleinen Rathes der Stadt und Republik Bern, 5 (1831), pp. 37-88 or art. 20 in the excerpt from the 
previous capitulations of 1825 with other Swiss cantons in: Maag, Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen 
Diensten, pp. 625-636, art. 20 is on p. 634. 
1236
 Jean-Antoine-Charles-Nicolas de Gady, Entwurf eines Straf-Gesetzbuchs für die Schweizer-Regimenter im 
Dienste seiner allerchristlichsten Majestät / Projet d'un code pénal militaire pour les régimens suisses au service 
de sa Majesté très-chrétienne (Bern: s. n., 1817); an overview of this code and a harsh critique on its “barbarian” 
nature was written by who was by then a major magistrate of the Swiss regiments of Naples, H. Pfyffer von 
Heidegg, "Ueber die Gerechtigkeitspflege bei den capitulirten Schweizerregimentern im ausländischen 






 Behind the patent brevity of this article stood a dispute within the 
Ministry itself, as is revealed by the archival material regarding the preparation of the 
recruitment law of 1852. In preparation of the promulgation of the recruitment law of 1852, 
the issue had been discussed amongst the generals and the Ministry. The Swiss general, 
Wilhelm von Kalbermatten,
1238
 laid down in a memorandum the reasons why, in his view, the 
existing military criminal law of 1842 should not apply to the foreign regiments. He stressed 
that the old traditions of the Swiss regiments had their own regulations on disciplinary and 
penal sanctioning: “That which has always distinguished the Swiss corps in all of their 
services has been their excellent discipline. To deprive the regiment of its own particular 
justice, is to remove its ability to provide those good services that the government has a right 
to expect from it.”
1239
 And, further on in the same document, Kalbermatten underlined that 
this tradition continued to be upheld in the Swiss regiments of the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies: “In the service of Naples, as in all of those of the Swiss under foreign powers, the 
regiments have always had their own discipline and military justice.”
1240
 The Ministry had a 
different opinion on the matter: In response to Kalbermatten’s memorandum, it stated that 
until the issue was once again taken up by the government, military justice in the foreign 
regiments had to adhere to the general military criminal law: “For the present moment it is 
indispensable that everything functions according to the […] regulations of the year 1842!” 
According to these documents, it indeed seems that for the time being military justice for the 
foreign regiments was dictated by the general code that was valid for all corps of the Papal 
                                                 
1237
 “I corpi esteri amministeranno la giustizia militare nell’interno del proprio corpo sulle basi del codice dei 
delitti, e delle pene, e dei metodi di procedura relativa, che dal comandante del corpo medesimo verranno 
proposti e sottomessi alla revisione del Ministro delle Armi, per riportarne in appresso la Sovrana approvazione.” 
Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato lì 7 gennaro 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari speciali d'individui di 
nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede, art. 132, p. 43.  
1238
 Wilhelm von Kalbermatten entered papal service in 1848, where he was General until 1870; his brother, 
Theodor von Kalbermatten, was for a brief period (16 February 1850 – 1 November 1850) pro-Minister of Arms. 
See the biographies of both in Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, online at http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch (last 
accessed: 21/08/2008). 
1239
 “Ciò che ha sempre distinto i Corpi Svizzeri in tutti i loro servizi, è stata l’eccelente loro disciplina. Privare il 
reggimento della sua giustizia particolare, si è levargli la facoltà di rendere quei buoni servizi che il Governo è in 
diritto di aspettare da lui.” Untitled document in ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, busta 1143. 
1240
 “Nel servizio di Napoli […] come in tutti quelli degli Svizzeri presso Estere Potenze, i reggimenti hanno 
sempre avuto in proprio la loro disciplina e giustizia militare.” Untitled document in ASR, Fondo Ministero delle 





, even if the regulation in the recruitment law of 1852 contemplated the introduction 
of special codes at the regimental level.
1242
  
7.5.2 Military criminal law and foreigners in the Bourbon Army 
In the foreign regiments of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies that were assembled in 1859 to 
replace the former Swiss regiments, special legislation continued to govern military justice. 
Hence the former practice to exclude foreign regiments from the general (military) laws of the 
receiving country continued to be upheld. The Swiss-Neapolitan capitulations of the 1820s 
had explicitly established that the Swiss regiments had their own judicature. It went on to 
specify: “They will execute the latter according to the military criminal code instituted for the 
Swiss regiments in French service as it is at present or as it will be changed or modified.”
1243
 
Furthermore, even the non-military criminal offences committed by Swiss/foreign soldiers 
came under the jurisdiction of the regiments themselves: “The personnel of these regiments 
cannot, in any case, be brought to trial for disciplinary offences, misdeeds or offences before 
any other tribunal than that of their respective corps.”
1244
 Until 1859, hence, judicature in the 
Swiss regiments was based on the rather harsh “Gady’s Draft”, the “Draft of a military 
criminal code for the Swiss regiments at the service of his most Christian Majesty”.
1245
 A 
revised draft of the code was worked out for the Swiss regiments in France in 1829, 
abolishing some of the corporal punishments of the previous edition; this draft never came 
into force in France. Only in 1859, when the Swiss regiments of Naples were reconfigured 
                                                 
1241
 Alessandro Mancini-Barbieri, erroneously, takes for granted the continued validity of a much more severe 
“Military Criminal Code for the foreign regiments” which can be found in fact in ASR, Ministero delle armi, box 
no. 1144; but this code must have been issued prior to 1846, because it was signed by the secretary of the 
Presidency of Arms (the precursor to the Ministry of Arms between 1828 to 1847), Filippo Contini, who died in 
1846. 
1242
 In the respective boxes of the Archivio di Stato, I found no such special code; the only code that exists dates 
to before the law of 1852. For this, see footnote no. 1241. 
1243
 „[..W]erden dieselbe nach dem für die Schweizer-Regimenter in französischen Diensten bestehenden 
Militärstrafgesetzbuch, so wie dieses gegenwärtig besteht, oder mit der Zeit abgeändert oder modifizirt werden 
dürfte, ausüben.“ Art. 20 of the capitulations between the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the cantons of 
Freiburg and Solothurn from 1825; the same wording is found in art. 137 of the capitulations with the canton of 
Bern from 1828. Militär-Kapitulation mit Sr. M. dem König beider Sizilien für ein von den hohen Ständen 
Freyburg und Solothurn zu stellendes Schweizer-Regiment, for instance in: Ludwig Snell, ed., Handbuch des 
schweizerischen Staatsrechts, vol. 1 (Zurich: Orell, Füßli und Compagnie, 1837), pp. 556-580, art. 20 is on p. 
573-574; Militair-Kapitulation mit S. Maj. Dem König Beider Sizilien, for instance in: Neue Sammlung der 
Gesetze und Dekrete des Großen und Kleinen Rathes der Stadt und Republik Bern, vol. 5, 1828-1831 (Bern: L. 
A. Haller, 1831), pp. 37-88, art. 137 is on p. 78.  
1244
 „Alle zum Regiment gehörigen Personen können in keinem Falle für Disziplinsfehler, Vergehen und 
Verbrechen vor andere Tribunale als vor diejenigen ihres eigenen Corps gezogen werden.“ Ibid., art. 20 
(capitulations of 1825) and art. 138 (capitulations of 1828). 
1245
 Gady, Entwurf eines Straf-Gesetzbuchs. 
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into new foreign regiments did the second draft enter into force in southern Italy, constituting 
the valid effective legal basis for punishments in the Bourbon foreigners’ regiments.
1246
  
7.5.3 Military criminal law and the Garibaldian campaigns 
The practice of adopting (parts of) other legislations also occurred on the political opposite 
side. While the provisory government of Rome in January 1849 had issued its own military 
penal code that was modelled partially on the Piedmontese code
1247
, this last as such applied 
to the garibaldini of 1859. In 1860, it was decided to apply the Piedmontese regulations for 
those soldiers that came from northern Italy and the Bourbon legislation instead for the 
southern soldiers, guaranteeing for both groups, however, the milder of the penalties found in 
either code. Although this might seem like a somewhat complex decision, it was most likely 
motivated by the idea to subject the soldiers to more or less “their” respective legislation, and 
in doing so to create an economizing effect by already counting on the familiarity that the 
soldiers from Piedmont on the one hand and those taken over from the Bourbon Army on the 
other would have with these respective codes. 
7.6 The performative aspects of the soldiers’ free-time 
When looking at the service regulations and personal reports on the time spent in Italy it 
immediately becomes clear that the soldiers, more than the officers, passed most of their time 
in the presence of their respective battalions.  
In times of peace, at least until 1 p.m. (winter) or 3 p.m. (summer), the Bourbon 
soldiers were exclusively occupied with military tasks. were obliged to remain very much in a 
military context: This first part of the day was dedicated to visits, exercises, the common meal 
(“rancio”, at 9.30 a.m. or 10 a.m. depending on the season), the assembly, and services of 
various nature, such as post and sentinel duty.
1248
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 Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, L'esercito borbonico I, p. 108. The link was created by the regulations for 
the formation of the new foreign regiments: Regolamento per l'organizzazione del 1° e 2° battaglione 
carabinieri leggieri e del 13° battaglione cacciatori approvato da Sua Maestà il dì 10 novembre 1859 in Portici, 
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incominciò col 25 novembre 1848 ed ebbe termine il 9 febbraio 1849, epoca in cui fu proclamata la Repubblica 
romana (Rome: Tipografia governativa, 1849), appendix, pp. 1-111. 
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 See the time tables in Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, il servizio e la disciplina delle Reali Truppe 
nelle piazze, modello no. 16, pp. 360-361. 
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7.6.1 “Outward” order – in and after service 
Whereas the drill books aimed at a “disciplinization” in terms of corporal movements, 
habituating the trooper to automatically execute specific moves when a command was issued, 
the Bourbon General Ordinance (ordinanza di piazza) envisaged a control of the soldier that 
was far more comprehensive and broad reaching. One of the main considerations contained 
therein regarded the “outward” order of the troops. In this part of the regulations, outward 
appearance took centre stage and was measured according to the cleanliness, posture and 
elegance of the soldiers. The soldiers were urged to keep their uniforms and possessions 
clean: “The soldier must very much care for the neatness of his person; it contributes to his 
health and distinguishes the educated from the coarse man. His clothing, leathers and every 
other type of possession must always be clean and without stains: he must change his 
underpants”, and as strange as it may sound to our ears today, it went on to specify “every 
time there is a need to do so.”
1249
 
These regulations were concerned with the “outward” order also because they were 
explicitly directed, at least in part, to the non-military sphere. This is evident, for instance, in 
the regulations on how to go out in public: “When he leaves his quarters, he has to compose 
exactly his clothing and to keep it in good order without minimally changing his posture: in 
the streets he will walk with composure, with his body erect, and with that elegance and that 
esprit that are suitable for he who is attired in Our Royal uniform.”
1250
 Although this was 
most certainly a measure put in place to avoid deterioration of the attire and possessions of the 
soldier, these prescriptions on cleanliness had a symbolic function as well, and served to 
demonstrate that the king’s soldiers were different from the unpolished and unkempt soldiery 
of former times. Standards of personal cleanliness, however, seem to have been far from those 
of today
1251
: Superiors were to watch over their soldiers and ensure that the latter were 
provided with freshly-laundered underwear at least once a week and with new bedclothes 
every two, as well as with new straw for the paillasse every three months. They were also to 
make sure that their soldiers took care of their beards, kept their hair and their fingernails 
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7.6.2 Drinking, Gambling and Prostitution 
Aside from cleanliness, posture and therefore outward physical appearance both in and 
outside the military environment, military regulations were also expressly concerned with the 
“holy trinity” of traditional “dangers” to which the soldiers were exposed and vulnerable: 
drinking, gambling and prostitution. Most likely the first and last were seen to be particularly 
problematic for the outward appearance of the military, i.e. for the public “image” that 
civilians had of the military. While Scott Hughes Myerly in his book on “British Military 
Spectacle”
1253
 spoke of the performative features of military life as positively contributing to 
military public image, another such instrument was the prevention of soldiers from availing 
themselves of excessive amounts of alcohol, gambling and prostitutes. As it seems, attempts 
to rehabilitate the image of the military were not made only with the colourful display of 
military spectacle, but also through the disciplinization of soldiers in terms of general mores, 
and especially when this occurred publically before the common civilians. These were 
measures to counter what Christoph Kucklick has described as “problematic masculinity” in 
the sense of a “negative andrology” in the transition period (Sattelzeit) around 1800.
1254
  
Alcohol and prostitution were in fact a central theme in the reports of German and other 
foreign soldiers.  
Whether prostitution was openly addressed or had been "camouflaged", by speaking of 
prostitutes as "waitresses" in inns, etc., a fair amount of space was dedicated to it in the 
soldiers’ reports. However, despite the official prohibitions to partake in such activities, "half-
official" brothels that were provided with a military guard did exist, in the Bourbon Army for 
instance.
1255
 The Garibaldian Rüstow also spoke a great deal about prostitution. During his 
soldiers’ stay in Salerno in 1860, according to Rüstow, “officers had made a visit to”, as he 
calls it in German “a funny house”.
1256
 The degree of detail included in his reports on 
prostitution render his claim that he had never participated in such arrangements rather 
questionable.  
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Maestà pel governo, §1542; see as well §1616. 
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Prostitution was identified as a concern in the Bourbon general service regulation as 
well. Every soldier seen in public with “obviously immoral women” was to be arrested, 
whereas non-commissioned officers and soldiers, but not officers, who were caught engaging 
with these “immoral women” in military buildings and grounds, were to be punished. The 
prostitutes were to be turned over to the civil authorities to be punished according to civil 
criminal law. In general terms, commandants of the fortified town and civil authorities – 
while perhaps aware that prohibition had never truly functioned well in this context – were to 
act in concert to take at least “the necessary measures to reduce the number of these women”, 
or, in the event these last were unsuccessful, to at least take measures to “remove the infected 
ones”.
1257
 Similarly, the respective medical practitioner was asked to visit at least once a 
month “all non-commissioned officers and soldiers, in order to discover those infected with 




Prostitution was not the only concern; more generally speaking sexuality was another 
issue of import. Uniforms that had been designed appositely to showcase the musculature, the 
elongation and rigidity of male bodies were capable of arousing civil interest; it is difficult to 
say, however, whether this form of attraction was more the imagination of the soldiers or was 
indeed a reality manifest in the reaction of civilians. In fact, placing excessive emphasis on 
the “sexual-attraction thesis” creates the risk of glossing over or diminishing the very 
probable violent character of many of these sexual encounters between members of the armed 
forces and civilians, which was most likely downplayed in the soldiers' reports. In fact, many 
soldiers’ songs played out this motive to such an extent that they were generally regarded to 
be “dirty”: See for instance the hidden, and as such open, refrain (“Schingderassa…”) in the 
German song “Wenn die Soldaten durch die Stadt marschieren", most probably written 
between the 1830s and 1870s.  
The continual mention of the “good” but “heady” quality of Italian and especially 
Sicilian wines exemplifies how omnipresent alcohol in this context was. Alcohol was not only 
officially and regularly distributed to the soldiers
1259
, but it also took centre stage in the 
reports on meals and drinks that were taken outside of the official meal that was provided.  
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 “[..D]onne patentemente scostumate […]”; “[…] le misure necessarie per scemare il numero di esse donne 
[…]”; “[…] allontanare le infette […]”. 
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 “[..T]utt’i sotto-uffiziali e soldati, onde conoscere gl’infetti da malattie cutanee e veneree […].” Ordinanza 
di Sua Maestà pel governo, §1387. 
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Drunken soldiers, according to the regulations, were to be withdrawn: When 
“[e]ncountering a non-commissioned officer or soldiers inebriated from wine, [the patrols] 
will conduct him or have him conducted to the nearest sentry point, where he is to remain as 
long as the effects last, to then be sent to the guard house for the providence of the governor 
or commandant of the fortress.”
1260
 The Bourbon Ordinance also repeatedly reiterated the ban 
on gambling: “The games of hazard are absolutely forbidden, and the chiefs of the corps will 
attentively ensure that this prescription is executed, severely castigating the transgressors.”
1261
 
The main concern with gambling appears to have been to avoid the incurrence of excessive 
debt on the part of the soldiers and officers, most probably because the pressure to settle ones 
debts could lead them adopt fraudulent behaviour with regard to the goods supplied by the 
military administration. A rule was established for officers, for which they should generally 
be punished in the event they spent more than they could from their pay. Officers were, 
however, allowed to incur debts – reaching a maximum of one-third of their pay – only in 
special circumstances, i.e. in case they had to pay for “costly diseases, or when an officer 
must equip himself or become mounted”
1262
; at any rate, it was necessary to first obtain 
permission from the colonel.  
7.6.3 Desertion and its prevention  
Specific measures were devised to prevent desertion. Because new recruits were considered to 
be particularly susceptible to desertion, it was established that they were not allowed to leave 
military quarters without being accompanied, and in the event they were encountered without 
the latter they were to be immediately arrested. To facilitate the identification of the new 
recruits, the letter “R” of the dimension of 3 inches (ca. 7.6 cm) was sewn on the right arm of 
their uniform. Similarly, for the accompanying soldiers, i.e. those who were no longer new 
recruits – this occurred after 4 months of instruction for the infantry and 8 months in the other 
branches of service – and were charged with accompanying the new members, the letter “P” 
was added to their uniform.
1263
 In the event numerous desertions were discovered for 
instance, two cannon beats were to go off, “to advise the inhabitants of the near villages and 
fields to take the appropriate measures needed to arrest the deserters, and to occupy the 
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 Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, §§870 and 871 respectively. 
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previously identified routes and locations.”
1264
 Aside from these “outward” measures to 
contain and deal with the act of desertion, however, the commandants were to also try to 
understand the “internal” reasons for desertion, and therefore it was recommended “they 
investigate whether the soldiers had reason for complaint, whether this be for a lack of 
administration, for excessive rigour, or faulty methods, or on the contrary whether there was a 
slackening in the application of the rules of discipline.”
1265
  
7.7 Officers and soldiers 
As aforementioned, in the various armed groups of the Italian Risorgimento, Germans 
together with other foreigners were present in various ranks, be it that of simple soldier, 
officer, or general. Is it possible to detect in these higher-ranking soldiers loyalties or 
German-Italian experiences that differ from those of the rank and file? What role did they 
play in the German-Italian and European processes of transfer regarding the general culture of 
war, military cultures and issues of military organization?  
Second, if inquiring into the roles and specificities of the group of “German” officers, 
the more general issues of the composition and function of officer corps in European armies 
must be discussed
1266
 before the Italian armed groups and the respective role of foreign 
officers in general and German officers in particular is to be analysed. 
7.7.1 Officers as “military elite” 
While there are good reasons to attempt a “military history from below” that would shed light 
on the experiences of “simple soldiers” that have normally been neglected by traditional 
military history, the officer corps nevertheless remains an important object of study. As 
Eckart Conze has written, to concentrate only on the simple soldier is to “overlook the simple 
fact of the hierarchical organization of the military, and, as a result of this, the decisive 
importance of officers, of their leading and mediating role in the processes of development 
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 “[…] onde avvertire gli abitanti de’paesi convicini e delle campagne di prendere le convenevoli misure per 
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The word “officer” (“Offizier” in German, ”ufficiale” in Italian) etymologically relates 
to the office-holder (“officiarius” in medieval Latin, which traces back to opi-facium, carrying 
out a certain job/task or service). Historically, both civil and, later, military “officials” were 
those charged with performing a specific function within the administration and armies. The 
establishment of officer posts must be considered within the context of the general 
development of division of labour: in the armies of the late medieval knights, there was not 
much more of a differentiation than that between the mounted knight on the one hand and the 
array of foot soldiers on the other. The knight was merely the vessel of the higher ranking 
noble, and foot soldiers were quite unconnected to the knight in the battle itself.  
This level of differentiation had increased already with the advent of the mercenary 
armies of the Italians, Swiss and Germans. Here, a series of specific “offices” were 
introduced. The office-holders were nominated either by the colonel– who had contracted 
with a sovereign as “warlord” – or were chosen by the soldiers themselves. Along with the 
captain of a given squad, a series of more specific office-holders were responsible for such 
tasks as the administration regarding wages, accommodation or discipline; many of the names 
for these offices, created within the mercenary armies of the fifteenth century and before, 
survived and were transferred over to the officer corps of armies in the following centuries, 
among which the sergeant-major (Feldwebel) who was responsible for drilling and the 
internal organization of service and the ensign who was responsible for giving the signals to 
the soldiers in formation. The power relation between these “officers” and the soldiers 
originated from two different sources: from the delegated power of the colonel and the 
election of a portion of the officers directly by the soldiers. The power of the “officers” in 
these mercenary armies before the introduction of the standing army, however, was far from 
absolute and was restricted in varying degrees by the self-government of the soldiers, which 
reflected traditions of communal self-government and the guild tradition; moreover, this self-
governing power was most visible in the forms of military justice.  
The advent of the absolute state brought about the further development of the 
commissioning of officers. The power of the traditional intermediate estates, such as the 
nobles, was seriously reduced by absolute monarchy, where all decisions and power ideally 
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derived from the sovereign. This absolutist ideology is evident in the tendency of sovereigns 
to appoint “not only generals and colonels, but officers of every grade. The officer thus 
became both servant and representative of the power of the absolute State, and of its monarch 
as a person.”
1268
 The concentration of power that came with the creation of the absolute state 
also occurred in the military organization, where the officer formed, cum grano salis, his own 
kind of “monarchy”: he was a nearly absolute monarch over the soldiers he commanded. The 
typical idea, as aforementioned, that both the state and the military were "machines" that 
adhered to the concepts of force and function in mathematical and physics terms
1269
 was 
added to this increased level of authority. This idea, in fact, informed not only the 
conceptualization of strategy and tactics, but the relation with the “soldiers as material” as 
well. Getting the soldier to do what the officer wanted was based on ideas of a mechanistic 
vision of the relationship between action and reaction. Automatic and immediate obedience 
was the expected direct response to commands from superiors. Where this response was 
lacking, enforcement – in the form of corporal enforcement – also adhered to a specifically 
"mechanical" logic. Only in the late eighteenth century did “humanitarian” thought call into 
question this dynamic in the officer-soldier relationship.  
Another effect of the Enlightenment was the idea that in order to make the military 
machinery function properly, one had to increase knowledge of this very machinery. It was 
here that the idea of training both soldiers and officers took root, challenging the traditional 
legitimation of assigning officer positions due to an individual's (noble) status. The late 
eighteenth century – hence, before the French Revolution – was already a period of 
intensified debates on the purportedly “scientific” nature of war. Consequently, a series of 
fundamental military reforms were projected, and a real “mania to subordinate everything to 
prescriptions” bloomed. One result of this reformatory “furore” was the formation of military 
institutions of education. The number of military publications increased considerably, military 
academies were instituted, cadet corps assembled or reformed, and prescriptions on the 
education of future officers issued. These reforms also brought about an increase in the cross-
border circulation of military knowledge: Officers were sent to foreign countries with the 
deliberate aim to “copy” from other armies
1270
, not only in terms of natural sciences in regard 
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to armament, artillery and fortification – “today one would call this industrial espionage”
1271
 –
 but also to obtain information and understanding of the foreign military organization, from 
their recruitment procedures to their officer-soldier relations. The prime objective was nothing 
short of “a comprehensive rationalization and professionalization of the army”.
1272
 
The connection to one’s royal court – or one’s supreme commander – however, 
remained strong: Careers were, at least formally, decided at court, and this was even more so 
for foreign soldiers.
1273
 The courts were and continued to be to a certain degree multinational 
societies. In the early modern period, they were important nodes in the “noble international 
universe.”
1274
 Due to the partial merging of nobility and officer corps at the courts, the 
“cosmopolitanism of the upper ranks of both the nobility and army”
1275
 that had already 
characterized the eighteenth century was further developed in the following century.
1276
 
The beliefs and behaviour of the officer corps and nobility converged on the issue of 
honour as well. Carmen Winkel maintains that the “noble point d’honneur” functioned as a 
“benchmark” for the behaviour of officers, at least in the eighteenth century. But even in the 
nineteenth century, Gundula Gahlen asserts that for “bourgeois officers the duel constituted 
an instrument with which to gain access to the culture of the noble estates. By the near affinity 
between the concept of honour of officers and the noble point d’honneur it was possible for 
bourgeois officers to participate in a culture of behaviour to which they were otherwise 
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 The duel formed one of the instances in which the “bourgeoisie” 
adapted to and appropriated noble standards.
1278
 
7.7.2 Officers and soldiers: maintaining distance 
As previously discussed, officers and soldiers were treated very differently in material terms, 
not only in State armies but often in the Garibaldian troops as well. In many of the Italian 
armed groups, the different treatment reserved for officers and for soldiers was not limited to 
questions of pay, but also applied to provisions and housing. Even if huge wage differences 
are a characteristic in today’s “bourgeois” society, in the armies of the nineteenth century this 
difference was connected to keeping distance between soldiers and officers. Many bourgeois 
officers appropriated the nobility’s tendency of “conspicuous consumption”. 
Officers and soldiers continued to live in partially separated worlds, and this was the 
case in all of the Italian armed groups regardless of political side. As aforementioned, officers 
were treated better in terms of pay, accommodation and provisions. When looking at how 
housing worked in the regular armies, this becomes evident. The accommodation for foreign 
soldiers in the papal barracks was regulated according to the rules governing indigenous 
regiments. Regular mattresses were provided only for non-commissioned officers upward, 
whereas the simple soldier had to sleep on a wooden panel filled with paillasse and was 
supplied a change of straw once every four months.
1279
 Separate accommodation from the rest 
of the soldiers was provided only for some of the higher ranked officers, particularly those 
with administrative competences. Furthermore, it seems that – at least according to the 
specific regulations from 1822 on barracks for the indigenous troops – two soldiers were to 
sleep in one bed of straw.
1280
  
Accommodations in the Garibaldian armed groups also differed for officers and 
soldiers. In the Roman Republic in 1849, for instance, many officers, including Garibaldi 
himself, lodged in the Hotel Cesari in via di Pietra.
1281
 Ernst Haug also boarded there. 
According to him, the hotel “was not one of the cleanliest, but offered, due to its central 
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; the soldiers – including the Garibaldian legionnaires for a time 
– were accommodated instead in the very nearby convent of San Silvestro in Capite. But in 
the hotel, the officers could make use of the personnel provided by the hotel in addition to the 
military adjutants that they often kept by their sides. Hoffstetter, for instance, kept a Swiss 
“orderly”, and he translates the word without hesitation as “servant”.
1283
 Haug, directly upon 
his arrival ordered a barber, and let a bath be prepared for him. That there were other types of 
comfort in close reach becomes clear from Haug’s observation of the scene from his window: 
opposite to his room, he could see “an opulent Roman woman” (donna romana in the 
original), “looking out for the newly arriving guests of the hotel Cesari. She looked at me 
curiously with an ambiguous half smile.” And Haug asks: “Does she count amongst the 
effective defenders of Rome?”
1284
 
These differences in accommodation were common during many of the Garibaldian 
campaigns. Gustav von Hoffstetter, for instance, reports that while in the near vicinity of 
Palestrina, the troops of Garibaldi and Manara were housed in a convent, the single 
companies were “lead into the hallways of the cloister, where they bedded down on the hard 
stone, their hat as a pillow.” The officers, instead, lodged “in their own big hall on 
mattresses”, and they were provided with “wine, cheese and cigars” and therefore very 
“cheery”.
1285
 During the various Garibaldian undertakings, the officers and especially those of 
the general staffs
1286
 were often invited to stay in private houses and/or enjoyed their dinner 
there.
1287
 In Frosinone, where in 1849 the Roman officers as well as Garibaldi took quarter in 
the pontifical palace; they were even entertained by the “unforgettable cook”, one of the 
members of the palace household.
1288
 
In the military environment even the bourgeois officers kept their distance from the 
simple soldiers adopting behaviour typical of a stratified society, which was a noble legacy, 
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neugierig nach mir herüber mit einem zweideutig halben Lächeln. – ‚Die zählt zum Effektivstande der 
Verteidiger Roms?“ Haug, Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt, p. 217. 
1285
 “Die Mannschaft wurde kompagnieweise in die Gänge des Klosters geführt, wo sie auf harten Steinen, den 
Hut als Kopfkissen, sich zur Ruhe legten. […] Wir Offiziere lagerten in einem großen Saal auf Matratzen, waren 
mit Wein, Käse und Zigarren wohlversehen und seelenvergnügt. ” Hoffstetter, Tagebuch, p. 30. 
1286
 The point here is not to insinuate that the officers and the general staff were “lazy”; they took huge risks and 
carried out exhausting services, even if their duties often differed from the rank and file. The point here is to see 
how much distance was kept between officers and troopers or how close they were depending on area or topic, 
and how the manners of officer-soldier relationship continued to be informed by the stratified society 
consolidated in previous times. 
1287
 See, e.g., Hoffstetter, Tagebuch, p. 84. 
1288
 “[..S]einem unvergeßlichen Koch […]” ibid., p. 87. 
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even if at times they used a functional argument to legitimize their behaviour. The 
Garibaldian officer Rüstow, when writing of his better treatment in terms of provisions, 
expresses a modicum of remorse when seeing around him “many who had nothing. But I, first 
of all others, was in need of strength. And this thought comforted me in some way on the 
inequality of property that always seemed to me scandalous, scandalous especially among 
comrades.” Notwithstanding, he continuously asserts his right to this much better treatment in 
terms of room and board and warns his fellow officers not to appear too frequently in camp 
alongside the simple soldiers.
1289
 Hoffstetter writes that he, as a staff officer, did not interfere 
much in the “inner service of the regiment, and I kept myself busy for the greater part of the 
day with the amenities of the ‘dolce far niente’.”
1290
 
7.7.3 Excursus: Rüstow and the quest for “Adeligkeit” 
In some papers of the Southern Army of 1860, Wilhelm Rüstow is denoted as a count (conte). 
Some of the literature also refers to “Wilhelm von Rüstow” as a noble.
1291
This is of note 
because Rüstow himself never used the title. The registers and literature, however, were 
perhaps not entirely wrong. As Marcel Herwegh reveals in one chapter, entitled “The origins 
of the Rüstows”, in his 1935 biography of Wilhelm Rüstow, this family had been “barons and 
counts of the German empire”
1292
 at least until the eighteenth century. Marcel Herwegh had 
obtained his information on this matter from a letter written by Rüstow’s daughter, Marie. 
According to her, the family was originally from Hannover, but moved eastwards in the 
twelfth century during the conquest of Pomerania by Henry the Lion. Marie went on to write 
that the Rüstows became imperial barons and counts following this period of conquest, even 
if she does not know exactly when. Skimming through the available registers on the German 
and Prussian nobility, there are two most probably unconnected families: the Ristow family, 
with their ancestral home near Schlawe (Sławno in today’s Polonia) in Pomerania, and the 
Rueste or Rüstow family in the district of Randow (the area surrounding Stettin (Szczecin). 
According to Marie Rüstow, the family papers were kept in the church of Bublitz (Bobolice), 
                                                 
1289
 „[…]viele um mich herum sehen mußte, die nichts hatten. Ich brauchte schließlich vor allen andern Kraft – 
und diese Betrachtung tröstete mich einigermaßen über die mir immer anstößige ungleiche Vertheilung des 
Besitzes – anstößig vor allem im Kreise von Kameraden.“ Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen 
Feldzuge von 1860, 1, p. 196. 
1290
 “Der innere Dienst beim Regimente berührte mich nur wenig, und ich beschäftigte mich den größten Theil 
des Tages mit den Annehmlichkeiten des ‘dolce far niente’ [Italian in the orginal].” Hoffstetter, Tagebuch, p. 59. 
1291
 Even when referring to his grandnephew, the sociologist and economist Alexander Rüstow, some authors use 
the “von” erroneously. Alexander Rüstow, since the 1930s, was an important exponent of ordo-liberal economic 
theories and lived in Istanbul in exile since 1933. 
1292
 “Les Origines des Rüstow”; “[…] barons et comtes de l’Empire germanique […]”. Marcel Herwegh, 
Guillaume Rustow. Un garnd soldat, un grand caractère (1821-1878) (Paris ; Neuchatel: Attinger, 1935), pp. 
170 and 172. 
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which is, however, roughly 50 kilometres from the Schlawe (Sławno) and hence of the first 
mentioned family Ristow but 200 kilometres from Stettin (Szczecin). According to Marcel 
Herwegh, Wilhelm Rüstow was interested in his own possible noble descent: “Guillaume 
Rüstow affirmed to have found their coat of arms still in churches and cemeteries, while he 
was garrisoned in Danzig and roamed through the surrounding environs. Moreover, it was 
there that he gathered the greatest amount of information on his family. A knowledgeable 
man, an architect probably, having heard that a young officer that went by the name of 
Rüstow was in town, went to visit him and he [Rüstow] learned details on the history of his 
pedigree that he still did not know.”
1293
  
But to which family did Rüstow belong? Danzig (today Gdańsk) is approximately 340 
kilometres away from the ancestral home of the Rüstow family, while Bublitz – where 
according to Marie the papers of the family went up in flames, is 170 kilometres from this 
city. In the end, given the available information, it is not possible to irrefutably remove all 
doubt surrounding from which family Wilhelm and Marie descended; it is even possible that 
they did not belong to either of the two. But the point to underline is not whether or not 
Rüstow had noble roots. It was the fact that, Marcel Herwegh and, according to him, Wilhelm 
Rüstow himself wished to believe he was from noble descent – as is demonstrated by 
Rüstow's search for his coat of arms in the vicinity of Danzig. The mention that “all the 
papers and documents of the Rüstows” in Bublitz had been burnt is particularly revealing 
here: Documents were crucial to the “proof of nobility” (Adelsprobe)”, especially when 
attempting to regain a title that had at some point been lost. Therefore it is somewhat 
contradictory when Marie Rüstow writes in her letter to Marcel Herwegh: "If my father did 
nothing to regain his old title (as far as I know, already his father did not wear it) it was 
probably because it was no matter to him. Marcel, you would do well not to expatiate this old 
stuff, which gets lost in the mists of time. All this has no sense and reason anymore.”
1294
  
Even a decidedly “democratic” officer such as Rüstow, a partisan of a militia system 
of defence, therefore, may not have just cleaved to the many manners of intercourse between 
                                                 
1293
„[..A]ffirmé avoir trouvé encore leurs armoiries dans des églises ou cimetières, pendant qu’il se trouvait en 
garnison à Dantzik [sic], et qu’il parcourait le pays environnant. C’est là, du reste, qu’il eut de plus amples 
renseignements sur sa famille. Un savant, architecte probablement, ayant appris, par hazard, qu’un jeune officier 
du nom Rüstow se trouvait dans la ville, vint le trouver et lui apprit des details sur l’histoire de sa race qu’il 
ignorait encore.” Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
1294
 “Wenn mein Vater nichts dafür that, seinen alten Titel wieder zu erlangen (soviel ich weiß, trug ihn schon 
sein Vater nicht mehr) so war es wahrscheinlich, weil er ihm ganz egal war. Marcel thäte gut daran, diesen alten 
Kram, der sich im Dunkel der Zeiten verliert, nicht breit zu treten. Das Alles hat ja keinen Sinn und Verstand 
mehr.” Letter from Marie Herwegh to the wife of Marcel Herwegh, 11 March (without year, most probably from 
the 1930s), in the Nachlass of Wilhelm Rüstow in: Dichter- und Stadtmuseum Liestal/BL (Switzerland), Rü M 
51, p. 3. 
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soldiers and officers derived from noble traditions, but he could have been interested in 
improving his standing and reputation by availing himself of his possible noble descent. He, 
like other portions of the bourgeoisie, strove to enjoy the social capital possessed by the 
nobility. Similarly, democratic officers may have been interested in having official proof for 
their military value; medals of military merit
1295
 continued to be an important form of capital 
in the military and civil spheres, not only for legitimists
1296
 but for democrats as well.
1297
 
7.7.4 Officers and soldiers: keeping closeness 
While esprit de corps, social and educational background, and noble traditions served to 
maintain a basic distance between officers and soldiers, a certain closeness between the two 
groups nevertheless became increasingly important.
1298
 According to Morris Janowitz, the 
professionalization of the officer corps came about also in part because of a “change in the 
basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment, a shift from authoritarian 
domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus.”
1299
 Even if 
Janowitz was not a historian but a sociologist, and wrote on the officer corps of his time, it is 
possible to see this type of “closeness” already in the armies of the nineteenth century; an 
example of such may be seen in the use of different metaphors taken from the family sphere. 
Especially because they did not (completely) overturn authority, parental metaphors were 
quite commonly used to describe the role officers and their duties held in regard to the 
soldiers.
1300
 At times the officers might feel like a nineteenth-century “mother”, when they 
wrote about such problems as how to provide enough food or good accommodation to their 
men. The planning, organization or at least securing provisions or accommodation was just 
                                                 
1295
 For the analysis of symbolic capital by assessing the practices linked to medals and orders, see Ralph 
Winkle, "Für eine Symbolgeschichte soldatischer Orden und Ehrenzeichen," in Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst 
Carl, eds., Die Erfahrung des Krieges. Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution 
bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2001), pp. 195-214. 
1296
 In 1867, the Pope issued a medal for the combatants of the “Battle of Mentana”. This was sometimes 
included in the carte de visite photographs of single soldiers, as was the case for instance with the portrait of the 
papal officer Joseph Alois Bach, see the image A2.2 in appendix II, on p. 506. 
1297
 Ernst Haug, who took part in the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849 and the 1866 Garibaldian Trentino 
campaign, was awarded the medal in the officer’s rank of the Savoyard Army. Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow 
received his diploma of appointment as a Cavaliere dell’Ordine militare di Savoia in 1862. 
1298
 The following paragraphs up to p. 346 are a revised version of my forthcoming publication: Göhde, "La 
fraternité d’armes des peuples. Champ sémantique fraternel et soldats transnationaux au cours de l’(Anti-
)Risorgimento. Le cas des combattants allemands,” in an anthology edited by Catherine Brice. 
1299
 Janowitz, The professional soldier, pp. 8-9. 
1300
 It would be important to have a more detailed look at the history of parent-child relationships in this period: 
As Catherine Brice has rightly argued, the history of the family must be seen as a (necessary) contextualization 
of the history of the use of family metaphors in different contexts. See for this in relation to monarchism and 
nationalism, Brice, "Métaphore familiale".  
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one of the duties of the officers.
1301
 They also carried out functions that for this period would 
have been more typical of a father, e.g. commanding or drilling. The officers frequently used 
the word “children” in reference to the soldiers, which for them “were the children, under the 
obligation to obey, love and respect their parents unquestioningly, and meet their siblings 
with fraternal and comradely feelings.”
1302
 The officer-soldier relationship underwent a 
significant period of development, particularly from the Enlightenment onward. The more 
benevolent treatment of soldiers by officers was clearly informed by ideas of individual and 
then later constitutional liberties, even more so if the military wished to attract members of 
the bourgeoisie (as well) to its ranks. A different way to think of the officer-soldier 
relationship, therefore, took centre stage in liberal and democratic military conceptions.
1303
 
How much these conceptions still influenced the practices linked to the Garibaldian armed 
groups of the 1860s is still open to debate. When one bears in mind some elements of the 
democratic military conceptions of the 1840s that were never put into practice in these armed 
groups, such as the election of officers, they seem in some regards more regular.
1304
 In 1860, 
the initial Thousand were given the possibility to decide under whose command they wished 
to serve, even if the officers had already been nominated beforehand; the foreign soldiers of 
the national and foreigners’ legions, however, did not enjoy this freedom.
1305
 At the same 
time we should not underrate the change that was underway in the regular armies: The 
Bourbon Army, at least in the indigenous corps, was still very much characterized by 
Murattian personnel: Although they were old, they were not necessarily conservative. 
Furthermore, in the 1830s and 1840s, many officers – including the quintessential democrats 
Carlo Pisacane and Enrico Cosenz – were influenced by liberal and democratic thought.
1306
 In 
addition, before the kingdom toppled, the military was very much based on regulations that 
                                                 
1301
 See, e.g., the respective chapters on the planning of accomodation and provisions in Friedrich Wilhelm 
Rüstow, Anleitung für die Dienstverrichtungen im Felde für den Generalstab der eidgenössischen Bundesarmee 
(Basle: Schweighauser'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1855), pp. 15-47, 245-255. In 1860, Rüstow ordered a dozen 
copies of the French translation of these regulations and distributed them in southern Italy in order to organize 
the work of the general staff. See Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 1, p. 80. 
1302
 Frevert, A nation in barracks, p. 183. 
1303
 For Germany see ibid.; for Italy see instead Banti and Mondini, "Da Novara a Custoza"; the degree to which 
these conceptions (still) informed both military thinking and practices in the case of the garibaldini of the 1860s 
is however disputed. See two contrasting contributions, e. g., Virgilio Ilari, "L'esercito dell'utopia. I modelli 
militari 'alternativi' della sinistra risorgimentale e la questione della guardia nazionale (1821-1881)," in idem, 
Storia del servizio militare in Italia. Dall'ordinanza fiorentina di Machiavelli alla costituzione dell'esercito 
italiano, 1506-1870 (Rome: Rivista militare, 1989), pp. 377-430 on the one hand, and Riall, "Guerre et nation," 
pp. 49-64 on the other.  
1304
 Banti and Mondini, "Da Novara a Custoza,” p. 422; Frevert, A nation in barracks, p. 183. 
1305
 Giuseppe Capuzzi, "La spedizione di Garibaldi in Sicilia. Memorie di un volontario," in Vita di Giuseppe 
Garibaldi. Con la giunta di Garibaldi in Sicilia di Giuseppe Capuzzi, ed. Pier Carlo Boggio (Turin: s. n., 1860), 
p. 226; Cecchinato, Camicie rosse, pp. 201-202. 
1306
 Argiolas, Storia dell'esercito borbonico, p. 89. 
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had been enacted under the Ferdinandean military reforms of the 1830s; these last, for 
instance, were characterized by a more dynamic way to carry out the exercises and drills, the 
publication of military works and journals, and the reduction of corporal punishment.
1307
  
Military theorists, already at the beginning of the century, believed that the 
amelioration of the officer-soldier relationship would result in an increase in the performance 
of the soldiers, and hence increasingly comradeship and ideas of “brotherhood of arms” were 
consciously promoted, because they were thought to improve military discipline and 
performance. Brian Joseph Martin in his book on the politics and practices of friendship in the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Armies shows that both good horizontal (between soldiers) 
and vertical (between officers and soldiers) relations were also systematically invoked and 
sustained from “above”. Martin incisively wrote “Friendship, therefore, becomes a military 
technique for individual survival and collective success in combat, where men are trained to 
love and protect their fellow comrades in order to better hate and kill their enemies.”
1308
  
Garibaldi was well aware of the potential that this form of discipline had. In a text 
from August 1860 he advised his officers:  
 
“Of the qualities that must be primary among the officers of the Italian Army, other than 
valour, amiability, which attracts and binds the affection of the soldier, must be counted. It is 
difficult that an officer that is valorous and beloved by his subordinates does not obtain from 
them such discipline, subordination and verve as are necessary […] With vigour one can 
obtain a severe discipline, but it is preferable to obtain it through affection and positive 
influence. […] It is impossible that a soldier would abandon his dear officer on the battlefield, 
he who treated him well, helped him when in need, and with whom he shared the hardships 
and glory of the campaign. Therefore, it has to be a special duty of the officers to remain with 
their soldiers, and take care of them as they would their own family.”
1309
 
                                                 
1307
 Ibid., pp. 68-90. The issue should be developed further by having a look at the practices of the indigenous 
soldiers of the kingdom. 
1308
 Brian Joseph Martin, Napoleonic friendship. Military fraternity, intimacy, and sexuality in nineteenth-
century France (Durham, N.H. et al.: Univ. of New Hampshire Press; Univ. Press of New England, 2010), p. 11. 
On the both the functionality and disfunctionality (subversive potential) of comradeship see as well Kühne, 
"Kameradschaft," p. 510. 
1309
 “Tra le qualità che devono primeggiare negli ufficiali dell’esercito italiano, oltre il valore, deve contarsi 
l’amabilità, che attrae e vincola l’affetto del soldato. È difficile che un ufficiale valoroso, ed amato da’ suoi 
subalterni, non ottenga da loro, quella disciplina, subordinazione, e slancio necessarii […] Col vigore si può 
ottenere una severa disciplina; ma è preferibile ottenerla coll’affetto e coll’ascendente. […] È impossibile che il 
soldato abbandoni sul campo di battaglia il suo caro ufficiale, che lo trattò benevolmente, che lo sorresse nei 
bisogni e con cui divise fatiche e glorie della campagna. Perciò dev’essere cura speciale degli ufficiali di stare 
coi loro militi, e prenderne cura, come della propria famiglia.” Garibaldi, "Alcune parole agli ufficiali". 
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The ways in which officers treated their soldiers, however, became an issue of 
comparison between the officers themselves. Rüstow, despite the fact that in other passages of 
his report he underlined the need to maintain distance between officers and soldiers, criticizes 
the Italian officer Giuseppe Sirtori for “lacking comradely affection with the soldiers, which 
nearly instinctively makes possible to identify the officer […] There are some formalities, the 
violation of which offends the soldier, the observation of which wins him over easily. Of this 
Sirtori knew nothing. To the comfort and the care for a soldier he had nearly no regard.”
1310
 
Sometimes the soldiers, however, seemed to be able to differentiate between the real 
human affection of the officers toward their soldiers, and mere functional friendliness. Georg 
von Vollmar notes a situation that occurred before his papal corps had to return to the battle: 
“The officers approached us in a friendly way, adulated and asked us, if the abundantly 
distributed hard liquors and coffee were sufficient […] But the soldier is disgusted by such a 
sudden and egoistic amiability, and he holds his superior in even less esteem.”
1311
 
7.8 Brothers in arms, companions and comrades
1312
  
Military historians have pointed out with insistence, that the reference group for the individual 
soldier in the nineteenth century was still primarily his own regiment rather than the army as a 
whole. Rather than speaking of a homogenous army, therefore, “it is more accurate to say that 
a collection of regiments was put together for some time for action”.
1313
  
Here, the topic somewhat opens onto a minefield of a military history
1314
 that is 
articulated along a spectrum, the two extremes of which are: the cohesion that came out of a 
                                                 
1310
 “daß ihm der Sinn für die kameradschaftliche Zuneigung zum Soldaten fehlte, welche den Offizier 
gewissermaßen instinctiv erkennen läßt […]. Davon wußte Sirtori nichts. Auch auf die Bequemlichkeit und die 
Sorge für den Soldaten nahm er so gut als keine Rücksicht.” Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen 
Feldzuge von 1860, 2, p. 22. 
1311
 “Die Offiziere kamen freundlich heran, schmeichelten und befragten uns, ob uns der reichlich vertheilte 
Schnaps und Kaffee genüge […]. Den Soldaten aber widert eine so plötzliche und egoistische Freundlichkeit an, 
und er achtet seinen Vorgesetzten nur noch weniger.” Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, p. 26. 
1312
 This section up to p. 346 is a translated and revised version of my Göhde, "La fraternité d’armes des peuples. 
Champ sémantique fraternel et soldats transnationaux au cours de l’(Anti-)Risorgimento. Le cas des combattants 
allemands", forthcoming in an anthology edited by Catherine Brice. 
1313
 Myerly, British Military Spectacle, p. 1. 
1314
 This is a highly debated field, especially in German historiography on the Second World War insofar as it 
apparently leads to the question of individual responsibility for the crimes committed by the Wehrmacht. Two 
examples of this are, on the one hand, the work that has been carried out on the protocols on German POWs by 
Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten. On fighting, killing and dying, which emphasizes the importance of a general 
frame of war; and on the other the work carried out on the relationship between Nazism and "comradeship" by 
Thomas Kühne, "Zwischen Männerbund und Volksgemeinschaft. Hitlers Soldaten und der Mythos der 
Kameradschaft," Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 38 (1998): pp. 165-89; Thomas Kühne, "Comradeship. Gender 
confusion and gender order in the German military, 1918-1945," in Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-
Springorum, eds., Home - front. The military, war and gender in 20th century Germany (Oxford; New York: 
Berg, 2002), pp. 233-54. 
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common objective and the common ideological convictions of the combatants on one hand, 
and the cohesion that resulted from living in close quarters within the military groups 
themselves on the other.  
The military traditionally reserves a series of specific words, or words with a 
specifically military denotation and frequency of use, to express loyalty within the military 
sphere. These words could actually be used to express the bonds within the formal groups of 
the regiments and smaller military corps, but they could also be used between soldiers of 
more informal or transversal groups respectively.
1315
 
The specific use of the words "brotherhood in arms", "companion" and "comrade" in 
the military has a long history; no new words were invented during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, however. The "brotherhood in arms" in particular has a long history that 
stretches back from antiquity up through to today. 
In the Middle Ages, the knights in particular formed “brotherhoods of arms”; these 
"brotherhoods in arms" and the idea of “blood brotherhood” were intimately connected in the 
Middle Ages. The word companion also possesses a long military history; the word originally 
used to denote a member of a "company", i.e. of a legal society, came to be used in Italian, 
French and Spanish in the more strictly military sense following the creation of the 
"compagnie di ventura" (lit. venture companies) of the fourteenth century.
 1316 
“Comrade” was originally used to indicate the community of people living in the same 
"camera" (room); it seems that its military use already had an extended acceptation – i.e., it 
was not limited only to the community living in a single habitation – by the sixteenth century; 
most likely, this too emerged from the mercenary context in Italy. 
Even if this term has a particular history of use especially in the twentieth century
1317
, 
comrade is often used in the written texts of soldiers, for example Germans in the nineteenth 
                                                 
1315
 I will discuss the various possible group loyalties (political party, sovereign/commander, regiment, national 
and/or regional etc.) in the chapter 8.3. 
1316
 R. Manselli, "Compagnia di ventura," in Robert-Henri Bautier, ed., Lexikon des Mittelalters (Stuttgart: 
Metzler, 1999); J. L. Bermejo Cabrero, "Compañia," in Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 
1999), col. 100; Ph. Contamine, "Kompa/g)nie, 1. Frankreich," in Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: 
Metzler, 1999), cols. 1291-92.  
1317
 The history of the concept has been studied first and foremost within the context of “comradeship” in the 
nineteenth century, hence in the use extended to the whole population (women included) of a “blind obedience” 
to the “Führer” or “duce”, and its integration with racism and martial tendencies. See first and foremost the 
publications of Kühne, "Kameradschaft," pp. 504-29; Kühne, "Zwischen Männerbund und Volksgemeinschaft," 








First is the connection of the concept, mirrored already in the word comrade (French 
camerade) itself, with an important characteristic of the military of modern times that was 
discussed above: the close physical proximity of the soldiers in the armies, with regard to the 
physical interdependence of war movements and to living together day in and day out. 
These connotations are inherent to the nineteenth century use of these words. Therefore, in 
1793, for example, the German dictionary Adelung considers one of the examples of 
comradeship (Cameradschaft) to be the cohabitation of soldiers or apprentices, "when they 




That the soldiers lived together is to be taken literally, seeing as it was still quite 
frequent in the nineteenth century for common soldiers to sleep in a communal bed, 
perpetuating the phenomenon of the “bedfellow” (camarade de lit). 
This idea that there was a special corporal closeness between the soldiers is 
emphasized in the poem “Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden”, which was written by the (democrat 
and) poet Ludwig Uhland at the beginning of the nineteenth century
1320
; it is often used even 
today as a song during funerals, both military and civilian. The first stanza reads, the 
"comrade went alongside me in matched pace and footstep", while in the second, the dying 
comrade was "as though he were a part of me".
1321
 
Like Thomas Kühne, it seems right to view comradeship not as a practice that evolves 
on its own, but more as a specific discourse that has a series of functions. As a discourse, 




                                                 
1318
 At least this is how it seems based on a rapid search in Garibaldi's texts; therefore, perhaps it is telling that 
the word "Kamerad" in Gustav von Hoffstetter's diary on the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849 appears as 
"compagno" in the Italian translation of 1851. See Hoffstetter, Tagebuch; Gustavo de Hoffstetter, Giornale delle 
cose di Roma nel 1849 (Turin; Capolago: Cassone; Tip. Elvetica, 1851), passim. 
1319
 „[…] Cameradschaft, wenn sie mit einander in Gesellschaft reisen, ingleichen, wenn sie in Einem Zimmer 
wohnen und eine gemeinschaftliche Haushaltung führen.“ Johann Christoph Adelung, "Cameradschaft," in idem, 
Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, vol. 1 (A-E) (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1793), p. 
1295. 
1320
 Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat (Munich: C. H. Beck, 
1983), p. 25. 
1321
 “Er ging an meiner Seite, / In gleichem Schritt und Tritt. […]Als wär’s ein Stück von mir.” Ludwig Uhland, 
"Der gute Kamerad," in idem, Gedichte (Stuttgart; Tübingen: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1815), p. 219. 
1322
 Kühne, "Zwischen Männerbund und Volksgemeinschaft. Hitlers Soldaten und der Mythos der 
Kameradschaft," p. 175 
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The main function of comradeship was, without doubt, that of harmonizing the 
reciprocal relationships of the soldiers. It had a "gentle" side to it that allowed for emotions 
and tears and open displays of affection; it was a special "habitus" between men, 
incorporating practices that at the time were considered to be "feminine". 
These "rituals of tenderness" were put into practice to enable the soldiers to bear the 
brutal realities, both emotional and physical, that were connected to military life and war. 
This "gentle" comradeship was one of the ingredients of a special "homosocial desire" in 




This special male society in the army explains why many soldiers could speak of their 
time in the army as a period that was (also) characterized by love
1324
, friendship and joy. 
Hoffstetter reports on his time in the Roman Republic in 1849, that the soldiers 
sometimes put on puppet shows: “Behind a bed sheet or tablecloth – accompanied by an 
orchestra (harmonica or trumpet) – the stupidest things in the world were performed; we 
almost laughed ourselves to death.”
1325
 On other occasions, according to the reports of the 
German soldiers and officers, soldiers would prank the population or they would dance like 
couples in their camp.
1326
 
Head-brigand Ludwig Richard Zimmermann wrote of his first contact with the 
brigands' camp: "What a happy and bellicose life here in and between the huts made of leaves, 
around an enormous and beating fire. [...] Oh! To suffer together, common peril so rapidly 
create friendship and trust! How healthy it would be for a cold and proud heart, that would 
only govern and not love, to transfer to the brigands for several months!”
 1327 
Soldiers effectively filled typically familial roles with regard to their comrades. During 
the procedures connected to the death of a soldier in battle is one example of such, this being 
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 Banti, L'onore della nazione, p. 291. 
1324
 On homoerotism and the military, see the discussion of the painting by David, “Leonidas at Thermopylae”, 
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 “Marionettenaufführung […] Hinter einem Bett- oder Tischtuch wurde nun unter Orchesterbegleitung 
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 See the Garibaldian Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 1, p. 210; the papal 
Eickholt, Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara, p. 96; Hoffstetter, Tagebuch, p. 73. 
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 „Welch ein lustiges, kriegerisches Treiben in und zwischen den vielen Laubhütten, um die mächtigen, 
prasselnden Feuer. […] O! das gemeinschaftliche Leiden, die gemeinschaftliche Gefahr schaffen die 
Freundschaft und das Vertrauen ganz schnell! Wie heilsam wäre für manches kalte, stolze Herz, das nur 
beherrschen und nicht lieben will, eine mehrmonatige Transferirung zu den -Briganten!“ Zimmermann, 
"Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," pp. 46-47. 
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the frequent topos based on the model of the “Pietà” where a soldier would fill the role of 
mother to caress his dying friend and comrade. 
Gustav von Hoffstetter wrote of one such scene that occurred during the defence of the 
Roman Republic in 1849: "A bullet" struck Colonel Laviron "in his lower abdomen. The 
soldier-priest Ugo Bassi [...] gathered him in his arms. The dying man haltingly uttered 
several intelligible [the German version: unintelligible] words, made one more effort then to 
kiss his friend, and then gave up his soul to the Creator."
1328
 
It remains unclear whether Hoffstetter really saw this scene with his own eyes, 
however, because this story is similarly recounted by many authors.
1329
  
Analogously, in the "old habit of bringing their fallen with them", the soldiers – to be 
able to bury their comrades as would a family – "extended their hands to them". This at times 
proved to be a deadly habit because, as Hoffstetter wrote, "the hand that reached out for that 
extreme task, promptly pulled back, more than zealously, to press over their own mortal 
wound. Others, already safe behind the ally's house, or having reached the entrance to the 
garden, would run forward to succour their wounded comrade, who lay so close by, but after a 
convulsive and fearful jerk of the limbs, they too would lie still alongside their friend."
 1330 
But comradeship, or brotherhood-in-arms, was not limited to this "maternal" role alone 
insofar as it seemed that, like the ritual of blood brotherhood, it also encompassed the duty to 
help one's brother on the battlefield and also the "vendetta di sangue" (lit. "blood vendetta"). 




Zimmermann wrote of how several peasants had helped the "brigands", and he 
imagined that they thought that "the brothers, for whom we risked everything, will try to 
liberate us! They will risk their lives, as we have for them!"
1332
 
The duty to carry out a vendetta for one's fallen comrades was, as aforementioned, 
closely connected to the "blood brotherhood" and the "brotherhood in arms". Therefore, the 
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German soldier Maier in the Bourbon Army, described a moment just before they were to be 
transferred from Sicily to Calabria on 13 June 1860: "But before leaving, we still wished to 
take out our revenge for our fallen comrades and leave the City of Palermo with the memory 
of its lack of faith. We set fire to all of the neighbourhoods we had taken. The damage caused 
was enormous, but our exacerbation was equally great."
1333
 
When their wounded comrades beseeched them to end their suffering, the soldiers 
were confronted with the inability to carry out the act. Maier related: "Taking leave of our 
poor, sick comrades who were to be left behind was poignant. Knowing that they would fall 
into Garibaldi's hands and would have nothing but an ignoble death, they asked us to kill them 
with well-aimed shots. But who would have been able now, when they hadn't even the 




It, however, would be erroneous to consider comradeship the simple and inevitable 
“social-psychological” result of the soldiers living together. From the outside, the 
"brotherhood in arms" and comradeship were not the antithesis of discipline; on the contrary, 
it seems that the appellation "brother in arms" could also be accompanied by general calls to 
discipline. For example, Garibaldi stated in one of his orders of the day to the Cacciatori delle 
Alpi: "I recall with emotion the affection and obedience demonstrated to me by my brave 
companions in arms; however, for the good of all, and availing myself of my experience, I 
must council our soldiers and recommend the officers never to tire of inculcating and 
practicing the following principles, which (just) the other day were flouted for a moment." 
What follows are a series of problems that Garibaldi noticed, be it from a lack of "cold 
blood" (in the sense of cool-headedness) to the chaotic deployment in sequence. He goes on to 
conclude with a Garibaldian carrot: a "special report will indicate those that distinguished 
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 „Doch bevor wir abzogen, wollten wir noch unsere gefallenen Kameraden rächen, und der Stadt Palermo ein 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the military penal codes served not only to discipline 
soldiers in order to make the military service more effective but also to discipline the daily 
communal lives of the soldiers: the regulations on theft and swindling, whereby a soldier was 




Rüstow, recounting how several soldiers had sold materials that were reserved for the 
Southern Army, goes on to mock the "brotherhood": "Amongst the sellers, there were even 
some that had with the utmost urgency asked that we view each other as brothers. I charged 
the officers to tell the soldiers that this pretext of brotherhood [Brüderschaft in German
1337
] 
toward honest men was sorely unjust on the part of such louts.
”1338 
But regardless of the function they served in rendering the army more efficient, 
comradeship and the brotherhood also had subversive potential, and this with regard to the 
relationship between the officers and soldiers. These ties could be invoked to call for less 
hierarchy and more equality. The word “comrade” is associated with a strong connotation of 
equality because it refers – already in the history of the word itself – to living together under 
the same roof, i.e. to being in the same condition. 
At times, (common) soldiers use this acceptation of "equality" to demand a more 
equitable culture and less hierarchy. 
Rüstow relates a scene where Captain Francesco Taddei within the Garibaldian army 
"spoke with the general staff on the part of the soldiers. [...] He primarily requested that we all 
regard each other as brothers." But according to Rüstow, Colonel Luigi Pianciani "responded 
kindly but firmly to all this", declining the request.
1339
 
                                                                                                                                                        
più si distinsero nei due fatti d’armi passati, e li porgeròalla venerazione dei loro fratelli d’armi.” Garibaldi, 
"Ordine del Giorno, Ai Cacciatori delle Alpi, Como, 28 maggio 1859,", pp. 97-98. 
1336
 Terminology used in the military penal code in use for the Bourbon foreigners' regiment after 1859, the code 
of the Swiss soldiers in service to France: Entwurf eines Straf-Gesetzbuchs für die Schweizer-Regimenter im 
Dienste Seiner Allerchristlichsten Majestät / Projet d'un code pénal militaire pour les régimens suisses au 
service de Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne, (Naples: Richter, 1858), § 134, p. 54. 
1337
 For the German words, see Meriggi, "Fraternité/Brüderlichkeit". 
1338
 „Es waren unter den Verkäufern gerade auch einige, die am dringendsten begehrt hatten, daß wir uns alle als 
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Soldier fraternization against military leaders was a constant risk. According to the 
common soldier Rottmund, within the Papal Army "the officers were second-rate", but "the 
supplies and the common man, they were excellent".
1340
 
At times the ties among a group of common soldiers was so strong that they seemed to 
desert as a group: this seemed to have happened with Rottmund, who with a group of papal 
soldiers joined the Garibaldian ranks; this was also what occurred with the desertion of a 





If we wish to understand the specificities of a foreign group such as that of the German 
soldiers in the Italian armed groups of the nineteenth century in terms of their experiences, 
practices and contribution to foreign-Italian and German-Italian transfers, it is helpful to have 
an idea of what military life in the nineteenth century armies was like in general, and how it 
was in the Italian armed groups in particular. Unfortunately, daily life in many Italian pre-
Unitarian armed groups has been studied very little. This chapter, therefore, aimed to bring to 
light some aspects of military life in the various armed groups; a comparative approach was 
adopted to indicate in which regards the life of the foreign soldiers resembled that of their 
“indigenous” colleagues in the various groups, and in which instances it tended to differ. 
The military in the nineteenth century is a highly codified world, and the number of 
different aspects of military life that were meticulously regulated by legislation is extremely 
high. There are three main fields of governmental intervention: The first are the regulations 
on the services to be fulfilled by the military together with rules on the administrative and 
logistical aspects; the second is constituted by the drill books for the various branches of the 
armies (infantry, artillery, etc.), while the third is constituted by military criminal law. 
Codification was not only important in the regular armies of the states, but it also informed 
the various Garibaldian undertakings, even those in which the garibaldini were not officially 
linked to the Army of Piedmont or Italy. At times the regulations that were used in these latter 
cases were officially those of the states’ armies, an example of which were the criminal codes 
that were taken over from Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and applied to the  
 
                                                 
1340
 „[…] Offiziere […], die unfähig waren […]“. „Das eigentliche Material, der gemeine Mann, war 
vortrefflich.“ Rottmund, Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten, p. 84. 
1341
 Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's", p. 470. 
347 
 
Southern Army of 1860. In those instances in which specific regimes were not specified with 
regard to the other areas of regulation, commanders such as Wilhelm Rüstow established their 
own regime. At times the regulations from other armies would be applied, and at others the 
commanders would simply resort to what they knew and what they thought were adequate 
practices. Hence one would have to go into more depth and look at the varying practices that 
were established in the different military subgroups of these armies; this however was more 
than could be done here.  
Although the regulations cannot provide us with a complete view of how military life 
actually was, they can, nevertheless provide us with an idea of how it should have been.  
In all of the armed groups, the services expected of the foreigners’ corps – from the 
Papal Zouaves to the Papal Carabineers and the Bourbon foreigners’ regiments to the 
Garibaldian foreign company of 1860 – essentially mirrored the duties assigned to the other 
regiments of the same branch (i.e., in this case, the infantry). In the Bourbon and Papal 
Armies, the foreign soldiers basically adhered to the same time-table as the Italians; this 
applied not only to when they were woken up and when they went to bed but also to the time 
in between, when they had to, like the indigenous corps, carry out the typical services of 
nineteenth-century armies in peacetime. Such activities included providing sentinels and 
patrols in more or less little groups formed of soldiers from the same corps, doing specific 
work (“corvées”), drilling, exercising and parading, and finally forming escorts and showing 
their presence in a significant number of civil and – particularly for the papal soldiers – 
religious occasions. In providing these services, alongside their war training, the foreigners’ 
and indigenous corps of the regular armies participated in preserving the public “order” that 
was primarily maintained by the more circumscribed, but nevertheless militarily organized 
police forces. Herein lays one further, possible ingredient for negative views on these soldiers 
by democrats or liberals. Both the foreign and indigenous corps also contributed to the 
“military spectacle” put on by the states to display their power and presence. The emphasis 
placed on order, cleanliness and posture, and therefore aesthetics – both on and off duty – that 
was typical of the military regulations was not only functional for economic or disciplinary 
purposes so as to avoid the wear on the provisions/equipment and to reduce the number of 
desertions caused by friction within the corps, but it was functional for the theatrical role 
filled by the military as well, insofar as it was intended to help rehabilitate the image the civil 
sphere had of the military. For the soldiers, however, this amounted to an extremely strong 
and far reaching conditioning of their behaviour on the part of the state. Furthermore, the 
sheer quantity of controls carried out on the soldiers during the day without doubt led to the 
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internalization of controlling practices on the part of the soldiers, which became their own, 
individual control before they were then controlled from above; this seems to work very much 




At least until the eighteenth century, military training and drill were also meticulously 
regulated. As many authors have noted, traditional military drill may be compared to dancing, 
with regard to both the process of learning individual movements and the choreography with 
others. While the mechanisms to learn the movements and how to coordinate the personal 
movements of each soldier with that of the others were likened to the processes used in social 
dancing, the military apparatus as a whole was considered to be a machine comprised of many 
interlocking parts. This idea of the military as a machine with perfectly interlocking parts 
could go together with aesthetic considerations. But the question remains as to how much drill 
in the Italian armies continued to rely on traditional close-order control and on training each 
soldier the many different and precise movements that went with it. A comparison of the 
various armed groups reveals some differences. Based on the analysis of the drill book of the 
Papal Army, it seems that the exercises did not differ much from the old models. At the legal 
level, the Bourbon Army already differed quite a bit more. This was because the regulations 
in use up to the fall of the Kingdom stemmed from the period of the Ferdinandean military 
reforms of the 1830s; the regulations, in fact, were characterized not only by a conscious 
copying from abroad, but had introduced dynamic, less corporal punishments (even if this for 
the military criminal law applied to the foreigners’ regiments happened later) and, as we will 
see in the following chapter, military gymnastics at a relatively early stage. 
With regard to the Garibaldian armed groups, the issue of training was more 
complicated, for several reasons. In some cases, the garibaldini were to be trained using the 
Piedmontese regulations, or were even – as was the case in 1859 – trained by Piedmontese 
officers, if hastily. In other cases, official decisions were never taken, and therefore the 
methods adopted depended, even more than was usual in the regular armies, on the respective 
superiors of each corps. It is important to note, however, that the duration of training that the 
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Garibaldian soldiers were subject to was not even close to the amount of time that most of the 
soldiers of the regular armies were subject to. This was most probably due to a variety of 
reasons: To differing ideas regarding the aims and necessary level of precision that “drill” was 
to reach in the liberal-democratic political field could have argued that the garibaldini had to 
be ready for combat as soon as possible and therefore their training could not be as extensive; 
this in a sense is confirmed by the equally short training the pro-Bourbon “brigands” of the 
1860s received or that of the lately arriving German soldiers of the new Bourbon foreigners’ 
regiments, who were nearly immediately sent into battle upon their arrival in 1860. In 
contrast, since the regular armies were not dismantled in times of peace, they could use these 
periods for more substantial training. Another factor that must be taken into consideration is 
the fact that varying numbers of foreign and Italian soldiers alike had already had some 
military experience that they had acquired while serving in other armies and/or armed groups 
prior to joining Garibaldi's forces. As I wrote above, however, one would have to look more 
in depth into the variety of the military subgroups; the practices in a group such as the British 
Legion – of which at least a part of its members seems to never have previously been part of a 
military
1343
 – necessarily differed from those of the Germans, Austrians and Swiss ex-
bourbon soldiers who were in the Garibaldian “foreign company”. Nevertheless, some basic 
training in an abbreviated version of the tripartite “school of the soldier” remained important 
for the garibaldini as well, if only to calm and tame possible “hot” emotions before moving 
on to tasks such as handling the gun, which necessitated a "cool" head. 
Despite informing the practical work of the soldiers to varying degrees, the regulations 
were also an important tool for discursive imprinting within the armies themselves. Parts of 
these regulations, such as the general service regulations or military criminal law, were not 
only distributed – e.g. in the printed form of the soldiers’ service books or Rüstow’s 
distribution of the instructions for the duties of the general staff, and parts of service 
regulations and military criminal law issued for the “brigands” by Zimmermann – but 
regularly read to the common soldiers in the regular armies, thus reaching those who could 
not read as well. Specifically military texts such as the orders of the day (including those of 
Garibaldi), given by both the supreme commander and the respective heads of corps, 
conveyed specific values, be it cleanliness and posture or the harmonization of soldier-soldier 
and soldier-officer relationships. The particularly harsh punishment of property crimes, when 
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they occurred between soldiers is an indication that regulations could, for instance help to 
inform practices of harmonious “comradeship”. The regulations and orders of the day as 
important media for the dispersion of values and concepts, e.g. honour and comradeship, 
would be worthwhile elements for further analysis. 
Furthermore, more study is needed to make a greater distinction between legal 
prescriptions and the actual practices in these armed groups than was possible here; one 
aspect that has yet to be analysed is how the practices in the foreigners’ corps of the Papal and 
Bourbon Armies were influenced and changed by foreign officers that had previously served 
in other European armies. It was possible in this chapter to only partially compare the legal 
level with the practical through the integration of the German soldiers' reports. Nevertheless, 
this chapter serves to indicate some of the possible directions of further inquiry. 
The same may be said, mutatis mutandis, for some of the other issues addressed in this 
chapter.  
Since 1846, military criminal law was the same for the foreigners’ and indigenous 
regiments in the Papal Army. This was not the case for the foreign regiments in the Bourbon 
Army, where a more or less dynamic connection to the code used by the Swiss corps in the 
French Army had been established. Essentially this guaranteed the group of German Bourbon 
soldiers, that had served between 1859 and 1860, with an at least partially humanized 
treatment – compared with the previous version of the French code that had been valid for the 
former Bourbon “Swiss” regiments; this took the form of a reduction of corporal punishment. 
Again, practices could partially differ according to how the law was interpreted by the officers 
or the judicial bodies of the first instance, which normally was comprised of members of the 
regiment itself. 
Although some work could still be done with regard to the practices of military 
criminal law, thanks to the German soldiers’ reports used in this chapter, more can already be 
said about officer-soldier relationships, for instance. 
As always, the comparative method helps to “render the invisible visible”
1344
, which in 
this case applies to aspects, for instance, of the garibaldini that are often not touched upon in 
Risorgimento historiography. From the role of previously militarily experienced foreign and 
Italian soldiers mentioned in the previous chapter, to military criminal law and punishment 
practices (including martial law and executions), and to officer-soldier relationships we can 
discover aspects of the garibaldini that call into question some of the images of these armed 
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groups that have been established and perpetuated in much of the Risorgimento 
historiography, images that at times tend to exclude beforehand everything that has to do with 
the military as such. However, despite the multiple changes brought about in the Garibaldian 
armed groups compared with the states’ armies, the entanglements between the two must not 
be underrated: There were various ways in which the regulations and practises of the states’ 
armies were incorporated at least partially into the Garibaldian armed groups, either by 
adopting these laws or through the practices brought to the groups by officers and experienced 
soldiers. Despite all of the politically and functionally motivated changes in the officer-soldier 
relationships that occurred in both the regular and the Garibaldian armed groups, the fact that 
the two groups remained partially separated in all of the armed groups studied here – whether 
this took the form of different wage levels (though not always), and different accommodations 
and provisions, the different types of duties and hence “work” that were assigned, and the 
different possibilities and quantity of free-time allowed – must not be underestimated. 
Furthermore, based on the sources analysed, it seems that in terms of closeness or distance 
between officers and soldiers, the inter-soldier relationships in the garibaldini of 1860, for 
instance, were not so totally different from those of the regular armies. However, it was 
possible to find instances in which partially differing ideas on the officer-soldier relationships 
conflicted one with the other; a good example is the admonition (whether it was motivated by 
questions of humanity or/and functionality is not entirely clear) Garibaldi made to his officers 
to be present among the soldiers, and the opposite view represented by Rüstow, for whom 
nevertheless the care an officer took of his soldiers seemed to be an important quality of a 
“good officer”. 
Furthermore, the specific communication methods typical of the military – which were 
partially derived from the nobility-nobility and nobility-sovereign forms of intercourse – were 
not totally discarded in the Garibaldian case; a number of instruments were preserved and 
used such as “orders of the day”, the role of military ceremonies (namely the aforementioned 
parade of the different brigades, including the “Hungarian Legion”, before Garibaldi in 
Caserta), or – last but not least – the ascendency that the noble world and costumes still 
exerted at least on some bourgeois officers. Despite the many professionalizing tendencies 
especially in the officer-corps as described in a previous chapter, even if one were to want to, 
it was not easy to disentangle the nobility and the officer corps, which were so historically 
intertwined especially in terms of the traditions of social intercourse. Moreover, it seems to 
me that much remains to be written on the interrelated topic of a "military history from 
below" of the garibaldini. In other words, much of the historiography on the garibaldini 
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carried out to date is particularly valid for the history of Garibaldian officers, while the 
experiences of the many common soldiers, whether foreign or Italian, have not yet been 
studied in as much depth.
1345
 
With regard to the discourse of comradeship in the nineteenth century, it has been 
shown here how regulations, officer-soldier relations, and the discursive embossments of 
military practices were in fact intertwined. Without a doubt, the soldiers developed forms of 
small-group identity, which however in varying degrees were informed by general as well as 
more circumscribed military media, such as the regulations governing soldier-soldier and 
soldier-officer-relationships or the particular military forms of individual and military unit 
communication with each other. At times small-group identity could lead to acts of brutality, 
an example of which was the revenge taken out on the civil population as recounted by the 
Bourbon soldier Maier. At the discursive level, group-identity or fidelity toward a group was 
also influenced by specific ideas surrounding the concept of the "brotherhood of arms" among 
which duties to exact or inflict vengeance. Here, in this context as elsewhere, it is important to 
bear in mind the qualifying additions to words such as “brotherhood” or “solidarity”: This 
makes an obvious difference when speaking of concepts such as "brotherhood" and 
"solidarity" or "solidarity between nations" and "brotherhood of arms", which on the surface 
are apparently positive concepts. Among these would also be the military duties that 
specifically go beyond the single isolated act of cooperation and take the form of repayment 
of bloodshed for one's own cause wherein one's own blood is sacrificed to the causes of the 
other. Despite the specificities and functionalities of the discourse of comradeship, however, 
this last has always contained a certain degree of subversive potential, for example, when it 
was used by the soldiers to unite against officers or more generally the military establishment. 
While this chapter seems to indicate that there is much in common between the foreigners’ 
and indigenous soldiers’ practices in the various Italian armed groups, the next chapter aims 
to look more carefully at the peculiarities as well as consequences of the presence of foreign, 
and among them German, soldiers and officers. It will examine the ways in which the 
institutional structures discussed here overlapped and were interrelated, but also superseded 
by national grouping especially, and how this informed transnational comparisons, clashes as 
well as transfers that occurred within the single Italian armed groups.  
                                                 
1345
 It may well be that the world of many Garibaldian soldiers in fact exhibited some traits that were 
characteristic of the “inmates” of the “total institutions” described by Goffman. One of Goffman’s aims is to 
underline the difference between the worlds of the “inmates” from that of the keepers/staff; it is of note that 
among his examples of “total institutions” Goffman does not count the military or army as a whole, but – in this 
military sphere – only the “army barracks”. See: Goffman, Asylums, pp. 7 and 5. 
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8 Contemporary comparisons, circulation and transfers 
8.1 Military masculinities, corps-to-corps and individual physical interactions 
Both the military and masculinity can be partially understood from a performative and/or 
theatrical perspective: Military rituals and ceremonies such as parades, marching, or military 
salutations consist very much in the planned exhibition of an army and of its more or less 
distinguishable component parts, the corps. The history of the military and masculinities can 
hence profit from those strands of scientific discussion that centre on performativity and/or 
“theatricality”.  
Mere linguistic practices are often important in establishing meaning at the level of 
(structures of) words. But at least some of them also function in a “performative” manner, 
namely, because there are “cases […] in which to say something is to do something; or in 
which by saying or in saying we are doing something.” These are referred to as, in the words 
of John L. Austin, “performatories or performatives. These have on the face of them the look 
– or at least the grammatical make-up – of ‘statements’; but nevertheless they are seen, when 
more closely inspected, to be, quite plainly, not utterances which could be ‘true’ or 
‘false’.”
1346
 A classical example of such is the declaration of the marriage registrar, “I now 
pronounce you man and wife”: this statement is not just a simple declaration of the facts, but 
it actually brings into being the couple’s officially married status. Such linguistic practices are 
even more complex: They behave as “interpellations” – a concept developed by the 
philosopher Louis Althusser, which profoundly informed the work of Michel Foucault (who 
was one of his students) and Judith Butler respectively.
1347
 Interpellations must necessarily 
fulfil what they state: e.g. upon the pronouncement "husband and wife", the two must behave 
as such. Or, a little new-born girl ought to be as such once the words "It's a girl" have been 
uttered upon her birth. 
The military is not just a world based on linguistic structures and commands, it is also 
a world comprised of physical individuals.
1348
 Erving Goffman’s sociological work is 
                                                 
1346
 John L. Austin, How to do things with words, 2 ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 
12, italics in the original. 
1347
 Judith Butler, The psychic life of power. Theories in subjection (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1997), on Althusser, see especially pp. 95-96 and 106-131. 
1348
 In our case, we are dealing nearly exclusively with men as soldiers, despite the fact that instances in which 
women dressed as men, especially on the Garibaldian side, have been confirmed. I, however, did not come 
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dedicated especially to the interaction between corporally co-present individuals and groups, 
and delves into the rules and concrete effects the individuals’ actions have upon one another. 
Goffman’s work, due to the emphasis he places on physical presence as well as the use of 
metaphors from the world of the theatre to describe social interaction, is particularly 
interesting with regard to those later strands of discussion that go beyond the performativity 
of acts of speech at the linguistic level alone and instead (or as well) go on to emphasize the 
ways in which cultural performances can be understood in terms of the theatre proper. This 
type of “theatrical” inflection of the “performative turn” can be found in concepts of 
“theatricality” that underline the role of corporal performances in society, i.e. staging 
practices precisely for the perception of others.
1349
 The role of the body; the actual physical 
presence in social situations; and the differentiation, the interaction of corporally present 
actors, and audiences as well as the changes that arise from the repetition of a performance are 
all aspects that belong to the more circumscribed area of theatre studies, but also to the study 
of society at large insofar as they can be productively transferred and applied to this sphere. 
Some of these aspects figure prominently in gender studies: “The acts through which gender 
is constituted show similarities with those performative acts that can be found in theatrical 
contexts.”
1350
 The invocation “Be a girl!” is therefore (also, or even “only”) “a request to 
perform, a self-staging, in which the girl must ‘cite’ the norm”, and so to be a “subject”.
1351
 In 
fact, the perlocutionary aspect of this gender invocation consists in the directive to literally 
accomplish, according to Judith Butler, the embodiment or performance of gender norms.
 1352
. 
It is therefore not astonishing that many authors find similarities between Butler and 
                                                                                                                                                        
across any German women as soldiers in the Italian armed groups in this period. Of note, however, is Marie 
Esperance von Schwartz and her nursing activities ; despite the fact that she was the daughter and wife (second 
marriage) of a banker from Hamburg, she would not fall within our definition of “German”, insofar as she was 
born in the UK and had lived the greater part of her life outside Germany. A partially different issue is the 
presence of women who had for instance accompanied their husbands or lovers; even here I could find no 
German cases. Furthermore, on the basis of both regulations and German reports, it seems to me that, in spite of 
the aforementioned female presences, a kind of male Arcanum dominated, both in the regular armies and in the 
Garibaldian undertakings. There is an ongoing debate on both mentioned points. On the issue of women dressing 
as men and participating on the Garibaldian side, underlining however the important point that not every act of 
cross-dressing is necessarily subversive and equivalent to a non-hegemonic gender conception, see Guidi, 
"Patriottismo femminile e travestimenti," pp. 571-87. On the same aspect and that of women following their 
husbands and lovers into the Garibaldian context, see Riall, "Men at war. Masculinity and military ideals in the 
Risorgimento," pp. 160-164. On the crucial role of women in the Risorgimento in general as well see p. 88. 
1349
 See, e.g., Fischer-Lichte, Performativität. 
1350
 Uwe Wirth, "Der Performanzbegriff im Spannungsfeld zwischen Illokution, Iteration und Indexikalität," in 
idem, ed., Performanz. Zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2002), p. 40. 
1351
 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
1352




Goffman’s later work, in particular, insofar as the scholars both underline that (gender) 





, which are of paramount importance especially in the military, can be 
seen not only as “gender-as-performativity” in the Butlerian sense, but “as sets of socially 
specific performances”
1355
 in a dramaturgical sense: “The masculine self can be understood as 
reflexively constructed within performances; that is, performances can construct masculinity 
rather than merely reflect its pre-existence […] Researchers can investigate how masculinities 
are done and how these performances are received within social interaction […].”
1356
  
The utility of the theatre metaphor is not limited to the issue of gender;; not without 
reason, it is often used within the context of the military and war as well; it is, for example, 
embodied in such expressions as the “theatre of war”
1357
, even if this can at first seem 
euphemistic in regard to the violence, deprivation and harshness that war normally 
represented for soldiers. However, be it in times of war or peace, the military is already very 
much a “theatrical” institution due simply to the role that military rituals and ceremonies of 
display play in the daily life of the soldiers.  
But “theatricality” as has been theorized by some exponents of “performativity” is also 
important for the place that literal embodiments take in the everyday life of the soldiers. The 
imperatives of dress, drill and discipline are nearly always (or at least also) directed at the 
soldiers’ bodies. The body of the soldier and the military corps are, finally, interconnected by 
way of social interaction. At the individual level, close physical interaction is involved for 
instance in much of the concrete war making activities, or the corporal closeness of everyday 
life, from housing to eating. At the same time, the military is characterized by the specific 
interactions between military units. Armed groups are formed of different military corps, 
which in turn are characterized by specific forms of interaction. In this analysis, the 
                                                 
1353
 For the similarities and differences between Goffman and Butler see, e.g., Chris Brickell, "Masculinity, 
performativity, and subversion," Men and Masculinities 8, no. 1 (2005): pp. 24-43. In contrast to the essentialist 
reading of (early) Goffman by Butler, see instead Greg Smith, "Reconsidering gender advertisements. 
Performativity, framing and display," in Michael Hviid Jacobsen, ed., The contemporary Goffman (Milton Park; 
New York: Routledge, 2010), especially pp. 170-173. 
1354
 The two gender conceptions are of course relationally intertwined, and “femininities” are also “gender-as-
performativity” and a quest for feminine performances. 
1355
 Brickell, "Masculinity," pp. 25 and 29. 
1356
 Ibid., p. 32. 
1357
 See the definition of the war arena as a “whole, complete in itself”(“ein kleines Ganzes”) by Clausewitz, 
book 5, chapter 2. For the early-modern metaphor of the “theatrum belli” see, e.g., Marian Füssel, "Theatrum 
Belli. Der Krieg als Inszenierung und Wissensschauplatz im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert," Metaphorik.de 7, no. 14 
(2008): pp. 205-30. A study that takes the metaphor, so to speak, even more seriously, to research the 
theatricality of war as well as the presence of soldiers in theatres and the soldiers performing acts of theatre for 
themselves, is Gillian Russell, The theatres of war. Performance, politics and society, 1793-1815 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995).  
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interaction between the various national groups present in the single armies must be 
considered as well.  
This chapter demonstrates that the German soldiers and officers were placed in 
different institutional contexts in the various armies. To this must be added the complexity of 
the foreigners’ various group memberships and loyalties, from their relationship with the 
respective Italian sovereign or commander, with their – at times primarily foreign, at times 
Italian – regimental “comrades” and their national but also regional and other biographical 
allegiances. The chapter is based on a rich variety of sources, which include the German 
soldiers’ reports, pamphlets, and songs. 
One objective of the chapter is to elucidate the ways in which these different loyalties 
informed, cut across or superseded the formal institutional structures of the armies. Another is 
to examine how visible these different allegiances were made to other militaries and/or 
civilians, and how much they were institutionally sustained in the various armed groups. 
Lastly, the chapter aims to identify what main issues were involved in the transnational 
comparisons and what clashes and transfers occurred within the single Italian armed groups. 
8.2 Foreign soldiers and their different institutional placements 
As we have seen in the chapter on mobilization, the projects to create nationally 
homogeneous military corps for the various Italian sides were very widespread. These 
attempts conformed to the particular way in which solidarity was often conceived in the 
nineteenth century eventually by all political sides: i.e., as solidarity between nations or by 
nations. There were two underlying motives to the plans to create "national legions" on the 
part of foreign nations: the exaltation of solidarity with the respective Italian parties, and 
frequently the idea that such groups would serve a functional purpose for their own nation.; 
the Italian experience was, in fact, considered as the area within which to prepare for the 
future struggles and wars in their own nation. 
But the reality of the actual situation was far more complex than these grandiose plans 
admitted. In fact, foreign soldiers were not confined to just foreign regiments during their 
participation in the Italian conflict and often were found in different institutional settings in 
the Italian armed groups. Though not many, some joined corps in which the majority of 
soldiers were subjects of the respective Italian states, therefore of units that in the 
contemporary regulations, in the case of the Bourbon and Papal Armies, often figured as 
“indigenous” military groups. At the same time, many were part of dedicated foreigners’ 
corps – such as the “Foreign Carabineers” of the Papal Army, the “foreign regiments” of the 
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Bourbon Army, and the Garibaldian “foreign company” in 1860. As opposed to other 
nationalities, such as the Irish in the papal case or the Polish, British or Hungarians in the 
Roman Republic in 1849 and the various Garibaldian undertakings in the 1860s
1358
, the 
Germans never came to have an official “German Legion” in one or another of the Italian 
armed groups. 
8.2.1 Foreign soldiers and officers in “indigenous” corps, general staffs, and the ministry 
and administration 
The initial division into national battalions (including a German one) failed to materialize 
during the invasion of Savoy in 1834, when many exiles were blocked from reaching Savoy; 
consequently, the national and mixed corps were combined:: “Two Polish, two Italian and 




In subsequent armies, single Germans continued to be part of indigenous regiments, 
but only in limited number. The possession of specifically requested professional expertise 
could lead to the transferal of the individual from the foreigners’ corps into for instance the 
ambulance, artillery or engineer corps.
1360
 
Like the common soldiers, foreign officers were found in different institutional 
contexts. Most carried out their service in the aforementioned constellations of the foreigners’ 
corps, such as the German officers in the Papal Zouaves or Carabineers, or as Garibaldian 
officers for the “foreign company” in 1860. Some, however, held officer posts in the so-called 
indigenous corps, and yet several others were part of general staffs, or placed in the military 
administration or ministries, working alongside primarily Italian and foreign officers of 
different nationality. 
Gustav von Hoffstetter, as part of Lucio Manara’s “Lombard Sharpshooters” and 
eventually captain in Garibaldi’s general staff in 1849, or Ernst Haug, as colonel in the 
general staff and commander of the second division of the regular Army of the Roman 
                                                 
1358
 See on this chapter 4.2.4. 
1359
 Prechner, "Savoyerzug," pp. 490 and 492. 
1360
 The precise number of soldiers serving in “indigenous” corps has yet to be determined, however. It was not 
possible to analyse all of the armies’ soldiers’ registers for this study. Nevertheless, based on a cursory look at 
the registers of the papal artillery, where Germans could be found only sporadically, the relatively small number 
of people that transferred to other corps from the foreigners’ corps (see footnote no. 927), the reports of the 
German soldiers themselves, the rare reporting on Germans in “indigenous” corps, and last but not least the 
official denomination of these corps as “indigenous” on the part of the military administration and official 
regulations, it seems more than fair to conclude that in fact these corps for the most part consisted of Italian 
soldiers and especially subjects of the respective states.  
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Republic in 1849, were positioned in an institutional sphere dominated by Italians and other 
foreigners of nationalities different from German. The same may be said of Hermann 
Kanzler’s experience in the Papal Army after having left the foreign corps in 1848. Once he 
became Minister of War in 1865, Kanzler was surrounded by other foreign officers as well as 
pontifical citizens. In 1867, for instance, his aide-de-camp was from Bologna (Giacomo 
Ungarelli), his three batmen were from Savoy (Francesco de Maistre), from the French 
Auvergne (Gaspardo de Bourbon) and from Bavaria (Ludovico Filchner) respectively. The 
members of the Council of the Ministry were predominantly Italian (with only one Swiss 
presence, Wilhelm Kalbermatten), while the general staff was half Italian, half French and 
Savoyard.
1361
 Like Hoffstetter or Haug, Kanzler definitely had more occasions already within 
the military institutional setting to come into contact with Italians and other foreigners. Even 
more than Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow
1362
, Kanzler reached a position where he could have a 
decisive influence on the organization of the army.  
8.2.2 Foreigners in foreigners’ corps and National Legions 
Quantitatively, it is of note that most foreigners, and especially those of the rank and file, 
were integrated into special foreigners’ corps be they in the Papal or Bourbon Armies or in 
Garibaldi’s armed groups. These groups differed in terms of the “homogeneity” of the origin 
of their members. Some were more mixed in terms of nationality, such as the Papal Zouaves. 
Others were more “homogenous” using language as the common denominator, such as the 
Papal Carabineers, the foreigners’ units of the Bourbon Army since 1859, and the part of this 
last that went on to form Garibaldi’s “foreign company” in 1860. Some corps were strongly 
characterized by one nationality that was reflected in the official denomination of the corps, 
among which were Garibaldi’s British and Hungarian Legions. In all these different cases, 
however, the foreigners were, at least at the formal level, more or less separated from their 
Italian “comrades”. 
These foreigners’ corps were generally identified as such in the Italian armies of the 
nineteenth century through the official name of the corps, which communicated this foreign 
composition, e.g., the “Foreign Carabineers” in the Papal Army or the “Foreign Jägers” in the 
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 See, e.g., Annuario militare pontificio. Anno 1867, pp. 9-10, 28-29, 30-31. 
1362
 When he was a colonel, Rüstow commanded, in several battles, up to three brigades, and therefore 
approximately 2,400 men; as chief of the general staff of the 15
th
 Garibaldian division, he commanded together 
with the Hungarian Istvàn Türr a total of about 5,200 men. See for these numbers, e.g., Herwegh, Guillaume 
Rustow, p. 47 (2,400) or Di Fiore, I vinti del Risorgimento, footnote no. 57, p. 288 (5,200). 
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Bourbon Army. Sometimes these names were also included on the company’s flag, for 
instance like that in Image 8.1 below. 
 
Image 8.1. Maneuver flag of one of the Bourbon foreigners’ regiments, 1859-1860.  
 
Source: Boeri, Crociani, Fiorentino, L’esercito borbonico II, p. 473. 
 
Uniforms and parts of uniforms (shoulder plates, headpieces, military cap badges, etc.) 
were sometimes so specific, that it was evident that one was dealing with a member of a 
special corps, regardless of the rank of the soldier. The most emblematic is of course the 
uniform of the Papal Zouaves, with its baggy trousers and prominent ornamental details, the 
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 See, e.g., Coulombe, Pope's legion, p. 24. 
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Image 8.2. Uniforms of papal Zouaves  
 
Non-commissioned officer (left) and captain (right). Vatican Historical Museum (Lateran), Photograph: 























Image 8.3 Uniforms of the officers in the papal corps of the Foreign Carabineers and the 
Papal Zouaves 
 








But foreign soldiers were also visible in varying degrees on the opposite political side. 
According to Vigevano, the soldiers of Garibaldi’s “foreign company” of 1860 continued to 
serve in their Bourbon uniforms.
1364
 However, whether these last were foreign or not could 
not be readily determined by observing the soldiers' uniforms alone. For a civilian to 
understand that these soldiers in particular were foreign, however, they would have had to 
have had additional information or specific knowledge of the fighting forces before them.
1365
  
8.3 Overlapping and conflicting loyalties 
It is important to bear in mind the various ways foreign soldiers and officers are placed in the 
army corps insofar as they – as I will try to show – affected the complicated issue of 
“loyalties” of the foreign soldiers. A soldier’s institutional placement was only one element 
that informed their life. In fact, foreign soldiers were contemporaneously part of different 
groups: namely Italian armed groups of a given political orientation or another, their 
respective military corps, and their respective national group. It is also possible that regional 
and other communalities between soldiers may have been important. Several questions spring 
from this observation: what is the relative weight these different memberships had on the 
foreign soldiers' experiences; and how did these memberships overlap or enter into conflict 
with one another.  
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 Vigevano, Compagnia estera garibaldina, pp. 3, 4, and 6. 
1365
 The question of uniforms and their design opens a rich field of possible further investigation, especially from 
a cultural historical perspective: On the one hand, the uniform is interesting from a gender perspective, from the 
interplay between clothing and posture (think of the neck-stock) to the question as to what type of image of the 
man should be displayed. To this one can add the supposedly high aesthetic and sexual attractiveness that men 
wearing uniforms exert(ed) over at least some parts of society and in some periods of history, while for other 
parts of society and in other times uniforms could be seen in a negative light insofar as they became symbols of 
particularly hierarchical organizations. On these civilian aspects of uniforms, and for instance on the uniformity 
of brand-name clothing or the use of typically military elements for uniforms today, see Gabriele Mentges and 
Birgit Richard, Schönheit der Uniform. Körper, Kleidung, Medien (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005). These 
questions should not be left only to the more circumscribed enthusiasts and collectors, but their work ought to be 
used to contribute to the history of the “development of the uniform and the relationships between soldiers’ and 
civil fashionable clothing” according to Nowosadtko, Krieg, Gewalt und Ordnung, p. 178. One example of such 
a study is Sabina Brändli, "Von 'schneidigen Offizieren' und 'Militärcrinolinen'. Aspekte symbolischer 
Männlichkeit am Beispiel preußischer und schweizer Uniformen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," in Ute Frevert, 
ed., Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997), pp. 201-28; for the role 
of the uniform within the context of military display as well, see Myerly, British military spectacle, passim. 
Intertwined with the former question is to more general question regarding the function of the uniform as a 
highly intense “text” in terms of the quantity of information encapsulated within the uniform itself and 
consequently the highly communicative function the uniform held when soldiers independently changed parts or 
added other pieces to their uniform. For the uniform as a “text”, see e.g., Lorenzo Greco, "Semiotica della 




8.3.1 Italian allegiances 
The German and foreign soldiers in the Papal and Bourbon
1366
 Armies were bound to the 
Pope and the king respectively, by the oath they had to swear upon entering into service. In 
the Papal Army, the text of the oath was not only printed in the laws on recruitment for the 
foreigners’ corps
1367
, but in the individual soldiers’ service book as well.
1368
 The simple 
soldier in the Papal Army, for instance, had to swear to be forever “loyal and obedient” to 
“my sovereign the Roman Pontiff”, not to be part of “any secret society”, to “obey to all my 
legitimate superiors […] and to execute all of their orders in everything that concerns the 
observance of religion and the loyal service for the Holy See”, and finally to observe the 
regulations regarding capitulation, military regulations and more generally all the laws of the 
Papal States.
1369
 Therefore, the oath not only demanded loyalty to the Pope as a sovereign but 
in a much wider sense it also demanded certain moral and political qualities, among which the 
respect for religion.  
The oaths were still the expression of an (imagined) personal relationship between an 
individual and a sovereign (even “foreign”). The papal soldier swore his oath to “my 
sovereign”, the Pope. This type of personal relationship of loyalty was also evident in the 
writings of the Bourbon soldier Maier, who recounted that his corps of foreign Bourbon 
soldiers marched “with a happy ‘Hurrah’ to our king”.
1370
 The democrat Hoffstetter speaks 
without hesitation of the Triumvirate of the Roman Republic as “our government”.
1371
 
Similarly, anthems of the Italian “party” of affiliation were sung by the foreign soldiers as 
well, be it in Italian or translated. 
This connection to the sovereign – or the supreme commander – was of course 
especially important for officers: Not only were their “careers” in the end officially dictated 
by these last – to a far greater extent than the careers of the common soldiers and non- 
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 The foreign soldiers had to swear the same oath as the “indigenous” soldiers in the Bourbon Army, see 
Regolamento per la reclutazione del 13° battaglione cacciatori e de' due battaglioni carabinieri leggieri 
sovranamente approvato il dì 10 novembre 1859 in Portici, art. 9, p. 4. 
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 Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato lì 7 gennaro 1852, pp. 57-58. 
1368
 See the service books contained in the ASR, Ministero delle armi, busta 2180 (“corpi diversi – arruolamenti 
e carte personali – esteri), p. 2. 
1369
 “[..E]ssere fedele ed obbediente al mio Sovrano il Romano Pontefice”; “ad alcuna società segreta”; “di 
obbedire a tutti i miei leggimiti superiori […] e di eseguire ogni loro ordine in tutto ciò che concerne la 
osservanza della Religione, ed il fedele servizio della Santa Sede.” Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato lì 7 
gennaro 1852, p. 57. 
1370
 “Mit einem freudigen ‚Hurrah‘ auf unsern König” Maier, Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-
Legion und den Garibaldianern, p. 6, the italics are mine. 
1371
 “[..U]nsere Regierung” Hoffstetter, Tagebuch, p. 54, the italics are mine. 
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commissioned officers and those of their Italian colleagues – they, as “military notables”, had 
easier access to the court. The German officer in the Zouaves, Franz von Schmising-
Kerssenbrock, enthusiastically told of his private audience with the Pope to his father in 
Westphalia, remarking upon the Pope’s ease of manner and kindness.
1372
 When Franz Xaver 
died in 1911, the Pope allowed a telegram to be sent in Latin to Korff’s family, expressing his 
personal grief and imparting the apostolic benediction.
1373
 As in earlier times, to be near to the 
monarch (or, mutatis mutandis, to Mazzini or Garibaldi
1374
) or even to have personally met 
him was a privilege that “took a prominent place in the testimonies of officers”.
1375
 
8.3.2 National allegiances 
8.3.2.1 National groups in the Italian armies 
The origin of the national corps was often made visible through the use of typically national 
symbols. The Germans that were to be part of the invasion of Savoy appeared before 
Mazzini’s house in Geneva wearing a black-red-golden cockade on their hats.
1376
 According 
to Marcella Pellegrino Sutcliffe, with regard to Garibaldi’s “British Legion” in 1860, “the 
national identity […] was potentially underlined by the British Legion’s flag, especially 
designed […] for their expedition.”
1377
 
Sometimes the composition of these specifically national corps was more variegated 
than the national symbols would indicate. Rüstow, in his report on the war in southern Italy in 
1860, ventured the guess that the “Hungarian Legion” in reality consisted of soldiers of 
different nationalities.
1378
 In fact, when the “Hungarian Legion” was reviewed in January 
1861 with the intent to integrate the remnant soldiers of the corps into the Italian Army, it was 
revealed that many “German” Austrians were part of the Legion.
1379
  
Despite the fact that in many cases different foreign nationalities were integrated into 
one single military corps, i.e. the “multi-national” corps, the concept of grouping the soldiers 
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 Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 1, p. 51-52. 
1379
 See Vigevano, Legione ungherese, pp. 102-104. 
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according to nationality nevertheless took centre stage in many reports of the German and 
other foreign soldiers. So, for instance, with regard to the foreigners’ corps of the Army of the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies that were recreated in 1859 – wherein primarily German, 
Austrian and Swiss soldiers were grouped together – the German soldier Maier when he 
spoke of the Bourbon corps he exaggerated the national homogeneity of the group by 
speaking of a “German foreign legion” (see the title of his report).
1380
 Even if he 
acknowledged the presence of Swiss soldiers, he did so by pointing out their differences from 
the Germans. According to him, the Swiss possessed “neither military knowledge nor military 
education”; they, “due to their boastfulness, were not very liked, because one could 
sufficiently verify for oneself their cowardice on the battlefield of Naples"; captives “could 
and should not hope for a human treatment by Swiss soldiers.”
1381
  
In an equally exaggerated manner, the German papal soldier Eickholt spoke of the 
“Foreign Carabineers” as “Deutsche Jäger”
1382
. His compatriot Georg von Vollmar, who was 
obliged to enter the Foreign Carabineers in 1867 instead of the much desired Papal Zouaves, 
(based on the numbers, also erroneously) asserted that the former was actually a “Swiss 
battalion”
1383
: “Because one hears talk in Germany always and only about the Zouaves”, 
Vollmar writes in his recount on the two years he was member of the Papal Army, “to some 
readers it may be of interest that the Germans serve in this regiment.”
1384
 Nevertheless, in his 
opinion, despite “the fact that the majority of it is comprised of Germans, it is however not a 




As discussed above, when reporting on the goings-on in the Papal Army, many 
publications divided multinational battalions into their separate national components and 
                                                 
1380
 Maier, Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern im Königreich beider 
Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860. 
1381
 „[..W]eder militärische Kenntnisse noch militärische Ausbildung besaßen.“ , „[…] welche aber durch ihre 
Prahlsucht nicht sonderlich beliebt waren, da man sich von ihrer Feigheit auf dem Kampfplatze von Neapel 
genügend überzeugt hatte.“ […] von den Schweizern konnten und durften sie nicht menschliche Behandlung 
erwarten.“ Ibid., pp. 3-4 and 30. 
1382
 Eickholt, Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara. Erinnerungen eines römischen Kanoniers aus den Jahren 1868 
bis 1870, p. 81. 
1383
 “Schweizer-Bataillone”. Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat,  p. 14. 
1384
 “Da man in Deutschland immer nur von den Zuaven reden hört, so dürfte es für manchen Leser Interesse 
haben zu erfahren, daß in diesem Regimente die Deutschen dienen.” Ibid., p. 94. 
1385
 “Obwohl die Mehrzahl dieser Deutsche sind, so ist es doch kein deutsches, sondern ein Schweizerregiment. 
Das Offizierkorps besteht größtentheils aus Schweizern […].” Ibid., pp. 96-97. It is important to note that 
Vollmar hopes to rapidly advance in his career in the Papal Army, as he notes from a talk with a lieutenant in the 
recruitment office of St. Louis that he had “the officers’ epaulets nearly already” on his shoulders. (“daß ich die 
Offiziersepauletten schon so viel wie auf den Achseln hätte.”) Ibid., p. 6. 
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spoke of each component separately; an example of which would be how they spoke of the 
“Dutch Zouaves” in the Papal Army rather than just the Zouaves in its entirety.
1386
 
National grouping within the corps was also reinforced by the fact that some specific 
institutions were foreseen for the single nationalities. In the Papal Army, for instance, a series 
of foreign military chaplains were taken on to care for the needs of the soldiers of the various 
participant nationalities; one such individual was the Rhenish chaplain Anton de Waal. Since 
1868, he was the chaplain of the German national church, Santa Maria dell’Anima as well. In 
1871, he even published a theatre piece about the Papal Army.
1387
 
In Rome, some nationalities had their own military circles. Therefore, not only was 
there a general officers' club for all of the officers in the army – which was located after 1868 
in the Palazzo Wedekind in Piazza Colonna, in the rooms of the former casino of the French 
soldiers of the Papal Army, but there were also national casinos open to both officers and 
soldiers. There was a French, Dutch, and Belgian casino, and from 1868 to 1870 a German 
military casino operated in the convent of San Francesco di Paolo on the Esquiline Hill. The 
club boasted three levels and contained a “German” restaurant, rooms for gambling, billiards, 
music, reading and writing, and a library with German literature. According to a list that Korff 
wrote, military works, from Clausewitz to Decker and Willisen
1388




                                                 
1386
 N., "Die holländischen Zuaven im päpstlichen Heere," pp. 670-90. 
1387
 Anton de Waal, Die Streiter des heil. Vaters. Episode aus der jüngsten Geschichte der Eroberung Roms, 20. 
September 1870. Schauspiel in drei Aufzügen (Regensburg; New York; Cincinnati: Friedrich Pustet, 1871). 
1388
 That “scientific” military works transcended political boundaries and loyalties is attested by the fact that the 
works of Karl Wilhelm von Willisen on the Italian wars of 1848 and 1849, written from the Austrian point of 
view, were – according to Korff’s list – in the library of the Papal German club, just as they were highly 
acclaimed by Ernst Haug on the opposite political side of the conflict. On Willisen as the “brilliant thinker of the 
theory of the great [i.e. ‘regular’] war” see Haug, Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt, p. 86. 
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Image 8.4 – Korff’s list of the military works in the library of the German military Casino, 
Rome ca. 1869 
 
(Source: Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive (VWA) Münster, Nachlaß Franz Xaver von Korff gen. 
Schmising-Kerssenbrock (1838-1910), Bri. N. XVI-3. ) 
 
Georg von Vollmar complained, however, that the non-military section of the library 
contained only “legends of saints and novels on the holy Genovesa.”
1389
 Aside from books, 
several German and foreign newspapers were made available by the soldiers’ club as well.  
The casino was financed by donations from the German Archbrotherhoods of Saint 
Michael. In December 1868, the beer, wine and cigars were free at the inauguration of the 
club,
1390
 but it seems this changed not long after. Vollmar, for example, complained that the 
                                                 
1389
 “Die Bibliothek […] enthält natürlich nur Heiligenlegenden und Romane im Sinne der heil. Genovesa [sic].” 
Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, p. 141. 
1390
 "Politische Angelegenheiten. Italien. Rom," Freisinger Tagblatt, no. 1: p. 1. 
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“cigars, which were destined to be distributed for free in high quantity for the German 
soldiers” were in fact put on sale.
1391
  
According to a German newspaper report, the German club had “3,000 members”, 
most of which served in “the courageous regiment of the Foreign Carabineers which consists 
nearly entirely of Germans”. The article naturally does not fail to underline that in the 




Even if one newspaper regretted that there was “no garden for gymnastic exercises and 
no bowling alley”
1393
, another underlined that the casino disposed of “three long corridors that 
served for gymnastic exercises”.
1394
 
The casino was often visited by church and state dignitaries. Hermann Kanzler during 
a visit was “highly content with the whole institution”
1395
. The bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm 
Emanuel von Ketteler, held a speech there in December 1869.
1396
 In January 1870, to 
entertain the “German, Austrian and Swiss bishops present for the council”, the German 
military casino put on a theatrical performance.
1397
 The soldiers thought it amusing “to dress 
the master Beelzebub with a red shirt” and to present him as Garibaldi.
1398
 In the “intervals, 
the German soldiers’ choral club of the casino performed select four-part songs, the last of 
which was a medieval battle song sung by the Germans to Saint Michael; this song in 






                                                 
1391
 “Cigarren, welche in großer Menge für die deutschen Soldaten zur unentgeltlichen Vertheilung bestimmt 
wurden, werden […] verkauft.” Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, p. 141. 
1392
 „[..D]as tapfere Regiment Carabinieri esteri beinahe zu ganz aus Deutschen besteht […]“ „[…] genannten 
Regiment - in welchem wohl die strengste Disciplin von allen Regimentern in der Welt geübt wird“. "Das 
deutsche Militärcasino in Rom," Augsburger Postzeitung. Beilage, no. 10 (1869): p. 40. 
1393
 “[..W]äre nur noch ein Garten für gymnastische Uebungen, Kegelbahn u. s. f. zu wünschen.” N. N., "Das 
deutsche Militär-Casino in Rom [24. Januar 1869]," Der Traunbote. Gemühtliche Volksschrift für den Bürger 
und den Landmann 2, no. 4 (1869): p. 316. 
1394
 "Politische Angelegenheiten. Italien. Rom," p. 1. 
1395
 „[..S]ehr zufrieden mit der gesamten Einrichtung […]“ N. N., "Das deutsche Militär-Casino in Rom [24. 
Januar 1869]," p. 317. 
1396
 Neue Bamberger Zeitung, 12/12/1869, p. 347. 
1397
 Florian Rieß and Carl Weber, Das Oekumenische Concil. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach. VI. Das Vaticanum im 
Lichte des katholischen Glaubens (Freiburg: Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1870), p. 172. 
1398
 “Der Soldatenwitz hat dem Meister Beelzebub ein Rothhemd und das wohlgetroffene Porträit Garibaldi’s 
gegeben.” Ibid., p. 173. 
1399
 “In den Zwischenpausen trug der deutsche Soldaten-Gesangverein des Casino ausgewählte vierstimmige 
Lieder vor, unter welchen besonders das letzte, ein mittelalterliches Schlachtlied der Deutschen zum hl. Michael, 
stürmischen Beifall fand und zum zweiten Mal gesungen werden mußte.” Ibid., p. 173. 
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8.3.2.2 “Show that you are men”: foreigners’ (national) war songs  
Songs were an important part of the more strictly military life, as well. The author of Olderic, 
the Catholic Zouave novel discussed in Chapter 3, after having presented several sections of 
the song of the French Zouaves, incorporates this observation through the persona of a duke: 
“All martial poetry […] is this way. Four weighty words combined with each other and sung 
to galloping rhythm; instil great heart and verve in the warriors when proceeding to battle 
[…].”
1400
The fictional duke was, I would suggest, both right and wrong. He was clearly right 
in his assertion described by Martin van Creveld as: A “very important factor in cohesion is 
music.”
1401
 For this reason, the songs in this paragraph are only single isolated cases extracted 
from a “sea of war songs”.
1402
  
In October 1860, following a stretch of bad weather, intense outpost service, fatiguing 
marches, and last but not least more frequent battles, Rüstow reported that the morale of his 
soldiers was flagging. Therefore, he wanted to do “something for the inner man, both 
materially and mentally”. He not only doubled the quantity of wine and coffee available to his 
soldiers, he promoted entertainment through song, observing: “Even if the Italian soldiers are 
very much less song-loving than the Germans, I did not doubt that they too could be 
encouraged a bit by singing, and be sustained despite the many sufferings that the bad weather 
was procuring them. I had the Garibaldi anthem printed in many hundreds of copies.”
1403
 
Below follows a comparison of this Garibaldi anthem
1404
 with several songs of the 
other warring parties. While the Garibaldi anthem and a song sung by the (French) 
Zouaves
1405
 are two prominent examples of the more circumscribed songs of the battalions (of 
Garibaldi’s alpine chasseurs and the papal corps of the Zouaves respectively), others have to 
be seen more generally as war songs (two Dutch
1406
 and an English
1407
 Zouave song). The 
                                                 
1400
 “Le poesie marziali […] sono tutte cosi. Quattro paroloni cuciti insieme, e cantati sopra un tuono concitato al 
galoppo, e che infonde gran cuore, e grand’estro nei guerrieri nel procedere alle battaglie […]” Bresciani, 
Olderico, p. 107. 
1401
 Martin van Creveld, The culture of war (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008), p. 116. 
1402
 On German soldiers’ songs, see the comprehensive handbook and collection by Uli Otto and Eginhard 
König, 'Ich hatt' einen Kameraden...'. Militär und Kriege in historisch-politischen Liedern in den Jahren von 
1740 bis 1914 (s. l.: ConBrio Verlagsgesellschaft 1999). With regard to France see, e.g., Thierry Bouzard, 
Histoire du chant militaire français, de la monarchie à nos jours (Paris: Grancher, 2005). 
1403
 “Obgleich nun die italienischen Soldaten viel weniger sanglustig sind als die Deutschen, war es mir doch 
nicht zweifelhaft, daß auch jene durch Gesang ein wenig angeregt und in den mancherlei Leiden, welche ihnen 
das schlechte Wetter bereitete, aufrecht erhalten werden würden.” Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen 
Feldzuge von 1860, 2, p. 710. 
1404
 See the print of the text in Pivato, Bella ciao, pp. 19-20. 
1405
 See the print of this song in Oscar Philippe Francois Joseph de Poli, Souvenirs du bataillon des zouaves 
pontificaux (franco-belges) (Paris: Imprimerie de H. Carion, 1861), pp. 67-68. 
1406
 See the prints of the songs in N. N., Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger, of 's pausen tijdelijke macht en hare 
dappere verdedigers (s'-Hertogenbosch: Henri Bogaerts, opvolger van P. N. Verhoeven, Drukker en 
Boekhandelaar van Z. H. Paus Pius IX., 1869), pp. 226-227.  
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songs differed also for the fact that, strangely enough, the Garibaldi anthem is not an anthem 
sung directly about or to Garibaldi, since he is not directly or indirectly mentioned in the text, 
whereas Pius IX figures prominently in some of the Zouave songs and in an “Anthem to the 
Papal Army of 1867” as well.
1408
 Those, “whose hearts are glowing for Pius”, for the “great 
Pius” (Dutch Zouave Song)
1409
, for “Father Pius” (both a Dutch Zouave Song and a Dutch 
Zoauve War Song) fought for the Pope.
1410
  
Songs and anthems aimed to mobilize the soldiers both before and during military 
deployment. They were set to a rhythm that rendered them “very useful in countering 
fatigue”
1411
, a fact often expressed in the songs themselves, for instance in the Marseillaise, 
originally a war song of the Army of the Rhine. The form of incitement expressed in the 
Marseillaise can also be found in the songs pertinent to this context as well, such as in the 
refrain of the French song of the Papal Zouaves: “Forward! Let us march / Zouaves of the 
Pope, up to the front”.
1412
 The “su” (“up”) in the Garibaldi anthem, corresponds to the 
“Vooruit maar!” (“Go ahead!) found in the Dutch Zouaves’ War Song
1413
 and the “march, 
march, to the combat” in the song of the English Zouaves.
1414
 Incorporated into these songs, 
alongside this function to facilitate the mobilization of the soldiers, was a subtle mechanism 
intended to counterbalance the fear of combat and more specifically of dying in combat; this 
often took on the form of a secondary theme. The examples abound. One such is found at the 
end of the second stanza of the “Camp Song of the Dutch Zouaves”:  
 
“We fear no menacing lead
1415
, 
We shy not from steel, 
We fly willingly into death 




                                                                                                                                                        
1407
 Printed in Powell, Two years in the pontificial Zouaves, p. vii. 
1408
 Printed in Coulombe, Pope's legion, pp. 220-221. 
1409
 “Wien t’Neêrlandsch hart voor PIUS gloiet”; “Den grooten PIUS trouw”. N. N., Pius IX en zijn roemrijk 
leger, p. 225. 
1410
 “Vader Pius”; ibid., p. 226-227. 
1411
 Creveld, The culture of war, p. 117. 
1412
 “En avant ! Marchons ! / Zouaves du Pape, à l’avant-garde.” English translation in Coulombe, Pope's 
Legion, p. 224. 
1413
 “Vooruit maar!” N. N., Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger, p. 227. 
1414
 Powell, Two years in the pontificial Zouaves, p. vii. 
1415
 Lead as in lead bullets. 
1416
 “Wij vreezen voor geen dreigend lood, / Wij schrikken voor geen staal, / Wij vliegen willig in den dood / 
Voor PIUS ‘zegepraal.” N. N., Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger, p. 226. 
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The theme of taming the fear of dying lies at the heart of many of these stanzas. The song in 
French has a stanza that says: “And when comes / The moment to die, / Without fear and 
reproach, / The Zouaves [“All riflemen” in the French original] will see it coming.”
1417
 In the 
English song, this impetus is openly expressed in the last stanza: “March, march to the 
combat and fear not”, since “A light play our weapons will play”.
1418
 Combat itself is 
presented in the songs as an easy act; this is because the leaders will conduct the soldiers “to 
victory as they would a dance” (“a la victoire comme au bal”).
1419
 Although one element of 
the songs is to calm a soldier's fears, the songs actually determine the essence of courage by 
establishing the emotional requirement not to feel fear or to show it; this occurs by the 
negation of fear through the elements of manliness and religious faith and can be clearly seen 
in one stanza of the Dutch War Song:  
 
“No, no, no Christian heart,  
Fears once the snake head. 
Go ahead! 
No danger is under the cross;  
Christ himself leads you into battle, 




Another approach to fear is addressed in the songs, however; why should the soldiers not be 
afraid of the battle and their possible death in it? From this perspective, the battle songs 
moved away from the internal perspective of the soldier to take a more external perspective. 
Here, the attention is turned toward the Pope, but also toward the glory of the leading 
general(s); the French Zouave song is an example, wherein three famous Zouave leaders are 
mentioned in the first three stanzas: Lamoricière, is openly mentioned right at the beginning, 
and Becdelièvre and Charette are in the following stanzas.
1421
  
In the songs of the Papal Zouaves there are also elements that call into question the 
idea that the Zouaves are a cosmopolitan, nearly a-national force. When the Zouave songs are 
looked at in their collectivity, it becomes clear that all of them are national Zouave songs. One 
                                                 
1417
 “Et quand il sera proche / Le moment de mourir, / Sans peur et sans reproche / Tout chasseur le verra venir.” 
Poli, Souvenirs du bataillon des zouaves, p. 68. English translation taken from Coulombe, Pope's legion, p. 225. 
1418
 Powell, Two years in the pontificial Zouaves, p. vii. 
1419
 Poli, Souvenirs du bataillon des zouaves, p. 67. 
1420
 “Neen, neen, geen eerlijk christenhart / Vreest ooit den slangenkop. / Vooruit maar! / Onder t kruis is geen 
gevaar; / CHRISTUS-zelf voert u ten strijd, / Toont dat gij mannen zijt.” N. N., Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger, p. 
227. 
1421
 Coulombe, Pope's legion, pp. 222-224. 
372 
 
of the final stanzas of the French Zouave song states: “For the Church and France / We march 
forever united!” (“Pour l’Eglise et la France / Marchons toujours unis!”).
1422
 In the “War 
March of the Dutch Zouaves”, this element is taken a step further, with its repeated calls to 
the “Bataver”, the former tribe and Latin name for the Dutch; its final lines conclude with 
“Selected host of Christians, Netherlands’ love and Netherlands’ pride, / Ahead for the glory 
of God!”
1423
 Descriptions of the native countries figure prominently in these songs: 
 
“We come from the blue shores of England, 
From the mountains of Scotia we come, 
From the green, faithful island of Erin, 




In this way, the war for the Pope in Italy does not seem to be in contrast to or separate from 
the warfare of the represented nations, but rather intertwined with it. This is most openly 
expressed in the Dutch Camp Song: 
 
“For him [the Pope], we left you, o beach, 
Wrested from the sea and tide, 
For him, o dear Netherlands, 




The author of the Dutch War Song linked three different kinds of wars together: The actual 
war between the Pope and his enemies, those wars fought by the Netherlands, and the internal 
‘wars’ of the Netherlands (Dutch Kulturkampf):  
 
“Provider of our destiny all,  
Give us once your hand, 
If this pleases you, all good God, 
                                                 
1422
 Ibid., pp. 223-224. 
1423
 “Uitgelezen Christenschaar, / Neêrlands liefde en Neêrlands trots, / Vooruit ter glorie Gods!” N. N., Pius IX 
en zijn roemrijk leger, p. 227. 
1424
 Powell, Two years in the pontificial Zouaves, p. vii. 
1425
 “Voor hem verlieten we u, o strand, / Ontrukt aan zee en vloed, / Voor heem, o dierbar Nederland, / Stroome 
ook ons laatste bloed.” 
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In the English Zouave Song the presence of a hierarchization, without however any 
juxtaposition, leaves unquestioned the legitimacy of making war in the name of the nation: “If 
‘tis sweet for our country to perish, / Sweeter far for the cause of today”
1427
  
Along with these songs, other songs were sung by the soldiers, independent of which 
Italian side they were serving. In the reports of the German soldiers, the song “Was ist des 
Deutschen Vaterland” (“What is the German’s Fatherland”) – written by Ernst Moritz Arndt, 
which stems from the period of the anti-Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the century – is 
almost always mentioned.
1428
 Ludwig Richard Zimmermann, an officer in the pro-Bourbon 
guerrilla groups of the 1860s, wrote about how he felt during the campaign in southern Italy: 
“The German brigand [!] thinks melancholically of his German sky […] He cries desperately 
into the dark night: ‘What is the German’s fatherland?’”
1429
 According to the papal soldier 
Eickholt, German folk songs could also be heard from the camp of the Papal Foreign 
Carabineers, “sung with splendid voices”.
1430
 
8.3.2.3 Italian publics and national groups of soldiers 
The nationalities as such were “addressed” (in the Althusserian way of “interpellation”) also 
by the kind of “direct” communication that developed between the various national groups of 
foreign soldiers and the Italian public. The French soldiers in 1848 Sicily, who – having 
previously been part of the regular Bourbon Army – now found themselves in the new 
“national Sicilian Army” of the revolutionary Sicilian government
1431
, felt obliged to express 
their (new!) “loyalty” to the Sicilians in a bilingual pamphlet: “We want to fight, win or die 
                                                 
1426
 “Beschikker van ons aller lot / Hergeve ons eens uw hand, / […] Behaagt U dit, algoede God, / Aan’t lieve 
Vaderland.”N. N., Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger, pp. 226-227. 
1427
 Powell, Two years in the pontificial Zouaves, p. vii. 
1428
 Schulze, Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte, p. 171. Aside from including a strongly anti-
French stanza, the song still seems to define the nation on the ground of shared language. Furthermore, it 
highlights piety as a specific “quality” of the German “character”, according to Jörg Echternkamp, "'Religiöses 
Nationalgefühl' oder 'Frömmelei der Deutschtümler'? Religion, Nation und Politik im Frühnationalismus," in 
Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Dieter Langewiesche, eds., Nation und Religion in der deutschen Geschichte 
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2001), footnote no. 12, p. 147. 
1429
 “Der deutsche Brigant denkt dabei wehmütig an seinen deutschen Himmel. […] Er ruft verzweifelt in die 
dunkle Nacht hinein: ‘Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?’” Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen 
Briganten-Chef's," p. 553. 
1430
 “[…] von prächtigen Stimmen gesungen […]” Eickholt, Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara, p. 101. 
1431
 Therefore, this pamphlet does not stem from the French “volunteers” that were appositely recruited by the 




with you. (“Nous voulons combattre, vaincre ou mourir avec vous […].”).
1432
 Reciprocal 
attempts of the various political parties to (de-)mobilize and (de-)legitimize the other were 
often directed at the different national components present in the various armies. The 
aforementioned pamphlet, for instance, addressed the “German soldiers in the service of King 
Francis II of Naples”: “Germans and Italians are brothers. Do you want to be an exception, 
undermining the core of the nation and committing murder? […] Accept a friendly suggestion 
from us and leave a cause that is lost anyway. […] In the name of the nation we make you a 
brotherly offer: […] Return to your homeland without charge, and with adequate travel 
expenses. Think about what you are doing; the choice is not difficult. If you stick to the bad 
cause notwithstanding our well-intended warning, then beware; the vengeance of an 
embittered people is terrible. The National Committee.”
1433
 
8.3.2.4 Foreign soldiers and civilians 
The history of the contact between foreign soldiers and the Italian civilian population was – as 
in other cases
1434
 – variegated. It ranged anywhere from fierce opposition between the two to 
total indifference – this last of which Rüstow noted in some places in southern Italy
1435
 – to 
the founding of friendships as reported by the Zouaves regarding their campaign in the 




The German soldiers left Germany with an idea of Italy and the Italians that was based 
on prejudices and stereotypes that had their roots in contexts such as the tradition of the 
“journey to Italy”. Here, climatic theories dating back to the Enlightenment contributed in 
shaping images of the assumed physical and particularly psychological and behavioural traits 
                                                 
1432
 “Proclama al popolo siciliano degli ufficiali francesi in servizio nello esercito nazionale siciliano”, Museo 
del Risorgimento “Vittorio Emanuele Orlando” Palermo, permanent exhibition (seen in July 2012).  
1433
 „Deutsche und Italiener sind Brüder. Wollt ihr eine Ausnahme machen, an dem Marke der Nation zehren 
und dann auch morden? […] Nehmt einen freundlichen Wink von uns an; und verlasst eine Sache die ohnehin 
verloren ist. […] Im Namen der Nation machen wir euch einen brüderlichen Antrag […] Kostenfreie Rückkehr 
in euer Vaterland, und angemessenes Reisegeld. […] Bedenkt wohl, was ihr thut, - die Wahl ist nicht schwer: 
Bleibt ihr ungeachtet unsener [sic] gutgemeinten Warnung, der schlechten Sache an hänglich [sic],- dann weh 
euch; die Rache eines erbitterterten Volker [sic] ist fürchterlich. Das national [sic] Comité“. Proclamation: “An 
die Deutschen Soldate im Dienste des Königs von Franz II von Neapel”, State Archive of the Canton Basel-City, 
Personal Estates of Johann Lucas von Mechel, PA 149 5 (Akten 1849-1873), fasc. “Akten August 1860”. 
According to a handwritten note in the top righthand corner, the pamphlet was from Salerno and printed in 
August 1860. 
1434
 See, e.g., Ute Planert, Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg : Frankreichs Kriege und der deutsche Süden. Alltag 
- Wahrnehmung - Deutung 1792-1841 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), passim. 
1435
 On the inhabitants of Milazzo see, e.g. Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 1, p. 
108; see as well ibid., p. 199. 
1436





 Those images were related to the perception on the part of Northern 
Europeans of larger areas – such as the south of Europe, Italy or southern Italy – as an inner-
European, “oriental” and “feminine” colonial “other”.
1438
 More often than not, the German 
soldiers did not describe the (southern) Italians as being wholly "others", but rather 
considered them more as a people that lay somewhere in the middle, between Orient and 
Occident.
1439
 In Rüstow’s opinion, for instance, the Sicilians were “funny” because they 
seemed to him like “savages” and only partly European: “Like the island, due to its position it 
builds the bridge from Europe to Africa, the same can be said of its inhabitants and their 
nationality”.
1440
 Similarly, Haug noted the historical connection created by the Port of Genoa 
(“the sea-queen of the Orient”) between the Orient and the Occident
1441
, and takes the time to 
describe the incoming goods: “The Orient sent her [the city of Genoa] the soft shawls from 
Cashmere, iced attar of roses from Mecca, embroidered carpets from Persia, the sweet fruits 
of the Levant.”
1442
 He described his sea voyage along the coast between Nice and La Spezia 
to be comparable to the “most abundant tales of Scheherazade” of the Arabian Nights.
1443
 
Orientalizing tendencies were also to be found in the ways in which the Italians, and 
Italian women in particular, were described by the German soldiers.
1444
 Vollmar noted that 
the “Italian ladies all sleep in their beds as Eve in paradise, and shamefacedness is totally 
alien to Italian women.”
1445
 He went on to write, in the typical combination of orientalism 
with anti-clericalism and anti-Catholicism
1446
 – that the “the clerics […] for time immemorial 
provide for the fact that no Roman woman remains a virgin for long”. Vollmar is not 
                                                 
1437
 Brilli, Il viaggio in Italia, pp. 278-286. 
1438
 Schultz, "Italien und der Mittelmeerraum"; Schenk, "Mental Maps"; Müller-Funk and Wagner, Eigene und 
andere Fremde; Thies Schulze, "Conference Report: Der Süden Europas - Strukturraum, Wahrnehmungsraum, 
Handlungsraum? 10.02.2005-12.02.2005, Berlin," <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-
berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=728> (last accessed: 20/01/2008); Richter, Der Süden. 
1439
 I surmise that this was informed by the trading myth of Italian port cities (see the citations from Haug that 
follow in the main text), just as it could have informed a contemporary image that Italians could be perhaps more 
easily “bettered” and “civilized” than the inhabitants of countries further south. The topic strays from our main 
topic of interest here, but could be developed further by more in-depth research on the orientalizing images of 
Italy. 
1440
 „Wie die Insel durch ihre Lage den Uebergang von Europa nach Afrika bildet, so kann man Gleiches von 
ihrer Bevölkerung, von deren Nationalität sagen.“ Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 
1860, 2, p. 87. 
1441
 Haug, Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt, p. 64. 
1442
“Der Orient sandte ihr weiche Shawls von Kaschmir, geeistes Rosenöl von Mekka, gestickte Teppiche von 
Persien, die süßen Früchte der Levante.” Ibid., p. 65. 
1443
 “[…] gleich den üppigsten Märchen von Sheherezade […]”. Ibid., p. 82. 
1444
 On orientalism and sexuality see, from the broad and still growing literature, the recent publication: Ulrike 
Stamm, "Oriental sexuality and its uses in nineteenth-century travelogues," in James Hodkinson et al., eds., 
Deploying orientalism in culture and history. From Germany to central and eastern Europe  (Rochester, NY: 
Camden House, 2013), pp. 228-41. See as well Aldrich, The Seduction. 
1445
 “[…] die italienischen Damen schlafen ja alle im Bette wie Eva im Paradiese, und Schamhaftigkeit ist den 
Italienerinnen ganz fremd.” Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, p. 120. 
1446
 See Borutta, Antikatholizismus; in English see Borutta, "Settembrini's world”. 
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embarrassed to confess: for “my part I have found the women of Rocca [Rocca di Papa, where 
the papal troops regularly held their manoeuvres] in this regard already highly progressed in 
‘civilization’.”
1447
 The reports of the German soldiers are replete with references to this topos 
of the supposed sexual lasciviousness of the southern population. The pro-Bourbon 
Zimmermann reports about a mother of two “pretty” daughters – aged 13 and 15 years. She 
wished him to “enjoy your meal”: he went on to specify that whether this was said in regard 
to the melons they had provided him “or in regards to the children, I was unable to decipher 
from her voice.”
1448
 If we are to judge by the importance attributed to chastity in Italian 
women towards foreigners in national discourse, the talk of foreign soldiers stressing the 
supposed ease with which sexual encounters occurred between Italian women and the foreign 
soldiers must have been quite inflammatory for the Italians.
1449
 A further example of this 
condition was the instance included in Zimmermann's report wherein he asserted that he had 
committed adultery with the wife of the brigands' "general", Luigi Alonzo, who went by the 
nickname Chiavone.
1450
 As Zimmermann writes, he did so as well because he subjected 
himself “always willingly to the malediction of the original sin.”
1451
 Quite happily 
Zimmermann, after having had his amorous encounter with Olimpia Alonzo, began to refer to 




                                                 
1447
 “die Geistlichen […] sorgen von jeher dafür, daß keine Römerin zu lange Jungfrau bleibt. Ich meinerseits 
habe die Roccanerinnen in dieser Hinsicht schon weit in der ‚Civilisation‘ vorgeschritten gefunden […].” 
Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, p. 108. 
1448
 “Jetzt kam die Mutter der beiden hübschen Kinder, um mir ‚guten Appetit‘ zu wünschen (ob zu den Melonen 
oder zu den Kindern, vermochte ich an der Stimme nicht zu erkennen) […].” Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines 
ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," p. 408. 
1449
 The issue can be developed further by analysing the military criminal cases of the foreign soldiers since 
sexual misdeeds were given a prominent place in the military criminal codes (in the indigenous and foreigners’ 
codes alike). Court records exist for the various armies and armed groups in the various Archives of State in 
Italy. An example – for the Papal Army – are the records in the ASR, Ministero delle armi, buste no. 1412-
1421and 3032-3062. 
1450
 Even if this nickname is said to have been attributed to him because he, as a child, wore the keys on a 
keychain around his neck, it seems that the “double entendre” of the nickname in Italian (which refers to the 
sexual sphere) was noted already at his time; see Giordano B. Guerri, Il sangue del Sud. Antistoria del 
Risorgimento e del brigantaggio (Milan: Mondadori, 2010), p. 125. 
1451
 “[..M]ich stets willig dem Fluche der Erbsünde unterworfen.” Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines 
ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," p. 42. 
1452
 Ibid., p. 42. In the Italian (as well as French) culture, to refer to a man as "having horns" (uno che ha le 
corna) or "being horned" (cornuto) is to call him out as a cuckold. 
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8.4 Transnational comparisons, clashes and transfers 
8.4.1 Corps comparisons and national group comparisons  
Many elements rendered evident the division of the single Italian armies into distinct military 
groups. In most cases, each regiment had its own uniform
1453
, which differed from the others 
in colour, style and a series of minor and major stylistic details. While some of these 
particularities could more easily be understood by military personnel
1454
, some of the 
distinctive characteristics of the uniforms of the various corps were also understood by the 
civilian population as well. As with other armies and centuries, past and present, the various 
corps of the Italian armed groups enjoyed different levels of prestige. However, given that any 
regiment, as based on the "quality" of its constituent corps and their soldiers, could improve 
or decline, comparisons were constantly being made.  
Furthermore, despite the foreigners’ regiments had a more diversified national 
makeup, many soldiers began to see some of the corps as national ones, which confirms the 
quest for their institutionalization in the form of national “Legions” encountered above in my 
analysis on mobilization. By viewing existent corps as “national” corps, the traditional 
competition between military corps in terms of prestige overlapped with nationality related 
comparisons. 
Therefore, not only was the quality of each corps constantly compared to the others by 
foreign and "indigenous" soldiers, so were the national groups that comprised the various 
armed groups. The papal carabineer Vollmar, while acknowledging there were Germans in 
the Papal Zouaves, asserted all the same that the Zouaves were “good-for-nothings”. He went 
on to argue against the usual image of the Zouaves as the best corps in the Papal Army: “In 
                                                 
1453
 Due to the integration of corps that retained their uniforms from their previous engagements, such as the 
“foreign company” and most probably also caused by smaller or bigger changes brought about by the production 
of “red shirts” in different places, it seems that the Garibaldian Army in fact was more “multi-coloured” than one 
would normally expect. For the Bourbon uniforms of the “foreign company” see Vigevano, Compagnia estera 
garibaldina, pp. 3, 4, 6; for the production of “Red shirts” in Prato, see Antonio Mauro and Piero Fiorenzani, 
"Sulle camicie rosse di Garibaldi tra storia e manifattura," A Campione 59, no. 1 (2012): pp. 5-11. In the 
splendid Textile Museum (“Museo del Tessuto”) in Prato “Garibaldi’s fulling mill” (“follone di Garibaldi”) is on 
display; that this fulling mill was used for the fabrication of the Garibaldian uniform has been passed down 
orally. On this question, which lies somewhere between between history and myth, see Antonio Mauro and Piero 
Fiorenzani, "Sul 'follone di Garibaldi' esistente a Prato," A Campione 59, no. 2 (2012): pp. 8-12. It seems that the 
“red shirts” used by the British Garibaldians may have been produced in the UK itself, and at the very least they 
were provided by the military outfitters S. Isaac, Campbell & Co. in Jermyn Street, London, according to 
Pellegrino Sutcliffe, "British Red Shirts," p. 206. 
1454
 On the military as not only a hypercodified institution but – due the multitude of smaller and bigger 
distinctive symbols used – also as “hyper-symbolic” (“ipersegnico”) wherein the uniform may be conceived as a 
text, see Greco, Homo militaris, on the “semiotics of the uniform” (“semiotica della divisa”) see the chapter of 
the same name, pp. 165-177. 
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Germany, one normally thinks of the Zouaves as real hotshots. […] In reality, the Zouaves are 
worse soldiers than their comrades in the line.” Vollmer inveighed against the publication of 
the theologian Georg Mösinger
1455
, who according to him erroneously adulated the Zouaves 
by attributing “all merits of the other troops […] only to the Zouaves.”
1456
 Vollmar also 
makes a comparison of the qualities of the various nationalities present in the Papal Army. He 
believed that the Dutch soldiers were the worst servicemen; the French soldiers of the Legion 
d’Antibes not only behaved “casually in the French way in service”, they were not interested 
in “accuracy”, and were, moreover, lazy: “Where the German on the drill-ground swings his 
cane around for hours, he [the Frenchman] puts his hands into his pockets and smokes 
[…].”
1457
 The Italian gunners were similarly lazy “because the hot blood of the southerner 
leaves no room for mathematical calculations and cool-headed guidance.”
1458
 The pro-
Bourbon officer Zimmermann, equally asserted that the “indigenous officers were for the 
large part wretched creatures”.
1459
  
German soldiers and officers not only regarded themselves as Germans
1460
 and were 
also regarded as such by the Italians, they nearly always considered themselves to be the best 
soldiers in the armed groups. According to Zimmermann, upon his arrival, the “brigands 
curiously came running out of their huts and from their fires, to see the German officer 
[ufficiale tedesco in the German original] arriving from Rome.”
1461
  
Having to act against a conspiracy during his service in the Papal Army, Rottmund is 
pleased to be able to form a detachment of men comprised mostly “of Germans and Swiss, 
                                                 
1455
 Mösinger, Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee?; see for the contents of the booklet chapter 3. 
1456
 “In Deutschland stellt man sich gewöhnlich unter Zuaven wahre Teufelskerle vor. […] In Wirklichkeit aber 
sind die Zuaven schlechtere Soldaten, als ihre Kameraden in der Linie.” “[..A]lle Verdienste der anderen 
Truppen […] nur den Zuaven zugeschrieben werden.” Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, p. 77. 
1457
 “Im Dienste sind die Antibeslegionäre französisch legère [….] nichts auf Accuratesse. […] Wo der Deutsche 
Stunden lang seine Spazierhölzer auf dem Exerzierplatze herumschlenkert, steckt er beide Hände in die Taschen 
und raucht […]”.  Ibid., p. 82. 
1458
 “[..W]eil das hitzige Blut des Südländers eine kühle mathematische Berechnung und besonnene Führung 
nicht zuläßt.” Ibid., p. 92. 
1459
 “[..D]ie eingeborenen Offiziere [….] wirklich zum größten Theile ganz erbärmliche Wichte.” Zimmermann, 
"Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," p. 554. 
1460
 In their reports, the self-naming by the Germans is ubiquitous. Only rarely do they refer to other allegiances, 
such as regional ones; an example of this for instance may be seen in the case of those German soldiers and 
chaplains who knew each other from their time together in the Austrian boarding school in Feldkirch, see 
footnote no. 669. Other soldiers, although they normally wrote of themselves as Germans, sometimes referred to 
themselves as Austrians (which, however, due to the “German question”, which was still open at the time, is not 
in total contrast with their identification as Germans), given they had been part of the Austrian Army before 
joining the Italian group, see for instance ibid., p. 63. On the interconnection of, rather than contrasting national 
and regional identities in nationalism, see, e.g., Confino and Skaria, "The local life of nationhood," pp. 5-24. 
1461
 “Neugierig eilten die Briganten aus den Hütten und von den Feuern herbei, um den vom Rom kommenden 
ufficiale tedesco [so in the original] zu sehen […].” Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-
Chef's," p. 47. 
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upon which, because we had to act against Italians, I could rely the most […].”
1462
 The 
Bourbon soldier Maier reveals his hubris when he writes that had “only the German Legion 
been sent to Sicily […] we would certainly have come to terms with Garibaldi and his bands, 
and Francis II would still today be in possession of the royal throne of the Two Sicilies.”
1463
 
8.4.2 The main objects of comparison 
The comparison between the military corps and/or the nationalities present within each single 
Italian armed group regarded four qualities in particular: humane or harsh treatment (whether 
it be that of the soldiers by their officers, or of civilians by the soldiers); cleanliness or 
uncleanliness; courage, cold-bloodedness (in the sense of “cool-headedness”) and endurance 
as opposed to fear, indolence and laziness; and finally loyalty versus treason. 
In many German soldiers’ reports, one quality of the German soldier as well as officer 
is described as being supposedly more humane in the treatment of other individuals. The 
Bourbon soldier Maier observes of his Swiss comrades (in the same regiment) that captives 
“could not expect humane treatment from the Swiss.”
1464
 Similarly, the pro-Bourbon 
Zimmermann criticizes Chiavone for being more interested in finally acquiring the title of 
“general” and especially in “obtaining a complete Neapolitan general’s uniform”, than in 
caring for his soldiers: “I believed this man capable of giving the order to execute officers for 
a missing button on his general’s trousers […] German officers would surely have cared more 
about their subordinates’ buttons than their own.”
1465
 And Rüstow accused Sirtori of not being 
interested enough in the humane and benevolent treatment of his soldiers. Of course one of 
the reasons for placing such emphasis on humanity (in a national light) was linked to the 
attempt to dismantle the perception of the Germans as “barbarians”, and more specifically as 
being barbaric in their treatment of civilians. According to the German reports, these images 
were quite widely diffused.
1466
 In this regard, the Bourbon soldier Maier stated “Garibaldi 
                                                 
1462
 “[..M]eist Deutsche und Schweizer, auf die ich meines Erachtens, da es gegen Italiener ging, am meisten 
rechnen konnte […].” Rottmund, Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, 
römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten 
Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. Rottmund], p. 53. 
1463
 “Wäre die deutsche Legion einzig gewesen in Sicilien […] wären wir sicherlich mit Garibaldi und seinen 
Banden fertig geworden, und Franz II. wäre heute noch im Besitze des königlichen Thrones beider Sicilien.” 
Maier, Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern im Königreich beider 
Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860, p. 17. 
1464
 “[…] denn von den Schweizern konnten und durften sie nicht menschliche Behandlung erwarten.” Ibid., p. 4. 
1465
 “Erlangung einer kompletten neapolitanischen – Generalsuniform [..I]ch hielt den Mann für fähig, wegen 
eines fehlenden Generals-Hosenknopfes ein paar Offiziere erschießen zu lassen […] Deutsche Offiziere hätten 
sich gewiß mehr um untergebene als eigene Knöpfe gekümmert […].” Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines 
ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," p. 478. 
1466
 Haug, Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt, pp. xxi-xxii. 
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must have told the Sicilians terrible things about the Germans, because when we met several 
mostly elder people, they crossed themselves, loudly imploring God and all the saints to 
intercede on their behalf for their protection.”
1467
 
Cleanliness was not only regulated and governed by the military regulations, it 
constituted an object of comparison specifically between Italians and Germans
1468
, but also 
between the soldiers and officers of differing nationality. Zimmermann spoke of Chiavone as 
a “dirty” individual, insofar as this last had the habit of “cleaning his nose with his dirty 
fingers and then wiping them clean” on his clothing
1469
; and Haug spoke of a French officer, 
who was “dirty from the ribbon of his cross of the Legion of Honour to his […] fingernails 
with black borders”, and in short, “an un-groomed litter lout”.
1470
 
The various national groups of soldiers often found the others wanting in courage, 
cool-headedness and endurance; the French and Italian soldiers in particular are characterized 
as lazy and prone to committing treason by the German soldiers. In his report written by the 
Bourbon officer Zimmermann, the other German officers, as well as an Irish officer, were all 
“brave and courageous”, while the others – among which a Swiss officer – revealed their lack 
of courage by “the audible chattering of their teeth.”
1471
 For the Bourbon soldier Maier, his 
Swiss comrades had given proof of “their cowardice on the battle field of Naples”.
1472
 And 
Hoffstetter reports that in the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849 his commandant 
Luciano Manara referred to him as “hard-hearted” (cuore duro)“, because in the 
pandemonium of the fight he did not notice any outwardly visible emotion in me.”
1473
 
                                                 
1467
 [..M]ußte Garibaldi den Sicilianern Schreckliches über die Deutschen aufgebunden haben, denn wo wir noch 
auf wenige, meistens alte Leute stießen, bekreuzten sie sich und riefen Gott und alle Heiligen laut bestend um 
Schutz an.“ Maier, Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern, p. 12. 
1468
 The topos of the “unclean” or “dirty” is of course linked to the discourse of indolence and decadence. The 
topos colours the descriptions of Italian cities by the German soldiers, see, e.g., Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen 
eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," pp. 14 and 23; the exception proves the rule in the case of Rottmund, who 
likes Florence due to its relative cleanliness as compared to other Italian cities. Rottmund, Erlebnisse und 
Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und 
französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. 
Rottmund], p. 75. 
1469
 “[..P]utzte seine Nase mit den schmutzigen Fingern und wischte diese am Futter […] ab.” Zimmermann, 
"Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," p. 518. 
1470
 “[..S]chmutzig vom Bande seines Ehrenlegionkreuzes bis zu […] Fingernägel mit einer schwarzen Bordur 
unterlegt […] der ungebürstete Schmutzhammel.” Haug, Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt, pp. 145-146. 
1471
 “[..K]lapperten hörbar mit den Zähnen […]” Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-
Chef's," p. 546. 
1472
 “[…] Feigheit auf dem Kampfplatze von Neapel […]” Maier, Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-
Legion und den Garibaldianern im Königreich beider Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860, p. 3. 
1473
 “[..C]uore duro (hartherzig), weil er […] äußerlich keine Regung an mir bemerkt hätte.” Hoffstetter, 
Tagebuch, p. 121. Hoffstetter notes in this context, however, that “perhaps those that […] can weep, may be 
more enviable than those that seem to be stolid but in fact aren’t.” 
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According to Vollmar, the fact that the French officers of the Papal Legion of Antibes 
deserted was not in and of itself a trait particular to these men (the same happened as well 
with other nationalities), but he stated: “compared to the Germans, who all deserted 
northwards, these legionnaires are directing mostly toward Naples, where they get 
gratifications and support from Garibaldian committees.”
1474
 Therefore, the accusation is not 
so much desertion, but more precisely treason, because they had left to join the “enemy”. This 
is clearly Maier’s position on the matter as well when he pointed out that those Bourbon 
officers and soldiers that had defected to the Garibaldian Army “had sworn to the King never 
to take service against him”.
1475
 
The result was a world of continuous and mostly unjust comparisons (unjust in the sense that 
the outcome was already predetermined beforehand), a world of mutual accusations, 
denigrations and degradations amongst the various corps and/or nationalities within the single 
armies. Comparisons among the different nationalities sometimes overlapped with the formal 
institutional structure, particularly when the corps were perceived as “national corps” despite 
their more multinational makeup, as was the case with the supposedly German Papal 
Carabineers and the Bourbon “German Foreign Legion”. In other instances, multinational 
corps were split into distinct national components in order to carry out national comparisons; 
this occurred with the differentiation between the “French Zouaves” or the “Dutch Zouaves” 
and the Swiss members of the Bourbon foreign regiments. Therefore, alongside the attraction 
that existed between nationalities as expressed through ideas of “brotherhood” and 
“solidarity” between and by nations, there also existed a type of repulsion between the various 
nationalities present. It is not astonishing that verbal as well as corporal disputes ensued. 
Maier speculated, for instance, that “in those corps that consist of different nationalities”, such 
as the Garibaldian Army, it must be almost certain that “scenes and incidents” occur.
1476
 
Vollmar wrote that in the Papal Army the indigenous line regiments “and the Germans 
continuously bicker, and resolve their national quarrels in broad daylight with weapons laid 
bare. In June 1869, for instance, three companies of papalini [i.e. indigenous soldiers] at the 
                                                 
1474
 “Zum Unterschiede von den Deutschen, welche alle nordwärts desertiren, wenden sich diese Legionäre 
meistens nach Neapel, wo sie von gaibaldinischen Komitè’s Belohung und Unterstützung erhalten.” Herwart, 
Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, p. 84. 
1475
 “[…] die dem König eidlich gelobten, nie gegen Ihn Dienste zu nehmen […]” Maier, Der Kampf zwischen 
der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern, p. 5. 
1476
 “Daß es in denjenigen Corps, die aus so manchen Nationalitäten zusammengesetzt sind, öfters besondere 
Auftritte und Vorkommnisse gibt”. Ibid., p. 78. 
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change of the guard were kicked out of the small town of Albiano by a company of Germans, 
resulting in loss of lives and wounded, and in the serious flogging of their officers.”
1477
 
8.5 From comparisons to change: transnational clashes and transfers 
8.5.1 Conflict and change 
But even in those instances in which corporal violence did not break out as a result, these 
competitive comparisons were never really “fair”. Despite the differences in the criticisms 
expressed by the nationalities toward another, there were also shared hetero-stereotypes 
passed between nationalities; however, these were nearly never “proved wrong” by “direct 
experience”, barring isolated exceptions made for single foreign individuals.
1478
 In nearly no 
instance did a change occur in the level of observation in a Luhmannian sense, and therefore 
resulting in the identification of these comparative assessments for what they really were: 
stereotypes. Nevertheless, it can be argued that a heightened atmosphere of continuous 
contemporary comparison could have been the first step towards bringing about changes and 
transferral of practices. 
Change can be triggered by open conflict. Moreover, the foreign soldiers with military 
experience did contribute to these transnational transfers, insofar as they helped to 
“regularize” such aspects of the armed groups, for instance the war making in the Garibaldian 
groups. Rüstow, for instance, believed it was particularly important to establish and strictly 
adhere to the military, hierarchical chain of command. He systematically complained to his 
fellow officers of the violations of this principal, especially when higher ranks passed him 
over to give direct orders to his troops, or went directly to Garibaldi, ignoring the hierarchical 
procedures according to which officers were only to address the general through their 
superiors. Hence, during the preparations for the southern campaign, he emphasized the need 
for there to be one undisputed commander in chief, a stance that according to him ironically 
led Mazzini to refer to him as a “monarchist”.
1479
 
                                                 
1477
 “Sie [the papal indigenous line regiments] und die Deutschen liegen sich fortwährend in den Haaren und 
kämpfen oftmals ihren Nationalitätenhader auf offener Straße mit blanken Waffen aus. So wurden im Juni 1869 
drei Compagnien Papalini bei Gelegenheit der Ablösung von einer Compagnie Deutschen mit Verlusten an 
Todten und Verwundeten [gramatically it remains unclear, if there were dead and wounded soldiers among the 
Papalini, the Germans or both] zu dem Städtchen Albiano hinausgeworfen und ihre Offiziere beträchtlich 
durchgeprügelt.” Herwart, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat, pp. 85-86. 
1478
 But these exceptions were often formulated in such a way as to confirm the rule, when for instance an Italian 
sergeant is seen as “the only brave man of the whole guard” according to Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines 
ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," p. 547. 
1479
 Rüstow, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 1, p. 52. 
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The importance Rüstow placed on military “regularity” and “order”, however, was 
heavily contested by other officers; they accused him of not understanding what they saw as 
necessary differences between the “Garibaldian” type of war making and the practices typical 
of regular armies. One officer, who like Rüstow was part of the same General Staff of the 15
th
 
division (under Colonel Istvàn Türr), described this difference of opinion as follows: “Rüstow 
was not familiar with this type of Garibaldian war making, as he was with regular war […], 
and so, as a purely scientific man, he did not find himself at ease.”
1480
  
Rüstow himself, in his report on the campaign that was already published by 1861, 
was well aware of this difference of opinion: “Several commanders had the particular view 
that order was not suited for the type of warfare of Garibaldi, while I am of the opinion, 
however, that order is necessary for any kind of warfare [...]. As a result of this contradiction 
of views I have heard reproaches of all types, that I, despite the fact that I know regular 
warfare better than anyone else and everything connected to it, had the defect of wanting to 
transfer regular war making and the use of these instruments to ‘our’ conditions.”
1481
 
Similarly, the ex-Austrian officer Ernst Haug underlines the necessity to maintain 
strict levels of discipline, which he felt was important in situations of revolution such as the 
one of the Roman Republic in 1849: “In no historical period does the necessity of the most 
strict discipline make itself more felt than during the revolution; never is its absence more 
fatal than during the revolution.”
1482
  
The emphasis that Rüstow and Haug place on order and discipline seemed to be connected to 
the stereotypes held by foreigners and Italians that particularly Italians lacked this quality. 
The response directed toward Rüstow that he did not understand the typically “Garibaldian” 
style of war making may have been an excuse of sorts. Namely, by hiring experienced foreign 
officers for their “expertise” and the implementation of military “order”, the Italian 
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nationalists effectively “imported” a type of “loudspeaker” that emphasized the supposed 
Italian military decline. 
Differences in terms of imposing strict hierarchy and establishing a distinct order 
between the regular and the Garibaldian armies
1483
, in the end, seem to be confirmed by the 
German soldier Rottmund – who had served at one time in the militaries of Pius IX, Francis 
II, and Garibaldi – and his written comparisons of the three. In his short memoir, he specified 
which army he liked most: Garibaldi’s. The hierarchy that existed between soldiers and 
officers was, he wrote, less pronounced: "the men enjoyed more freedom, officers and 
soldiers lived more in harmony”.
1484
 Although it was true that levels of discipline were worse, 
in contrast to the regular armies, the “mistreatment of the troops did not happen.”
1485
  
8.5.2 Practices and change: military Turnen all’italiana 
In terms of concrete foreign-Italian military transfers that are linked to the presence of foreign 
soldiers and officers in the Italian armies, the diffusion of military gymnastics proves to be a 
good example.  
The history of gymnastics (Turnen), however, has been researched mostly within the 
context of gymnastics’ associations and the incorporation of gymnastics in the school 
curricula.
1486
 Furthermore, these studies focused primarily on political, social and 
organizational questions, thus overshadowing the strictly physical practices. The question as 
to when and in which forms gymnastics found their way into the standard education of the 
European armies has not been asked, even if this is decisive for resolving the question of 
when physical and especially muscular strength was officially incorporated (and hence was no 
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longer merely a bi-product of “drill”) into the educational aims of the armies. Those authors 
who have thus far lightly touched upon the issue erroneously suppose that gymnastics spread 
to schools and armies at the same time.
1487
 The issue, however, is far more complicated due to 
the relationship between the political, education and military dimensions of gymnastics and 
“Turnen”, which differed quite a lot amongst the various national cases.  
In Prussia, after the initial interest in gymnastics was sparked during the Napoleonic 
Wars, there was a period in which gymnastic associations were prosecuted between 1819 and 
the 1840s, only to see their subsequent rehabilitation in 1842 upon monarchical decision. The 
sport was initially understood as a primarily pre-military education of “military masculinity” 
that was particularly suited to schools; the introduction of these physical practices into the 
army met with far more reluctance. Two Prussian officers in the 1840s were sent to Sweden 
and Denmark, where dedicated military academies for gymnastics had already been 
established at the beginning of the century, with the aim to collect knowledge and based on 
this to then build a “Royal Central Gymnastics Institute” (“Königliche Central-Turn-Anstalt”) 
in Berlin; this last was to be under the control of both the Ministry of War and the Ministry of 
Education and would go on to train school teachers and army officers alike. One of the two 
officers was the Prussian artillerist Hugo Rothstein, who was placed in charge of the newly 
founded Gymnastics institute from 1847 to 1863. Whereas this institute contributed to the 
general establishment of gymnastics in the schools from the 1840s onwards, its integration 
into the more strictly military education occurred more slowly. In 1845, the Minister of War 
von Boyen only “recommended” that military officers read a manual on gymnastics written 
by Rothstein, which was based on the Swedish gymnastics of Pehr Henrik Ling and 
conformed for the most part to the ideas of Adolf Spieß
1488
 (and as such was not directly 
connected to Friedrich Ludwig Jahn)
1489
. He left it entirely up to the officers as to whether 
they wished to read the manual and/or to follow gymnastic courses at the institute. In 1860, 
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386 
 
instructions on gymnastics were still only “experimentally” approved for the military, and the 
full integration of these exercises had been postponed to an indefinite future and the 
ambiguous condition of “when sufficient teachers for it have been educated”.
1490
 Even if the 
number of gymnastically educated military personal rose from 18 officers and 58 non-
commissioned officers (in 1859) to 27 officers and 68 non-commissioned officers (in 1860), 
in 1863 the implementation of gymnastics was still heavily dependent upon the stance 
adopted within each regiment and their respective commanders.
1491
 Furthermore, due to the 
persisting conflict between the “Central-Turn-Anstalt” and the (civil) gymnasts’ associations 
that conformed to Jahn’s methods – this conflict was fuelled by not only political conflict but 
also by “scientific” differences between the approaches – there were those officers in the 
army who followed Jahn’s exercises, and those that stood by Rothstein’s methods.  
The process of diffusion of more strictly military gymnastics in the Italian armies, 
apart from virtually not having been studied
1492
, is interesting for this study for several 
reasons. Despite its pre-nineteenth century roots and ancient sources, by the nineteenth 
century, it, in its “Turnen” form, was seen as a Prussian (Friedrich Ludwig Jahn), German 
and/or Swiss “invention”. This view of gymnastics is confirmed by the decisive role 
appositely hired German and Swiss immigrants played in its European diffusion.
1493
  
The diffusion of gymnastics showcases how new conceptions of military masculinity 
“travelled” between European countries – from Sweden and Denmark to Germany to France 
and from Switzerland to Italy – in the mid-nineteenth century; they also travelled between 
political sides, if one considers the early institution of the initially liberal “Turnen” into the 
regular armies of Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.  
In Prussia, as aforementioned, gymnastics were incorporated first and quite early on 
into school curricula, and only later and slowly adopted by the army. In Italy on the other 
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hand, some armies actually “imported” the German-Swiss exercises – which in turn were 
imported from further north, i.e. Sweden and Denmark – for military purposes not only before 
they were used in schools but also relatively early on.
1494
 Swiss grammar school teacher 
Rudolf Obermann, who had been member of the Zurich gymnastics association – which was 
in direct contact with southern German associations – and was quite familiar with Jahn’s 
method of gymnastics, was invited in 1831 by King Carl Albert of Savoy to teach gymnastics 
to the artillery and to the students of the Military Academy in Turin. Although at first he only 
taught gymnastics within a military setting, in 1844 Obermann helped found the – still 
existing – “Royal Gymnastics Association of Turin” (“Reale Società Ginnastica di Torino”), 
which was “open to all classes and strata of society without restriction.”
1495
 In the schools, 
gymnastics – after having been incorporated in the reform plans of the Bourbon King in 1848 
that never went into effect due to the revolution – were officially introduced in 1859 in 
Piedmont, within the context of the school reforms laid out in the “Legge Casati
1496
, and were 
extended to the new Italian monarchy in 1860
1497
; similar to the Prussian model, teachers had 
to come to the central institute in Turin to be taught by Obermann. 
Manuals on military gymnastics were published quite early on in both the Bourbon 
and Piedmontese Armies: within the context of the inauguration of the first “military 
gymnasium” (in the sense of gym) built in Naples in 1846, under the auspices of the Bourbon 
General Carlo Filangieri and King Ferdinand, one of the first (and most probably the first) 
Italian manuals on military gymnastics, written by the infantry officer Niccolò Abbondati,
1498
 
was published by the official royal military publishing house in the same year. Shortly 
thereafter, other military gyms were erected in Capua and Nocera.
1499
  
In the north, Piedmontese officers and non-commissioned officers that were interested 
in gymnastics initially followed Obermann’s courses on their own initiative. Most of these 
officers were from the newly instituted riflemen’s corps of the “bersaglieri”, whose founder 
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Alfonso La Marmora (the future Prime Minister of Italy from 1864 onwards) urged the 
bersaglieri officers and non-commissioned officers to become educated by Obermann
1500
, 
having identified gymnastics as one of the central points of their education.
1501
 La Marmora 
sensibly reduced the quantity of “old drill”, i.e. the pan-European “school of the soldier and 
platoon”, and resorted instead to new training techniques such as less orderly battle tactics, 
shooting exercises and gymnastics.  
Travelling German and Swiss soldiers “brought” gymnastics “with them” as well. 
Rüstow, according to a military handbook he had written in 1859
1502
, adhered to the military 
gymnastics method, i.e. that of the Prussian gymnastic institute and its principal Hugo 
Rothstein, who had gone on to develop his own method of military gymnastics that was only 
partially based on Friedrich Ludwig Jahn's method. According to Rüstow, military gymnastics 
had the primary aim of “strengthening the muscles of the male body”.
1503
 But even where 
gymnastics had not been introduced officially, e.g. the Papal Army, the German soldiers did 





The military is – or, if the most recent developments in war and the military today are taken 
into consideration, perhaps “was” – a world that was particularly characterized by corporal 
presence and embodiments. The soldier’s body is regulated in the military with an extensive 
series of imperatives, from drill and dress to discipline. “Emotional standards”, such as having 
no fear and being courageous, being disciplined and loyal were also imperatives; because it is 
not possible to look into the “”mind” of another, many of these emotional standards were 
often measured using physical parameters. While a portion of these “emotional” requirements 
more or less differ from those that governed civilian life, others overlapped or informed this 
last – taking the form of "militarization" of the civil sphere. 
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Individual soldiers were members of specific groups or military units that were made 
more or less visible through the development of a series of differentiating signs and symbols; 
the military units also interacted with each other in ways in which their differences from each 
other as corps came to the fore.  
Aside from the respective formal military unit of each soldier, other types of groups 
receive the soldiers’ loyalty, among which are more institutionalized groups such as the army 
as a whole or the respective state or political party to which this army belongs. Other 
communalities between soldiers tend to overlap or cut across these more institutional 
memberships; in the case of multinational armies for instance the national groups of the 
soldiers or other perceived communalities, be these regional or biographical connections 
between portions of the soldier population as a whole. At times these communalities are 
supported by or tend towards an independent institutionalization, and as such become 
increasingly visible.  
This chapter discussed how the membership of German soldiers in their military corps 
related with other group loyalties, as these last became increasingly more important for them.  
It must first be recalled that the institutional placement of foreign soldiers in the Italian 
armed groups, among which the Germans, differed considerably from soldier to soldier: Some 
served in military units that were predominantly comprised of Italians or at least subjects of 
the state, in other words corps that in the case of the Papal and Bourbon Army were referred 
to as “indigenous corps”. Others served in either a mostly Italian-dominated or more 
decisively multinational context, whether this was the military administration or the general 
staffs and ministries. Most foreign soldiers, however, served in specifically created 
foreigners’ regiments, and in some cases these last were further divided into “national” units.  
In the latter two cases, the nature of these regiments and corps was made visible, in 
varying degrees, through the use of cockades, flags, uniforms; this however was an aspect 
that, for temporal and space issues, could not be developed in depth here. It seems however, 
that these differentiations were at times so distinct that not only did military personnel 
recognize them, but civilians did as well; in other cases, these types of symbols were not as 
obvious, and in order to recognize or understand their meaning, civilians would have had to 
have at least some basic knowledge of the armies and their inner workings. Given the hyper-
symbolic nature of armies, which characterized the ways in which other differentiations were 




Based on these observations, this chapter discussed a series of developments. First, 
soldiers tended to make comparisons not only between themselves individually, but between 
their respective groups as well: One such comparison was that of their own army and that of 
the enemy – e.g. by making a distinction between mercenaries and volunteers. Another placed 
the various military units within the single armies in contrast to each other. Second, many 
soldiers tended to identify as “national” groups even those military units that were in fact of a 
more multinational makeup; one such example was that the Papal Foreign Carabineers or the 
Bourbon foreigners’ regiments were considered German or Swiss corps, even if these last 
were characterized by a number of different nationalities within their ranks. Third, in other 
cases such as the multinational corps of the Zouaves, the soldiers as well as publications on 
the Zouaves tended to subdivide the corps into national segments, making reference to “Dutch 
Zouaves” or “English Zouaves” for instance. A further example of this subdivision, which 
was so commonplace and rooted in the minds of the soldiers, is the fact that some 
nationalities created their own Zouave war songs, which bound rather than opposed the 
national cause to that of the Pope.  
In other words, foreign soldiers increasingly began to refer to themselves as members 
of a nation and were referred to as such by others as well. In their reports, German soldiers 
and officers speak of themselves as “German”; other biographical elements, such as regional 
origin, or biographical communalities were named as well, though much less. The German 
soldiers and officers openly distinguished themselves from the Italians or other nationalities, 
such as the Swiss with whom they were often grouped in the military setting. Moreover, at 
least partially orientalizing images of southern Europe, Italy or southern Italy can be detected 
in the German soldiers’ descriptions of the Italians, most emblematically in the idea that 
Italian women were “sexually wild”. As aforementioned, German soldiers were also 
addressed as such by external sources as well, e.g. in the press and in pamphlets and by a 
population that seemed to be informed by the typical image present in the Italian national 
discourse at the time of the German (soldier) as a “barbarian”.  
The continuous comparison in terms of military ability and manliness of the 
“nationalities” was connected to the overlap between military units and national grouping and 
the separation of these units into national segments; therefore, alongside the attraction 
between nations, expressed in terms such as "brotherhood of peoples" and international 
"solidarity", the repulsion and competitivity between nations existed. The object of these 
comparisons took the form of four “qualities”: humane treatment (between officers and 
soldiers, or soldiers and civilians), cleanliness, courage and discipline, and loyalty. These 
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objects were, however, very much bandied about regarding the different nationalities, so that 
the same quality could be acknowledged in oneself by a given group, while a member of 
another national group could at the same time doubt its presence in that very group. The 
heightened atmosphere of continuous and “unfair” comparisons (insofar as they were 
informed by static stereotypes), however, led at times to violent clashes between the members 
of the various national groups of foreign soldiers.  
Despite the nationality-related clashes between soldiers of different national groups 
and military units, clashes and conflict were also often a sign of partially differing ideas on 
military organization. There was a controversy for instance between officers like Rüstow and 
some of his colleagues regarding the necessity of maintaining a strict hierarchy or discipline 
within the ranks, or the extent to which officers should spend their time among their soldiers. 
The need to maintain strict discipline had already been underlined by Haug in his writings on 
the Roman Republic in 1849. This, of course, is an instance in which regular army officers 
were expressing their opinions; these officers were able to keep their differing political beliefs 
and their individual ideas regarding the organization of “democratic” armies but nevertheless 
highlighted questions of discipline and hierarchy in the military. Certainly, the results of these 
partially differing ideas and practices on the “reality” of the situation, in the Garibaldian 
armed groups in particular, remain to be analysed in more depth; but if it is taken into account 
that at least some foreign officers informed the practices of considerable segments of the 
southern army and that the number of ex-regular soldiers and officers serving in these 
“democratic” forces was higher than often acknowledged, the probability that there was total 
opposition between the “military culture” of the garibaldini and that of the “regular” armies 
diminishes. 
Though it was not the only way, conflict within the armies was often a sign of (the 
beginning of) change. Another channel of change was based on consciously copying other 
armies; and another means still resulted from slightly differing practices. 
Conscious copying and change through the modification of internal practice were both 
involved in the transnational transfer of gymnastics and its integration into the official army 
practices of Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The presence of German soldiers 
not only played a role in this transfer with regard to these two armies, but – through their 
personal initiative to pursue and practice military gymnastics – also in the case of the Papal 
Army, which did not officially integrate the practice. The analysis here is only a first 
contribution to the possible further inquiry into the history of the more circumscribed military 
gymnastics, which, as opposed to the history of gymnastics in the schools, has hardly been 
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studied. While in Prussia, for instance, gymnastics was first implemented into the school 
curricula and only subsequently into the army, in some of the Italian armies the opposite 
seems to have occurred. Furthermore, despite the fact that it was an import from further north, 
i.e. Sweden and Denmark, gymnastics in general came to be seen as a German and/or Swiss 
invention, and Germans and Swiss individuals contributed to its early implementation in the 
Armies of Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In fact, German officers (among 
which Rüstow) were supporters and practitioners of military gymnastics. Even in the absence 
of an official decision to adopt it, the German soldiers continued to pursue their practice of 
gymnastics, apparently unable to abstain from practicing it, as may be surmised by the 




9 General conclusions  
When I began to examine the German soldiers on the various Italian sides, the differences are 
what, first and foremost, surfaced.  
The German soldiers fought for fundamentally opposed political Italian sides, and 
hence effectively – but not necessarily subjectively – for different political aims: For 
democracy and/or the Italian nation under Mazzini and Garibaldi, and therefore what may be 
described as being “on the left” or the “centre-left”; and for the “legitimate” rights of the 
Bourbon monarch or the Pope as monarch to govern over their own territory and people, 
hence on the counter-revolutionary or “right” side of the political spectrum. From this 
perspective, the Germans served in armed groups that seemed to be fundamentally different in 
their nature: On the one side there were the "democratic"/”liberal” irregular combatants, while 
on the other the "conservative" "regular" armies; the first more a group of revolutionaries than 
an "army", the second official state armies. 
But as this research suggests, there were other differences and communalities as well, 
some of which cut across this political divide. 
As the chapter on mobilization has shown, there was a series of elements that 
essentially behaved in an international or even a-national manner. Other forms of 
mobilization however established links between foreign regions and nations and the 
respective Italian side; an example of such was the development in the German-Italian case of 
“minor” personality cults around figures like Hermann Kanzler or Marie Sophie of Bavaria. 
Especially after 1860 Catholic publications generated by Rome provided elements for 
“national” and “regional” stories about the Papal Army, which were then be further 
“mythologized” in the “periphery”. What emerged from this research was that regional and 
national “identity” were not so much in opposition with one another as much as they informed 
one another, and regional and national references were often to be found in the same texts by 
the same authors, among which the poems on the “Bavarian-German” Marie Sophie, Kanzler 
“from Baden” as the “pride of Catholic Germany”, and Bach as the “Bavarian” that shot in the 
“Prussian way” (regardless of the fact that he had never been a member of the Prussian 
Army). 
These national stories coming out of Rome and the consequent emergence of national 
groupings assimilated what was initially the democratic idea of “brotherhood of peoples”. 
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This concept was previously developed and put into practice especially from the 1830s and 
1840s onwards by the democratic “party”. In fact, this concept was one of international bonds 
that was intimately bound to the separation of the world into different nations; brotherhood 
within this context was imagined to engender solidarity between and by nations. But, as 
aforementioned this specific vision had also taken hold in the world-views of the political 
opponents, of legitimists and Catholics, at least by 1860. 
From the internalization of this concept sprang the desire, on all political sides to 
create “national legions” that would be sent to the different Italian parties; with regard to the 
German-Italian case these included the various projects put forth by Johann Philipp Becker –
 first for Sicily and the Roman Republic in 1848-49 and then for the southern campaign in 
1860– and the endeavours to create just such a Legion for the Pope within the context of the 
German Catholic Assemblies in the 1860s. This planning of such legions exemplifies how 
discourses tend to undergo a process of institutionalization. In contrast to Garibaldi’s British 
Legion or the St. Patricks Irish battalion that fought for the Papal Army, in fact, none of the 
attempts to create an official “German Legion” in Italy was successful.  
Whether in terms of the ideas that intertwined nationalism and internationalism, the 
nation and the Italian “parties”, or of the elements of political and cultural mobilization that 
functioned alongside the nation, this study shows that they all were important for the actual 
outcome of German soldierly engagement in Italy. They engendered private activities to 
support the respective Italian armed group in Germany whereby other people were prevailed 
upon to enlist or donate money. But this type of mobilization did not necessarily directly 
reach the single recruit.  
For the recruits, political considerations were frequently mixed with economic and 
career prospects, though it was not uncommon for these last to take precedence. This is 
confirmed by the fact that alongside the political and cultural driving forces, the concrete 
recruitment of foreigners for all the Italian armies also made use of economic incentives 
which were rooted in the traditions of mercenary recruitment of former centuries. 
On all sides, regular pay was foreseen for the soldiers and officers. Wages often 
differed, though not so much between the pro- and anti-Risorgimento armed groups, but along 
other lines of differentiation: First, wage differentiation was to all effects based on rank and 
therefore wages differed between officers and common soldiers even in nearly all Garibaldian 
campaigns, but often also according to hierarchical order among these two groups. Second, 
the payment schemes in the regular armies often differed from corps to corps, dictating wage-
level according to whether one was a member of the foreigners’ corps or the “indigenous” 
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corps; this difference in wages was particularly pronounced in the Bourbon Army, but was 
present albeit to a lesser degree (and only until 1866) in the Papal Army as well. As 
exploration has revealed, these differences informed and reinforced a negative imagery of the 
foreign soldier as a foreign “mercenary” amongst indigenous soldiers and the garibaldini 
alike. Third, it is opportune to note the differences between the various Garibaldian 
undertakings in terms of monetary retribution: At times, wages were officially anchored in the 
regulations of the states’ armies, and so in 1849, 1859 and 1866. But already with regard to 
the 1860 campaign the decision was made to align wages to those established in the 
Piedmontese Army; the same decree communicated that actual payments would be reduced to 
half-wages but specified that soldiers and officers could ask for the rest at war’s end. This was 
regardless of the fact that during times or war wages were often irregularly paid in all armies. 
Enlistment premiums were not only offered in the Papal and Bourbon Army, but were 
at least in 1860 offered by Garibaldi’s Southern Army as a means to induce Bourbon (and 
among them foreign and German) soldiers to desert or to join the pro-national side.  
The results of this study show that for a large number of German soldiers and officers 
on all sides, economic and career considerations were in fact important. It was not uncommon 
for higher ranking foreign officers – in the case of the Sicilian State in 1848, the Roman 
Republic in 1849 or the Southern Army of 1860 for instance – to negotiate individual wages 
that were greater than the standard, and to ask to be engaged at the highest rank possible. For 
many, the Italian commitment was also a way to continue a military career that had been 
interrupted for mostly political but also other reasons (another hint at the interweaving of 
politics and military careers) – for instance in the case of Rüstow due to his revolutionary 
commitment or in that of Korff and – probably – Kanzler, who had refused duels because of 
their Catholic beliefs. 
Furthermore, while changing sides to fight in a different armed group or army in the 
Italian conflict was not unheard of, this study also brought to light the fact that many soldiers– 
and not just officers – served at one time or another in more than one European army: work 
on the archival material and namely the soldiers’ registers revealed that there were soldiers 
that fought in the Crimea, Algeria and Mexico before they joined the Garibaldian ranks, or 
those of the Papal and Bourbon Armies. What this means is that former “enemies” became 
“comrades”, and vice versa: perhaps one of the most evident examples of this was the ex-
Bourbon German soldiers of the Garibaldian “foreign company” who were now required to 
fight against their former colleagues. Another is the soldiers that fought against each other in 
the Austro-Prussian war of 1867, that were then put together in the same corps of the Papal 
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Carabineers. The Austrian Officer Haug is an example at the individual level; this last fought 
the Italians in 1848 and joined the Army of the Roman Republic in 1849 in order to – as he 
saw it – bring some “order” to its ranks. Of course it would be necessary to further examine 
this phenomenon of cross-army mobility within a broader context than is offered by this 
specific bilateral study. 
The contemporaneity of political and cultural mobilization and of economic and career 
incentives used to attract (foreign) soldiers rendered it necessary to discuss in a more 
substantial manner the question of motives and motivation. This issue was addressed from 
multiple angles. First, the question of motives and motivations was assessed from a 
theoretical perspective by having a look at how these objects are addressed both in 
historiography (especially the field of intentional explanations) and in motivational 
psychology. From this analysis, three salient points emerged: it is possible for there to be 
more than one, or even one primary motive; "motivation" can be understood as the sum of an 
individual's different motives; and that research on the relationship between motives and 
"motivational self-images" ought to be carried out. It is of note, that this last point in 
particular, would clearly lend itself to further study. Second, this study empirically showed 
not only the importance of economic and professionalizing elements, it revealed that motives 
from very different spheres, e.g. political, cultural, economic and private, in fact overlapped in 
many individual cases.  
The controversies between the political sides at the time were based on a strong 
opposition between two motives in particular: the political and the economic. This opposition 
manifested in the counterposition of volunteers and mercenaries, whereby each political side 
described their adherents as politically driven volunteers while the adherents of their political 
opponents were denounced as mercenaries, exclusively motivated by economic interests. 
Within this context, the image of the mercenary was used by each side to attack the soldiers of 
the other. Each side rejected that the soldiers of the other were or could be politically 
motivated, and hence directly attacked the heart of the idea of the volunteer as sacrificing any 
and all personal interests to a political cause. 
As I expressed in my work, classifying these soldiers into these two categories of the 
volunteer and the mercenary hinges on identifying one, or at least one primary, motive, and 
hence necessitates a clarity that is very seldom present in historical reality. 
The study underlined two points in particular: First, it wasn't necessary that each 
individual soldier come into contact with the political and cultural mobilization to induce him 
to enlist into one of the Italian armed groups; notwithstanding, it is likely that this level 
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contributed to the outcome; what came to light here was that these elements affected the 
members of the associations that channelled recruits to the official recruitment offices more 
than they did many enlisting soldiers; at other times, associations (and specifically the 
Catholic associations) raised money to cover the wages of soldiers that enlisted and went to 
serve in the Papal Army in Rome. Second, it is worthy of note that in many instances the 
different types of motives often overlapped, as is suggested by the cases of many German 
officers, from Haug to Korff to Rüstow. That different motives were at stake is also indirectly 
confirmed by the combination of political and economic incentives adopted in the Garibaldian 
armed group in its attempt to induce the Bourbon soldiers to desert and/or to changes sides 
and come over to fight with the “red shirts” in 1860. By deciding a priori in favour of one of 
the two labels – the “real” political war volunteer or mercenary – historians run the risk of 
unnecessarily narrowing the analysis: In this regard, the history of soldiers that actually 
enlisted is necessarily different from studies that – with good reason – concentrate on a 
specific class of motive(s), be it economic, political, religious, cultural etc. 
Although this opposition between volunteer and mercenary, wherein the positive 
political motives of the political volunteer are separated from the negative economic image of 
the mercenary, there are elements in the recruitment practices of the various Italian armed 
groups of the nineteenth century that were a continuation of those of the historical 
mercenaries. One typical instrument of the era of the (foreign) mercenary was the practice of 
establishing recruitment offices in foreign states. As in previous centuries, the location of 
these offices was very much informed by the prohibitions on the recruitment of subjects for 
foreign countries that were still in place in the nineteenth century in many countries. But 
during the period studied here, there was significant development in the German case, and it 
would be interesting to see how this was in other cases. While at the beginning of the century 
freedom of emigration and the possibility to enter foreign military service were a prerogative 
first and foremost for some groups of German nobles (the Standesherren and – to a lesser 
degree – the Reichsritter), the constitutional debates and reforms, particularly those enacted 
following the period of revolution of 1848-49, informed the legal situation of non-nobles 
entering foreign military service. There was a progressive relaxation in the legal situation as it 
applied to the potential recruits due to the equation of foreign military service with 
emigration; furthermore as the right to emigration gained recognition, the traditional bans that 
prohibited recruitment for foreign armies in general were limited to the recruitment of the 
subjects of the said territory, and often only those subjects that were still liable in one way or 
another for their military service at "home". 
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While in regard to the recruits the “freedom to enter foreign military service” gained 
momentum especially from the mid-century on, the bans placed on recruiters as well as on the 
advertisement of foreign recruitment continued to remain in effect in nineteenth-century 
Germany. This informed the practice of placing the recruitment offices in the regions that lay 
on just the other side of the border. In fact, recruitment offices for the Papal and Bourbon 
Armies were erected in countries where recruitment was more or less openly allowed by 
governmental decision, hence in France, Belgium and – partially – Austria (this last especially 
with regard to recruitment for the Bourbon Army). In this context, Germans had to turn 
toward these offices on foreign ground; the offices in St. Louis in France, in the near vicinity 
of Basle and Baden; Feldkirch in Austria, which “serviced” the southern German states; and 
in Brussels in Belgium which bordered the southern Rhineland were all important. The fact 
that German recruits had to reach foreign soil before enlisting in one of the Italian armies, 
regardless of political orientation, seemed to have affected the regional origin of the Germans 
that eventually enlisted in the Italian forces. 
The recruitment offices and structures for different European armies were often 
located in the same cities: Feldkirch, for example, was an important place to recruit for the 
Papal and Bourbon Armies, while British recruitment offices were to be found along the 
French-German border just as those for the Italian armed groups. In the port cities, the flux of 
soldiers directed toward the different European armies overlapped as well; this was 
particularly true for Trieste and Marseille, which channelled many of the northern European 
recruits for various European armies, and among them the Italian ones. The presence of 
multiple recruitment offices along the border regions and this funnel-like effect generated by 
and in the port cities without doubt informed the persistence of a “European soldier market” 
even in the nineteenth century.  
Another element often considered to be typical of mercenaries, in that it seemed to 
symbolize arbitrariness of origin, was the soldier's service in more than one army over the 
course of his life. Many German soldiers had already led for some time a more decidedly 
military life (in their national/regional armies) before they joined the Italian armed groups, 
and went on to join others after they had completed their Italian commitment. There were also 
those that had already served in foreign armed forces, among which the French Foreign 
Legion, especially in Algeria, the different sides in Mexico, the British foreign Legions in the 
Crimea or in India, many of which also went on to join other armies, for instance those of the 
different sides of the American Civil War, once they had completed their Italian service.  
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Although many had led a military life for an extended period of time, it was 
nonetheless not uncommon to find civil professions noted down in the soldiers' registers next 
to their names: What this indicates is that entries on professions are not always sufficient 
proof – and this could also have applied to the Italian members of the Garibaldian armed 
groups as well – as to whether or not a soldier was an "amateur" or not; in order to 
substantiate (or, conversely, disprove) this classification, one would need to examine more 
closely each single biography. This study further suggests that rather than (only) underlining 
the differences between political commitment and military life, it would be more appropriate 
to see that the two were often intimately linked. 
Due to the absence (in the Papal Army, garibaldini) or much-reduced practical role 
(Bourbon Army) played by military conscription in this period, many of the soldiers in 
general, and the foreigners in particular, were formal volunteers. In fact contracts governed 
and established their terms of service; depending on the contract that was signed, the period of 
enlistment was set for a specific duration that ranged between 6 months and 4 years. The 
possibility to re-enlist was not only possible it was incentivized by pay packages and the 
promise of a dismissal fund or pensions. The conditions – usually in terms of length of service 
– that had to be met in order to obtain the latter remained so high (for the “jubilee” pension 
normally a minimum 20 years of service), however, that they proved extremely difficult to 
meet. In light of the fact that the average and median length of time served on the part of 
German soldiers in the Papal Zouaves and the Foreign Carabineers was around two years, it 
becomes clear indeed how difficult it would be to meet the necessary conditions for the 
pension plan.  
The abovementioned points demonstrate that there are elements of continuity between 
the foreign soldiering of the eighteenth century and that of the nineteenth. What changed is 
perhaps not so much the role of economic rewards, the contractual nature of the service or the 
succession of different military engagements, but the way in which foreign soldiers were 
perceived by public opinion. The terms mercenaries and volunteers were increasingly used as 
counter-concepts in the antagonistic communications between the various political sides, 
especially with regard to foreign soldiers. In fact, as of at least 1860, the papal institutions 
spoke of their foreign soldiers as "volunteers", and the military groups of the pro-Bourbon 
forces were referred to by these last as "volunteer" corps in the same period. 
A comparison of the available numbers on foreigners in the European armies of the 
nineteenth century with those of the Italian armed groups reveals the absolutely remarkable 
status of the Papal Army in this period; the percentage of foreigners in the Papal Army went 
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against the general trend and actually saw an increase. The ratio of foreigners serving in the 
Bourbon but also Garibaldian armed groups – even if caution must be made with this latter 
due to the particularly difficult archival situation – more or less corresponded to the similar 
percentages verified in other European armies at the time, which hovered around 5%. This is 
telling especially with regard to the garibaldini, because these numbers suggest that the 
fascination of European publics with Garibaldi in many cases did not lead to a particularly 
strong foreign presence in the Garibaldian ranks, even if there were noticeable differences 
among the various (individual) foreign national groups that were present.  
The numbers of German soldiers very much conform to these general findings, but are 
not without their specificity as well. The greatest number of Germans by far was to be found 
in the Papal Army; and while only some served in the corps of the Zouaves, many more were 
listed in the ranks of the heretofore unstudied corps of the Foreign Carabineers; altogether, 
approximately 1,800 Germans enlisted from 1861 to 1870 in these corps of the Papal Army. 
They were, however, outnumbered by many other nationalities; a good example was the 
larger numbers of French and Belgians. It is clear that these numerical differences without 
doubt were informed by the fact that Frenchmen and Belgians did not have to face the legal 
obstacles to foreign recruitment and to recruitment advertising that the Germans did.  
Some 500 Germans are recorded to have enlisted in the foreigners’ regiments of the 
Bourbon Army that were assembled in 1859; even if there were many more Austrians and 
even Swiss than there were Germans, it is of note that the latter came not only from Bavaria, 
but also from Württemberg and – counter to the official decision not to recruit from there – 
Prussia.  
In comparison, the number of Germans in the Garibaldian ranks seems particularly 
small: the multiple attempts Becker mounted to form German Legions for Garibaldi were 
always set in motion too late. Among the German Garibaldian officers figure more or less the 
names that were already known and noted in the existing literature – some even had to be 
excluded from this study because they were in fact not German, even when considering a 
definition of this that included subjects born in Austria. In terms of soldiers the 200-strong 
“foreign company” comprised of ex-Bourbon soldiers, among which 64 soldiers that are of 
ascertained German origin, is of note; they indubitably constitute a specificity, even if only a 
partial one, if we take into account other cases of ex-Bourbon soldiers in the Southern Army.  
Thus far the thesis has examined aspects connected to the motivation of the German 
soldiers that underpinned their choice to enlist in the Italian armed groups, to their enlistment 
itself, and the actual numbers of Germans that went on to actually enlist. But in addition to 
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this line of inquiry, I thought it opportune to also propose a shift in the perspective and to look 
at what kinds of experiences the German soldiers and officers in the Italian armed groups had.  
In this regard, the study underlined that it is important to bear in mind the different 
institutional placements of the foreign, and among them German, soldiers. While most, 
regardless of armed group and political side, were placed in foreigners’ regiments or in (at 
least nominally) national military groups, some of the foreign soldiers and officers served in 
other contexts: from “indigenous” regiments to the military administration, from general 
staffs to the ministry. The experiences they had differed in part according to these different 
placements: While for a common soldier in the foreigners’ regiments “horizontal 
cooperation”
1505
 with other military corps was the norm, for officers that did not serve in the 
foreigners’ corps an Italian and/or foreign, sometimes “cosmopolitan” context, was their 
reality. And of course it is possible to ask whether it would be correct to identify single 
figures, such as Hermann Kanzler, that had been in Italy for more than 30 years and pursued 
their whole career (in his case within the Papal Army) in Italy as “Germans” or whether it 
would be more appropriate to consider them papal subjects or even Italians. 
In the regular armies, the service of the (foreign or “indigenous”) soldier that formally 
enlisted on a voluntary basis was still linked to the idea that there was a personal relationship 
of loyalty between the individual and the respective sovereign and that this sovereign could 
even be a “foreign” head of state. The oath the German soldier was expected to swear in the 
Papal or Bourbon Armies still contained the words "to my sovereign", hence the respective 
Italian sovereign (the Pope or the Bourbon king). In their own writings, the Germans do in 
fact refer at times to the Italian sovereign or state or – mutatis mutandis – to the Italian 
political party they had adhered to by using the possessive pronouns (“my”, “our”). 
But, given that the presence of foreign soldiers was increasingly seen through the filter 
of national grouping, there was a clear shift in the history of foreign soldiers from that of the 
previous century. 
The foreign regiments of the Papal and Bourbon Armies remained multinational 
regiments, even if they continued to differ in national composition, mostly because of the aim 
to put soldiers with linguistic similarities together. Nevertheless, both the general public and 
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the soldiers themselves began, to see these corps in national terms. One perspective 
exaggerated the national homogeneity of these groups, for instance by seeing the Papal 
Foreign Carabineers or the Bourbon foreign regiments as “German” corps, or the Zouaves as 
“French”; another was to divide these corps into smaller national components, for instance 
referring to these different groups in the Zouaves as the “Dutch Zouaves” and “English 
Zouaves” for example. The separation and institutionalization of national groups did not 
occur only at the linguistic level however. In fact, some features of the armies provided focal 
points that reinforced these processes of consolidation of national grouping; such examples 
include the national military chaplains or the creation of national military casinos in the 
Roman case. 
The “quality” of corps and the “quality” of their soldiers had already traditionally been 
subject to comparison in the European armies. By viewing the multinational corps of the 
Papal and Bourbon Armies as “national” corps, the differences in prestige of each corps could 
be translated into a battle over the prestige of the different nationalities in these armies. These 
battles were first and foremost symbolic fights regarding the “honour” of the national groups 
that could lead to “real” and violent clashes between different corps and/or national groups of 
soldiers. 
In this way, the experiences of the foreign soldiers in the Italian armed groups 
increasingly became nationalizing experiences and this was valid on all political sides; despite 
the question how foreign soldiers could be and have been motivated to enter these armies, 
their military experiences in Italy, whether on the side of the garibaldini or, especially from 
1859 onwards in the Bourbon or Papal Armies, not only functioned as a “school of men”, but 
as “school of the nation”
1506
, this last in the sense that the world-views were nationalized. The 
soldiers were increasingly addressed, and increasingly addressed themselves, as members of 
national groups. The mutual views between the national groups of soldiers incorporated the 
existing assumptions and stereotypes on different military national characters that had already 
developed in the eighteenth century. To a great extent, these longstanding stereotypes 
informed the reciprocal comparisons between the national groups and/or different corps of the 
armies. The traditional image that Germans were “calm, obedient and disciplined”, was 
combined with the seemingly opposing image of them as “barbarians”, and the view that the 
Italians were “hot-headed” both continued to inform these comparisons, which revolved 
around issues such as the treatment of others (whether this was of soldiers on the part of the 
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officers or the civilians or captives on the part of the soldiers), cleanliness, courage and 
discipline, and loyalty. To this nationalizing effect were added foreign-Italian transfers, 
whereby new practices from abroad were introduced and spread in the military context; such 
was the case of the "German-Swiss" gymnastics, the incorporation of which led to a partial 
shift away from mechanistic military drill and toward an active focus on the cultivation of 
physical fitness and strength. Military gymnastics were adopted very early on in the Bourbon 
Army, but were practiced at the informal level by the German soldiers in other armies as well, 
e.g. by Rüstow in the Garibaldian Army and the soldiers in the Papal Army. All of these 
dimensions were intimately linked to images of masculinity, and therefore these comparisons 
between national groups or corps were ultimately a comparison in terms of masculinity and 
virility as well. It is for this reason that the single Italian armies, including the “anti-national” 
Papal and Bourbon Armies, became important places for the struggles surrounding the 
concept of “revirilization” and the “military” Risorgimento of both Italians and other 
nationalities. Hence, the history of the Risorgimento unfolded, so to speak, not only in the 
pro-national field via the various activities of liberals and democrats, but also in the spheres of 
the political opponents as well.  
Within the concept of revirilization, a decidedly “military” Risorgimento, and the 
understanding that the Italians necessitated this process, the stereotypes of the German 
character – i.e. that they were innately organized, disciplined, cool-headed and calm – and the 
often opposite “negative” stereotypes of the Italians created tensions within the ranks of the 
Italian armies and armed groups. Many Germans, and specifically the German officers, 
believed that their function was to introduce order, discipline, and organization to what they 
often considered to be poorly organized and undisciplined Italian fighting forces. This belief 
resulted in the tendency of some to behave arrogantly toward the Italian soldiers, and often 
they became rigid, refusing to accept much variation on their sense of limits and discipline. 
Therefore, perhaps more than in other foreign-Italian cases, the German foreign 
soldiers and officers tried to “regularize” the garibaldini, by bringing the service regulations 
or military criminal law from the other armies they had served in and/or by behaving 
accordingly. Differences of opinion informed not only clashes between the officers, but were 
the reasons why military practices could differ considerably from corps to corps. This type of 
variation in military practices leads to the observation that, particularly with regard to the 
Garibalidini, it would be important to study the worlds of the various military subgroups more 
than was possible in this thesis. The former Bourbon soldiers that joined the Garibaldian 
“foreign company”, after having changed sides together with some of their Bourbon officers, 
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could more or less continue on “as usual” under the new flags. The practices of this company 
necessarily differed from groups that had a higher percentage of inexperienced soldiers.  
Despite the fact that the study does not delve further into the topic of the 
diversification of practices within the various Garibaldian subgroups, the study nevertheless 
underlines the communalities that exist between the “regular” and Garibaldian armed groups. 
For instance, the physical separation of officers and soldiers, specific modes of military 
communication, and military criminal law were present on all sides. Based on the differences 
that existed between the Garibaldian officers and common soldiers and on the different 
placements – e.g. in the general staffs or in that of one of the national legions – it very well 
may be that the histories of the garibaldini that underline their "cosmopolitan" character may 
apply more to (a portion of) the Garibaldian officers than to the common soldiers; therefore, a 
“military history from below” of the garibaldini remains yet to be written. 
On the history of the foreign and German soldiers in Italy, the study has clearly 
evidenced the specific ways in which in the nineteenth century “humanity” and 
internationalism were conceptualized as solidarity, first and foremost, between and by 
nations; it is in this specific way that internationalism and nationalism were in fact intertwined 
instead of being placed in opposition to each other. As it obviously makes a difference 
whether one speaks of “brotherhood” in general or “brotherhood of peoples” instead, one 
must not forget the specific declinations that characterized the concept of “brotherhood” when 
used within the context of the nineteenth-century military. The “brotherhood of arms of the 
peoples” created through the common shedding of blood by others in support of the cause of 
the one generated a duty to be “repaid” with the blood of this last for the cause of the other. 
Horizontal “comradeship” between officers and soldiers was, at least since the Napoleonic 
times, also considered to be functional with regard to discipline and military performance; by 
the documented content of Garibaldi’s communications to his soldiers, this last seems to have 
understood this idea as well.  
These additions used to qualify concepts in history are important, regardless of 
whether they apply to society in general or only to the military context, and hence they ought 
to be kept in mind. Both their existence and use are a crucial sign that internationalism has its 
own history and that there are different ways to conceptualize international bonds. Rather than 
seeing internationalism only in a positive light, at the political level – and this moves a bit 
away from the historiographical work done here – some of the qualified ideas of 
internationalism and brotherhood of the nineteenth century can rightly be criticized. 
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This study clearly could not cover every ambit comprehensively and therefore there 
are several aspects that either have not been touched upon at all or have not been sufficiently 
addressed but ought to be in the future. The processes of “remembering and forgetting” the 
foreign participation should be investigated for instance by analysing the virtually unstudied 
monuments of the “Anti-Risorgimento” such as the “Monument for the Papal Army” of 1867 
that lies in the cemetery of Verano in Rome. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to rethink 
the role of actual physical presence in the processes analysed in this study in a more 
substantial manner than has been done here within the context of the contemporary 
comparisons between soldiers and corps, and specifically with regard to the case of military 
gymnastics. Finally, as I have already emphasized above, the complex nature of the 
composition of the Garibaldian undertakings in particular suggests that more detailed research 
could be carried out on the military subgroups and the variations that existed in the different 
practices of these groups.  
Despite these lacunae and given that the history of the German soldiers in the various 
Italian armed groups, for the sake of intelligibility, had to be seen within the context not only 
of the history of the pre-Unitarian armed groups in Italy in general but also of the more 
circumscribed history of foreigners in these armed groups in particular, the study constitutes a 
contribution – even if this was not its primary aim – to a possible comparative military history 
of the pre-Unitarian Italian armed groups and also to the transnational transformation of what 
has traditionally been a nationally-oriented military history of the nineteenth century in 
general.  
 
Many extremes have been discussed herein. Some, however, only seem to be but are not in 
fact oppositions. There were also many stories that have been told. In this study, I have tried 
to show how they were or were not connected. And although there are already many valuable 
stories told by others, my aim was to approach this theme from a slightly different perspective 
and therefore tell a new story. At the same time, it was not possible to embark upon several 
paths in that the stories would have been too implausible or because the source material 
necessary was different from what I had at my disposition. There are also several storylines 
that beg further work, and others – based on what I now know – that would need re-working. 
No stories of a “glorious” German Legion or of “valorous” German soldiers in Italy have 
emerged or been recounted. Nor was this story one of “mercenaries” or only and exclusively 
of “political war volunteers”. Lastly, it was not possible to recount stories of a transnational 











Archivio di Stato di Roma (ASR) 
Fondo Ministero delle Armi 
  Matricole Artiglieria, vols. 1349-1352. 
  Matricole Corpi esteri, vols. 1371-1385 (ufficiali); vols. 1602-1656 (truppa). 
  Affari speciali 
   Legislazione 1816-1870, b. 1142-1144. 
   Reclutamento in Austria, b. 1277-1279. 
   Reclutamento di Marsiglia, b. 1280. 
   Carte personali, b. 2180-2181. 
Naples 
Archivio di Stato di Napoli (ASN) 
Archivio Borbone (AB), b. 1262, 1143-1144. 
Germany 
Münster 
Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive (VWA) 
Personal estates Franz Xaver von Korff, Bri. 
 
Düsseldorf 
Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen (LA NRW) 
 Regierung Aachen 
  Militärwesen, B/1436, Militaria; Deserteurs. 
 
Bonn 
Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (ASDFE) 








Herwegh-Archiv; Dichtermuseum (HA) 
 Personal Estates Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow. 
 
Basle, BS 
Staatsarchiv Basel-Stadt (STABS) 
Personal Estates Johann Lucas von Mechel; Archiv des 13. Jägerbataillons und der 





Museo Storico Vaticano 
 
Palermo  








A., M. v., "Militärische Bilder aus dem Kirchenstaat," Die Grenzboten. Zeitschrift für Politik 
und Literatur 19, no. 3 (1860): pp. 370-79. 
Abbondati, Nicolò, Istituzione di arte ginnastica per le truppe di fanteria di S. M. Siciliana 
(Naples: Reale Tipografia Militare, 1846). 
"Abschied des Deputations-Tags zu Worms Anno 1564 auffgericht," in Aller des Heiligen 
Römischen Reichs gehaltenen Reichs-Täge, Abschiede und Satzungen etc. (Frankfurt 
am Main: In Verlegung Johann Martin Schönwetters, 1707), pp. 713-21. 
"Abschied des Reichs-Tags zu Nürnberg Anno 1542 auffgericht," in Aller des Heiligen 
Römischen Reichs gehaltenen Reichs-Täge, Abschiede und Satzungen etc. (Frankfurt 
am Main: In Verlegung Johann Martin Schönwetters, 1707), pp. 393-403. 
Adelung, Johann Christoph, "Cameradschaft," in idem, Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch 
der Hochdeutschen Mundart, vol. 1 (A-E) (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1793), p. 1295. 
"Adresse der Generalversammlung der katholischen Vereine an den hl. Vater," in 
Verhandlungen der dreizehnten Generalversammlung der katholischen Vereine 
Deutschlands in München am 9., 10., 11. Und 12. September 1861. Amtlicher Bericht 
(Munich: Verlag von J. G. Weiß, 1862), pp. 83-86. 
Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1850, vol. 87 (Gotha: 
Justus Perthes, 1850). 
Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1860, vol. 97 (Gotha: 
Justus Perthes, 1860). 
Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1868, vol. 105 (Gotha: 
Justus Perthes, 1868). 
Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1871, vol. 108 (Gotha: 
Justus Perthes, 1871). 
Annuario militare pontificio. Anno 1867 (Rome: Tipografia della Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 
1867). 
Bär, Max, Die deutsche Flotte von 1848-1852. Nach den Akten der Staatsarchive zu Berlin 
und Hannover (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1898). 
Becker, Johann Philipp, "Brief an Karl Marx, Neapel 15. Januar 1861," in Marx-Engels-
Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Bd. 11, Briefwechsel Juni 1860 bis Dezember 1861, ed. Rolf 
Dublek, vol. 3/11 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1861), pp. 304-08. 
410 
 
Berger, H., "Die Turnübungen der Soldaten nach ihrer jetzigen Methode und den etwa 
wünschenswerten Veränderungen," Deutsche Klinik. Zeitung für Beobachtungen aus 
deutschen Kliniken und Krankenhäusern XVI-XVII, no. 25, 29, 31, 41, 48, 49, 52, 10 
(1864): pp. 237-39, 73-75, 93-96, 393-97, 461-64, 73-77, 501-03, 89-93. 
Bergmayr, Ignaz Franz, Kriegsartikel für die kaiserlich-königliche Armee mit allen übrigen 
österreichischen Militär-Strafgesetzen vereinigt und erläutert, 2 ed. (Vienna: Auf 
Kosten des Verfassers, 1825). 
Bianchi, Celestino, I martiri d'Aspromonte. Cenni storici, Panteon dei martiri della libertà 
italiana (Milan: C. Barbini, 1863). 
Bianco di Saint-Jorioz, Carlo, "Della guerra nazionale d'insurrezione per bande, applicata 
all'Italia [Malta, 1830]," in Giuseppe Mazzini e i democratici, ed. Franco della Peruta 
(Milan: Ricciardi, 1969), pp. 39-75. 
Botta, Carlo, Storia d'Italia continuata da quella del Guicciardini sino al 1789, vol. 7 (Turin: 
Pomba e Comp., 1852). 
Bresciani, Antonio, Oderic, der päpstliche Zuave. Historischer Roman. Mit einer Biographie 
des Verfassers (Münster: Druck und Verlag der E. L. Braun'schen Buchdruckerei, 
1862). 
———, Olderich, der päpstliche Zuave (Regensburg: Manz, 1862). 
———, Olderich, der päpstliche Zuave. Erzählung aus dem Jahre 1860 (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 1864). 
———, Olderico ovvero il Zuavo pontificio. Racconto del 1860 (Rome: Civiltà Cattolica, 
1862). 
Buttà, Giuseppe, Viaggio da Boccadifalco a Gaeta. Memorie della rivoluzione dal 1860 al 
1861 (Naples: Comm. G. de Angelis & figlio tipogr., 1883). 
Calvi, Pasquale, Memorie storiche e critiche della rivoluzione siciliana del 1848, vol. 3 
(London: s. n., 1851). 
Capuzzi, Giuseppe, "La spedizione di Garibaldi in Sicilia. Memorie di un volontario," in Vita 
di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Con la giunta di Garibaldi in Sicilia di Giuseppe Capuzzi, ed. 
Pier Carlo Boggio (Turin: s. n., 1860), pp. 217-96. 
Castner, Julius, "Bataillon," in Militär-Lexikon. Heerwesen und Marine aller Länder mit 
besonderer Berücksichtigung des Deutschen Reiches, Waffen und Festungswesen, 
Taktik und Verwaltung (Leipzig: Verlag des Bibliographischen Instituts, 1882), p. 20. 
"Codice penale militare," in Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni del governo provvisorio 
pontificio che incominciò col 25 novembre 1848 ed ebbe termine il 9 febbraio 1849, 
411 
 
epoca in cui fu proclamata la Repubblica romana (Rome: Tipografia governativa, 
1849), pp. Appendix, pp. 1-111. 
"Comando generale dell’armata meridionale, Ordine del giorno, 12 november 1860," in Atti 
governativi per le provincie napoletane. Raccolta dell’avv. Giuseppe d’Ettore, 2 vols., 
vol. 1 (Naples: Stamperia del Fibreno, 1861), pp. 322-23. 
Crispi, Francesco, I Mille. Da documenti dall'archivio Crispi (Milan: Fratelli Treves, 1911). 
Cronaca degli avvenimenti di Sicilia. Da aprile 1860 a marzo 1861 estratta da documenti, (s. 
l.: s. l., 1863). 
D'Ayala, Mariano, Bibliografia militare-italiana antica e moderna (Naples: Stamperia reale, 
1854). 
"Das deutsche Militärcasino in Rom," Augsburger Postzeitung. Beilage, no. 10 (1869): p. 40. 
"Decree from 17 May 1860," in Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni governative 
compilate dall'avvocato Nicolò Porcelli, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), pp. 9-10. 
"Decreto no. 2 del 7 settembre 1860. Decreto circa la nomina o conferma di Ministri e 
Direttori di varii Dipartimenti," in Collezione delle leggi e de' decreti emanati nelle 
provincie continentali dell'Italia meridionale durante il periodo della dittatura. Da' 7 
settembre a 6 novembre 1860 (Naples: Tipografia Nazionale, 1860), p. 2. 
"Decreto no. 36 del 14 agosto 1866. Rilascio per la giubilazione degl'individui di nazione 
estera," Giornale Militare Officiale (1866): pp. 182-83. 
"Decreto no. 69 del 11 giugno 1860. Emolumenti mensili da doversi agli ufficiali e sotto 
ufficiali dell'armata nazionale (11/06/1860)," in Collezione delle leggi, decreti e 
disposizioni governative compilate dall'avvocato Nicolò Porcelli, ed. Nicolò Porcelli, 
2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), pp. 40-41. 
"Decreto no. 101 del 17 giugno 1860. Soprasoldi e razioni delle Truppe Nazionali," in 
Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni governative compilate dall'avvocato 
Nicolò Porcelli, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), pp. 51-52. 
"Decreto no. 123 del 17 luglio 1861. Decreto circa il corso legale della lira italiana...", in 
Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti del regno d’Italia, vol. 1 (Turin: Stamperia 
Reale, 1861), pp. 355-60. 
"Decreto no. 132 del 25 giugno 1860. Si dà un premio di ducati 50 alla fine della guerra a tutti 
i disertori napolitani che verranno a militare sotto le nostre bandiere (25/06/1860)," in 
Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni governative compilate dall'avvocato 
Nicolò Porcelli, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), pp. 69. 
412 
 
"Decreto no. 938 del 22 novembre 1860. S'ordina il sodisfo della intiera entrata in campagna 
per tutti gli uffiziali dell'esercito," in Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni 
governative compilate dall'avvocato Nicolò Porcelli, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), 
pp. 661-62. 
"Decreto no. 1602 del 23 luglio 1833. Decreto che aggiunge una cattedra di lingua tedesca nel 
real collegio militare," in Collezione delle leggi e de’ decreti reali del Regno delle Due 
Sicilie, vol. 2 (Naples: Stamperia Reale, 1833), pp. 14-15. 
"Decreto no. 1813 del 13 aprile 1828. Decreto col quale approvasi un regolamento per gli 
ascensi militari," in Collezione delle leggi e de’ decreti reali del Regno delle Due 
Sicilie. Anno 1828, vol. 1 (Naples: Stamperia Reale, 1828), pp. 80-89. 
"Decreto relativo alle percezioni straordinarie nel disimpegno dei servizi di lucro," in 
Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello stato pontificio 
emanate [...] Dal 1 gennaio al 31 dicembre 1866, 23 vols., vol. 20 (Rome: Rev. Cam. 
Apostolica, 1866), pp. 685-96. 
Delli Franci, Giovanni, Cronica della campagna d'autunno del 1860 fatta sulle rive del 
Volturno e del Garigliano dall'esercito napolitano, vol. 3 (Napoli: pei tipi di Angelo 
Trani, 1870). 
Der italienische Raubzug wider Rom im September 1870. Von einem Augenzeugen, (Münster: 
Russell's Verlag, 1871). 
"Der tapfere Pfälzer," St. Josephsblatt. Illustrirte Monatsschrift für Belehrung und 
Unterhaltung des christlichen Volkes (1867): pp. 187-88. 
"Deutsche Bundesakte vom 8. Juni 1815," in Dokumente zur deutschen 
Verfassungsgeschichte, ed. Ernst Rudolf Huber, 3 ed., vol. 1 (Stuttgart Kohlhammer, 
1978), pp. 84-89. 
"Die neapolitanische Armee," Die Grenzboten. Zeitschrift für Politik und Literatur 19 (1860): 
pp. 27-33. 
Dorer-Egloff, Edward, "Der Kronenwechsel in Gaeta," in Gedichte an Ihre Majestät Marie 
Sophie, Königin beider Sicilien, geb. Herzogin in Bayern. Mit dem Porträt Ihrer 
Majestät der Königin beider Sicilien, ed. Johann Baptist Vogl and Friedrich Wolf 
(Munich: s. n., 1861), p. 15. 
———, "Die Krankenwärterin," in Gedichte an Ihre Majestät Marie Sophie, Königin beider 
Sicilien, geb. Herzogin in Bayern. Mit dem Porträt Ihrer Majestät der Königin beider 
Sicilien, ed. Johann Baptist Vogl and Friedrich Wolf (Munich: s. n., 1861), pp. 16-17. 
413 
 
"Edict die staatsrechtlichen Verhältnisse der vormals Reichsständischen Fürsten, Grafen und 
Herren betreffend (Vierte Beylage zu der Verfassungs-Urkunde des Königreichs 
Bayern, Tit. V, § 2)," in Gesetzblatt für das Königreich Baiern Edict die 
staatsrechtlichen Verhältnisse der vormals Reichsständischen Fürsten, Grafen und 
Herren betreffend (Munich: s. n., 1820). 
"Edict no. 9, 29 of January 1754," in Novum Corpus Constitutionum Prussico-
Brandenburgensium Praecipue Marchicarum, Oder Neue Sammlung Königl. Preußl. 
und Churfürstl. Brandenburgischer, sonderlich in der Chur- und Marck-Brandenburg, 
Wie auch andern Provintzien, publicirten und ergangenen Ordnungen, Edicten, 
Mandaten, Rescripten... Vom Anfang des Jahrs 1751 und folgenden Zeiten, vol. 1, 
partial vol. 1754 (1754), pp. 619-22. 
"Edict, die standes- und grundherrlichen Rechtsverhältnisse im Großherzogthum Baden 
betreffend. 16 April 1819," in Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungsblatt 
(Karlsruhe: in der C. F. Macklotscehn Hof-Buchdruckerey, 1819), add., p. 1-18. 
"Edict, die standesherrlichen Rechts-Verhältnisse im Großherzogthum Hessen betreffend. 29 
March 1820," in Großherzoglich-Hessisches Regierungsblatt auf das Jahr 1820 
(Darmstadt: im Verlage der Großherzoglichen Invaliden-Anstalt, 1820), pp. 125-60. 
"Edict. 22 April 1824," in Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungs-Blatt 
(Karlsruhe: in dem Comptoir des Staats- und Regierungsblatts, 1824), pp. 71-81. 
"Editto no. 26 del 16 aprile 1844. Disposizioni riguardanti le giubilazioni alle truppe di linea 
indigene," in Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello 
stato pontificio emanate nell’anno 1844 (Rome: Nella stamperia della R. C. A., 1845), 
pp. 71-78. 
Eickholt, Klemens August, Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara. Erinnerungen eines römischen 
Kanoniers aus den Jahren 1868 bis 1870 (Freiburg: Herder, 1917). 
"Elenco alfabetico di tutti i componenti la spedizione dei Mille di Marsala...", Gazzetta 
Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia. Supplemento, no. 266 (1878): pp. 1-24. 
"Entschließung der Generalversammlung katholischer Vereine Deutschlands [1862]," in 
Deutschland - Italien 1850 - 1871. Zeitgenössische Texte, ed. Dietmar Stübler 
(Leipzig: Leipziger Universitäts-Verlag, 2007), pp. 185-87. 
Entwurf eines Straf-Gesetzbuchs für die Schweizer-Regimenter im Dienste Seiner 
Allerchristlichsten Majestät; Projet d'un code pénal militaire pour les régimens 
suisses au service de Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne, (Napoli: Richter, 1858). 
414 
 
"Fix, Louis F.," in Biographie nationale publiée par l’Academie royale des sciences, des 
lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, vol. 35, supplement vol. VII (Adrenatius-
Hubert) (Brussels: Établissements Émile Bruylant 1869), pp. 268-69. 
Fleck, Eduard, Kommentar über das Strafgesetzbuch für das Preußische Heer [1845] (Berlin: 
Verlag der Deckerschen Geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei, 1856). 
———, "Preußische Militair-Strafgerichtsordnung [1845]," in Preußische Militair-
Strafgerichtsordnung nebst den dieselbe ergänzenden, erläuternden und abändernden 
Gesetzen, Verordnungen, Erlassen und allgemeinen Verfügungen. Zum 
Handgebrauch, ed. Eduard Fleck (Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen Geheimen Ober-
Hofbuchdruckerei (R. v. Decker), 1873), pp. 14-104. 
Gady, Jean-Antoine-Charles-Nicolas de, Entwurf eines Straf-Gesetzbuchs für die Schweizer-
Regimenter im Dienste seiner allerchristlichsten Majestät; Projet d'un code pénal 
militaire pour les régimens suisses au service de sa Majesté très-chrétienne (Bern: s. 
n., 1817). 
Ganter, Henri, Histoire du service militaire des régiments suisses à la solde de l'Angleterre, 
de Naples et de Rome (Geneva: Ch. Eggimann, 1896). 
Garibaldi, Giuseppe, "Al Colonnello Türr, Nuvolento, 17 giugno 1859," in Edizione nazionale 
degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Epistolario, vol. 4 (Rome: Istituto per la storia del 
Risorgimento italiano, 1982), pp. 77. 
———, "Alcune parole agli ufficiali e militi dell'esercito [Messina, 6 August 1860]," in 
Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Scritti e discorsi politici e 
militari, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Bologna: Cappelli, 1934), pp. 287-88. 
———, "All'emigrazione polacca - Firenze, Caprera, 5 febbraio 1863," in Edizione nazionale 
degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Scritti e discorsi politici e militari, 3 vols., vol. 1 
(Bologna: Cappelli, 1934), p. 184. 
———, "Alla associazione operaia di Napoli, Malatico 28 aprile 1861," in Edizione nazionale 
degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Epistolario. A cura di Giuseppe Fonterossi, 
Salvatore Candido, Emilia Morelli, 14 vols., vol. 6 (Milan: Cappelli, 1983), p. 93. 
———, Clelia. Il governo del monaco (Roma nel secolo XIX). Romanzo storico politico 
(Milan: Fratelli Rechiedei editori, 1870). 
———, Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Vol. II. Le Memorie di 
Garibaldi nella redazione definitiva del 1872 (Bologna: Capelli, 1932). 
415 
 
———, "Ordine del Giorno, Ai Cacciatori delle Alpi, Como, 28 maggio 1859," in Edizione 
nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Scritti e discorsi politici e militari, 3 
vols., vol. 1 (Bologna: Cappelli, 1934), pp. 171-72. 
"Gesetz über die Einführung des Strafgesetzbuches für die Preußischen Staaten [1851]," in 
Sammlung der deutschen Strafgesetze, ed. Melchior Stenglein, vol. 3 (Munich: Verlag 
von Christian Kaiser, 1858), pp. part XI, 7-18. 
"Gesetz über die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Eigenschaft als Preußischer Unterthan, 
sowie über den Eintritt in fremde Staatsdienste vom 31. Dezember 1842," in Gesetz-
Sammlung für die Königlichen Preußischen Staaten (Berlin: zu haben im vereinigten 
Gesetz-Sammlungs-Debits- und Zeitungs-Komtoir, 1843), pp. 15-18. 
"Gesetz über die Verpflichtung zum Kriegsdienste," in Regierungs-Blatt für das Königreich 
Württemberg vom Jahr 1843 (1843), pp. 321-57. 
Gilardone, "An die Heldin von Gaeta," in Gedichte an Ihre Majestät Marie Sophie, Königin 
beider Sicilien, geb. Herzogin in Bayern. Mit dem Porträt Ihrer Majestät der Königin 
beider Sicilien, ed. Johann Baptist Vogl and Friedrich Wolf (Munich: s. n., 1861), pp. 
40-43. 
Guardione, Francesco, Il dominio dei borboni in Sicilia dal 1830 al 1861, 2 vols., vol. 2 
(Turin: Società tipografico-editrice nazionale, 1907). 
Guerzoni, Giuseppe, Garibaldi, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Florence: G. Barbèra, 1889). 
Guida pratica per la compilazione e verificazione dei fogli delle competenze dell'Esercito 
italiano... (Florence: G. Cassone e Comp. Tipografi di S. M., 1868). 
Handbuch für die Unterofficiere und Corporäle der päpstlichen Fremden-Regimenter 
enthaltend die Soldaten- und Plotons-Schule in Fragen und Antworten, (Macerata: 
Bianchini, 1858). 
Harring, Paul Harro, Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie et sur les derniers événements de Savoi, 
par un témoin oculaire, 2 vols. (Paris: Libraire de M. Dérivaux, 1834). 
Haug, Ernst, Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt (Bremen: Franz Schlodtmann, 1851). 
"Heerwesen Großbritanniens," v. Löbell's Jahresberichte über die Veränderungen und 
Fortschritte im Militärwesen 32 (1905): pp. 91-109. 
Herwart, Lothar, Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat. Aus dem Tagebuche eines päpstlichen Soldaten 
(Munich: Adolf Wagner, 1870). 




Herwegh, Marcel, Guillaume Rustow. Un garnd soldat, un grand caractère (1821-1878) 
(Paris; Neuchatel: Attinger, 1935). 
Höfen, Heinrich von, "Eine deutsche Frau," in Gedichte an Ihre Majestät Marie Sophie, 
Königin beider Sicilien, geb. Herzogin in Bayern. Mit dem Porträt Ihrer Majestät der 
Königin beider Sicilien, ed. Johann Baptist Vogl and Friedrich Wolf (Munich: s. n., 
1861), pp. 4-8. 
Hoffstetter, Gustav von, Tagebuch aus Italien 1849 (Zurich: F. Schulthess, 1851). 
Hoffstetter, Gustavo de, Giornale delle cose di Roma nel 1849 (Turin; Capolago: Cassone; 
Tip. Elvetica, 1851). 
"I Crociati di San Pietro. Scene storiche del 1867," La Civiltà Cattolica ser. 7, vol. IV (1868). 
"Instruktion wegen Ausführung des Edikts vom 21sten Juni 1815, die Verhältnisse der 
vormals unmittelbaren deutschen Reichsstände in der Preußischen Monarchie 
betreffend. 30 May 1820," in Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preußischen 
Staaten Instruktion wegen Ausführung des Edikts vom 21sten Juni 1815 (Berlin: zu 
haben im Königl. Debits-Kontoir für die Allgemeine Gesetz-Sammlung, 1820), pp. 
81-100. 
The Italian Revolution. The Papal Allocution," New York Times, 19/10/1860: p. 2. 
Kanzler, Hermann, "Doc. no. 686. Rapporto alla Santità di Nostro Signore Papa Pio IX. 
felicemente regnante del generale Kanzler proministro delle armi sulla invasione dello 
stato Pontificio nell'autunno 1867," in Das Ende des Kirchenstaates, ed. Norbert 
Miko, 4 vols., vol. 1 (Wien: Herold, 1962), pp. 362-91. 
———, Rapporto alla Santità di Nostro Signore Papa Pio IX. felicemente regnante del 
generale Kanzler pro-ministro alle armi sulla invasione dello Stato Pontificio 
nell'autunno 1867 (Rome: Coi tipi della Civiltà Cattolica, 1868). 
Kaufmann, Wilhelm, "Hoffmann, Ernst F., Major," in Die Deutschen im amerikanischen 
Bürgerkriege (Sezessionskrieg 1861-1865) (Munich; Berlin: Druck und Verlag von R. 
Oldenbourg, 1911), pp. 513-14. 
———, "Spraul, Karl M., Inspektor der Infanterie im 11. Korps," in Die Deutschen im 
amerikanischen Bürgerkriege (Sezessionskrieg 1861-1865) (Munich; Berlin: Druck 
und Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1911), p. 554. 
Killmeyer, H. O., Militär-Geographie von Europa mit den asiatisch-russischen und asiatisch-
afrikanisch-türkischen Ländern (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler'sche Buchhandlung, 1857). 
Knauber, Jakob, Der päpstliche Offizier Joseph Alois Bach (1838-1912) aus Rülzheim (Pfalz) 
(Landau-Queichheim: St. Josef, 1935). 
417 
 
"Königliche allerhöchste Verordnungen die der königlichen Souverainität unterworfene 
Ritterschaft und ihre Hintersassen betreffend. 31 January 1807," in Königkich-
Baierisches Regierungsblatt (Munich: gedruckt von Franz Hübschmann, 1808), pp. 
193-217. 
La Masa, Giuseppe, Documenti della rivoluzione siciliana del 1847-49 in rapporto all'Italia, 
vol. 1 (Turin: Tipografia Ferrero e Franco, 1850). 
Landi, Guido, Istituzioni di diritto pubblico del Regno delle Due Sicilie 1815-1861 (Milan: 
Dott. A. Giuffrè editore, 1977). 
"Landwehrmänner können sich der Desertion schuldig machen, wenn die Landwehr auch 
nicht zusammengezogen ist," Archiv für das Civil- und Criminal-Recht der Königl. 
Preuß. Rheinprovinzen 23 (1836): p. 34. 
Le Varenne, Louis, Les chasseurs des Alpes et des Apennins. Histoire complete de la guerre 
de l'independance italienne en 1859. Avec un appendice contenant les noms de tous 
les volontaires qui ont pris part a la guerre de l'independance italienne en 1859 
(Florence: Le Monnier, 1860). 
Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato lì 7 gennaro 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari 
speciali d'individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede, (Rome: Tipografia della 
Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1852). 
"Legge no. 280 del 30 settembre 1848," in Collezione delle leggi e decreti del General 
Parlamento in Sicilia nel 1848. Anno 1° della Rigenerazione (Palermo: Stamperia 
Pagano, 1848), pp. 307-10. 
"Legge no. 1238 del 7 luglio 1851," in Raccolta degli atti del governo di Sua Maestà il re di 
Sardegna, vol. 19 (Turin: Stamperia reale, 1851), pp. 957-67. 
"Legge per la reclutazione dell’Esercito Nazionale. Legge no. 276 del 29 settembre 1848," in 
Collezione delle leggi e decreti del General Parlamento in Sicilia nel 1848. Anno 1° 
della Rigenerazione (Palermo: Stamperia Pagano, 1848), pp. 300-06. 
"Legge sul reclutamento dell’esercito del Regno di Sardegna. 20 March 1854, no. 1676," in 
Raccolta degli atti del Governo di Sua Maesta il re di Sardegna, vol. 22 (dal 1° 
gennaio a tutto giugno 1854) (Turin Stamperia reale, 1854), pp. 81-140. 
Linaker, Arturo, La vita e i tempi di Enrico Mayer. Con documenti inediti della storia della 




Maier, M., Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern im 
Königreich beider Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860 (Karlsruhe: Druck von 
Friedrich Gutsch, 1861). 
Manuale pe’ Soldati e Sotto-Uffiziali del Real Esercito atto a guidarli ne’ diversi esami cui 
vanno sottomessi giusta I programmi fissati per le varie armi, (Naples: Nella 
tipografia dei fratelli reale, 1837). 
Maurigi, Ruggiero, Aspromonte. Ricordi storico-militari, 4 ed. (Napoli: Perrotti, 1862). 
Mazzini, Giuseppe, "Atto di fratellanza della Giovine Europa," in Scritti editi ed inediti di 
Giuseppe Mazzini, vol. IV (Imola: Cooperativa tipografica-editrice Paolo Galeati, 
1908), pp. 3-6. 
———, "D'alcune cause che impedirono finora lo sviluppo della libertà in Italia," in Scritti 
editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini, vol. 2 (Politica vol. 1) (Imola: Cooperativa 
tipografico-editrice Paolo Galeati, 1907 [1832]), pp. 147-221. 
———, Foi et avenir (Paris: Au Bureau du Nouveau Monde, 1850). 
———, "Fratellanza dei popoli," in Scritti editi e inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini. Edizione 
diretta dall'autore (Milan: G. Daelli, 1861), pp. 286-91. 
———, "The Holy Alliance of Peoples [1849]," in Life and writings of Joseph Mazzini, 6 
vols., vol. 5 (Autobiographical and political) (London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1891, 
1891), pp. 265-82. 
———, "Instructions générales pour les initateurs [Statuto della Giovine Europa, French 
version / Melegari; 1834]," in Scritti editi ed ineditit di Giuseppe Mazzini, vol. IV 
(Scritti politici vol. III) (Imola: Cooperativa tipografica-editrice Paolo Galeati, 1908), 
pp. X-XIX. 
———, "La Santa Alleanza dei Popoli [1849]," in Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini, 
vol. 39 (Imola: Cooperativa tipografica-editrice Paolo Galeati, 1924), pp. 203-21. 
———, "Letter from Giuseppe Mazzini to Aurelio Saffi a Forlì [1849]," in Scritti editi ed 
inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini, vol. 38 (epistolario vol. 20) (Imola Cooperativa 
tipografico-editrice Paolo Galeati, 1923), pp. 260-65. 
———, "Statuto della Giovine Europa [1834]," in Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini, 
vol. IV (Scritti politici vol. III) (Imola: Galeati, 1908), pp. 9-21. 
Miko, Norbert, Das Ende des Kirchenstaates, vol. 2 (Wien: Herold, 1962). 
"Militär-Strafgesetze für die K. Truppen vom 20. Juli 1818," in Vollständige, historisch und 
kritisch bearbeitete Sammlung der württembergischen Gesetze, ed. August Ludwig 
419 
 
Reyscher, vol. 19, 2 (Tübingen: Verlag und Druck von L. Fr. Fues, 1850), pp. 1448-
505. 
Mistrali, Francesco, "Le guerre d'Italia da Villafranca ad Aspromonte," (Milan: Francesco 
Pagnoni tipografo-editore, 1863) 
Mohl, Robert, Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Württemberg, 2 vols. (Tübingen: Heinrich 
Laupp, 1831). 
Monnier, Marc, Garibaldi. Histoire de la conquête des Deux-Siciles. Notes prises sur place 
au jour le jour (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1861). 
Mösinger, Georg, Waarom heeft de paus een leger noodig? (Haarlem: van den Heuvel; 
Katholiek-Nederlandsche Brochuren-Vereeniging, 1868). 
———, Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee? Den Katholiken Deutschlands und 
Österreichs beantwortet (Salzburg: J. Oberer's Buchhandlung, 1868). 
Moufang, Christoph, Der Kampf um Rom und seine Folgen für Italien und die Welt. Zwei 
Reden gehalten auf den Katholiken-Versammlungen zu Münster und Cöln am 2. 
December 1867 und 27. Januar 1868 von Dr. Christoph Moufang, Domcapitular und 
Regens am bischöflichen Seminar in Mainz (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1868). 
N., N., "Das deutsche Militär-Casino in Rom [24. Januar 1869]," Der Traunbote. Gemühtliche 
Volksschrift für den Bürger und den Landmann 2, no. 4 (1869): pp. 316-17. 
———, Die General-versammlungen der katholischen Vereine Deutschlands. Rundschau und 
Kritik über die Wirksamkeit der letzten fünf General-versammlungen. Der 
neunzehnten General-versammlung zu Bamberg gewidmet (Münster: Adolph Russell, 
1868). 
———, "Die holländischen Zuaven im päpstlichen Heere," Historisch-politische Blätter für 
das katholische Deutschland 61 (1868): pp. 670-90. 
———, "Kirchliche Rundschau," Der Katholik. Zeitschrift für katholische Wissenschaft und 
kirchliches Leben 47 (1867) 
———, Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger, of 's pausen tijdelijke macht en hare dappere 
verdedigers (s'-Hertogenbosch: Henri Bogaerts, opvolger van P. N. Verhoeven, 
Drukker en Boekhandelaar van Z. H. Paus Pius IX., 1869). 
———, Verhandlungen der neunzehnten General-Versammlung der katholischen Vereine der 
deutschen Länder in Bamberg am 31. August, 1., 2. und 3. September 1868. Amtlicher 
Bericht (Bamberg: Otto Reindl, 1868). 
Niedermayer, Andreas, Die Streiter für den apostolischen Stuhl im Jahre 1867 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft; Katholischer Broschüren-Verein, 1867). 
420 
 
"Novos et ante. Allocutio habita in concistorio secreto die XXVIII septembris MDCCCLX," 
in Pii IX pontificis maximi acta. Vol. III (acta exhibens quae ad ecclesiam universam 
spectant) (Rome: Ex Typographia bonarum artium habita facultate, 1864), pp. 180-89. 
"Nuovo ordinamento della truppa di fanteria," Gazzetta piemontese 19, 31 January 1832. 
O'Clery, Patrick Keyes, The making of Italy (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 
1892). 
Oddo, Giacomo, I Mille di Marsala. Scene rivoluzionarie (Milan: presso Giuseppe Scorza di 
Nicola editore, 1863). 
"Ordinanza del Ministero delle Armi sull’arrolamento per compire i quadri dell’esercito," in 
Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni del governo provvisorio pontificio che incominciò 
col 25 novembre 1848 ed ebbe termine il 9 febbraio 1849 epoca in cui fu proclamata 
la Repubblica Romana (Rome: Tipografia governativa, 1849), pp. 73-76. 
Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, il servizio e la disciplina delle Reali Truppe nelle 
piazze, (Naples: Reale Tipografia della Guerra, 1831). 
Ordinanza di Sua Maestà per gli esercizi e le evoluzioni delle truppe di fanteria, (Naples: 
Reale Tipografia della Guerra, 1833). 
Papa, Giuseppe Antonio, "Il centunesimo anniversario del 10 dicembre 1746 in Genova," in 
'Fratelli d'Italia'. Goffredo Mameli e Genova nel 1847, ed. Emilio Costa, Giulio 
Fiaschini and Leo Morabito (Savona: Sabatelli, 1998), pp. 232-40. 
"Patent on Emigration, 10th of August 1784," in Handbuch aller unter der Regierung des 
Kaiser Joseph des II. für die K. K. Erbländer ergangener Verordnungen und Gesetze 
in einer Sistematischen Verbindung enthält die Verordnungen und Gesetze vom Jahre 
1784, vol. 6 (Vienna: Verlegt bei Joh. Georg Moesle K. K. privil. Buchhändler, 1768), 
pp. 297-307. 
Pecorini Manzoni, Carlo, Richiami del gia capitano di stato maggiore Pecorini-Manzoni 
sopra alcuni appunti fatti alla storia della 15. divisione Turr (Catanzaro: Tip. G. 
Dastoli, 1882). 
Pertz, Georg Heinrich, Das Leben des Ministers Freiherrn vom Stein, vol. 3 (Berlin: Verlag 
von G. Reimer, 1851). 
Pfyffer von Heidegg, H., "Ueber die Gerechtigkeitspflege bei den capitulirten 
Schweizerregimentern im ausländischen Kriegsdienste," Kritische Zeitschrift für 
Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslands 9 (1837): pp. 250-83. 
421 
 
"Piano organico per la composizione dell’Esercito Siciliano, Palermo, 7 febbraio 1848," in 
Collezione officiale degli atti del Comitato Generale di Sicilia nell’anno 1848 
(Palermo 1848), pp. 78-85. 
"Placat, betreffend das Verbot der Annahme fremder Kriegsdienste, vom 18. Juni 1625," in 
Vollständige historisch und kritisch bearbeitete Sammlung der Württembergischen 
Gesetze, ed. August Ludwig Reyscher, vol. 19/1 = Kriegsgesetze 1. Teil 1360-1800 
(1849), pp. 153-54. 
Poland, Charles A., Army Register of Ohio Volunteers in the Service of the United States […] 
for July 1862 (Columbus (Ohio): The Ohio State Journal Printing Co., 1862). 
Poli, Oscar Philippe Francois Joseph de, Souvenirs du bataillon des zouaves pontificaux 
(franco-belges) (Paris: Imprimerie de H. Carion, 1861). 
"Politische Angelegenheiten. Italien. Rom," Freisinger Tagblatt, no. 1: pp. 1. 
Poten, Bernhard von, "Personal- und Qualifikations-Berichte," in Handwörterbuch der 
gesamten Militärwissenschaften, vol. 7 („Militärliteratur bis Polnischer Aufstand“) 
(Bielefeld; Leipzig: Verlag von Velhagen und Klasing, 1879), pp. 373-74. 
Powell, Joseph, Two Years in the Pontifical Zouaves. A Narrative of Travel, Residence, and 
Experience in the Roman States (London: R. Washbourne, 1871). 
"Publicandum no. 3, 18 February 1779," in Novum Corpus Constitutionum Prussico-
Brandenburgensium Praecipue Marchicarum, Oder Neue Sammlung Königl. Preußl. 
und Churfürstl. Brandenburgischer, sonderlich in der Chur- und Marck-Brandenburg, 
Wie auch andern Provintzien, publicirten und ergangenen Ordnungen, Edicten, 
Mandaten, Rescripten... Vom Anfang des Jahrs 1751 und folgenden Zeiten, vol. 6, 
partial vol. 1779 (1779), pp. 1453-54. 
"R. Decreto circa la formazione in Cuneo delle Compagnie di Cacciatori delle Alpi, 17 marzo 
1859," in Il volontariato militare nel Risorgimento. La partecipazione alla guerra del 
1859, ed. Anna Maria Isastia (Rome: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Ufficio storico, 
1859), pp. 162-63. 
Ramorino, Gerolamo, Précis des derniers événemens de Savoie (Paris: Ambroise Dupont, 
1834). 
"Reglement über die Besetzung der Stellen der Portepee-Fähnriche und über die Wahl zum 
Offizier bei der Infanterie, Kavallerie und Artillerie vom 6. August 1808," in Novum 




"Regolamento di giustizia criminale e disciplina militare," in Raccolta delle leggi e 
disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello Stato pontificio emanate nell'anno 
1842 (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1843), pp. 77-162. 
Regolamento pel cappellano maggiore e pei cappellani militari delle truppe pontificie, (s. l.: 
s. n., 1850). 
"Regolamento per gli alloggi degli uffiziali," in Collezione delle leggi e de' decreti reali del 
Regno delle Due Sicilie. Anno 1835. Semestre II. Da luglio a tutto dicembre (Naples: 
Stamperia Reale, 1835), pp. 113-50. 
Regolamento per il nuovo servizio del casermaggio delle truppe pontificie (Rome: Vincenzo 
Poggioli Stampatore della Rev. Cam. Apost., 1822). 
Regolamento per l'organizzazione del 1° e 2° battaglione carabinieri leggieri e del 13° 
battaglione cacciatori approvato da Sua Maestà il dì 10 novembre 1859 in Portici 
(Naples: Stamperia Reale, 1859). 
Regolamento per la reclutazione del 13° battaglione cacciatori e de' due battaglioni 
carabinieri leggieri sovranamente approvato il dì 10 novembre 1859 in Portici 
(Naples: Stamperia Reale, 1859). 
Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio, 
(Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1866). 
"Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio," in 
Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello stato pontificio 
emanate [...] Dal 1° gennaio al 31. dicembre 1866, 23 vols., vol. 20 (Rome: Rev. 
Cam. Apostolica, 1866), pp. 406-732. 
Regolamento sul servizio interno per le truppe pontificie di fanteria pubblicato con sovrana 
approvazione (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1854). 
Regolamento sull' esercizio e sulle manovre per le truppe pontificie di fanteria: pubblicato 
con sovrana approvazione, (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1858). 
"Reichsadel," in Herders Konversations-Lexikon. Kurze aber deutliche Erklärung von allem 
Wissenswerthen aus dem Gebiete der Religion, Philosophie, Geschichte, Geographie, 
Sprache, Literatur, Kunst, Natur- und Gewerbekunde, Handel der Fremdwörter und 
ihrer Aussprache. Reich illustriert durch Textabbildungen, Tafeln und Karten, vol. 4 
(„Lindenbrug bis Ryut“) (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1856), pp. 692. 
Ricciardi, Giuseppe, "Balilla, ovvero la cacciata degli austriaci da Genova nel 1746 [debut 
performance in 1859]," in Opere scelte, ed. Giuseppe Ricciardi, vol. 7 (Balilla, 
423 
 
Torquemada, Maria Maddalena, I due Candidati) (Naples: Dalla stamperia del Vaglio, 
1870) 
Rieß, Florian, and Carl Weber, Das Oekumenische Concil. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach. VI. 
Das Vaticanum im Lichte des katholischen Glaubens (Freiburg: Herder'sche 
Verlagshandlung, 1870). 
Rönne, Ludwig von, Die Verfassungs-Urkunde für den Preußischen Staat vom 31. Januar 
1851 (Berlin: Verlag von Carl Heymann, 1850). 
Rottmund, J., Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben. Geschichtliche Zusammenstellung 
denkwürdiger Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in Kriegsdiensten der Königin Victoria 
v. England, des Papstes Pius IX., des Generals Garibaldi, des Königs Franz II. von 
Neapel u. des Kaisers Napoleon III. von Frankreich. Reise- und Kriegs-Memoiren 
(Augsburg: Selbstverlag, 1864). 
———, Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, 
römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und französischen Kriegsdiensten. 
Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. Rottmund] 
(Augsburg: Selbstverlag, 1863). 
Rudloff, Karl Gustav von, Handbuch des preußischen Militairrechts, vol. 2 (1826). 
Ruggeri, E., Della ritirata di Giuseppe Garibaldi da Roma. Narrazione (Genoa: Tip. Moretti, 
1850). 
Rüstow, Friedrich Wilhelm, Anleitung für die Dienstverrichtungen im Felde für den 
Generalstab der eidgenössischen Bundesarmee (Basle: Schweighauser'sche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1855). 
———, Annalen des Königreichs Italien. 1861 bis 1863, 3 vols. (Zurich; Leipzig: Meyer & 
Zeller; K. F. Köhler, 1864). 
———, Der italienische Krieg 1860 politisch-militärisch beschrieben. Mit 7 Karten und 
Plänen. Des 'italienischen Krieges' zweiter Band (Zurich: Friedrich Schultheß, 1861). 
———, Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860, 2 vols. (Leipzig: F.A. 
Brockhaus, 1861). 
———, Militärisches Hand-Wörterbuch nach dem Standpunkte der neuesten Literatur und 
mit Unterstützung von Fachmännern bearbeitet und redigirt 2vols. (Zurich: Druck 
und Verlag von Friedrich Schultheß, 1859). 
Schulte, Johann Friedrich von, "Klitsche, Theodor Friedrich," in Allgemeine Deutsche 
Biographie (1882), pp. 199-200. 
424 
 
Schulthess, Heinrich, ed. Europäischer Geschichtskalender, vol. 9 (Nördlingen: Druck und 
Verlag der C. H. Beck’schen Buchhandlung, 1869). 
Schweizer, Paul, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität (Frauenfeld: J. Hubers Verlag, 
1895). 
Segur, Anatole de, Les martyrs de Castelfidardo (Paris: Ambroise Bray, 1861). 
Stempf, Ludwig, Das Polizeistrafgesetzbuch für das Großherzogthum Baden mit den 
Motiven, Commissionsberichten und den landständischen Verhandlungen bearbeitet 
(Mannheim: Verlag von J. Bensheimer, 1864). 
Stenglein, Melchior, Commentar über das Strafgesetzbuch für das Königreich Bayern und 
das Gesetz über die Einführung des Strafgesetzbuches und des Polizei-
Strafgesetzbuches vol. 2 (Munich: Christian Kaiser, 1862). 
Strafgesetzbuch für das Königreich Würrtemberg. Amtliche Handausgabe, (Stuttgart: Joh. 
Friedr. Steinkopf, 1839). 
"Strafgesetzbuch für die Preußischen Staaten vom 14. April 1851," in Melchior Stenglein, ed.,  
Sammlung der deutschen Strafgesetze, vol. 3 (Munich: Verlag von Christian Kaiser, 
1858), part XI, 141-60. 
"Tavola 21.3. Prezzi medi al consumo di alcuni prodotti del comparto alimentare - Anni 1861-
2010," in L'Italia in 150 anni. Sommario di statistiche storiche 1861-2010, ed. Istituto 
Nazionale di Statistica (Rome: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 2011), pp. 884-
89.Temme, Jodocus Donatus Hubertus, Glossen zum Strafgesetzbuche für die 
Preußischen Staaten (Breslau: Verlag der Schletter’schen Buchhandlung 1853). 
Torre, Federico, "Relazione del Maggior Generale Federico Torre, direttore generale delle 
leve, bassa-forza e matricola al signor ministro della guerra sulle leve eseguite in Italia 
dalle annessioni delle varie provincie al 30 settembre 1863," L'Italia militare. 
Rassegna mensile 1 (1865): pp. 265-435. 
Uhland, Ludwig, "Der gute Kamerad," in Gedichte (Stuttgart; Tübingen: J. G. Cotta'sche 
Buchhandlung, 1815), p. 219. 
Verhandlungen der dreizehnten Generalversammlung der katholischen Vereine Deutschlands 
in München am 9., 10., 11. Und 12. September 1861. Amtlicher Bericht, (Munich: 
Verlag von J. G. Weiß, 1862). 
Verhandlungen der dritten General-versammlung des katholischen Vereines Deutschlands am 




Vico, Pietro, "Diritto penale militare," in Enciclopedia del diritto penale italiano, ed. Enrico 
Pessina, vol. 11 (Milan: Società editrice libraria, 1908), pp. 1-406. 
Vogl, Johann Baptist, and Friedrich Wolf, eds., Gedichte an Ihre Majestät Marie Sophie, 
Königin beider Sicilien, geb. Herzogin in Bayern. Mit dem Porträt Ihrer Majestät der 
Königin beider Sicilien (Munich: s. n., 1861). 
Waal, Anton de, Die Streiter des heil. Vaters. Episode aus der jüngsten Geschichte 
der Eroberung Roms (20. September 1870). Schauspiel in drei Aufzügen (Regensburg; 
New York; Cincinnati: Friedrich Pustet, 1871). 
Wasserburg, Philipp, Silvio. Ein Roman aus den Tagen von Mentana, 2 vols. (Mainz: 
Kirchheim, 1873). 
Weis, Ludwig, Das Strafgesetzbuch für das Königreich Bayern sammt dem Gesetze vom 10. 
November 1861 zur Einführung des Strafgesetzbuches und des 
Polizeistrafgesetzbuches (Nördlingen: Druck und Verlag der C. H. Beck’schen 
Buchhandlung, 1863). 
White Mario, Jessie, Vita di Giuseppe Garibaldi, 2 ed., 2 vols. (Milan: Fratelli Treves editori, 
1882). 
"Wiederum erneuertes Mandat gegen die fremden Werbungen, von 1655, 1661 und 1665, 
vom 19. Oct. 1666," in Sammlung der von E. Hochedlen Rathe der Stadt Hamburg so 
wol zur Handhabung der Gesetze und Verfassungen als bey besonderen Eräugnissen 
in Bürger- und Kirchlichen, auch Cammer-Handlungs- und übrigen Policey-
Angelegenheiten und Geschäften vom Anfange des siebenzehnten Jahr-Hunderts bis 
auf die itzige Zeit ausgegangenen allgemeinen Mandate, bestimmten Befehle und 
Bescheide, auch beliebten Aufträge und verkündigten Anordnungen. Der Erste Theil, 
welcher die Verfügungen im siebenzehnten Jahr-Hundert in sich fasset, (Hamburg: 
gedruckt und verlegt bei J. C. Piscator, E.Hochedlen und Hochweisen Raths 
Buchdrucker, 1763), pp. 233-35. 
Zimmermann, Ludwig Richard, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," Der 
Kamerad 4 (1864). 
———, Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chefs (Berlin: Hausfreund-Expedition, 
1869). 
Zoepfl, Heinrich, Grundsätze des allgemeinen und deutschen Staatsrechts. Mit besonderer 
Rücksicht auf die neuesten Zeitverhältnisse, 4 ed., vol. 2 (Leipzig; Heidelberg: 









Albergoni, Gianluca, "Sulla 'nuova storia' del Risorgimento. Note per una discussione," 
Società e Storia 120 (2008): pp. 349-66. 
Alberton, Angela Maria, "Perché partire? La scelta di indossare la camicia rossa. Percorsi in 
area veneta (1849-1866)," Società e storia, no. 131 (2011): pp. 68-103. 
Albrecht, Andrea, Kosmopolitismus. Weltbürgerdiskurse in Literatur, Philosophie und 
Publizistik um 1800 (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2005). 
Aldrich, Robert, The Seduction of the Mediterranean. Writing, Art and Homosexual Fantasy 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1993). 
"Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi", 
http://archiviodistatotorino.beniculturali.it/work/garb_search.php (last 
accessed:.05/01/2013). 
Alter, Peter, Nationalismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985). 
Altgeld, Wolfgang, "Christentum, Revolution, Nation. Geschichtliche und zeitgeschichtliche 
Auseinandersetzungen in der Formierung des deutschen Katholizismus," Historisches 
Jahrbuch 121 (2001): pp. 501-12. 
———, Das politische Italienbild der Deutschen zwischen Aufklärung und europäischer 
Revolution von 1848 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1984). 
———, "Giuseppe Garibaldi in zeitgenössischer Sicht von der Verteidigung Roms bis zur 
Niederlage bei Mentana (1848-1867)," Risorgimento. Europäische Zeitschrift für die 
neuere Geschichte Italiens 3 (1982): pp. 169-99. 
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined communities (London; New York: Verso, 2006). 
Andreides, Gábor, "Alcuni ungheresi nelle lotte risorgimentali tra il 1859 e il 1861," in 
L'Unità d'Italia in Europa, ed. Andrea Ciampani (Rome: Istituto per la storia del 
Risorgimento italiano, 2013), pp. 169-76. 
Angelow, Jürgen, "Forschung in ungelüfteten Räumen. Anmerkungen zur 
Militärgeschichtsschreibung der ehemaligen DDR," in Was ist Militärgeschichte?, ed. 
Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2000), pp. 73-
89. 
Antonielli, Livio, ed. La polizia in Italia e in Europa. Punto sugli studi e prospettive di 
ricerca (Soveria Mannelli, Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2006). 
———, ed. La polizia in Italia nell'età moderna. Seminario di studi, Messina, 26-27 febbraio 
1998 (Soveria Mannelli, Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2002). 
428 
 
Apelt, Maja, "Militärische Sozialisation," in Militärsoziologie. Eine Einführung, ed. Nina 
Leonhard and Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, 2 ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), pp. 428-46. 
Argiolas, Tommaso, Storia dell'esercito borbonico (Naples: Edizione scientifiche italiane, 
1970). 
Arielli, Nir, "Getting There. Enlistment Considerations and the Recruitment Networks of the 
International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War," in idem and Bruce Collins, eds., 
Transnational Soldiers. Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 219-32. 
Arielli, Nir, and Bruce Collins, "Introduction. Transnational Military Service since the 
Eighteenth Century," in eidem, eds., Transnational soldiers. Foreign military 
enlistment in the modern era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 1-12. 
———, eds., Transnational Soldiers. Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
Arpino, Alberto Maria, "Studi militari sull'età del Risorgimento," in Guida alla storia militare 
italiana, ed. Piero Del Negro (Naples et al.: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1997), pp. 
123-33. 
Assereto, Giovanni, "I 'Viva Maria' nella Repubblica Ligure," Studi Storici 39, no. 2 (1998): 
pp. 449-71. 
Aust, Martin, and Daniel Schönpflug, eds., Vom Gegner lernen. Feindschaften und 
Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt; New York: 
Campus, 2007). 
Austin, John L., How to do things with words, 2 ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1975). 
Bachmann-Medick, Doris, Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften 
(Reinbek near Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2006). 
———, "Interpretive turn," in Cultural turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften 
(Reinbek near Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2006), pp. 58-103. 
Baioni, Massimo, "La 'bugia risorgimentale'. Revisionismo in mostra," in Risorgimento 
conteso. Memorie e usi pubblici nell'Italia contemporanea (Reggio Emilia: Diabasis, 
2009), pp. 233-41. 
———, "Mémoires publiques du Risorgimento dans l’Italie libérale. Un parcours 
historiographique," Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle 44 (2012): pp. 151-61. 
———, Patria mia. Scritture private nell'Italia unita (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011). 
429 
 
———, Risorgimento conteso. Memorie e usi pubblici nell'Italia contemporanea (Reggio 
Emilia: Diabasis, 2009). 
Banti, Alberto Mario, "Benigni e Fratelli d'Italia. Dubbi su una lezione di storia," Il 
Manifesto, 20/02/2012 
———, "Dell'uso pubblico del Risorgimento, e di un'antologia di documenti," in idem, ed.,  
Nel nome dell'Italia. Il Risorgimento nelle testimonianze, nei documenti e nelle 
immagini (Turin: Einaudi, 2010), pp. V-XVII. 
———, Il Risorgimento italiano (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2004). 
———, L'onore della nazione. Identità sessuali e violenza nel nazionalismo europeo dal 
XVIII secolo alla Grande Guerra (Turin: Einaudi, 2005). 
———, "La nazione come comunità di discendenza," in idem, L'onore della nazione. Identità 
sessuali e violenza nel nazionalismo europeo dal XVIII secolo alla Grande Guerra 
(Turin: Einaudi, 2005), pp. 112-98. 
———, La nazione del Risorgimento. Parentela, santità e onore alle origini dell'Italia unita 
(Turin: Einaudi, 2000). 
———, "Le invasioni barbariche e le origini delle nazioni," in idem and Roberto Bizzocchi, 
eds., Immagini della nazione nell'Italia del Risorgimento (Rome: Carocci, 2002), pp. 
21-44. 
———, "Reply," Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 3 (2009): pp. 446-54. 
Banti, Alberto Mario, and Catherine Brice, "Entretien avec Catherine Brice," Revue d'histoire 
du XIXe siècle 44 (2012): pp. 17-27. 
Banti, Alberto Mario, and Paul Ginsborg, "Per una nuova storia del Risorgimento," in eidem, 
eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. XXIII-XLI. 
Banti, Alberto Mario, and Marco Mondini, "Da Novara a Custoza. Culture militari e discorso 
nazionale tra Risorgimento e Unità," in Walter Barberis, ed., Guerra e pace, Storia 
d'Itali. Annali 18 (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), pp. 415-62. 
Bayley, Charles C., Mercenaries for the Crimea. The German, Swiss, and Italian Legions in 
British Service 1854 - 1856 (Montreal et al.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977). 
Beales, Derek, and Eugenio F. Biagini, The Risorgimento and the unification of Italy, 2 ed. 
(Harlow: Longman, 2002). 
Becker, Frank, Bilder von Krieg und Nation. Die Einigungskriege in der bürgerlichen 
Öffentlichkeit Deutschlands 1864-1913 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001). 
430 
 
Becker, Frank, and Elke Reinhardt-Becker, Systemtheorie. Eine Einführung für die 
Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 
2001). 
Belgrader, Michael, "Blutsbrüderschaft," in Enzyklopädie des Märchens, ed. Lotte Baumann, 
vol. 2 (BE-CHRI) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1979). 
Benvenuti, Sergio, L'autonomia trentina al Landtag di Innsbruck e al Reichstag di Vienna. 
Proposte e progetti 1848-1914 (Trento: Società di Studi Trentini di Scienze Storiche, 
1978). 
Benz, Hartmut, "Kammerherren mit ‘Schwert und Mantel’. Zur Präsenz deutscher Katholiken 
am päpstlichen Hof im 19. Jahrhundert. Part 1," Archiv für 
Familiengeschichtsforschung 10, no. 1 (2006): pp. 2-30. 
———, "Kammerherren mit ‘Schwert und Mantel’. Zur Präsenz deutscher Katholiken am 
päpstlichen Hof im 19. Jahrhundert. Part 2," Archiv für Familiengeschichtsforschung 
10, no. 2 (2006): pp. 82-102. 
Berger Waldenegg, Georg Christoph, "Die deutsche 'Nationale Mentalität' aus Sicht 
italienischer Militärs 1866-1876. Beschreibung, Rezeption, Schlußfolgerungen," 
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 50, no. 2 (1991): pp. 81-106. 
———, Die Neuordnung des italienischen Heeres zwischen 1866 und 1876. Preußen als 
Modell (Heidelberg: Winter, 1992). 
Berghahn, Volker Rolf, Militarism. The History of an International Debate 1861-1979 
(Leamington Spa, Warwickshire: Berg, 1981). 
Bermejo Cabrero, J. L. "Compañia." In Lexikon des Mittelalters, edited by Robert-Henri 
Bautier, 1291-92. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1999. 
Bertrand, Gilles, Catherine Brice, and Gilles Montègre, eds., Fraternité. Pour une histoire du 
concept (Grenoble: CRIHPA, 2012). 
Bistarelli, Agostino, Gli esuli del Risorgimento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011). 
Bizzocchi, Roberto, "Una nuova morale per la donna e la famiglia," in Alberto Mario Banti 
and Paul Ginsborg, eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia d’Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 
2007), pp. 69-96. 
Blaas, Riccardo, "L'Austria e le truppe straniere del re delle Due Sicilie," in Atti del XXXVI 
Congresso di storia del Risorgimento Italiano, Salerno 19 - 23 ottobre 1957  (Rome: 
Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, 1960), pp. 68-91. 
Black, Jeremy, Rethinking Military History (London et al.: Routledge, 2004). 
———, War and the Cultural Turn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). 
431 
 
Blaschke, Olaf, "Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter?," Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 26 (2000): pp. 38-75. 
Boeri, Giancarlo, Piero Crociani, and Massimo Fiorentino, L'esercito borbonico dal 1830 al 
1861, 2 vols. (Rome: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, 1998). 
Borutta, Manuel, Antikatholizismus. Deutschland und Italien im Zeitalter der europäischen 
Kulturkämpfe (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010). 
———, "Settembrini’s world. German and Italian Anti-Catholicism in the age of the culture 
wars," European studies 31 (2013): pp. 43-67. 
Bossenbroek, Martin, "'Dickköpfe und Leichtfüße'. Deutsche im niederländischen 
Kolonialdienst des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Deutsche im Ausland - Fremde in 
Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. Klaus J. Bade (Munich: 
Beck, 1992), pp. 249-54. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, "Social space and symbolic power," Sociological Theory 7, no. 1 (1989): pp. 
14-25. 
Bouzard, Thierry, Histoire du chant militaire français, de la monarchie à nos jours (Paris: 
Grancher, 2005). 
Boyer, Ferdinand, "Les volontaires français avec Garibaldi en 1860," Revue d'Histoire 
Moderne et Contemporaine 7, no. 2 (1960): pp. 123-48. 
Bracalini, Romano, L'Italia prima dell'Unità (1815-1860) (Milan: Rizzoli, 2001). 
Brändli, Sabina, "Von 'schneidigen Offizieren' und 'Militärcrinolinen'. Aspekte symbolischer 
Männlichkeit am Beispiel preußischer und schweizer Uniformen im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert," in Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Ute Frevert 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997), pp. 201-28. 
Braudy, Leo, From chivalry to terrorism. War and the changing nature of masculinity (New 
York: Vintage books, 2005). 
Breuilly, John F., "Risorgimento Nationalism in the Light of General Debates about 
Nationalism," Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 3 (2009): pp. 439-45. 
Briante, Paola, "Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi," Historia Magistra 111, no. 5 (2011): 
pp. 144-46. 
———, "Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi," Il Mondo degli Archivi on line. 
Quadrimestrale di informazione e dibattito, no. 2 (2011). 
Brice, Catherine, "Alberto M. Banti. A Historian of Politics?," Nations and Nationalism 15, 
no. 3 (2009): pp. 434-38. 
432 
 
———, "Métaphore familiale et monarchie constitutionnelle. L'incertaine figure du roi 'père' 
(France et Italie au XIXe siècle)," in eadem, Gilles Bertrand and Gilles Montègre, 
eds., Fraternité. Pour une histoire du concept (Grenoble: CRIHPA, 2012), pp. 157-85. 
———, "Monarchie, État et nation en Italie durant le Risorgimento (1831-1870)," Revue 
d'histoire du XIXe siècle 44 (2012): pp. 85-100. 
Brickell, Chris, "Masculinity, performativity, and subversion," Men and Masculinities 8, no. 1 
(2005): pp. 24-43. 
Brilli, Attilio, Il viaggio in Italia. Storia di una grande tradizione culturale (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2006). 
Bröckling, Ulrich, Disziplin. Soziologie und Geschichte militärischer Gehorsamsproduktion 
(Munich: Fink, 1997). 
Bron, Grégoire, "The exiles of the Risorgimento. Italian volunteers in the Portuguese Civil 
War (1832-34)," Journal of Modern Italian Studies 14, no. 1 (2009): pp. 427-44. 
Broumand, Ladan, "Emigration and the rights of man. French revolutionary legislators 
equivocate," Journal of Modern History 72 (2000): pp. 67-108. 
Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.; 
London: Havard University Press, 1992). 
Brückner, Annemarie, "Michaelsverehrung," in Theologische Realenzyklopädie, ed. Gerhard 
Müller and Horst Balz, vol. 22 (Malaysia - Minne) (Berlin et al. : de Gruyter, 1992), 
pp. 717-24. 
Brudzyńska-Němec, Gabriela. "Polenbegeisterung in Deutschland nach 1830." Europäische 
Geschichte Online (EGO) (2010). Published electronically 2010-12-03. 
http://www.ieg-ego.eu/brudzynskanemecg-2010-de. 
Brun, Jean-François, "Les unites étrangères dans les armées napoléoniennes. Un element de la 
stratégie globale du Grand Empire," Revue historique des armées, no. 255 (2009): pp. 
22-49. 
Brunello, Piero, "Austriaci a Venezia," in Fratelli di chi. Libertà, uguaglianza e guerra nel 
Quarantotto absburgico, ed. Stefano Petrungaro (Santa Maria Capua Vetere: Edizioni 
Spartaco, 2008), pp. 17-41. 
———, ed. Rivolta e tradimento. Sudditi fedeli all'imperatore raccontano il Quarantotto 
veneziano (Mestre: StoriAmestre, 2012). 
Buchheim, Karl, Ultramontanismus und Demokratie. Der Weg der deutschen Katholiken im 
19. Jahrhundert (Munich: Kösel, 1963). 
433 
 
Budde, Gunilla-Friederike, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, eds., Transnationale 
Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2006). 
Bührmann, Andrea D., and Werner Schneider, Vom Diskurs zum Dispositiv. Eine Einführung 
in die Dispositivanalyse (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008). 
Burke, Joseph, "Institution," in The Concise Encyclopedia of Sociology, ed. George Ritzer and 
J. Michael Ryan (Malden; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), pp. 321-22. 
Burke, Peter, What is Cultural History? (Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press, 2004). 
Burschel, Peter, "Krieg, Staat, Disziplin. Die Entstehung eines neuen Söldnertypus im 17. 
Jahrhundert," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 11 (1997): pp. 640-52. 
Buschmann, Nikolaus, Einkreisung und Waffenbrüderschaft. Die öffentliche Deutung von 
Krieg und Nation in Deutschland 1850-1871 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2003). 
———, "Treue und Verrat. Zur Semantik politischer Loyalität in Deutschland von den 
Befreiungskriegen bis zur Weimarer Republik," in Die Präsenz der Gefühle. 
Männlichkeit und Emotion in der Moderne, ed. Manuel Borutta and Nina Verheyen 
(Bielefeld: Transcipt, 2010), pp. 129-51. 
Buschmann, Nikolaus, and Horst Carl, eds., Die Erfahrung des Krieges. 
Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum 
Zweiten Weltkrieg, Krieg in der Geschichte (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001). 
Buschmann, Nikolaus, and Dieter Langewiesche, eds., Der Krieg in den Gründungsmythen 
europäischer Nationen und der USA (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003). 
Butler, Judith, Bodies that matter. On the discursive limits of 'sex' (New York; London: 
Routledge, 1993). 
———, The Psychic Life of Power. Theories in Subjection (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1997). 
———, "Subjection, Resistance, Resignification," in The Psychic Life of Power. Theories in 
Subjection (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 83-105. 
Canal, Jordi, "Guerra civile e controrivoluzione. Spagna ed Europa del sud durante il XIX 
secolo," Memoria e Ricerca, no. 21 (2006): pp. 133-56. 
———, "Une guerre civile longue et persistante. Liberalisme, anti-liberalisme et violence 
politique en espagne au XIXe siecle," Melanges de l'Ecole Francaise de Rome. Italie 
et Mediterranee 114, no. 2 (2002): pp. 679-93. 
434 
 
Candeloro, Giorgio, Storia dell'Italia moderna, Vol. II. Dalla restaurazione alla rivoluzione 
nazionale (1815-1846), 10 ed. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981). 
———, Storia dell'Italia moderna, Vol. III. La Rivoluzione Nazionale (1846-1849), 2 ed. 
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991). 
———, Storia dell'Italia moderna, Vol. IV. Dalla rivoluzione nazionale all'Unità (1849-
1860) (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1980). 
———, Storia dell'Italia moderna, Vol. V. La costruzione dello stato unitario (1860-1871), 2 
ed. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1989). 
Cardoza, Anthony L., Aristocrats in bourgeois Italy. The Piedmontese nobility, 1861-1930 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
———, "An officer and a gentleman. The Piedmontese nobility and the military in liberal 
Italy," in Esercito e città dall'unità agli anni trenta. Atti del convegno di studi, 
Perugia 11 - 14 maggio 1988, vol. 1 (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 
1989), pp. 185-99. 
Casalena, Maria Pia, "Femmes et Risorgimento. Un bilan historiographique," Revue d'histoire 
du XIXe siècle 44 (2012): pp. 115-25. 
Casti, Roberta Benedetta. "L'addestramento militare e l'educazione dei giovani allievi 
Carabinieri nella storica caserma Cernaia. Il contributo dell'Arma alla unificazione 
italiana." In La ginnastica militare e la ginnastica educativa nella costruzione 
dell’Italia unita. Turin, 2011. 
Cecchinato, Eva, Camicie rosse. I garibaldini dall'Unità alla Grande Guerra (Rome; Bari: 
Laterza, 2007). 
Cecchinato, Eva, and Mario Isnenghi, "La nazione volontaria," in Il Risorgimento, ed. Alberto 
Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg Storia d'Italia. Annali (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 697-
720. 
Chignola, Sandro, "Fraternitè. Pour l'histoire du concept," in Gilles Bertrand, Catherine Brice 
and Gilles Montègre, eds., Fraternitè. Pour une histoire du concept (Grenoble: 
CRIPHA, 2012), pp. 21-33. 
Clark, Christopher, Culture Wars. Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006). 




———, "The new Catholicism and the European culture wars," in idem, ed., Culture wars. 
Secular-Catholic conflict in nineteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp. 11-46. 
Cocks, Joan, "Touché! Marx on Nations and Nationalism," Socialism and Democracy 11, no. 
2 (1997): pp. 47-70. 
Collotti, Enzo, "I tedeschi," in I luoghi della memoria. Personaggi e date dell'Italia unita, ed. 
Mario Isnenghi (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 1997), pp. 67-86. 
Colombo, Adolfo, "La tradizione di Balilla a Genova nel 1846," in Goffredo Mameli e i suoi 
tempi, ed. Adolfo Colombo (Venice: La Nuova Italia, 1927), pp. 141-292. 
Colombo, Paolo, "Monarchia/Repubblica," in Alberto Mario Banti, Antonio Chiavistelli, 
Luca Mannori, and Marco Meriggi, eds., Atlante culturale del Risorgimento. Lessico 
del linguaggio politico dal Settecento all'Unità (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2011), pp. 315-
29. 
Confino, Alan, and Ajay Skaria, "The local life of nationhood," National Identities 4, no. 1 
(2002): pp. 5-24. 
Connell, Robert W., Masculinities, 2 ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005). 
Conrad, Horst, "Stand und Konfession. Der Verein der katholischen Edelleute. Teil I: Die 
Jahre 1857–1918," Westfälische Zeitschrift 158 (2008): pp. 125-86. 
Conrad, Sebastian, and Shalini Randeria, "Geteilte Geschichten. Europa in einer 
postkolonialen Welt. Einleitung," in eidem, eds., Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. 
Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften (Frankfurt 
am Main; New York: Campus, 2002), pp. 9-49. 
Contamine, Ph., "Kompa/g)nie, 1. Frankreich," in Lexikon des Mittelalters, 10 vols., vol. 5 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1999), pp. cols. 1291-92. 
Conti, Fulvio, "I fratelli e i profani. La massoneria e l'idea di fratellanza fra Sette e 
Ottocento," in Gilles Bertrand, Catherine Brice, and Gilles Montègre, eds., Fraternitè. 
Pour une histoire du concept (Grenoble: CRIPHA, 2012), pp. 137-55. 
Conze, Eckart, "Vom ‚vornehmsten Stand‘ zum ‚Volksoffizierkorps‘. Militärische Eliten in 
Preußen-Deutschland 1850-1950," in Geburt oder Leistung? Elitenbildung im 
deutsch-britischen Vergleich, ed. Frank Bosbach, Keith Robbins and Karina Urbach 
(Munich: K. G. Saur, 2003), pp. 101-17. 
Cooper, Sandi, "The Impact of Nationalism on European Peace Movements and Liberal 
Internationalists 1848-1914," Peace & Change 6, no. 1-2 (1980): pp. 23-36. 
436 
 
"Correlates of War - National Material Capabilities, Version 4." 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/NMC_v4_0.csv (last 
accessed: 21/02/2014). 
Costa, Emilio, Giulio Fiaschini, and Leo Morabito, eds., 'Fratelli d'Italia'. Goffredo Mameli e 
Genova nel 1847 (Savona: Sabatelli, 1998). 
Coulombe, Charles A., The Pope's legion. The multinational fighting force that defended the 
Vatican (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
Creveld, Martin van, The culture of war (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008). 
Crociani, Piero, "Kanzler, Hermann," in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, ed. Alberto M. 
Ghisalberti and Mario Caravale, 86 vols., vol. 64 (Iacobiti-Labriola) (Rome: Istituto 
della Enciclopedia italiana, 2004) 
D'Amore, Fulvio, Viva Francesco II. Morte a Vittorio Emanuele! Insorgenze popolari e 
briganti in Abruzzo, Lazio e Molise durante la conquista del Sud 1860-1861 (Naples: 
Controcorrente, 2004). 
Dalla Torre, Paolo, "Materiali per una storia dell'esercito pontificio," Rassegna storica del 
Risorgimento 28 (1941): pp. 45-99. 
Dann, Otto, Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770-1990 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 
1996). 
Davis, John A., Conflict and control. Law and order in nineteeth century Italy (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988). 
———, "L'Antirisorgimento," in Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, eds., Fare l'Italia. 
Unità e disunità nel Risorgimento, Gli italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memorie 
dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni 1 (Turin: UTET, 2008), pp. 753-69. 
De Cesare, Raffaele, La fine di un regno, 2 vols. (Rome: Newton Compton, 1975). 
Deák, István, Beyond Nationalism. A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer 
Corps 1848-1918 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
———, "Nobles and near nobles in the officer corps," in Beyond Nationalism. A Social and 
Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848-1918 (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 156-64. 
Degl'Innocenti, Maurizio, "Garibaldi, l'Internazionale e la questione sociale," in idem, 
Garibaldi e l'Ottocento. Nazione, popolo, volontariato, associazione (Manduria; Bari; 
Rome: Piero Lacaita Editore, 2008), pp. 97-227. 
Del Corno, Nicola, "Letteratura e Anti-Risorgimento. I romanzi di Antonio Bresciani," 
Memoria e Ricerca: Rivista di Storia Contemporanea 24 (2007): pp. 21-32. 
437 
 
Del Negro, Piero, "Garibaldi tra esercito regio e nazione armata. Il problema del 
reclutamento," in Garibaldi condottiero. Storia, teoria, prassi, ed. Filippo Mazzonis 
(Milan: F. Angeli, 1985), pp. 253-310. 
———, "L'età moderna. Eserciti e guerre," in Guida alla storia militare italiana, ed. Piero 
Del Negro (Naples et al.: Edizione Scientifiche Italiane, 1997), pp. 97-122. 
Demeter, Karl, The German officer-corps in society and state 1650-1945 (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965). 
Denzler, Georg, Das Papsttum. Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3 ed. (Munich: Beck, 2009). 
Devoti, Giacomo, and Gian Carlo Oli, "Soldo," in idem, Il Devoto-Oli 2007 (Florence: Le 
Monnier, 2006). 
Di Donato, Michele, "Cenni storici sulla 'ginnastica' e sull''educazione fisica' in Italia dal XIX 
alla metà del XX secolo," in Nel mito di Olimpia. Ginnastica, educazione fisica e 
sport dall'antichità ad oggi, ed. Jacques Ulmann (Rome: Armand, 2004), pp. 369-90. 
Di Fiore, Gigi, Controstoria dell'Unità d'Italia. Fatti e misfatti del Risorgimento (Milan: RCS 
Libri, 2007). 
———, Gli ultimi giorni di Gaeta. L'assedio che condannò l'Italia all'unità (Milan: RCS, 
2012). 
———, I vinti del Risorgimento. Storia e storie di chi combatté per i Borbone di Napoli 
(Turin: Utet, 2004). 
Dipper, Christof, "Traditionen des Italienbildes in Deutschland," in Dolce Vita? Das Bild der 
italienischen Migranten in Deutschland ed. Oliver Janz and Roberto Sala (Frankfurt 
am Main: Campus, 2011), pp. 39-61. 
Dlubek, Rolf, Johann Philipp Becker. Vom radikalen Demokraten zum Mitstreiter von Marx 
und Engels in der 1. Internationale (s. l.: s. n., 1964). 
Doni, Elena et al., eds., Donne del Risorgimento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011). 
Downs, Laura Lee, "If 'Woman' is just an empty category, then why am I afraid to walk alone 
at night? Identity politics meets the postmodern subject," Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 35, no. 2 (1993): pp. 414-37. 
Duggan, Christopher, The Force of Destiny. A History of Italy since 1796 (London: Penguin 
Books, 2008). 
Echternkamp, Jörg, "'Religiöses Nationalgefühl' oder 'Frömmelei der Deutschtümler'? 
Religion, Nation und Politik im Frühnationalismus," in Nation und Religion in der 
deutschen Geschichte, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Dieter Langewiesche (Frankfurt 
am Main: Campus, 2001), pp. 142-69. 
438 
 
Elbe, Martin, "Der Offizier. Ethos, Habitus, Berufsverständnis," in Handbuch Militär und 
Sozialwissenschaften, ed. Sven Bernhard Gareis and Paul Klein, 2 ed. (Wiesbaden: VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), pp. 459-72. 
Elbe, Martin, and Gregor Richter, "Militär. Institution und Organisation," in 
Militärsoziologie. Eine Einführung, ed. Nina Leonhard and Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, 
2 ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), pp. 244-63. 
Emsley, Clive, "A typology of nineteenth-century police," Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / 
Crime, History & Societies 3, no. 1 (1999): pp. 29-44. 
Englund, Peter, Schönheit und Schrecken. Eine Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs, erzählt in 
neunzehn Schicksalen (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2011). 
Esercito e città dall'unità agli anni trenta. Atti del convegno di studi, Perugia, 11 - 14 maggio 
1988, 2 vols. (Rome: Ist. Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1989). 
Espagne, Michel, "Le philhellénisme entre philologie et politique. Un transfert franco-
allemand," in Philhellénismes et transferts culturels dans l'Europe du XIXe siècle, ed. 
Michel Espagne and Gilles Pécout (Paris: CNRS Éd., 2005), pp. 61-75. 
Espagne, Michel, and Gilles Pécout, eds., Philhellénismes et transferts culturels dans 
l'Europe du XIXe siècle (Paris: CNRS Éd., 2005). 
Essen, Petra van, Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven 
1860-1870 (Oudenbosch: Stichting Nederlands Zouavenmuseum, 1998). 
Etzersdorfer, Irene, Krieg. Eine Einführung in die Theorien bewaffneter Konflikte (Vienna; 
Cologne; Weimar: Böhlau, 2007). 
Evans, Richard J., "Police and society from absolutism to dictatorship," in Rereading German 
history. 1800-1996. From unification to reunification, ed. Richard J. Evans (London; 
New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 65-86. 
Falzone, Gaetano, "Memorie e tradizioni di Garibaldinismo ungherese in Sicilia," Rassegna 
storica del Risorgimento 41 (1954): pp. 366-70. 
Fann, Willerd R., "Foreigners in the Prussian Army 1713-56. Some Statistical and Interpretive 
Problems," Central European History 23, no. 1 (1990): pp. 476-87. 
Fasano Guarini, Elena, Giuseppe Petralia, and Paolo Pezzino, eds., Storia della Toscana. Vol 
2. Dal Settecento a oggi (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2004). 
Ferrone, Vincenzo, "Un re, un esercito, una nazione. Il riarmo italiano nel Settecento tra 
innovazioni tecnologiche, assolutismo e identità nazionali d’Antico Regime," in 




Figes, Orlando, Crimea. The Last Crusade (London et al.: Penguin, 2011). 
Filippi, Nadia Maria, "L'altra metà dell'800. Nuove genealogie per il Risorgimento," Il 
Manifesto, 02/12/2012. 
Fink, Urban, Hervé de Weck, and Christian Schweizer, eds., Hirstenstab und Hellebarde. Die 
päpstliche Schweizergarde in Rom 1506-2006 (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 2006). 
Fischer-Lichte, Erika, Performativität. Eine Einführung (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012). 
Flacke, Monika, "Deutschland. Die Begründung der Nation aus der Krise," in Mythen der 
Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama, ed. Monika Flacke, 2 ed. (Munich; Berlin: 
Koehler & Amelang, 2001), pp. 101-28. 
Forrest, Alan, "The nation in arms I. The French Wars," in The Oxford history of modern war, 
ed. Charles Townshend (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 55-
73. 
Forth, Christopher E., Masculinity in the Modern West. Gender, Civilization and the Body 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
Foucault, Michel, "The Confession of the Flesh," in idem and Colin Gordon,  
Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 194-228. 
———, "Prefazione all’edizione inglese di The Order of Things," in Follia, scrittura, 
discorso (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1996) 
———, "The Subject and Power," in Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, ed. Paul Rabinow and Hubert L. Dreyfus (Brighton: Harvester Press, 
1982), pp. 208-26. 
———, Surveiller et punir. La naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). 
Francia, Enrico, "Eroi, popolo e soldati. Narrative patriottico-militari nell'Italia del 
Risorgimento," in Guerre e culture di guerra nella storia d'Italia, ed. Piero Del Negro 
and Enrico Francia (Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 2011), pp. 35-60. 
———, "La 'cabala' degli sbirri. Immagini della polizia nella rivoluzione del 1848," 
Contemporanea (Bologna) 6, no. 3 (2003): pp. 447-74. 
François, Etienne, and Hagen Schulze, "Das emotionale Fundament der Nation," in Mythen 
der Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama. Begleitband zur Ausstellung vom 20. März 
1998 bis 9. Juni 1998, ed. Monika Flacke (Munich; Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 
2001), pp. 17-32. 
François, Etienne, Hannes Siegrist, and Jakob Vogel, "Die Nation. Vorstellungen, 
Inszenierungen, Emotionen," in Nation und Emotion. Frankreich und Deutschland im 
440 
 
Vergleich, ed. Etienne François, Hannes Siegrist and Jakob Vogel (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), pp. 13-35. 
French, David, "The nation in arms II. The nineteenth century," in The Oxford history of 
modern war, ed. Charles Townshend (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), pp. 55-93. 
Frevert, Ute, "Das Militär als 'Schule der Männlichkeit'. Erwartungen, Angebote, Erfahrungen 
im 19. Jahrhundert," in Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Ute 
Frevert (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997), pp. 145-73. 
———, Ehrenmänner. Das Duell in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Munich: Beck, 1991). 
———, Eurovisionen. Ansichten guter Europäer im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am 
Main: S. Fischer, 2003). 
———, A Nation in Barracks. Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society 
(Oxford; New York: Berg, 2004). 
Friz, Giuliano, Burocrati e soldati dello Stato pontificio (1800-1870) (Rome: Edindustria 
editoriale, 1974). 
Fruci, Gian Luca, "Il sacramento dell'unità nazionale. Linguaggi, iconografia e pratiche dei 
plebisciti risorgimentali (1848-70)," in Il Risorgimento, ed. Alberto Mario Banti and 
Paul Ginsborg Storia d'Italia. Annali (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 567-605. 
Fuhrer, Hans Rudolf. "Schweizer in 'Fremden Diensten'. Verherrlicht und verurteilt." Zurich: 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2006. 
Furlani, Silvio, "Un inedito di Garibaldi. I 'consigli tattici'," in Garibaldi condottiero. Storia, 
teoria, prassi, ed. Filippo Mazzonis (Milan: F. Angeli, 1985), pp. 23-59. 
Füssel, Marian, "Theatrum Belli. Der Krieg als Inszenierung und Wissensschauplatz im 17. 
und 18. Jahrhundert," Metaphorik.de 7, no. 14 (2008): pp. 205-30. 
Gabrielli, Patrizia, ed. In viaggio per una causa (Rome: Carocci, 2010). 
Gahlen, Gundula, Das bayerische Offizierskorps 1815 - 1866 (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 
2011). 
Galle, Maja, Der Erzengel Michael in der deutschen Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts (Munich: 
Utz Verlag, 2002). 
Ganter, Henri, Histoire du service militaire des régiments suisses à la solde de l'Angleterre, 
de Naples et de Rome (Geneva: Ch. Eggimann, 1896). 
Gareis, Sven Bernhard, "Militärische Multinationalität," in Militärsoziologie. Eine 
Einführung, ed. Nina Leonhard and Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, 2 ed. (Wiesbaden: VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), pp. 342-66. 
441 
 
Geyer, Michael, "The past as future. The German officer corps as profession," in German 
professions. 1800-1915, ed. Geoffrey Cocks and Konrad H. Jarausch (New York; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 183-212. 
———, "Von einer Kriegsgeschichte, die vom Töten spricht," in Physische Gewalt, ed. 
Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), pp. 136-
61. 
Ginsborg, Paul, "Romanticismo e Risorgimento. L'io, l'amore e la nazione," in idem and 
Alberto Mario Banti, eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 
2007), pp. 5-67. 
Goffman, Erving, Asylums. Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other 
inmates (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1961). 
———, Frame analysis. An essay on the organization of experience (New York; San 
Francisco; London: Harper & Row, 1974). 
———, The presentation of self in everyday life (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1959). 
Göhde, Ferdinand Nicolas, "German volunteers in the armed conflicts of the Italian 
Risorgimento 1834-70," Journal of Modern Italian Studies 14, no. 4 (2009): pp. 461-
75. 
———, "La fraternité d’armes des peuples. Champ sémantique fraternel et soldats 
transnationaux au cours de l’(Anti-)Risorgimento. Le cas des combattants allemands," 
forthcoming in a subsequent anthology edited by Catherine Brice (2014). 
———, "A New Military History of the Italian Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento. The 
Case of 'Transnational Soldiers," Modern Italy 19, no. 1 (2014): pp. 21-39. 
———, "All'interno e al di sopra dei 'partiti'. Tedeschi nelle forze armate italiane del 
Risorgimento (1834-1870)," in L'Unità d'Italia in Europa, ed. Andrea Ciampani 
(Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risogimento italiano, 2013), pp. 309-37. 
Göhler, Gerhard, "Institution," in Politische Theorie. 22 umkämpfte Begriffe zur Einführung, 
ed. Gerhard Göhler, Mattias Iser and Isa Kerner (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), pp. 209-26. 
Gollwitzer, Heinz, Die Standesherren. Die politische und gesellschaftliche Stellung der 
Mediatisierten 1815-1918. Ein Beitrag zur deuschen Sozialgeschichte (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964). 
Goltermann, Svenja, Körper der Nation. Habitusformierung und die Politik des Turnens 
1860-1890 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998). 
442 
 
Gori, Gigliola, "La ginnastica," in Patrioti si diventa. Luoghi e linguaggi di pedagogia 
patriottica nell'Italia unita, ed. Arianna Arisi Rota, Monica Morandi and Matteo 
Morandi (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2009), pp. 101-12. 
Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm, Die Wiederkehr der Götter. Religion in der modernen Kultur (Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2004). 
Gramsci, Antonio, Letters from prison, edited by Frank Rosengarten, 2 vols., vol. 1 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
Grayzel, Susan R., "Across Battle Fronts. Gender and the Comparative Cultural History of 
Modern European War," in Comparison and History. Europe in Cross-National 
Perspective, ed. Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
pp. 71-84. 
Greco, Lorenzo, Homo militaris. Antropologia e semiotica della vita militare (Leghorn: 
Belforte, 2009). 
———, "Semiotica della divisa," in Homo militaris. Antropologia e semiotica della vita 
militare (Leghorn: Belforte, 2009), pp. 165-77. 
Green, Nancy, "Forms of Comparison," in Comparison and History. Europe in Cross-
National Perspective, ed. Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), pp. 41-46. 
Grewe, Wilhelm W., Fontes historiae iuris gentium, vol. 3 (Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 
1992). 
Guénel, Jean, La dernière guerre du pape. Les zouaves pontificaux au secours du Saint-Siège 
1860-1870 (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1998). 
Guerri, Giordano B., Il sangue del Sud. Antistoria del Risorgimento e del brigantaggio 
(Milan: Mondadori, 2010). 
Guida, Francesco, "Frigyesi, Gusztáv Suták," in Fare l'Italia. Unità e disunità nel 
Risorgimento (Gli italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai 
nostri giorni, vol. 1), ed. Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato (Turin: UTET, 2008), p. 
868. 
Guidi, Laura, "Donne e uomini del Sud sulle vie dell'esilio 1848-60," in Alberto Mario Banti 
and Paul Ginsborg, eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali 18 (Turin: Einaudi, 
2007), pp. 225-52. 
———, "Patriottismo femminile e travestimenti sulla scena risorgimentale," Studi Storici 41, 
no. 2 (2000): pp. 571-87. 
443 
 
Haas, Hans, "II. Vereine, Verbände und Parteien als Zentren der politischen Öffentlichkeit in 
den Donau- und Alpenländern / B. Politische, kulturelle und wirtschaftliche 
Gruppierungen in Westösterreich (Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Tirol, Vorarlberg)," in 
Politische Öffentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft. Partial vol. 1, ed. Helmut Rumpler and 
Peter Urbanisch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
2006), pp. 227-303. 
Haeberli, Wilfried, "Der erste Klassenkampf in Basel (Winter 1868-69) und die Tätigkeit der 
Internationalen Arbeiterassoziation (1866-1876)," Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte 
und Altertumskunde 64 (1964): pp. 93-216. 
Hagemann, Karen, "German heroes. The cult of death for the fatherland in nineteenth-century 
Germany," in eadem, ed., Masculinities in politics and war. Gendering modern history 
(Manchester; New York: Manchester United Press, 2004), pp. 116-34. 
Hahn, Hans-Werner, ed. Johann Philipp Becker. Radikaldemokrat - Revolutionsgeneral - 
Pionier der Arbeiterbewegung (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 1999). 
Hailbronner, Kay, Günter Renner, and Hans-Georg Maaßen, Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht 
(Munich: C. H. Beck, 2010). 
Hanson, Lawrence Douglas Taylor, "Voluntarios extranjeros en los ejércitos liberales 
mexicanos 1854-1867," Historia Mexicana 37, no. 2 (1987): pp. 205-37. 
Harrison, Carol E., "Zouave Stories. Gender, Catholic Spirituality, and French Responses to 
the Roman Question," Journal of Modern History 79, no. 2 (2007): pp. 274-305. 
Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, Gewalt und Politik im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012). 
———, Sozialgeschichte Frankreichs seit 1789 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1989). 
Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, and Jürgen Kocka, "Comparison and beyond. Traditions, scope, and 
perspectives of comparative history," in eidem, eds., Comparative and transnational 
history. Central European approaches and new perspectives (Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2009), pp. 1-30. 
———, eds., Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze international vergleichender 
Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 1996). 
Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, and Dieter Langewiesche, "Nation und Religion - zur Einführung," in 
eidem, eds., Nation und Religion in der deutschen Geschichte (Frankfurt am Main: 
Campus, 2001), pp. 11-29. 
444 
 
Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, and Jürgen Kocka, eds., Comparative and transnational history. 
Central European approaches and new perspectives (New York; Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2009). 
Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, and Wolf-Dieter Narr, "Vom Polizey-Staat zum Polizeistaat? Ein 
Forschungsbericht anhand neuerer Literatur," Neue Politische Literatur 23 (1978): pp. 
185-218. 
Hauser, Christoph, Anfänge bürgerlicher Organisation. Philhellenismus und 
Frühliberalismus in Südwestdeutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1990). 
Heilbronner, Oded, "Wohin verschwand das katholische Bürgertum? Der Ort des katholischen 
Bürgertums in der neueren deutschen Historiographie," Zeitschrift für Religions- und 
Geistesgeschichte 47, no. 4 (1995): pp. 320-37. 
Heinzle, Joachim, "Einleitung. Mythos Nibelungen," in idem, Mythos Nibelungen (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 2013), pp. 7-69. 
Henry, Philippe. "Fremde Dienste, in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz." http://www.hls-
dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D8608.php (last accessed: 21/03/2013). 
Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, Der Krieg. Geschichte und Gegenwart (Frankfurt am Main; New 
York: Campus, 2003). 
Herwegh, Marcel, Guillaume Rustow. Un garnd soldat, un grand caractère (1821-1878) 
(Paris; Neuchatel: Attinger, 1935). 
Hippler, Thomas, "Volunteers of the French revolutionary wars. Myths and reinterpretations," 
in Christine G. Krüger, and Sonja Levsen, eds., War volunteering in modern times. 
From the French Revolution to the Second World War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 23-39. 
Hobsbawm, Eric, Nations and nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality (Cambridge 
et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
Hochgeschwender, Michael, "Fág an Bealeagh. Irish Volunteers in the American Civil War," 
in Christine G. Krüger, and Sonja Levsen, eds., War volunteering in modern times. 
From the French Revolution to the Second World War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 78-91. 
Holmes, Richard, "Mercenaries, modern," in idem, ed., The Oxford Companion to Military 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
Hopkins, James K., Into the heart of the fire. The British in the Spanish Civil War (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
445 
 
Horstmann, Axel. "Kosmopolit, Kosmopolitismus," in Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, 
eds., Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Basel et al.: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1976), cols. 1155-67. 
Howard, Michael, War in European history, 2 ed. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
Howland, Douglas, "The Predicament of Ideas in Culture. Translation and Historiography," 
History and Theory 42, no. 1 (2003): pp. 45-60. 
Huck, Stephan, Soldaten gegen Nordamerika. Lebenswelten Braunschweiger 
Subsidientruppen im amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
2011). 
Hughes, Steven, "Fear and loathing in Bologna and Rome. The papal police in perspective," 
Journal of Social History 21, no. 1 (1987): pp. 97-116. 
Hunt, Lynn, "La critica non è più sufficiente," in La storia culturale nell'età globale, ed. Lynn 
Hunt (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2010), pp. 61-96. 
Hüppauf, Bernd, Was ist Krieg? Zur Grundlegung einer Kulturgeschichte des Kriegs 
(Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013). 
Ignace, Anne-Claire, "French volunteers in Italy, 1848-49. A collective incarnation of the 
fraternity of the peoples and of the tradition of French military rngagement in Italy and 
Europe," Journal of Modern Italian Studies 14, no. 4 (2009): pp. 445-60. 
Ilari, Virgilio, "L'esercito dell'utopia. I modelli militari 'alternativi' della sinistra 
risorgimentale e la questione della guardia nazionale (1821-1881)," in Storia del 
servizio militare in Italia. Dall'ordinanza fiorentina di Machiavelli alla costituzione 
dell'esercito italiano, 1506-1870 (Rome: Rivista militare, 1989), pp. 377-430. 
———, Storia del servizio militare in Italia. Dall'ordinanza fiorentina di Machiavelli alla 
costituzione dell'esercito italiano, 1506-1870, Collana del Centro militare di studi 
strategici (Rome: Rivista militare, 1989). 
Innocenti, Lorenzo, Per il papa re. Il Risorgimento italiano visto attraverso la storia del 
reggimento degli zuavi pontifici, 1860 - 1870 (Perugia: Esperia, 2004). 
Isabella, Maurizio, "Emotions, rationality and political intentionality in patriotic discourse," 
Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 3 (2009): pp. 427-33. 
———, "Mazzini's Internationalism in Context. From the Cosmopolitan Patriotism of the 
Italian Carbonari to Mazzini's Europe of Nations," in Giuseppe Mazzini and the 
Globalisation of Democratic Nationalism 1830-1920, ed. Christopher Alan Bayly and 
Eugenio F. Biagini (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 37-58. 
446 
 
———, Risorgimento in Exile. Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-
Napoleonic Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Isastia, Anna Maria, "Cacciatori delle Alpi," in Fare l'Italia. Unità e disunità nel 
Risorgimento (Gli italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai 
nostri giorni, vol. 1), ed. Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato (Turin: UTET, 2008), 
pp. 810-11. 
———, Il volontariato militare nel Risorgimento. La partecipazione alla guerra del 1859 
(Rome: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 1990). 
———, "La guerra dei volontari. Ruolo politico e dimensione militare," in Fare l'Italia. 
Unità e disunità nel Risorgimento (Gli italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memorie 
dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni, vol. 1), ed. Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato 
(Turin: UTET, 2008), pp. 172-79. 
———, "Volontari provenienti dall'estero nell'esercito di Vittorio Emanuele II," Bollettino 
della Domus Mazziniana 36, no. 2 (1990): pp. 135-49. 
———, "Volontari provenienti dall'estero nell'esercito di Vittorio Emanuele II," in Aldo 
Albònico, ed., Studi in onore di Federico Curato, vol. 2 (Milan: Angeli, 1996), pp. 
171-90. 
Isnenghi, Mario, Le guerre degli Italiani. Parole, immagini, ricordi, 1848 - 1945 (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2005). 
Jackman, Steven D., "Shoulder to Shoulder. Close Control and 'Old Prussian Drill' in German 
Offensive Infantry Tactics 1871-1914," Journal of Military History 68 (2004): pp. 73-
104. 
James, Leighton S., "For the Fatherland? The Motivations of Austrian and Prussian 
Volunteers during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," in War volunteering in 
modern times : from the French Revolution to the Second World War, ed. Christine G. 
Krüger and Sonja Levsen (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), pp. 40-58. 
Janowitz, Morris, "Armed forces in Western Europe. Uniformity and diversity," European 
Journal of Sociology 6, no. 2 (1965): pp. 225-37. 
———, The professional soldier. A social and political portrait (New York; London: The 
Free Press, 1971). 
Jansen, Christian, "Einleitung. Die Militarisierung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft im 19. 
Jahrhundert," in Der Bürger als Soldat. Die Militarisierung europäischer 
447 
 
Gesellschaften im langen 19. Jahrhundert. Ein internationaler Vergleich, ed. Christian 
Jansen (Essen: Klartext, 2004), pp. 9-23. 
Janz, Oliver, 14 - Der große Krieg (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2013). 
———, "Kriegstod und politischer Totenkult in der Neueren Geschichte Italiens," Quellen 
und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 84 (2004): pp. 360-72. 
Janz, Oliver, and Lucy Riall, "Special issue. The Italian Risorgimento. Transnational 
Perspectives. Introduction," Modern Italy 19, no. 1 (2014): pp. 1-4. 
Janz, Oliver, and Roberto Sala, "Einleitung," in Dolce Vita? Das Bild der italienischen 
Migranten in Deutschland, ed. Oliver Janz and Roberto Sala (Frankfurt am Main; 
New York: Campus, 2011), pp. 7-17. 
Jeismann, Michael, Das Vaterland der Feinde. Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und 
Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 1792-1918 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 
1992). 
Jones, Colins, "New military history for old? War and society in Early Modern Europe," 
European Studies Review 12 (1982): pp. 97-108. 
Jussen, Bernhard, "Künstliche und natürliche Verwandtschaft? Biologismen in den 
kulturwisenschaftlichen Konzepten von Verwandtschaft," in Das Individuum und die 
Seinen. Individualität in der okzidentalen und in der russischen Kultur in Mittelalter 
und früher Neuzeit, ed. Yuri L. Bessmertny and Otto Gerhard Oexle (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2001), pp. 39-58. 
Kaufmann, Wilhelm, "Hoffmann, Ernst F., Major," in Die Deutschen im amerikanischen 
Bürgerkriege, Sezessionskrieg 1861-1865 (Munich; Berlin: Druck und Verlag von R. 
Oldenbourg, 1911), pp. 513-14. 
———, "Spraul, Karl M., Inspektor der Infanterie im 11. Korps," in Die Deutschen im 
amerikanischen Bürgerkriege (Sezessionskrieg 1861-1865) (Munich; Berlin: Druck 
und Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1911), pp. 554. 
Keegan, John, A history of warfare (London: Pimlico, 2004). 
Kesper-Biermann, Sylvia, "'Jeder Soldat ist Staatsbürger'. Reformen im Militärstrafrecht in 
Deutschland 1800 bis 1872," in Reform - Reorganisation - Transformation. Zum 
Wandel in den deutschen Streitkräften vor der preußischen Heeresreform bis zur 
Transformation der Bundeswehr. Im Auftrag des Militärgeschichtlichen 
Forschungsamtes, ed. Karl-Heinz Lutz, Martin Rinke and Marcus von Salisch 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010), pp. 131-51. 
448 
 
Kiernan, Victor G., "Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy," Past & Present 11, no. 1 
(1957): pp. 66-86. 
Kiwior-Filo, Małgorzata, "Francesco Nullo e l'insurrezione polacca del 1863," in Andrea 
Ciampani, ed., L'Unità d'Italia in Europa (Rome : Istituto per la storia del 
Risorgimento italiano, 2013), pp. 215-26. 
Klein, Natalie, 'L'humanité, le christianisme, et la liberté'. Die internationale philhellenische 
Vereinsbewegung der 1820er Jahre (Mainz: von Zabern, 2000). 
Kleinschmidt, Harald, "Militär und Tanz," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 59, no. 9 
(2011): pp. 705-72. 
———, "Using the Gun. Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms," Journal of 
Military History 63, no. 3 (1999): pp. 601-31. 
Kleßmann, E., Die Verlorenen. Die Soldaten in Napoleons Rußlandfeldzug (Berlin: Aufbau 
Verlag, 2012). 
Knauber, Jakob, Der päpstliche Offizier Joseph Alois Bach (1838-1912) aus Rülzheim (Pfalz) 
(Landau-Queichheim: St. Josef, 1935). 
Kocka, Jürgen, Das lange 19. Jahrhundert. Arbeit, Nation und bürgerliche Gesellschaft, 10 
ed., Gebhardt. Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2001). 
———, Sozialgeschichte. Begriff - Entwicklung - Probleme (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1986). 
Koller, Christian, "Recruitment Policies and Recruitment Experiences in the French Foreign 
Legion," in Transnational Soldiers. Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era, 
ed. Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 87-104. 
Konstantinou, Evangelos, Die Rezeption der Antike und der europäische Philhellenismus 
(Frankfurt am Main et al.: Lang, 1998). 
Körner, Axel, "The Risorgimento's Literary Canon and the Aesthetics of Reception. Some 
Methodological Considerations," Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 3 (2009): pp. 410-
18. 
Koschorke, Albrecht, "Ein neues Paradigma der Kulturwissenschaften," in Eva Eßlinger, 
Tobias Schlechtriemen, Doris Schweitzer and Alexander Zons, eds., Die Figur des 
Dritten. Ein kulturwissenschaftliches Paradigma (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2010), pp. 9-31. 
Koselleck, Reinhart, "The historical-political semantics of asymmetric counterconcepts," in 
idem, Futures past. On the semantics of historical time (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1985), pp. 159-97. 
449 
 
Kraß, Andreas, ed. Queer denken. Gegen die Ordnung der Sexualität (Queer Studies) 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003). 
Krüger, Christine G., and Sonja Levsen, "Introduction: Volunteers, War, and the Nation since 
the French Revolution," in eaedem, eds., War Volunteering in Modern Times : from 
the French Revolution to the Second World War (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1-22. 
———, eds., War Volunteering in Modern Times. From the French Revolution to the Second 
World War (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
Kuckhoff, Michael, "Die Auswanderungsdiskussion während der Revolution von 1848/49," in 
Deutsche Amerikaauswanderung im 19. Jahrhundert. Sozialgeschichtliche Beiträge, 
ed. Günter Moltmann and Harald Focke (Stuttgart: Metzler 1976), pp. 102-45. 
Kucklick, Christoph, Das unmoralische Geschlecht. Zur Geburt der Negativen Andrologie 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008). 
Kühne, Thomas, "Comradeship. Gender confusion and gender order in the German military, 
1918-1945," in Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, eds., Home - 
front. The military, war and gender in 20th century Germany (Oxford; New York: 
Berg, 2002), pp. 233-54. 
———, "Kameradschaft. 'Das Beste im Leben des Mannes'. Die deutschen Soldaten des 
Zweiten Weltkrieges in erfahrungs- und geschlechtergeschichtlicher Perspektive," 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 22 (1996): pp. 504-29. 
———, "Zwischen Männerbund und Volksgemeinschaft. Hitlers Soldaten und der Mythos 
der Kameradschaft," Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 38 (1998): pp. 165-89. 
Kühne, Thomas, and Benjamin Ziemann, "Militärgeschichte in der Erweiterung. 
Konjunkturen, Interpretationen, Konzepte," in eidem, eds., Was ist Militärgeschichte? 
(Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2000), pp. 9-46. 
Kunze, Rolf-Ulrich, Nation und Nationalismus (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 2005). 
Labanca, Nicola, "Cultura di guerra. Note su una nuova categoria storica," in Guerre e culture 
di guerra nella storia d'Italia, ed. Piero Del Negro and Enrico Francia (Milan: 
Edizioni Unicopli, 2011), pp. 13-23. 
Lamberts, Emiel, ed. The Black International. L'internationale noir. The Holy See and 
Militant Catholicism in Europe 1870-1878 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002). 
Landi, Guido, Istituzioni di diritto pubblico del Regno delle Due Sicilie 1815-1861 (Milan: 
Dott. A. Giuffrè editore, 1977). 
450 
 
Langewiesche, Dieter, "Deutschland und Österreich. Nationswerdung und Staatsbildung in 
Mitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert," in Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in 
Deutschland und Europa (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000), pp. 172-89. 
———, Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa (Munich: C. H. 
Beck, 2000). 
Latini, Carlotta, Cittadini e nemici. Giustizia militare e giustizia penale in Italia tra Otto e 
Novecento (Florence: Le Monnier, 2010). 
———, "La giustizia militare pontificia tra privilegium fori e specialità giurisdizionale. Il 
processo militare e l’inchiesta nel ‘Regolamento di giustizia criminale e disciplinale 
militare’ (1842)," Le carte e la storia 13, no. 2 (2007): pp. 141-55. 
Laven, David, "Why patriots wrote and what reactionaries read. Reflections on Alberto 
Banti's La nazione del Risorgimento," Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 3 (2009): pp. 
419-26. 
Lehmann, Albrecht, "Der deutsche Wald," in Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, ed. Etienne François 
and Hagen Schulze, vol. 3 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), pp. 187-200. 
Leonardis, Massimo de, "Motivazioni religiose e sociali nella difesa del potere temporale dei 
papi (1850-1870)," Rassegna storica del Risorgimento 69 (1982): pp. 182-200. 
Leonhard, Jörn, "Initial oder Modell? Die Perzeption des italienischen Risorgimento in 
Deutschland seit 1850," Jahrbuch für Liberalismus-Forschung 17 (2005): pp. 199-
214. 
———, "Nati dalla guerra e macchine da guerra? Nazione e stato nazionale nell'età del 
bellicismo fino al 1871," Richerce di storia politica N. S. 9 (2006): pp. 31-52. 
Levi d'Ancona, Luisa, "Padri e figli nel Risorgimento," in Alberto Mario Banti, and Paul 
Ginsborg, eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 
153-79. 
Levis Sullam, Simon, "'Fate della rivoluzione una religione'. Aspetti del nazionalismo 
mazziniano come religione politica (1831-1835)," Società e storia, no. 106 (2004): pp. 
705-30. 
Levy, Carl, "Anarchism, internationalism and nationalism in Europe 1860-1939," Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 3 (2004): pp. 330-42. 
Lieven, Dominic, "The noble as warrior," in The aristocracy in Europe 1815-1914 (London: 
Macmillan 1992), pp. 181-202. 
Linch, Kevin, "The Politics of Foreign Recruitment in Britain during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," in Transnational Soldiers. Foreign Military 
451 
 
Enlistment in the Modern Era, ed. Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 50-66. 
Linch, Kevin, and Matthew McCormack, "Defining Soldiers. Britain's Military c. 1740-
1815," War in History 20, no. 2 (2013): pp. 144-59. 
Lind, Gunner, "Military and absolutism. The army officers of Denmark-Norway as a social 
group and political factor 1660-1848," Scandinavian Journal of History 12 (1987): pp. 
221-43. 
Lipp, Anne, "Diskurs und Praxis. Militärgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte," in Was ist 
Militärgeschichte?, ed. Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann (Paderborn et al.: 
Schöningh, 2000), pp. 211-27. 
Lodolini, Elio, “I volontari del Canada nell’esercito pontificio,” Rassegna storica del 
Risorgimento 56 (1969), pp. 641-687. 
Loevinson, Ermanno, Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano, 1848-49, 3 
vols. (Rome; Milan: Soc. Edit. Dante Alighieri di Albrighi, Segati e C., 1902-1904). 
———, Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano, 1848-49. Parte prima, con 
uno schizzo geografico, vol. 1 (Rome; Milan: Soc. Edit. Dante Alighieri di Albrighi, 
Segati e C., 1902-1904). 
———, Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano, 1848-49. Parte seconda. 
Coll'elenco degli ufficiali della prima legione italiana, vol. 2 (Rome; Milan: Soc. Edit. 
Dante Alighieri di Albrighi, Segati e C., 1904). 
Lönne, Karl-Egon, Politischer Katholizismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1986). 
Lorenz, Chris, Konstruktion der Vergangenheit. Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie 
(Cologne; Weimar; Vienna: Böhlau, 1997). 
Lorenz, Maren, Leibhaftige Vergangenheit. Einführung in die Körpergeschichte (Tübingen: 
Ed. diskord, 2000). 
Loriga, Sabina, Le petit x. De la biographie a l'histoire (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2010). 
Loth, Wilfried, Deutscher Katholizismus im Umbruch zur Moderne (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 
1991). 
Lüdtke, Alf, ed. Alltagsgeschichte. Zur Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen und 
Lebensweisen (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 1989). 
———, "Introduction. What is the history of everyday life and who are its practitioners?," in 
The history of everyday life. Reconstructing historical experiences and ways of life, 
ed. Alf Lüdtke (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 3-40. 
452 
 
Luhmann, Niklas, "Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie," in Theorie der Gesellschaft oder 
Sozialtechnologie. Was leistet Systemforschung?, ed. Jürgen Habermas and Niklas 
Luhmann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), pp. 25-100. 
Lupo, Salvatore, L'unificazione italiana. Mezzogiorno, rivoluzione, guerra civile (Rome: 
Donzelli, 2011). 
Lutz, Karl-Heinz, Das badische Offizierskorps 1840 - 1870/71 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 
1997). 
Lyttelton, Adrian, "The hero and the people," in Silvana Patriarca, and Lucy Riall, eds., The 
Risorgimento revisited. Nationalism and culture in nineteenth-century Italy 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 37-55. 
Maag, Albert, Geschichte der Schweizertruppen in französischen Diensten während der 
Restauration und Julirevolution (1816-1830) (Biel: Verlag von Ernst Kuhn, 1899). 
———, Geschichte der Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten 1825-1861 (Zurich: 
Schulthess, 1909). 
Mah, Harold, "The Predicament of Experience," Modern Intellectual History 5, no. 1 (2008): 
pp. 97-119. 
Malfèr, Stefan, ed. Abt. 5: Die Ministerien Erzherzog Rainer und Mensdorf, vol. II: 1. Mai 
1861 - 2. November 1861, Die Protokolle des Österreichischen Ministerrates (Vienna: 
Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1981). 
———, "Immagini dell'altro. Austriaci e italiani," in Alberto Mario Banti, and Paul Ginsborg, 
eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 825-56. 
Mancini Barbieri, Alessandro, "Nuove ricerche sulla presenza straniera nell'esercito 
pontificio," Rassegna storica del Risorgimento 73, no. 2 (1986): pp. 161-86. 
Mannori, Luca, "Il Risorgimento tra 'nuova' e 'vecchia' storia. Note in margine ad un libro 
recente," Società e Storia 120 (2008): pp. 367-79. 
Manselli, R. "Compagnia di ventura," in Robert-Henri Bautier, ed., Lexikon des Mittelalters, 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1999), pp. 98-99. 
Marchand, Suzanne L., Down from Olympus. Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany 
1750-1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
Martin, Brian Joseph, Napoleonic Friendship. Military Fraternity, Intimacy, and Sexuality in 
Nineteenth-Century France (Durham, N.H. et al.: Univ. of New Hampshire Press; 
Univ. Press of New England, 2010). 




Martschukat, Jürgen, and Olaf Stieglitz, Geschichte der Männlichkeiten (Frankfurt am Main; 
New York: Campus, 2008). 
Mauro, Antonio, and Piero Fiorenzani, "Sul 'follone di Garibaldi' esistente a Prato," A 
Campione 59, no. 2 (2012): pp. 8-12. 
———, "Sulle camicie rosse di Garibaldi tra storia e manifattura," A Campione 59, no. 1 
(2012): pp. 5-11. 
Mayer, Karl J., Napoleons Soldaten. Alltag in der Grande Armé (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008). 
Mazzetti, Massimo, "Dagli eserciti pre-unitari all'esercito italiano," Rassegna storica del 
Risorgimento 59 (1972): pp. 563-92. 
McCormack, Matthew, "Dance and drill. Polite accomplishments and military masculinities 
in Georgian Britain," Cultural & Social History 8, no. 3 (2011): pp. 315-30. 
McLellan, Josie, " 'I Wanted to be a Little Lenin'. Ideology and the German International 
Brigade Volunteers," Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 2 (2006): pp. 287-304. 
McNeill, William H., Keeping together in time. Dance and drill in human history 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
McSorley, Kevin, ed. War and the Body. Militarisation, Practice and Experience (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2013). 
Ménissier, Thierry, "République et fraternité. Une approche de théorie politique," in Gilles 
Bertrand, Catherine Brice, and Gilles Montègre, eds., Fraternité. Pour une histoire du 
concept (Grenoble: CRIHPA, 2012), pp. 35-51. 
Menozzi, Daniele, "L’historiographie catholique face au Risorgimento," Revue d'histoire du 
XIXe siècle 44 (2012): pp. 139-50. 
Mentges, Gabriele, and Birgit Richard, Schönheit der Uniform. Körper, Kleidung, Medien 
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005). 
Mergel, Harald, "Für eine bürgerliche Kirche. Antiultramontanismus, Liberalismus und 
Bürgertum 1820-1850. Rheinland und Südwestdeutschland im Vergleich," Zeitschrift 
für die Geschichte des Oberrheins 144 (1996): pp. 397-429. 
Mergel, Thomas, "Ultramontanism, Liberalism, Moderation. Political Mentalities and 
Political Behaviour of the German Catholic Bürgertum 1848-1914," Central European 
History 29 (1996): pp. 151-74. 
Meriggi, Marco, "Fraternité/Brüderlichkeit. Le ambivalenze della ricezione tedesca (1789-
1815)," in Fraternité. Pour une histoire du concept, ed. Gilles Bertrand, Catherine 
Brice and Gilles Montègre (Grenoble: CRIHPA, 2012), pp. 103-14. 
454 
 
———, Gli stati italiani prima dell'unità, 2 ed. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011). 
———, "L'ufficiale a Milano in età liberale," Rivista di storia contemporanea 17, no. 4 
(1988): pp. 524-45. 
———, "Legitimism, Liberalism and Nationalism. The Nature of the Relationship between 
North and South in Italian Unification," Modern Italy 19, no. 1 (2014): pp. 69-79. 
Messerschmidt, Manfred, "Die preußische Armee," in Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs 
Bänden 1648-1939, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 6 vols., vol. 2, section 
IV, part 2 (Herrsching: Manfred Pavlak Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983), pp. 10-225. 
Miani-Calabrese, Donato, "Lineamenti strutturali del gruppo demografico dei Mille," 
Statistica [Bologna] 4 (1960): pp. 559-84. 
Miko, Norbert, Das Ende des Kirchenstaates, vol. 2 (Wien: Herold, 1962). 
Moch, Leslie P., Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe since 1650 (Bloomington; 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003). 
Mondini, Marco, "Militarismo e militarizzazione. Modelli nazionali nel rapporto tra armi e 
politica nell'Europa contemporanea," Ricerca e memoria, no. 28 (2008): pp. 9-24. 
Montègre, Gilles, "La fraternité révolutionnaire. Discours et pratiques entre France et Italie," 
in Fraternité. Pour une histoire du concept, ed. Gilles Bertrand, Catherine Brice and 
Gilles Montègre (Grenoble: CRIHPA, 2012), pp. 83-102. 
Montroni, Giovanni, Gli uomini del re. La nobiltà napoletana dell’Ottocento (Catanzaro: 
Meridiana libri, 1996). 
———, "I gentiluomini della chiave d'oro," Meridiana, no. 19 (1994): pp. 59-82. 
Moos, Carlo, "Streiflichter auf Wilhelm Rüstows Beziehungen zu Italien," Quellen und 
Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 65 (1985): pp. 342-402. 
———, "Wilhelm Rüstow und die Schweiz," in Actes du symposium 1987 : [symposium 
d'histoire militaire et rencontre franco-suisse, 6-7 novembre 1987, Pully], ed. Hubert 
Foester (Pully: Centre d'histoire et de prospective militaires/Pavillon de recherches 
Général Guisan, 1989), pp. 65-79. 
Moran, Daniel, and Arthur Waldron, eds., The people in arms. Military myth and national 
mobilization since the French Revolution (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
Mori, Simona, "Becoming Policemen in nineteenth century Italy. Police gender culture 
through the lens of professional manuals," in A history of police and masculinities, 
1700-2010, ed. David G. Barrie and Susan Broomhall (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2012), pp. 102-22. 
455 
 
Mosse, George L., "Friendship and Nationhood. About the Promise and Failure of German 
Nationalism," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (1982): pp. 351-67. 
———, The Nationalization of the masses. Political symbolism and mass movements in 
Germany from the Napoleonic wars through the Third Reich (Ithaca / N. Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1994). 
Müller-Funk, Wolfgang, and Birgit Wagner, Eigene und andere Fremde. 'Postkoloniale' 
Konflikte im europäischen Kontext (Vienna: Turia & Kant, 2005). 
Müller, Guido, "Jenseits des Nationalismus? 'Europa' als Konzept grenzübergreifender adlig-
bürgerlicher Elitendiskurse zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen," in Adel und Bürgertum 
in Deutschland, ed. Heinz Reif, vol. 2 (2001), pp. 235-68. 
Myerly, Scott Hughes, British Military Spectacle. From the Napoleonic Wars through the 
Crimea (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
Napolitano, Giorgio, Una e indivisibile. Riflessioni sui 150 anni della nostra Italia (Milan: 
Rizzoli, 2011). 
Neitzel, Sönke, and Harald Welzer, Soldaten. On fighting, killing and dying. The secret 
Second World War transcripts of German POWs (London: Simon & Schuster, 2012). 
Nieuwazny, Andrzej, "Patriotes ou mercenaires? Les légions polonaises au service de la 
France (1797-1807)," Revue historique des armées, no. 260 (2010): pp. 26-36. 
Nipperdey, Thomas, Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat (Munich: 
C. H. Beck, 1983). 
———, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918. Erster Band. Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist (Munich: 
C. H. Beck, 1990). 
Nowosadtko, Jutta, Krieg, Gewalt und Ordnung. Einführung in die Militärgeschichte 
(Tübingen: edition diskord, 2002). 
O'Clery, Patrick Keyes, The making of Italy (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 
1892). 
Oliva, Gianni, Soldati e ufficiali. L'esercito italiano dal Risorgimento a oggi (Milan: 
Mondadori, 2011). 
Opgenoorth, Ernst, 'Ausländer' in Brandenburg-Preussen als leitende Beamte und Offiziere 
1604 - 1871 (Würzburg: Holzner, 1967). 
Osterhammel, Jürgen, Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts 
(Munich: C. H. Beck, 2009). 
456 
 
Ottanelli, Fraser "Internationalism and the Shaping of National and Ethnic Identity. Italian 
American Anti-Fascist Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War," Journal of American 
Ethnic History (2007): pp. 9-31. 
Otto, Uli, and Eginhard König, 'Ich hatt' einen Kameraden...'. Militär und Kriege in 
historisch-politischen Liedern in den Jahren von 1740 bis 1914 (s. l.: ConBrio 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999). 
Ozouf, Mona, "Fraternité," in Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française, ed. François 
Furet and Mona Ozouf (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), pp. 731-41. 
Palazzolo, Maria Iolanda, I libri, il trono, l'altare. La censura nell'Italia della Restaurazione 
(Milan: Franco Angeli, 2003). 
Paolino, Marco, "Johann Philipp Becker ed il Risorgimento italiano," Rassegna storica del 
Risorgimento 85, no. 2 (1998): pp. 216-37. 
Papa, Giuseppe Antonio, "Il centunesimo anniversario del 10 dicembre 1746 in Genova 
[1847]," in Emilio Costa, Giulio Fiaschini, and Leo Morabito, 'Fratelli d'Italia'. 
Goffredo Mameli e Genova nel 1847 (Savona: Sabatelli, 1998), pp. 232-40. 
Papenheim, Martin, "Il pontificato di Pio IX e la mobilitazione dei cattolici in Europa," 
Rassegna storica del Risorgimento 88 (2001): pp. 137-46. 
Patel, Kiran Klaus, "Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte," Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaft 52 (2004): pp. 626-45. 
Patriarca, Silvana, "Indolence and Regeneration. Tropes and Tensions of Risorgimento 
Patriotism," American Historical Review 110, no. 2 (2005): pp. 350-79. 
———, Italian Vices. Nation and Character from the Risorgimento to the Republic 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
———, "Une émotion patriotique. La honte et le Risorgimento," Revue d'histoire du XIXe 
siècle 44 (2012): pp. 65-83. 
Patriarca, Silvana, and Lucy Riall, eds., The Risorgimento revisited. Nationalism and culture 
in nineteenth-century Italy (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012). 
Pécout, Gilles, "Amitié littéraire et amitié politique méditerranéennes. Philhellénes français et 
italiens de la fin du XIXe siècle," in Philhellénismes et transferts culturels dans 
l'Europe du XIXe siècle, ed. Michel Espagne and Gilles Pécout (Paris: CNRS Éd., 
2005), pp. 207-18. 




———, "The International Armed Volunteers. Pilgrims of a Transnational Risorgimento," 
Journal of Modern Italian Studies 14, no. 4 (2009): pp. 413-25. 
———, Naissance de l'Italie contemporaine (1770-1922) (Paris: Nathan, 1997). 
———, "Philhellenism in Italy. Political Friendship and the Italian Volunteers in the 
Mediterranean in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Modern Italian Studies 9, no. 4 
(2004): pp. 405-27. 
———, "Pour une lecture méditerranéenne et transnationale du Risorgimento," Revue 
d'histoire du XIXe siècle 44, no. 1 (2012): pp. 29-47. 
Pellegrino Sutcliffe, Marcella, "British Red Shirts. A History of the Garibaldi Volunteers 
(1860)," in Transnational Soldiers. Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era, 
ed. Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), pp. 202-18. 
Pellicciari, Angela, Risorgimento ed Europa. Miti, pericoli, antidoti (Verona: Fede & Cultura, 
2008). 
Pernau, Margrit, Transnationale Geschichte (Stuttgart: UTB, 2011). 
Peruta, Franco della, "Democratici italiani e democratici tedeschi di fronte all'unità d'Italia 
1859-1861," Annali dell'Istituto Gianciacomo Feltrinelli 3 (1960): pp. 11-120. 
Pete, Làszló, "Gli ungheresi nei Mille," Rivista di studi ungheresi N. S. 10 (2011): pp. 8-17. 
Petersen, Jens, Italienbilder - Deutschlandbilder. Gesammelte Aufsätze (Cologne: SH-Verlag, 
1999). 
Petrizzo, Alessio, "Spazi dell'immaginario. Festa e discorso nazionale in Toscana tra 1847 e 
1848," in Alberto Mario Banti, and Paul Ginsborg, eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia 
d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 509-39. 
Petrusewicz, Marta, Come il Meridione divenne una Questione. Rappresentazioni del Sud 
prima e dopo il Quarantotto (Soveria Manelli: Rubbettino, 1998). 
Pieri, Piero, Storia militare del Risorgimento. Guerre e insurrezioni (Turin: Einaudi, 1962). 
Pivato, Stefano, Bella ciao. Canto e politica nella storia d'Italia (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2005). 
———, "Ginnastica e Risorgimento. Alle origini del rapporto sport / nazionalismo," Ricerche 
storiche 19, no. 2 (1989): pp. 247-79. 
Planert, Ute, Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg : Frankreichs Kriege und der deutsche Süden. 
Alltag - Wahrnehmung - Deutung 1792-1841 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 
2007). 
———, "Zwischen Alltag, Mentalität und Erinnerungskultur. Erfahrungsgeschichte an der 
Schwelle zum nationalen Zeitalter," in Die Erfahrung des Krieges. 
458 
 
Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der französischen Revolution bis zum 
Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst Carl (Paderborn et al.: 
Schöningh, 2001), pp. 51-66. 
Porch, Douglas, The French Foreign Legion. A complete history of the legendary fighting 
force (Skyhorse Publishing: New York, 2010). 
Porciani, Ilaria, "Disciplinamento nazionale e modelli domestici nel lungo Ottocento. 
Germania e Italia a confronto," in Alberto Mario Banti, and Paul Ginsborg, eds., Il 
Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 97-125. 
———, "Italien. 'Fare gli Italiani'," in Mythen der Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama, ed. 
Monika Flacke, 2 ed. (Munich; Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 2001), pp. 199-222. 
Prechner, Wilhelm, "Der Savoyerzug 1834. Die Geschichte eines mißlungenen 
Revolutionsversuchs," Zeitschrift für schweizerische Geschichte 4 (1924): pp. 459-
507. 
Pries, Ludger, Die Transnationalisierung der sozialen Welt. Sozialräume jenseits von 
Nationalgesellschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008). 
———, "Transnational social spaces. Which units of analysis, reference and measurement," 
in Rethinking Transnationalism. The meso-Link of organizations (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2008), pp. 1-20. 
Pröve, Ralf, Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert, Enzyklopädie Deutscher 
Geschichte (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006). 
Quack-Eustathiades, Regine, Der deutsche Philhellenismus während des griechischen 
Freiheitskampfes 1821-1827 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1984). 
Quirico, Domenico, Naja. Storia del servizio di leva in Italia (Milan: Mondadori, 2008). 
Raggi, Piero, La nona crociata. I volontari di Pio IX in difesa di Roma (1860-1870), 2 ed. 
(Ravenna: Libreria Tonini, 2002). 
Ranzato, Gabriele, "Un evento antico e un nuovo oggetto di riflessione," in idem, ed., Guerre 
fratricide. Le guerre civili in età contemporanea (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1994), 
pp. IX-LVI. 
Rao, Anna Maria, "Esercito e società a Napoli nelle riforme del secondo Settecento," in 
Eserciti e carriere militari nell’Italia moderna, ed. Claudio Donati (Milan: Ed. 
Unicopli, 1998), pp. 147-214. 
———, "Esercito e società a Napoli nelle riforme del secondo Settecento," Studi Storici 28, 
no. 3 (1987): pp. 623-77. 
459 
 
Raphael, Lutz, "Diskurse, Lebenswelten und Felder. Implizite Vorannahmen über das soziale 
Handeln von Kulturproduzenten im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," in Kulturgeschichte 
heute, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1996), pp. 165-81. 
Raugh jr., Harald E., The Victorians at war. An Encyclopedia of British Military History 
(Santa Barbara; Denver; Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2004). 
Razzell, P. E., "Social origins of officers in the Indian and British home army 1758-1962," 
The British Journal of Sociology 14, no. 3 (1963): pp. 248-60. 
Reckwitz, Andreas, "Toward a theory of social practices. A development in culturalist 
theorizing," European journal of social theory 5, no. 2 (2002): pp. 243-63. 
———, "Umkämpfte Maskulinität. Zur Historischen Kultursoziologie männlicher 
Subjektformen und ihrer Affektivitäten vom Zeitalter der Empfindsamkeit bis zur 
Postmoderne," in Die Präsenz der Gefühle. Männlichkeit und Emotion in der 
Moderne, ed. Manuel Borutta and Nina Verheyen (Bielefeld: Transcipt, 2010), pp. 57-
77. 
Redlich, Fritz, The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force. A Study in European 
Economic and Social history (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1965). 
Reichardt, Sven, "Praxeologische Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Diskussionsanregung," 
Sozial.Geschichte 22, no. 3 (2007): pp. 43-65. 
Reif, Heinz, Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 2 ed. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2012). 
Renn, Joachim, "Nicht Herr im eigenen Hause und doch nicht eines anderen Knecht. 
Individuelle Agency und Existenz in einer pragmatisierten Diskurstheorie," in 
Diskurs, Macht, Subjekt. Theorie und Empirie von Subjektivierung in der 
Diskursforschung, ed. Reiner Keller, Werner Schneider and Willy Viehöver 
(Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), pp. 35-51. 
Rheinberg, Falko, Motivation, 7 ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008). 
Riall, Lucy, "Eroi maschili, virilità e forme della guerra," in Alberto Mario Banti, and Paul 
Ginsborg, eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 
253-88. 
———, Garibaldi. Invention of a Hero (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2007). 
———, "Guerre et nation dans l'Italie du Risorgimento," Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle 44 
(2012): pp. 49-64. 
———, "Liberal policy and the control of public order in Western Sicily 1860-1862," The 
Historical Journal 35, no. 2 (1992): pp. 345-68. 
460 
 
———, "Martyr Cults in Nineteenth-Century Italy," Journal of Modern History 83 (2010): 
pp. 277-84. 
———, "Men at War. Masculinity and Military Ideals in the Risorgimento," in eadem, and 
Silvana Patriarca, eds., The Risorgimento Revisited. Nationalism and Culture in 
Nineteenth-Century Italy (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), pp. 152-70. 
———, "Nation, 'deep images' and the problem of emotions," Nations and Nationalism 15, 
no. 3 (2009): pp. 402-09. 
———, Risorgimento. The history of Italy from Napoleon to nation-state, 2 ed. (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
———, Sicily and the unification of Italy. Liberal policy and local power, 1859-1866 
(Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
Riall, Lucy, and Axel Körner, "Introduction. The New History of Risorgimento Nationalism," 
Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 3 (2009): pp. 369-401. 
Riall, Lucy, Axel Körner, Maurizio Isabella, Catherine Brice, and Alberto Mario Banti, 
"Leggere la nuova storia del Risorgimento. Una visione dall'esterno. Una discussione 
con Alberto M. Banti," Storica 13, no. 38 (2007): pp. 91-132. 
Richter, Dieter, Der Süden. Geschichte einer Himmelsrichtung (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2009). 
Roberts, Elizabeth, Freedom, Faction, Fame & Blood. British Soldiers of Conscience in 
Greece, Spain & Finland (Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2010). 
Robson, Martin, "'Strangers, Mercenaries, Heretics, Scoffers, Polluters' : Volunteering for the 
British Auxiliary Legion in Spain, 1835," in Transnational soldiers : foreign military 
enlistment in the modern era, ed. Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 181-201. 
Rochat, Giorgio, "Il genio militare di Garibaldi," in Garibaldi condottiero. Storia, teoria, 
prassi, ed. Filippo Mazzonis (Milan: F. Angeli, 1985), pp. 83-93. 
Rodríguez García, Magaly, "Early Views on Internationalism. Marxist Socialists vs Liberals," 
Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire 84, no. 4 (2006): pp. 1049-73. 
Röhrich, Lutz, "Bruder," in Lexikon der sprichwörtlichen Redensarten, vol. 1 (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1991), pp. 268-70. 
Romani, Mario, Storia economica d'Italia nel secolo XIX 1815-1882 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 
1982). 
Rowlands, Guy, "Foreign service in the age of absolute monarchy. Louis XIV and his forces 
étrangères," War in History 17 (2010): pp. 141-65. 
461 
 
Rozema, Jan Willem, 'Op, Neerlands jeugd! Naar't heilig, heilig Rome!' Een studie naar 
enkele demografische kenmerken van de Nederlandse pauselijke zouaven 1860-1870. 
Unpublished master's thesis in 'History of International Relations and Global History', 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Faculty of History and Science of Art, August 2010 
(supervisor: Prof. Hein Klemann). 
Russell, Gillian, The theatres of war. Performance, politics and society, 1793-1815 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995). 
Sala, Roberto, and Patrick Wöhrle, "Fremdheitszuschreibungen in der 
Einwanderungsgesellschaft zwischen Stereotypie und Beweglichkeit," in Dolce Vita? 
Das Bild der italienischen Migranten in Deutschland ed. Oliver Janz and Roberto Sala 
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011), pp. 18-36. 
Sanfilippo, Matteo, "Fuggitivi e avventurieri: volontari nord americani tra Garibaldi e Pio IX. 
Una proposta di ricerca," Ricerche di storia politica 10, no. 1 (2007): pp. 67-77. 
Sarasin, Philipp, "Die Wirklichkeit der Fiktion. Zum Konzept der 'imagined communities'," in 
Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 
pp. 150-76. 
———, Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003). 
———, Reizbare Maschinen. Eine Geschichte des Körpers 1765-1914 (Frankfurt on Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2001). 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid, Frank Whelon Wayman, and J. David Singer, "Inter-state, intra-State, 
and extra-state wars. A comprehensive look at their distribution over time, 1816-
1997," International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2003): pp. 49-70. 
Sarlin, Simon, "Fighting the Risorgimento. Foreign volunteers in southern Italy (1860-63)," 
Journal of Modern Italian Studies 14, no. 4 (2009): pp. 476-90. 
———, "L’effondrement de l’Italie pré-unitaire. L’exemple du royaume des Deux-Siciles," 
Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle 44 (2012): pp. 101-14. 
———, Le légitimisme en armes. Histoire d'une mobilisation internationale contre l'unité 
italienne (Rome: École française de Rome, 2013). 
Sarti, Roland, Mazzini. A life for the religion of politics (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 
1997). 
Scardigli, Marco, Le grandi battaglie del Risorgimento (Milan: RCS Libri, 2010). 
Schenk, Friethjof Benjamin, "Mental Maps. Zur Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in 




Schieder, Wolfgang, Anfänge der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Die Auslandsvereine im 
Jahrzehnt nach der Julirevolution von 1830 (Stuttgart: Klett, 1963). 
———. "Brüderlichkeit." In Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur 
politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, edited by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and 
Reinhart Koselleck, 552-81. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972. 
Schmale, Wolfgang, Geschichte der Männlichkeit in Europa, 1450-2000 (Vienna; Cologne; 
Weimar: Böhlau, 2003) 
Schmid, Hubert, Die Gesetzgebungsgeschichte des Militärstrafrechts für das Königreich 
Bayern zwischen 1806 und 1900. Zugl. Augsburg, Univ., Diss. (Munich: 
Kommissionsverlag Uni-Druck, 2000). 
Schmidt, Daniel, "Keine Kommissare. Preußische Polizeioffiziere zwischen soldatischem 
Selbstverständnis und polizeilicher Professionalität 1919 bis 1939," 
Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 69, no. 1 (2010): pp. 37-58. 
Schmidt, Johannes F. K., "Das Verhältnis von soziologischer und biologischer 
Verwandtschaft. Konkurrenz oder Symbiose biologischer und soziologischer 
Konzepte?," in Die Natur der Gesellschaft. Verhandlungen des 33. Kongresses der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Kassel 2006, ed. K. H. Rehberg, vol. 2 
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2006), pp. 894-908. 
Schmiedel, Karl, and Ingrid Becker Neumann, eds., Johann Philipp Becker. General der 
Revolution (Berlin: Militärverl. der Dt. Demokratischen Republik, 1986). 
Schnur, Roman, "Zur Theorie des Bürgerkrieges. Bemerkungen über einen vernachlässigten 
Gegenstand," Der Staat 19, no. 3 (1980): pp. 341-66. 
Schöttler, Peter, "Wer hat Angst vor dem linguistic turn?," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 23 
(1997): pp. 134-51. 
Schüler-Springorum, Stefanie, Krieg und Fliegen. Die Legion Condor im spanischen 
Bürgerkrieg (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2010). 
Schulte, Johann Friedrich von, "Klitsche, Theodor Friedrich," in Allgemeine Deutsche 
Biographie (1882), pp. 199-200. 
Schultz, Hans-Dietrich, "Italien und der Mittelmeerraum im geographischen Diskurs des 19. / 
20. Jahrhunderts," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 45 (1997): pp. 696-717. 
Schulze, Hagen, Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte (Munich: C. H. Beck, 
1994). 
Schulze, Thies. "Conference Report: Der Süden Europas - Strukturraum, 
Wahrnehmungsraum, Handlungsraum? 10/02/2005-12/02/2005, Berlin," 
463 
 
<http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=728> (last accessed: 
20/01/2008). 
Schweizer, Paul, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität (Frauenfeld: J. Hubers Verlag, 
1895). 
Scirocco, Alfonso, Garibaldi. Battaglie, amori, ideali di un cittadino del mondo (Rome; Bari: 
Laterza, 2001). 
———, Garibaldi. Citzen of the World (Princeton: Woodstock Princeton University Press, 
2007). 
Scott, Joan Wallach, "The Evidence of Experience," Critical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (1991): pp. 
773-97. 
———, "The Evidence of Experience," in Questions of Evidence. Proof, Practise, and 
Persuasion across the Disciplines, ed. Hames Chandler, Arnold Davidson and Harry 
Harootunian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 363-87. 
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, Between Men. English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 
Seiler, Jörg, "Somatische Solidarität als Moment ultramontaner Kommunikation. Die 
Inszenierung der Körperlichkeit Pius IX. in der Rottenburger Bistumszeitung," 
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte 101, no. 207 (2007): 
pp. 77-107. 
Sellin, Volker, Gewalt und Legitimität. Die europäische Monarchie im Zeitalter der 
Revolutionen (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011). 
Seriu, Naoko. "Du féminin dans le discours militaires au XVIIIe siècle," Genre et Histoire. 
Revue électronique de l'association Mnémosyne no. 1 (2007). 
http://www.genrehistoire.fr/document.php?id=103. 
Serman, William, "La noblesse dans l’armée française au XIXe siècle," in Les noblesses 
européennes au XIX siècle (Milan; Rome: Università di Milano; Ecole française de 
Rome, 1988), pp. 551-58. 
Severini, Marco, La Repubblica romana del 1849 (Venice: Marsilio, 2011). 
Siemann, Wolfram, "Polizei in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen, 
Operationsebenen, Wirkungsmöglichkeiten. Mit neuen Dokumenten," in Literatur und 
Kriminalität. Die gesellschaftliche Erfahrung von Verbrechen und Strafverfolgung als 
Gegenstand des Erzählens. Deutschland, England und Frankreich 1850-1880. 
Interdisziplinäres Kolloquium der Forschergruppe 'Sozialgeschichte der deutschen 
464 
 
Literatur 1770-1900', München 15./16. Januar 1981, ed. Jörg Schönert (Tübingen: 
Niemeyer, 1983), pp. 68-95. 
Signore, Adalberto, and Alessandro Trocino, Razza padana (Milan: Rizzoli, 2008). 
Sikora, Michael, "Das 18. Jahrhundert. Zeit der Deserteure," in Armeen und ihre Deserteure. 
Vernachlässigte Kapitel einer Militärgeschichte der Neuzeit, ed. Ulrich Bröckling and 
Michael Sikora (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), pp. 86-111. 
———, Disziplin und Desertion. Strukturprobleme militärischer Organisation im 18. 
Jahrhundert (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996). 
———, "Söldner. Historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus," Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 29, no. 2 (2003): pp. 210-39. 
Singer, J. David, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of 
States, 1816-198," International Interactions 14 (1987): pp. 115-32. 
Smith, Greg, "Reconsidering gender advertisements. Performativity, framing and display," in 
The contemporary Goffman, ed. Michael Hviid Jacobsen (Milton Park; New York: 
Routledge, 2010), pp. 165-84. 
Soldani, Simonetta, "Il Risorgimento delle donne," in Alberto Mario Banti, and Paul 
Ginsborg, eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 
183-224. 
Sorba, Carlotta, "Il 1848 e la melodrammatizzazione della politica," in Alberto Mario Banti, 
and Paul Ginsborg, eds., Il Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 
2007), pp. 481-508. 
———, Teatri. L’Italia del melodrama nell’età del Risorgimento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001). 
Spagnoletti, Angelantonio, Storia del Regno delle Due Sicilie (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997). 
Sperber, Jonathan, Popular Catholicism in nineteenth-century Germany (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
Speth, Rudolf, "Nation und Emotion. Von der vorgestellten zur emotional erfahrenen 
Gemeinschaft," in Masse-Macht-Emotionen. Zu einer politischen Soziologie der 
Emotionen, ed. Ansgar Klein and Frank Nullmeier (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
1999), pp. 287-307. 
Spiegel, Gabrielle M., ed. Practicing History. New Directions in Historical Writing after the 
Linguistic Turn (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
Stambolis, Barbara, "Nationalisierung trotz Ultramontanisierung oder: 'Alles für Deutschland. 
Deutschland aber für Christus'. Mentalitätsleitende Wertorientierung deutscher 
Katholiken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," Historische Zeitschrift 269 (2009): pp. 57-97. 
465 
 
Stamm, Ulrike, "Oriental sexuality and its uses in nineteenth-century travelogues," in 
Deploying orientalism in culture and history. From Germany to central and eastern 
Europe, ed. James Hodkinson, John Walker, Shaswati Mazumdar and Johannes 
Feichtinger (2013), pp. 228-41. 
Stearns, Peter, and Carol Z. Stearns, "Emotionology. Clarifying the history of emotion and 
emotional standards," American Historical Review 90, no. 4 (1985): pp. 813-36. 
Storrs, Christopher, and H. M. Scott, "The Military Revolution and the European nobility," 
War in History 3, no. 1 (1996): pp. 1-41. 
Tacke, Charlotte, Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und 
Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995). 
———, "'Es kommt also darauf an, den Kurzschluß von der Begriffssprache auf die 
politische Geschichte zu vermeiden.' 'Adel' und 'Adeligkeit' in der modernen 
Gesellschaft," Neue Politische Literatur 55 (2007): pp. 91-123. 
Teja, Angela, and Marco Impiglia, "Italy," in James Riordan and Arnd Krüger, eds., 
European cultures in sports. Examining the nations and regions (Bristol et al. : 
Intellect, 2003), pp. 139-59. 
Tempo, Giuseppe, "Solidarietà italo-ungherese," Rassegna storica del Risorgimento 22 
(1935): pp. 110-13. 
Theweleit, Klaus, Männerphantasien, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Roter Stern, 
1977). 
Thiesse, Anne-Marie, La création des identités nationales. Europe XVIIIe-XXe siècle (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1999). 
Thomson, Janice E., Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns. State-building and 
Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994). 
Torpey, John, The invention of the passport. Surveillance, citizenship and the state 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
Tosti, Amedeo, "La campagna del 1849," in Il Generale Giuseppe Garibaldi, ed. Ufficio 
Storico dell'Esercito (s. l.: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito - Ufficio Storico, 2007), pp. 
75-118. 
Trani, Silvia, "Die militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsämter der italienischen Streitkräfte," 
Archivalische Zeitschrift 89 (2007): pp. 241-73. 
———, "Gli archivi degli uffici storici e dei musei delle Forze armate. Appunti per una 
discussione," Le carte e la storia 12, no. 1 (2004): pp. 40-47. 
466 
 
Trapp, Wolfgang, Kleines Handbuch der Münzkunde und des Geldwesens in Deutschland 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999). 
Trevelyan, George Macaulay, Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic (London et al.: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1912). 
———, Garibaldi and the making of Italy (New York; Bombay; Calcutta: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1911). 
———, Garibaldi and the Thousand (May, 1860) (London et al.: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1916). 
Valsecchi, Franco, "Marie Sophie. Königin von Neapel," Zeitschrift für bayerische 
Landesgeschichte 44, no. 1 (1981): pp. 381-96. 
Varouxakis, Georgios, "'Patriotism', 'Cosmopolitanism' and 'Humanity' in Victorian Political 
Thought," European Journal of Political Theory 5 (2006): pp. 100-18. 
Vázquez, Josefina Zoraida, "Soldados alemanes en las huestes santanistas," Jahrbuch für 
Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 25 (1998): pp. 415-
36. 
Vernayre, Sylvain, La gloire de l'aventure. Genèse d'une mystique moderne (Paris: Aubier, 
2002). 
Viaene, Vincent, "The Roman Question. Catholic Mobilisation and Papal Diplomacy during 
the Pontificate of Pius IX (1846-1878)," in The Black International. L'internationale 
noir. The Holy See and militant catholicism in Europe 1870-1878, ed. Emiel Lamberts 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), pp. 135-77. 
Vico, Pietro, "Diritto penale militare," in Enciclopedia del diritto penale italiano, ed. Enrico 
Pessina, vol. 11 (Milan: Società editrice libraria, 1908), pp. 1-406. 
Vigevano, Attilio, La compagnia estera garibaldina nella campagna del 1860. Estratti dai 
fascicoli de 'La nuova rivista della fanteria' (Rome: Stamperia Reale D. Ripamonti, 
1914). 
———, La fine dell'esercito pontificio. Con 27 illustrazioni e tavole a colori e 7 carte e piani 
topografici (Rome: Stabilmento poligrafico per l'amministrazione della guerra, 1920). 
———, Legione ungherese in Italia (1859-1867) (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1924). 
Vogel, Jakob, Nationen im Gleichschritt. Der Kult der 'Nation in Waffen' in Deutschland und 
Frankreich 1871-1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997). 
Waldmann, Peter, "Civil Wars," in The International Handbook of Violence Research, ed. 
Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic, 
2003), pp. 291-308. 
467 
 
Weber, Christoph, "La corte di Roma nell'Ottocento," in La corte nella cultura e nella 
storiografia. Immagini e posizioni tra Otto- e Novecento, ed. Cesare Mozzareli and 
Giuseppe Olmi (Rome Bulzoni 1983), pp. 167-204. 
———, "Papsttum und Adel im 19. Jahrhundert," in Les noblesses européennes au XIX siècle 
(Milan; Rome: Università di Milano; Ecole française de Rome, 1988), pp. 607-57. 
Weber, Wolfgang, "Historische Methode," in Dieter Nohlen, and Rainer-Olaf Schultze, eds., 
Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), pp. 321-
24. 
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Von der deutschen Doppelrevolution 
bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges 1849-1914 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2006). 
———, Nationalismus. Geschichte - Formen - Folgen (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001). 
Weibel, Andrea, "Hoffstetter, Gustav von," in Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, ed. Marco 
Jorio, 13 vols., vol. 6 (Basle: Schwabe, 2007). 
Weichlein, Siegfried, Nationalbewegungen und Nationalismus in Europa (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006). 
Werner, Michael, and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Penser l'histoire croisée. Entre empire et 
réflexivité," Annales HSS 58 (2003): pp. 7-36. 
Wette, Wolfram, "Militärgeschichte zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik," in Was ist 
Militärgeschichte?, ed. Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann (Paderborn et al.: 
Schöningh, 2000), pp. 49-71. 
———, Militarismus in Deutschland. Geschichte einer kriegerischen Kultur (Darmstadt: 
Primus, 2008). 
Wildt, Klemens, Auswanderer und Emigranten in der Geschichte der Leibesübungen 
(Schorndorf near Stuttgart: Karl Hoffmann, 1964). 
Wilson, Peter H., "Defining military culture," Journal of Military History 72, no. 1 (2008): 
pp. 11-41. 
———, "The politics of military recruitment in eighteenth century Germany," English 
Historical Review 117, no. 472 (2002): pp. 536-68. 
Winkel, Carmen, Im Netz des Königs. Netzwerke und Patronage in der preußischen Armee 
1713-1786 (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh 2013). 
Winkle, Ralph, "Für eine Symbolgeschichte soldatischer Orden und Ehrenzeichen," in Die 
Erfahrung des Krieges. Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen 
Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst Carl 
(Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2001), pp. 195-214. 
468 
 
Wirth, Uwe, "Der Performanzbegriff im Spannungsfeld zwischen Illokution, Iteration und 
Indexikalität," in Performanz. Zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaften, 
ed. Uwe Wirth (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), pp. 9-60. 
———, ed. Performanz. Zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaften (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002). 
Wiwjorra, Ingo, "Germanenmythos und Vorgeschichtsforschung im 19. Jahrhundert," in 
Religion und Nation. Nation und Religion. Beiträge zu einer unbewältigten 
Geschichte, ed. Michael Geyer and Hartmut Lehmann (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), 
pp. 367-85. 
Wymann, Eduard, "Die letzten schweizerischen und deutschen Offiziere der päpstlichen 
Armee," Zeitschrift für schweizerische Kirchengeschichte / Revue d’histoire 
ecclésiastique Suisse 14 (1920): pp. 140-44. 
Zaal, Wim, De vuist van de paus. De Nederlandse zouaven en het einde van de Kerkelijke 
Staat 1860-1870 (Nieuwegein: Aspekt, 1996). 
Zamoyski, Adam, 1812. Napoleon's Fatal March on Moscow (London: Harper Perennial, 
2005). 
Ziekow, Jan, Über Freizügigkeit und Aufenthalt. Paradigmatische Überlegungen zum 
grundrechtlichen Freiheitsschutz in historischer und verfassungsrechtlicher 
Perspektive (Tübingen: Mohr, 1997). 
Ziino, Bart, "A kind of round trip. Australian soldiers and the tourist analogy," War and 










APPENDIX 1 – Numbers on Italian and European armies and armed groups and lists of 


































A1.1 Total number of soldiers in Italian and other European armies in the nineteenth 
century 
Table A1.1 Total number of soldiers - Papal Army, 1848-1870 
Year Number Source 
1848 13,000 Correlates-of-War. 
1859 11,000 Correlates-of-War. 
1860 19,000 Correlates-of-War. 
1848 16,020 Dalla Torre, "Materiali”. 
1859 15,305 Dalla Torre, "Materiali”. 
1860 23,342 Dalla Torre, "Materiali”. 
1867 14,000 Vigevano, La fine. 
1870 14,000 Vigevano, La fine. 
1859 16,864 Torre, “Relazione”. 
1860 22,820 Torre, “Relazione”. 
1853 12,828 Killmeyer, p. 239. 
 
Table A1.2 Total number of soldiers - Bourbon Army, 1849-1860 
Year Number Source 
1849 46,000 Correlates-of-War. 
1859 93,000 Correlates-of-War. 
1860 92,000 Correlates-of-War. 
1859 92,436 “Neap. Armee,” 29. 
1851 48,882 Gotha 1852, p. 361. 
1859 88,162 Torre, Relazione, p, 271. 
1860 99,432 Torre, Relazione, p. 275. 
1857 69,160 Killmeyer, 
Militärgeographie, p. 243. 
 
Table A1.3 Total number of soldiers - Invasion of Savoy 1834 






Table A1.4 Total number of soldiers - Roman Republic 
1849 19,000 Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia 
III, p. 444. 
1849 – “regular” 12,000 Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia, 
III, p. 444. 
1849 – “volunteers”  8,000 Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia, 
III, p. 444. 
Garibaldi Legion – 
21.12.1848 
482 Loevinson, II, p. 32-33. 
 
Table A1.5 Total number of soldiers - State of Sicily 1848-1849 
March 1848 – Messina 4,000 Pieri, Storia militare, p. 491. 
 
1 September 1848 – Messina 
- “regulars” 
2,500  Pieri, Storia militare, p. 500. 
1 September 1848 – Messina 
- “irregulars” 
5,500 Pieri, Storia militare, p. 500. 
1 September 1848 – Messina 
– total 
8,000 Pieri, Storia militare, p. 500. 
Palermo – September 1848 3,000 Pieri, Storia militare, p. 505. 
Sicilian Army – “regulars” – 
September 1848 
4,300 Pieri, Storia militare, p. 520. 
Sicilian Army – “regulars” – 
at the end of 1848 
8,000 Pieri, Storia militare, p. 521. 
Sicilian Army – estimate of 
all troops at the end of 1848 
(national guard and other 
corps included) 
15,000 Pieri, Storia militare, p. 525 




Table A1.6 Total number of soldiers - garibaldini 1859 
Cacciatori delle Alpi 3,200 Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia 
IV, p. 318. 
“Hungarian Legion” 3,200 Isastia in Albònico, p. 173. 
 
Cacciatori delle Alpi + 
Cacciatori degli Appennini 
6,700 Isastia in Isnenghi, p. 174. 
 
Table A1.7 Total number of soldiers - Southern Army 1860 
Southern Army 52,839 Torre, Relazione, p. 294. 
volunteers 21,000  
First “Thousand” 1,089 Miani-Calabrese, 
Lineamenti, p. 562. 
Later volunteers 20,000 Riall, Hero, p. 216. 
Hungarian Legion 218-448 Vigevano, Legione 
ungherese, p. 79. 
 
Table A1.8 Total number of soldiers - garibaldini 1862 
1862 ca. 5,000 Cecchinato, Camicie rosse, 
p. 73. 
 
Table A1.9 Total number of soldiers - garibaldini 1866 
“volunteers” commanded by 
Garibaldi 
40,000 Isastia in Isnenghi, p. 178. 
Table A1.10 Total number of soldiers - garibaldini 1867 





Table A1.11 Strength of European armies 1848 
Country Year Total strength Source 
Russia 1848 526,000 Correlates-of-War 
Austria-Hungary 1848 409,000 Correlates-of-War 
France 1848 387,000 Correlates-of-War 
United Kingdom 1848 208,000 Correlates-of-War 
Prussia 1848 135,000 Correlates-of-War 
Ottoman Empire 1848 135,000 Correlates-of-War 
Spain 1848 120,000 Correlates-of-War 
Piedmont 1848 70,000 Correlates-of-War 
Bavaria 1848 58,000 Correlates-of-War 
Two Sicilies 1848 49,000 Correlates-of-War 
Belgium 1848 33,000 Correlates-of-War 
Netherlands 1848 32,000 Correlates-of-War 
Hannover 1848 22,000 Correlates-of-War 
Saxony 1848 16,000 Correlates-of-War 
Papal States 1848 13,000 Correlates-of-War 
Württemberg 1848 8,000 Correlates-of-War 
Baden 1848 7,000 Correlates-of-War 
Tuscany 1848 6,000 Correlates-of-War 




Table A1.12 Strength of European armies 1859 
Country Year Total strength Source 
Russia 1859 850,000 Correlates-of-War 
France 1859 465,000 Correlates-of-War 
Austria-Hungary 1859 355,000 Correlates-of-War 
United Kingdom 1859 315,000 Correlates-of-War 
Ottoman Empire 1859 160,000 Correlates-of-War 
Prussia 1859 153,000 Correlates-of-War 
Spain 1859 124,000 Correlates-of-War 
Bavaria 1859 104,000 Correlates-of-War 
Two Sicilies 1859 93,000 Correlates-of-War 
Piedmont 1859 53,000 Correlates-of-War 
Belgium 1859 40,000 Correlates-of-War 
Netherlands 1859 38,000 Correlates-of-War 
Saxony 1859 27,000 Correlates-of-War 
Tuscany 1859 18,000 Correlates-of-War 
Papal States  1859 11,000 Correlates-of-War 
Württemberg 1859 10,000 Correlates-of-War 
Baden 1859 8,000 Correlates-of-War 
Modena 1859 5,000 Correlates-of-War 







Table A1.13 Strength of European armies 1870 
Country Year Total strength Source 
Russia 1870 738,000 Correlates-of-War 
France 1870 452,000 Correlates-of-War 
Germany 1870 319,000 Correlates-of-War 
United Kingdom 1870 257,000 Correlates-of-War 
Austria-Hungary 1870 252,000 Correlates-of-War 
Italy 1870 174,000 Correlates-of-War 
Ottoman Empire 1870 153,000 Correlates-of-War 
Spain 1870 124,000 Correlates-of-War 
Belgium 1870 40,000 Correlates-of-War 
Netherlands 1870 39,000 Correlates-of-War 




A1.2 Number of officers and their percentage of the total army of several Italian armies 
and armed groups 
Table A1.14 Number of officers and their percentage - Kingdom of Sardinia 

































Table A1.15 Number of officers and their percentage - Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 

































1860 26,667 897 3.4% Delli Franci, 
Cronica, pp. 328-
329. 
Table A1.16 Number of officers and their percentage - Papal Army  















Papal 20/09/1870 12,976 485 3.7% Vigevano, La 
fine, p. 485. 
                                                 
1507
 Only in the three main branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery).  
1508
 Only in the three main branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery). 
481 
 
Table A1.17 Number of officers and their percentage - Sicilian Army 1848 








Sicilian Army  end of 1848   ca. 9%
1509
 Pieri, Storia 
militare, p. 
526. 
Table A1.18 Number of officers and their percentage - Roman Republic 1848-49 




































 ? 4.5% Loevinson, 
Garibaldi e 
la sua 
legione I, p. 
160; II, pp. 
48-49. 
                                                 
1509
 Pieri notes as well that according to the plans, the ratio should have been smaller: 3 officers to 10 soldiers, 
Pieri, Storia militare del Risorgimento, p. 526. 
1510
 This included the corps of the lancers (lancieri), a type of cavalryman. 
1511
 This included the corps of the lancers (lancieri). 
1512
 Loevinson writes that these numbers were the result of the re-organization of the legion on the part of the 
Roman government; this re-organization also led to the reduction of officers, which were now similar to many 
other armies (around 4 to 5%). 
1513
 Loevinson does not provide numbers on the officers for this period; hence, it is only possible to assume and 
insert a number from the last statistical data available. 
482 
 
Table A1.19 Number of officers and their percentage - Southern Army 1860 













Table A1.20 Number of officers and their percentage - Cacciatori del tevere – Luigi Masi 













                                                 
1514
 That the percentage of officers in the Garibaldian troops was much higher than in the “regular armies” is an 
acknowledged fact in many studies. 
483 
 
Table A1.21 Number of officers and their percentage - Foreign corps of the Papal Army 














Papal –  
Papal 
Zouaves 









































                                                 
1515
 The entries in the registers of the common soldiers of the regiment between 1861 and 1870 exceed 10,000 
entries, but when re-engagements and annulations are excluded – according to Jean Guenel – that number lies at 
about 9,000. Guénel, Dernière guerre du pape, p. 40. 
1516
 This number holds if one accepts a similar ratio of re-engagements. 
1517
 Elio Lodolini, “I volontari del Canada nell’esercito pontificio,” Rassegna storica del Risorgimento 56 





Table A1.22 Number of officers and their percentage - Other European armies 





Baden 1849 9,000 (COW)
1518
 368 (Lutz) 4.1% COW, Lutz, 99. 
Baden 1860 8,000 (COW) 421 (Lutz) 5.3% COW, Lutz, 99. 
Baden  1871
1519
 14,000 (COW) 478 (Lutz) 3.4% COW, Lutz, 99. 
Bavaria  1849 58,000 2,033 
(Gahlen) 
3.5% COW, Gahlen, 
604. 




1896 305,000 (COW) 15,580 
(Deák) 




1906 300,512 14,471 5.3% Löbell 1906. 
Germany ca. 
1874 
401,660 (Wehler) 17,000 
(Wehler) 
4.0% Wehler, III, p. 875. 
France 
(according to 
the budget of 
1906) 








1906 288,788 12,513 4.3% Löbell 1906, 93. 
Italy 1906 235,658 10,959 4.4% Löbell 1906, 111. 
USA – 
infantry 
1906 68,556 3,884 5.7% Löbell 1906, 247. 
Ottoman 
Empire 
1906 286,908 24,548 8.6% Löbell 1906, 239. 
 
                                                 
1518
 Correlates-of-War-Project (“COW”, University of Michigan; University of California, Davis, since 1963), 
subset “National Material Capacities”. The numbers given here are the values given in the subset for the variable 
“military personal”. The definition for this variable in the COW-project is the following: “Military personnel are 
defined as troops under the command of the national government, intended for use against foreign adversaries, 
and held ready for combat as of January 1 of the referent year. […]. On occasion, however, there are instances 
where there are rapid changes in troop strength, such as mobilizations for conflicts and wars. Short-term 
variations in strength are not reflected in the project's data unless the changes remained in effect until the 
following January 1.” Moreover, “reserve” and “irregular” forces are not comprised in the COW calculations 
either. In sum, the numbers come very close to the usual army strengths “in peacetime”. See for the definitions 
and sources of COW the pdf “Correlates of War Project. National Material Capabilities. Data Documentation, 
Version 4.0, Last update June 2010”, online 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/NMC_Codebook_v4_0.pdf (last accessed: 
12./11/2013). 
1519





Table A1.23 Number of officers and their percentage - Militia and part-time reserve corps  
 


































A1.3 Numbers on the percentage of officers and generals from the nobility in some 
European armies of the nineteenth century 
Table A1.24 Noble and bourgeois officers in European armies in the nineteenth century 
Army Year Percentage of noble 
officers 
Source 
Prussia 1817 55.1% Demeter, p. 15. 
Prussia 1860 65% Demeter, p. 28. 
Bavaria 1815 31.9% Gahlen, p. 604. 
Bavaria 1846 43.1% Gahlen, p. 604. 
Bavaria 1860 33.4% Gahlen, p. 604. 
Baden 1815 29.4% Lutz, p. 99. 
Baden 1846 46.7% Lutz, p. 99. 
Baden 1860 30.7% Lutz p. 99 
Saxony 1828 30% Matzerath, p.295. 
Saxony 1847 20% Matzerath, p. 295. 
Saxony 1865/66 37% Matzerath, p. 265. 
Great Britain  1830 21% aristocracy 
32% landed gentry 
Razzell, p. 253. 
 
Great Britain 1875 18% aristocracy 
32% landed gentry 
Razzell, p. 253. 
 
Denmark 1814 ca. 22% Lind, p. 229. 
Denmark 1847 ca. 23% Lind, p. 229. 
Denmark 1864 ca. 20% Lind, p. 229. 
France 1789 80% Bodinier, p. 297. 
France 1792/93 5% Bodinier, p. 297. 
Austria 1870 ca. 20% Deak, p. 262. 
Piedmont 1820s 66% of cadets Del Negro, pp. 63-
64. 
Piedmont 1850s 33% of cadets Del Negro, p. 63-64. 




Table A1.25 Noble and bourgeois generals in European armies in the nineteenth century 




























Italy 1863   39,7%  Bertinaria, 
85. 
Italy 1872   35,4%  Bertinaria, 
85. 













A1.4 German Officers in the Papal Army 
Table A1.26 German officers in the foreign corps of the Papal Army 



















ca. 150  






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A1.6 Ranks and strength of corps in the infantry of the Italian armed groups 
Table A1.31 - Ranks in the Infantry of Italian armed groups 
Generale 




(colonel, Oberst, colonel) 
Officer 
Maggiore 
(major, Major, major) 
Officer 
Capitano 
(captain, Hauptmann, capitaine)  
Officer 
(primo) Tenente 









(first sergeant, Sergeant/Feldwebel, sergent [-chef]) – non-commissioned officer / “Unteroffizier” / 
“sottuffiziale” / “bass’uffiziale” 
 
Secondo sergente 
(second sergeant, Sergeant/Feldwebel, sergent [-chef]) – non-commissioned officer / “Unteroffizier” 
/ “sottuffiziale” / “bass’uffiziale” 
Caporale 
(corporal, Korporal, caporal) – non-commissioned officer / “Unteroffizier” / “sottuffizialie” / 
“bass’uffiziale” 
(Officers in grey) 
  499 
 
Table A1.32 - Corps, number of people and commanders in the regular army of the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (around 1859)
1543
 
Denomination of corps Number of people Commander 
Divisione (division, Division, 
division) 
ca. 6,500 Maresciallo di campo (field 
marshall,Feldmarschall, 
maréchal du camp) - Officer 
Reggimento (regiment, 
Regiment, Régiment) or 
brigata (brigade, Brigade, 
brigade) 
842 (special branches) to 
2,337 (infantry) to 2,526 
(special branches) 
Generale (general, General, 
général) or  
Colonnello (colonel, Oberst, 
colonel) – Officer 
Battaglione (battalion, 
Bataillon, Bataillon) 
900 (special branches) to 
1,329  
Maggiore (major, Major, 





Batteria (battery, Batterie, 
batterie) 
140 (special branches) to 160 
(infantry) to 200 (special 
branches) 
Capitano (captain, 
Hauptmann, capitaine) – 
Officer 
Plotone (platoon, Peloton, 
peloton) 
½ company = ca. 80 Tenente ([second] lieutenant, 
Leutnant, lieutenant) - 
Officer 
Sezione (section, Abteilung, 
section) 
½ platoon = ca. 40  Secondo sergente (second 
sergeant, 
Sergeant/Feldwebel, sergent 
[-chef]) – non-commissioned 
officer / “Unteroffizier” / 
“sottuffiziale” / 
“bass’uffiziale” 
Squadra ½ section = ca. 20  Caporale (corporal, Korporal, 
caporal) – non-commissioned 
officer / “Unteroffizier” / 
“sottuffizialie” / 
“bass’uffiziale” 
(Officers in grey) 
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 This is my own elaboration based on the data from: Almanach de Gotha 1860, p. 435; 




Table A1.33 - Corps, number of people and commanders in the regular army of the Papal 
States (around 1859) 
Denomination of corps Number of people Commander 
Reggimento (regiment, 
Regiment, Régiment) 
ca. 3,000 Colonnello (colonel, Oberst, 
colonel) – Officer 
Battaglione (battalion, 
Bataillon, Bataillon) 
ca. 1,000 Maggiore (major, Major, 





Batteria (battery, Batterie, 
batterie) 
140  Capitano (captain, 
Hauptmann, capitaine) – 
Officer 
Plotone (platoon, Peloton, 
peloton) - foreseen only in 
some corps and especially for 
training new recruits for war 
max. 140 Tenente ([second] lieutenant, 
Leutnant, lieutenant) or 
secondo tenente (second 
lieutenant, Leutnant, 
lieutenant)- Officer 
Sezione (section, Abteilung, 
section) 
ca. 10 (with only 
administrative functions) 
Uffiziale di abbigliamento 
nel grado di tenente 
(lieutenant, Leutnant, 
lieutenant) - Officer 
(Officers in grey) 
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A2.1 Joseph Alois Bach – Papal Army 
Joseph Alois Nikolaus Bach was born in 1838 in Rülzheim, in the part of the Palatinate that 
belonged at the time to Bavaria (Rheinpfalz). His father, born in Montbronn in Lorraine 
supposedly to a poor family: The father’s father died early, and his father’s mother was left to 
provide for her 5 – or 6, this remains unclear – children. The family, it seems, was very 
devoted to Catholicism: Jakob Knauber wrote in 1935 that it was intended that Bach's father 
become a priest, because he was sent to study at the minor seminary of Metz 
(“Knabenseminar” or “Kleines bischöfliches Seminar”). In the end, however, he did not 
become a priest but instead became a secretary in governmental service and eventually a tax 
collector in Klingenmünster; he married Bach’s mother, the daughter of an innkeeper, and 
settled with her in Zweibrücken; Joseph Alois was one of their seven children; one of Bach’s 
brothers did go on to become a priest and head of a Catholic orphanage. Joseph Alois was 
born in 1838, and when he reached school age, he was sent first to primary school and then to 
grammar school in Speyer, where he obtained his Abitur (university-entrance diploma). He 
continued with his studies and went to the university where he studied chemistry in Gießen. 
Here, he was a member of the student fraternity “Teutonia” (a duelling fraternity), where he 
learned the art of fencing. But Bach never finished his studies because his father called him 
back to Rülzheim to help him in his office. Shortly thereafter he left for Munich. It was clear 
that already here in the Bavarian capital he had decided to enter the Papal Army, insofar as he 
asked for and was granted permission to enlist in the Papal Army by the Bavarian 
government.
1544
 Upon his arrival in Rome, he was assigned (on 26 march 1860 with the 
matriculation number 1109) to the corps of the “Foreign Carabineers” (“carabinieri 
esteri”)
1545
, where he is registered as a furir (“forriere”), and therefore, according to the 
traditional offices, was responsible for logistics; this was one of the higher ranks of the non-
commissioned officers.
1546
 Just several months later, in June 1860, he was promoted to 
caporal and then to sergeant furir in October of that same year. Just one month later, on 16
 
November 1860, Bach was transferred to the Papal Zouaves but apparently did not keep his 
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 Carl Victor, Lexikon Pfälzer Persönlichkeiten (Edenkoben: Hennig, 1995), p. 169. 
1545
 Less than one year later, Bach was transferred to the Papal Zouaves; it is of note that his former service in 
the Foreign Carabineers goes unmentioned in the biography written by Knauber and also in the biographical 
reference works. This is most probably because the Zouaves were considered to be more prestigious than the 
other corps (numerous publications contributed to the “myth of the Papal Zouaves”, see for this p. 268) including 
the Foreign Carabineers.  
1546




previous rank, because it is noted in the records that he was promoted to corporal in the 
Zouaves only in 1863, to sergeant-furir in 1865, and then sergeant-major in April 1867. 
Image A2.1: Photograph of Bach in his Zouave uniform  
 
Source: Jakob Knauber, Der päpstliche Offizier Joseph Alois Bach, (1838-1912) aus Rülzheim, Pfalz 




Some months after he had obtained the rank of sergeant-major, on 19 October 1867, Bach was 
appointed officer with the (first) rank of second lieutenant. Bach was quite deployed (13 
October 1867) to fight in the battle of Montelibretti, some 30 kilometres from Rome; this was 
one of the first battles against the Garibaldians in their “Agro Romano Campaign” for the 
“liberation of Rome”. Bach continued to rise in the ranks of the Papal Army and was already 
appointed lieutenant by the end of November 1867. As “repayment” for his commitment to 
the papal cause – Bach was present and fought in the front lines of battles that broke out in 
1860, 1867 and 1870 – papal medals were conferred upon him (i.e. the medals of 
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 I am grateful to Joachim Specht for having sent me images of Knauber’s book. 
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Castelfidardo in 1860; Mentana in 1867). In 1871, Bach left the Papal Army and returned to 
Rülzheim in the Rhenish Palatinate together with his wife Emma Glanzmann who was 
originally from Baden; Bach had married Glanzmann in 1868 in Rome and had two children 
with her there. After his return, Bach became, like his father, a tax collector in Metz, and – 
according to the available sources – he became active in many Catholic circles and even 
founded the church choir of his parish. He is also said to have been involved in a duel in 
Metz: “When during an assembly at Metz a man allowed himself to express an improper 
remark about the Pope, the former Papal Zouave officer [Bach] approached this man and 
challenged him to a duel, so strong and determined were the feelings of this chivalrous man 
for the Pope and for whom he did not accept any denigration for whatever reason. The 
intervention of the Bishop of Metz was necessary to settle the cause in an amicable and 
orderly manner.”
1548
 The episode demonstrates a loyalty that may be seen as a typical return 
gift in an asymmetrical gift exchange: Bach demonstrated his continued loyalty to the Pope 
even after his term of service in the Papal Army had ended, and hence gave a gift in exchange 
for having received the papal medals and crosses.
1549
 After the turn of the century
1550
, Bach 
was granted the second class (“Commendatore”) of the equestrian order of Pius IX; this 
second class of the order comprised personal ennoblement ( hereditary nobility was instead 
reserved for the first class of the order), and hence Bach became a papal nobleman. For his 
work in the administration of Alsace-Lorraine he was also granted the Prussian Order of the 
Red Eagle. Bach died in Montigny near Metz in 1912, and according to a memoir written in 
1935, “the hero of Montelibretti” was buried together with the “honorary sword” that his 
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 “Als in einer Versammlung zu Metz ein Herr sich eine unangebrachte Bemerkung gegen den Papst erlaubte, 
trat der ehemalige Zuavenleutnant an ihn heran und forderte ihn zum Zweikampf. So streng und entschieden 
fühlte der ritterliche Mann für den Heiligen Vater und duldete um keinen Preis eine Verunglimpfung desselben. 
Es bedurfte der Vermittlung des Bischofs von Metz, um die Sache in Güte und ordnungsgemäßer Weise 
beizulegen.“ Jakob Knauber, Der päpstliche Offizier Joseph Alois Bach, (1838-1912) aus Rülzheim, Pfalz 
(Landau-Queichheim: s. d. [1935]), p. 24. 
1549
 In the previous century, this gift exchange between ennobled bourgeois officers and the Prussian King led to 
the formulas of courtesy, humbleness and loyalty that were used in the letters of the officers to the king, see for 
this Carmen Winkel, Im Netz des Königs, p.107. 
1550
 The Bavarian permission granting Bach the right to wear the cross of the order dates from 23 February 1906, 
see Finanz-Ministerialblatt für das Königreich Bayern, no. 4, 12 April 1906, p. 138. 
1551
 Knauber, Der päpstliche Offizier, p. 26. 
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Image A2.2: Photograph of Bach wearing different medals 
 
Photograph of Joseph Alois Bach wearing the necklace and cross of the Order of Pius IX, and – among 
others – the papal medal of Castelfidardo from 1860 (the second of those on the right). Source: Jakob 
Knauber, Der päpstliche Offizier Joseph Alois Bach (1838-1912) aus Rülzheim, Pfalz ( Landau-Queichheim 




A2.2 Xaver von Korff, genannt Schmising-Kerssenbrock – Papal Army 
Franz Xaver Graf von Korff zu Schmising-Kerssenbrock was born in 1838 in Schnellenberg 
in Sauerland in the south of Westphalia, and was educated in the Catholic colleges in Liège 
(Belgium) and Feldkirch (Austria). Korff and his two younger brothers Clemens and Adolf 
joined the Prussian Army in 1860 and became officers in the 1
st
 Infantry Guards (1. Garde-
Regiment zu Fuß). The three were the first Catholic officers in this Prussian regiment. When 
in 1863 Franz Xaver was challenged to a duel by a fellow soldier, he refused to duel because 
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 I am grateful to Joachim Specht for having sent me images of Knauber’s book. 
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of the Catholic Church’s condemnation of the practice. His father, Clemens August, however 
did not accept the proposal of the regiment’s commander to transfer Franz Xaver to another 
regiment and instead initiated a general discussion on the duel and his son's refusal to partake. 
On 12 May 1864, the three Korff brothers were dismissed from the Prussian Army. Since the 
Infantry Guards were under direct command of the king, the situation led to a military scandal 
that was closely connected, as Horst Conrad has noted, to the relatively high rank of the Korff 
brothers in such a prestigious King’s regiment and the Prussian constitutional crisis on 
military organization between 1862 and 1864.
1553
  
Korff was one of a group of seven nobles from Westphalia that joined the Papal Army 
in 1867 and 1868; the other members of the group came from the noble families Stollberg-
Racklewitz, Stollberg-Westheim, Nagel-Ittlingen, Galen and Oer. Franz Xaver von Korff left 
in December 1867 to join the Papal Zouaves, where he became corporal in June 1868 and 
then sergeant in October of the same year. In 1869, Korff was promoted to the rank of second-
lieutenant in the regiment of the Foreign Carabineers
1554
 and as such faced the fall of Rome in 
1870, after which he returned home.
1555
  
For Korff, joining the Papal Army, apart from being a way to continue a “brilliant” 
military career that had been interrupted in Prussia, was also an opportunity to visit holy sites 
and hence was another form of pilgrimage. Korff sent home many images of saints and of the 
Virgin Mary, which he collected in the various churches of the Papal States. He also 
recounted how he could be near the Pope when the latter inspected the troops, visited training 
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 Horst Conrad, Stand und Konfession, pp. 142-144. 
1554
 ASR, Ministry of Arms, soldiers’ registers vol. 1635-1645, register No. 6350. 
1555
 On Franz Xaver see Conrad, op. cit., and the obituaries: Julius Bertling, Franz Xaver Graf Korff-Schmising-
Kerßenbrock (Rietberg i. W., s.d. [1914]); N. N., “Graf Franz Xaver von Korff, genannt Schmising-
Kerssenbrock,” Die Welt 22 (1911), no. 26, pp. 512-513 and N. N., “Le Lieutenant von Korff Schmising-




Image A2.3: Photograph of Franz Xaver von Korff as an officer of the Papal Corps of the 
Foreign Carabineers 
 
(Source: Julius Bertling, Paschalis Neyer, eds., Franz Xaver Graf Korff-Schmising-Kerssenbrock. Mit e. 
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Image A2.4: Franz Xaver Graf von Korff with other German Zouaves, ca. 1868 
 
According to the handwritten information added by Franz Xaver’s son or daugther, the other two 
Zouaves are Franz Graf zu Stolberg-Borlinghausen and Franz Graf zu Stolberg-Räckelwitz. (Source: Die 
Welt 22 (1911), no. 26 (25 March 1911), p. 513, in: Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive, LWL MS, 
Personal Estates Franz Xaver von Korff, signature Bri. N. XVI-3). 
 
A2.3 Hermann Kanzler – Papal Army 
Hermann Kanzler
1556
 was born 28 March 1822 in Weingarten near Karlsruhe in the Grand 
Duchy of Baden of a non-noble family. Not long after his birth his family went to live in the 
near Bruchsal, where his father became a civil servant given the responsibility of carrying out 
the county tax assessment (“Kreissteuerperäquator”).
1557
 Hermann began his schooling in the 
bi-confessional grammar school (“Vereinigtes Großherzogliches Lyzeum” / “Gymnasium”) in 
Mannheim. Based on the information on his age and the various stages of his life, it seems 
that he most probably finished grammar school and obtained his “Abitur”, which was 
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 The best available summary of his biography is the entry “Kanzler, Hermann” in the Dizionario Biografico 
degli Italiani, vol. 62 (2004), online via http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_%28Dizionario-
Biografico%29/ (last accessed: 24.08.2013); my reconstruction adheres to this summary, but adds information 
from historical sources that were not used. 
1557
 See the notice on the conferment of a lower class of the civil medal of merit to Max Anton Kanzler in: 
Staats-Anzeiger für das Großherzogthum Baden 25 (1871), p. 233.  
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introduced as an obligatory university entrance qualification in Baden in 1823.
1558
 According 
to a Mannheim lyceum programme from 1832, Kanzler received a sound “classical” neo-
humanist education in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, in Geography and especially ancient history, 
with some excursions into the modern history of the Grand-Duchy itself.
1559
 Kanzler's 
education in French must have been quite comprehensive given that the Baden grammar 
schools at this time placed heavy emphasis on this language.
1560
 He may also have received 
his first lessons in Italian in the Baden schools: At least in 1834 some of the Lyceum’s eldest 
pupils had requested to be taught Italian and were, hence, taught one hour per week by their 
“italophile” director, who introduced the basics of Italian grammar and “the first thirty stanzas 
of Tasso’s Gerusalemme”.
1561
 After he finished his schooling, Hermann joined the Army of 
the Grand Duchy of Baden, and became an aspirant officer in the cadet-school. Based on the 
information available it seems that he entered the army not as a conscript (for which he would 
have had to have been older when he joined the army
1562
), but – in formal terms – as a 
volunteer.
1563
 He was educated at the “war school” at Karlsruhe, which was how the Baden 
cadet school was referred to in this period. Aspirant officers in order to progress had to pass 
the two-year cadet school. Here, they were required to attend both general and specifically 
military courses for 7 hours a day: German, French and Mathematics were general courses, 
and fortification, weaponry, tactics, surveying, map-making and the military regulations were 
specifically military courses.
1564
 Kanzler when he completed the “war school” met with 
success because he was – as was usual for the new graduates of the school – immediately 
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 Hans-Christof Kraus, Kultur, Bildung und Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhunder, Enzyklopädie Deutscher 
Geschichte 82 ( Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), p. 44. 
1559
 Friedrich-August Nüßlin, Programm des Großherzoglichen Lyceum in Mannheim für die Prüfung vom 9. Bis 
11. Sept. 1834 (Mannheim: Druckerei von F. Kaufmann’s Witwe, 1834), pp. 11-23. 
1560
 Kraus, Kultur, Bildung und Wissenschaft, p. 44. French was also the only regularly taught language at the 
cadet school in Karlsruhe, but even here for only four hours per week. For the history of this cadet school and the 
courses taught therein, see Bernhard von Poten, Geschichte des Militär-Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens in den 
Landen deutscher Zunge, vol. 1, „Allgemeine Übersicht. Baden, Bayern, Braunschweig, Colmar“ (Berlin: 
Hofmann & Comp., 1889), pp. 19-50. On the social background of the cadets see the – otherwise quite 
disappointing in that it systematically fails to include important details – study of Karl-Heinz Lutz, Das badische 
Offizierskorps 1840-1870/71, pp. 252-279. 
1561
 Friedrich-August Nüßlin, Programm des Großherzoglichen Lyceum in Mannheim für die Prüfung vom 9. Bis 
11. Sept. 1834 (Mannheim: Drcukerei von F. Kaufmann’s Witwe, 1834), p.20. Director Nüsslin inserted an 
Italian citation of Silvio Pellico at the beginning of his report; perhaps this “Italophilia” of the schoolmaster had 
had some influence on the young Hermann Kanzler.  
1562
 For the differences between conscripts and “volunteers” in the Baden Army, see the “Großherzoglich 
Badisches Conscriptions-Gesetz,” Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungsblatt 23 (1825), no. 10, pp. 
67-87. 
1563
 For the prerequisites and terms to enter the cadet school that were applicable in the case of Hermann 
Kanzler, see “Allgemeine Bestimmungen über die Ergänzung des Offiziers-Corps,” Großherzoglich Badisches 
Regierungsblatt 30 (1832), no. 37, pp. 332-344. For the subsequent changes of the rules regarding cadets and 
officers, see the information given in Lutz as well as in Poten, Geschichte.  
1564
 Poten, Geschichte, p. 32. 
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But already on 12
 
December 1843 he was dismissed from the Baden Army.
1566
 In the 
little literature that is available on Kanzler, there are two different reasons advanced for why 
he left the 4
th
 Baden Infantry Regiment. Both are related to Catholicism.
1567
 In the first of 
these two “stories”, Kanzler left the army together with his superior as a form of protest on 
the part of the latter against the “anticlerical attitude” of the Baden government.
1568
 In the 
second narration, instead, he left because he was challenged to a duel, which, due to his 
catholic faith, he could not accept. As in other states at this time, the status of the duel was 
also ambiguous in Baden: Although it was officially forbidden already at the beginning of the 
century, and especially for the officer corps, it nevertheless seems to have been accepted in 




After he left the Baden Army, Kanzler seems to have dedicated himself to the study of 
languages; he is even said to have spent time in Great Britain; taking into account his modest 
social origin, the child of a civil servant at the regional level, and the fact that because of the 
duel his “career” in the Baden Army had come to a halt, it is even probable that he went there 
in search of a job. His travels eventually brought him to Bologna, where he joined the Papal 
Army as a cadet of the first foreign regiment (1° Reggimento Estero) on 1 September 
1845.
1570
 Already in March 1847 he was appointed second lieutenant of the corps; it was in 
this rank that he fought against Austria in 1848, “where he was lightly wounded and where 
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 „Militär-Dienst-Nachrichten,“ Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungsblatt 39 (1841), no. 17, p. 
157. 
1566
 „Militär-Dienst-Nachrichten,“ Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungsblatt 42 (1844), no. 2, p. 9. 
1567
 That Kanzler was Catholic is noted in his first appearance in the papal soldier registers, Archivio di Stato di 
Roma, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, soldiers' registers vol. 1371 (1° Reggimento Estero, Ufficiali), no. 36. 
1568
 Julius Dorneich, Franz Josef Buß und die katholische Bewegung in Baden (Freiburg: Herder, 1979), footnote 
12 on p. 349. Based on the information available, it was not possible to identify the exact reason Kanzler left or 
was dismissed. 
1569
 On the duel in Baden and another case from 1843, which found its way into the German newspapers beyond 
Baden, see: Lutz, Das badische Offizierskorps, p. 346-349.  
1570
 ASR, Ministry of Arms, matricules vol. 1371 (1° Reggimento Estero, Ufficiali), no. 36. Most probably he 
was educated “in sito” in the foreign regiment, because the official cadets’ corps of the Papal Army was only for 
papal citizens. For more on this, see Vittorio Adami, “Notizie e documenti sugli istituti di educazione militare 
negli antichi stati italiani,” Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 1935, on the papal cadets especially see pp. 947-
949. In 1855, the cadets’ corps was reorganized and an appropriate military college (“collegio militare”) was 
instituted. This last was at least at the formal level open to non-papal subjects as well, even if they ought to be 
from “distinct family or at least of civil condition” (whatever that meant in practice) and had to personally pay at 
least 7.50 scudi per month to the cadet school. See “Regolamento del Ministero delle Armi per I cadetti, 18
th
 of 




he, as only remaining officer, commanded his company until the end of the battle.”
1571
 For 
this he was decorated, on 14
 
October 1848, with the cross of the Pontifical Equestrian Order 
of St. Gregory the Great.
1572
  
After the Pope’s flight from the revolution in Rome in November 1848 to Gaeta in the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Kanzler, who was called back to Rome but arrived too late, 
eventually reached Gaeta. He was – as many other foreign papal soldiers – dismissed on 16
 
April 1849 by the triumvirate of the Republic. One day later, the Pope in exile promoted him 
to first lieutenant, and on 21 June he became captain in the (exiled) general staff at Gaeta. 
Four days later he was declared a knight of the Pontifical Equestrian Order of St. Sylvester 
Pope and Martyr. After the return of the papal administration to Rome, he held several 
different positions in the Ministry of Arms and in leading divisions and regiments. What is 
worth noting is the fact that he was called to command so-called “indigenous” regiments – 
hence regiments mainly constituted by papal subjects, whereas until 1848 his service kept him 
strictly within the bounds of the foreign papal corps.  
In September 1860, Kanzler was involved in the repression of the revolts in the 
Marche, and one month later was promoted to the rank of general. After the fall of Ancona, he 
and his soldiers were captured by the Piedmontese Army. “Considered an Italian because the 
last command he held was over an indigenous regiment, he was not repatriated as were the 
other officers of foreign origin, and so was able to make his way back to Rome.”
1573
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 Entry “Kanzler, Hermann,” Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani 62 (2004), online via 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ (last accessed: 
24/08/2013). 
1572
 ASR, Ministry of Arms, matricules vol. 1371 (1° Reggimento Estero, Ufficiali), no. 36. 
1573
 Entry „Kanzler, Hermann,“ Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani 62 (2004), online via 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ (last accessed: 
24/08/2013). 
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Image A2.6: General Kanzler and the General Staff at Anzio, ca. 1862 
 
(Source: Paolo Della Torre, L’anno di Mentana.) 
 
On 15 October 1865, Kanzler was appointed the successor of Merode as the Commander-in-
Chief of the Papal Army and the Pro-Minister of Arms: insofar as he was an “unfailing 
worker and good organiser”, he proved capable of acting as a mediating figure “between the 
two components” of the Papal Army, “the foreign and the indigenous one. He was foreign 
[…] but he had been in the command of indigenous corps for a long time and knew well how 
the military administration functioned.”
 1574
  
Kanzler was involved in the measures taken against the “brigandage” in the Papal 
States as well as in the defence of the Papal States against the garibaldini in 1867, where he 
used the existing railroads (“the first case of tactical use of the railways in Italy”), he 
participated as well in the final battle of Mentana in the same year. In September 1870, having 
proposed an active defence to the Pope, he most likely pushed the military activities under his 
command further than requested by the Pope, who had written to him to lay down arms as 
soon as possible after the first bombings, hence surrendering only when the famous “breech” 
in the Porta Pia was opened. After 1870, Hermann Kanzler remained in the Vatican State with 
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his family and was ennobled by the Pope. Even if large portions of the Papal Army were 
dissolved after 1870, he kept his rank and position, which, however, became nearly 
insignificant. 
 
Image A2.7: Photograph: Hermann Kanzler 
 
(Source: Piero Raggi, La nona crociata: i volontari di Pio IX in difesa di Roma, 1860-1870. Seconda edizione 
accresciuta di immagini e documenti (Ravenna: Libreria Tonini, 2002), p. 64.) 
 
A2.4 Theodor Klitsche de Lagrange – pro-Bourbon campaigns 1860-1861 
Theodor Klitsche de Lagrange was born in Magdeburg, Prussia in 1797 to the morganatic 
marriage of Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia (1772-1806) and the Catholic Countess Maria 
Adelaide de Lagrange and was baptized a Protestant. He joined the Prussian volunteer forces 
to fight in the 1813-1815 wars against Napoleon, where he immediately became an officer in 
1813. During the war Klitsche was wounded near Ligny. In 1822, he converted to Catholicism 
and consequently lost the support of Frederic William II of Prussia. From 1826 to 1830 he 
was accredit of the likewise converted Duke Frederick Ferdinand of Anhalt-Köthen at the 
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Holy See. In Rome, Klitsche became a captain in the papal general staff in 1831. But it is 
clear that since 1855 he lived in Caserta and therefore it is most probably that already then he 
had joined the Bourbon Army. In September 1860, he helped to organize several columns for 
Francis II that were called the “Volunteers’ battalions brigade”
1575
, and was appositely 
nominated as a colonel for this service. A note kept regarding his biography in the Archivio 
borbone, the archival material regarding the government of Francis II in the exile in Gaeta and 
Rome, summed up why Klitsche was most likely so interesting to the Bourbon king: “A 
soldier for 48 years, an officer for 46, and a leading officer for 30 years, he was present in 
more than twenty battles […].”
1576
 
During the campaign in southern Italy of 1860, Klitsche made forceful requisitions 
that were used at times to sustain the troops and at others sent to Gaëta, a fact on which he 
was supposedly heavily criticized later on. He felt obliged to excuse himself for this issue, and 
explained – in a stamped report on the autumnal campaign – that his actions had been 
officially backed. On one specific requisition of cloth, for instance, he wrote: “I’ve been 
upbraided more than I could have imagined possible for the requisitions of cloth, which in 
exchange for royal coupons of the royal government I was forced to make. It was of the 
utmost necessity to provide the troops with winter clothes. Furthermore, I have acted strictly 
according to my orders, which for that very purpose were given to me.”
1577
 Already during his 
campaign, Klitsche constantly complained about the lack of resources in terms of weapons 
and general equipment. In his report, he made a major argument out of what he saw as 
inadequate support from Gaëta. With the resources he had at his disposal, the maximum effect 
had already been produced, Klitsche wrote in defence of his honour as a military leader: 
“Reputation is for me a holy palladium, which I intend to transmit intact to my children.”
1578
  
After having surrendered and fled to the Papal States, Klitsche continued to be 
productive as a writer: Apart from religious works on the Council of Trento and on the 
theological necessity of celibacy, he continued to publish military works as he had been doing 
since the 1840s. 
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A2.5 Gustav von Hoffstetter – Garibaldi’s Legion in Rome, 1849 
Gustav von Hoffstetter was born in 1818 in Aschaffenburg in Bavaria into a noble family 
originating from Tirol, which traditionally provided officers. His father was a major in the 
Bavarian Army, and eventually Gustav’s brothers both joined the same army too. Like his 
brother Hugo, Gustav in 1829 joined the Munich cadet school. He became an officer in 1841 
in a contingent of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, where he expressed his desire to go to Algiers; 
he was, however, not granted permission, though he was given permission by the 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen authorities to join the Swiss Sonderbund War, where he fought in 
several battles, for instance at Gislikon. In 1848, by appointment of the Prince of 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Hoffstetter was placed in command of the country’s national 
guard (Bürgerwehr). Following the suppression of the revolution in Baden by Prussian troops, 
Hoffstetter fled to Switzerland, where he unsuccessfully tried to find military employment. 
Within the context of Johann Philipp Becker’s plans to build a German-Swiss Legion for the 
South of Italy and later Rome, he offered his service to the Triumvirate of the Roman 
Republic, where he fought for instance against the Neapolitans in May 1849 and was 
integrated into Garibaldi’s General Staff, where he rapidly advanced in his military career. On 
30 June 1849, the day of the capitulation of Rome, Hoffstetter became still Chief of Staff of 
Garibaldi’s armed group, substituting the fallen Colonel Manara in organizing the retreat of 
Garibaldi’s troops to the Republic of San Marino, where they surrendered. With the help of 
the Italian sides, he managed to escape French capture by fleeing to Chiasso in Switzerland. 
In 1851, Hoffstetter obtained his citizenship in Eggenwyl, the canton of Aargau in 
Switzerland, and engaged in military education and publication, becoming the senior 
instructor in the St. Gallen canton in 1852, cantonal colonel in 1859, federal colonel in 1860, 




A2.6 Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow – Garibaldian Southern Army 1860 
Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow was born in 1821 in Brandenburg an der Havel in Prussia, and was 
the son of a Prussian Army major. He began his studies in law in Heidelberg, though never 
finished them. Between 1838 and 1840 he was scholar of the Prussian “Joined School of 
Artillery and Engineering” (Vereinigte Artillerie- und Ingenieursschule) in Charlottenburg 
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near Berlin, after which he entered the engineer corps of the Prussian Army. A “convinced, 
but iridescent democrat” in Königsberg in Prussia (today’s Kaliningrad), he began to frequent 
democratic circles and participated in the revolution that broke out in March 1848, for which 
he was brought before military courts but not sentenced. He began to advocate the 
replacement of the standing armies with the democratic concept of militias and, based on this, 
to heavily criticize the Prussian Army and especially its role in suppressing the revolution. His 
December 1848 publication on this matter resulted in charges of high treason and Lèse-
majesté being brought against him. But shortly before his definitive condemnation to more 
than 30 years of imprisonment in a fortress, he managed “an adventurous escape” from the 
fortress of Posen (today’s Poznan) and fled to Zurich in Switzerland.
1580
 His dedication to the 
revolutionary cause interrupted a potentially “brilliant officer’s career”.
1581
 
In Switzerland, he began his career as military writer – also very much for economic 
reasons – publishing on a wide array of topics in history, military history, more recent battles, 
on strategy and tactics as well as “military sciences”. Between the winter semester of 1852 
and the winter semester of 1854-55 he taught military history and military sciences at the 
University of Zurich and began to work for the Swiss General Staff. In this context of 
particular note is his publication of a manual for the service of the General Staff in campaign 
from 1855
1582
, which not only continued to be used by the Swiss General Staff until the 
1870s
1583
, but that he brought with him to southern Italy in 1860, distributing it among the 
officers. Upon his arrival on 1 July 1860 in Genoa from Zurich, after the failure of the project 
of an expedition into the Papal States, he stepped into his role as Chief of Staff of the 15
th
 
Garibaldian Division of Stefan Türr. He left southern Italy at the end of November 1860 and 
returned to Zurich.
1584
 Involved in several unrealized projects to form military corps for 
Germany and Italy in the 1860s, Rüstow continued to publish on military issues, among 
which his memoirs of the 1860 Garibaldian campaign, a more abstract work on the Italian 
wars of 1859 and 1860, and a piece on the general and not exclusively military history of Italy 
since 1860 among them.
1585
 For his service rendered in the Garibaldian campaign, Rüstow 
was nominated “knight of the Military Order of Savoy” in September 1862. Only in the late 
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1860s, does he seem to have been able to begin to move within the circles of the Swiss Army 
again, contributing first to the discussions on Swiss military organization, and secondly – after 
several unsuccessful earlier attempts – to become a Swiss colonel and member of the Federal 
General Staff as its chief of the “historical-statistical” section in 1870.
1586
 After an 
unsuccessful attempt to be appointed to the top of the Swiss Infantry or Engineers in 1874, 
Rüstow, in the winter semester of 1875-76, taught a course on the “introduction to war 
sciences” at the Polytechnic Institute (the later ETH) in Zurich; not having been appointed, as 
he wished, for the regular chair in “war sciences” there, and deeply affected by economic 
problems, Rüstow shot himself in 1878 in his home near Zurich. 
 
Image A2.8: Photograph: Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow in the Garibaldian “Red Shirt”, 1860
 
(Source: Dichtermuseum Liestal/Switzerland.) 
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A2.7 Louis-Ferdinand Fix –  Garibaldian Southern Army in 1860 
Louis-Ferdinand Fix was born in the city of Luxembourg on 3 September 1829. Shortly after 
his birth his parents moved to Arlon – today in the Belgian Province of Luxembourg. Toward 
the end of his school years, he and his brother (who became a lieutenant general in the 
Belgian army) stayed in the capital of Luxembourg to finish school. Louis Ferdinand then 
entered the Maritime Academy of Antwerp
1587
, where he attained, on 12 August 1848, the 
rank of a civil navy lieutenant. He then entered the German Navy: During the revolution, the 
National Assembly in Frankfurt on Main decided in June 1848 to form a German military 
naval force (“Reichsflotte” – Imperial Fleet), mainly to prepare for eventual naval warfare 
against Denmark in Schleswig-Holstein. Officers and soldiers were recruited from other 
European navies and merchant ships; among the latter was Louis Ferdinand Fix, who entered 
the German military navy as a “Seefähnrich” (naval fenrik).
1588
 The Reichsflotte continued on 
for some time after the restoration in 1849, but was definitively abolished in March 1852, 
when Fix, along with the other men, was dismissed from service. After this, Fix worked as a 
civil officer on merchant ships for a new Belgian company of transatlantic steamships that 
went between Antwerp and New York. During this period of his life he worked in the crews 
of the four ships that this company lent to the British Navy to transport the British troops to 
China and India, before the company was liquidated in 1859. Upon his return to Brussels, Fix 
became a member of the freemasons. He was again offered the command of a Belgian ship, 
but “he gave up the sea and went to Italy with one of his friends [...].”
1589
 Fix arrived at 
Palermo in June 1860, and he joined Garibaldi’s Southern Army as a captain of the General 
Staff, only to be transferred to the engineer corps shortly thereafter. According to a later 
biography on Fix, he was “seriously wounded on 1 October 1860 in the battle at the Volturno, 
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and after his recovery he remained in the engineer corps.”
1590
 Once the southern campaign 
came to a close, Fix entered the new Italian Army as a major in the engineer corps; in 
February 1862 he was nominated knight of the Military Order of Savoy (“Ordine militare di 
Savoia”).
1591
 Erroneously, some believed this honour had ennobled Fix,
1592
 but this Order was 
not limited to nobles nor was entry to the Order connected with an automatic (personal) 
ennoblement, as was the case with the higher order of Savoy, the “Order of Saints Maurice 
and Lazarus”
1593
, or the first two classes of the Papal Order of Pius IX (hereditary nobility for 
the “knights with the collar”, personal nobility for the “knights commanders”). Despite having 
been transferred over to the Italian Army and of having been decorated by the Italian state, 
Fix left Italy in the spring of 1862 for North America. He is recorded as a captain at the head 
of a company in the 58
th
 Ohio Infantry Regiment, and therefore on the side of the Northern 
Union from April 1862 onwards.
1594
 Once when wounded and in hospital, he made the 
acquaintance of a “young American-German” who worked as a hospital nurse and was the 
“daughter of an old Hessian captain”; this woman would go on to be his wife. Fix was 
promoted to major in September 1864 and then lieutenant-colonel for the State of Missouri in 
October of that same year. After the Civil War was over, he worked first as the director of the 
military prison of Saint-Louis (Missouri), before joining the US War Department in 
Washington, where he worked almost until he died at 63 years, in Washington in 1893; he 
was buried at the Arlington National Cemetery in the state of Virginia.
1595
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